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ABSTRACT 
 
Which historical lens and what scope can capture modernity’s complex social, political, 
economic, and epistemic permutations? Using an historical interpretive lens to explore 
contingent moments in its making, this work seeks to describe a core dynamic within modernity. 
In modernity, the assertion of freedom from rooted systems of meaning ushers in radical 
uncertainty. In response, new certainties are constructed for guiding human action, but being 
grounded upon indeterminacy these are necessarily provisional and open ended. Uncertainty thus 
grows in proportion to the expansion of freedom and the abstraction of foundations, making the 
drives to know and to control insatiable. To narrate a history of this dynamic, I frame it as a 
series of strategies for grounding upon groundlessness: surveying and mapping, enclosing and 
improving; risking and insuring. This narrative is largely set in the particular soil of British 
history, where the discourses surrounding efforts to ground property and knowledge upon new 
certainties uncovers the contingent nature of truth and legitimacy in modernity. In the Tudor 
period customary knowledge of the land was delegitimized as estate surveyors began to measure 
and represent land from the distanced perspective of geometry. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the discourse of improvement legitimized the practice of enclosure as the means of 
securing certainty of ownership in order to cultivate endless growth, while Baconian science 
pursued a parallel strategy. In the eighteenth century, risk was objectified in probability theory 
and traded in insurance and investment markets. Since the nineteenth century risk management 
has been applied to populations and has become the guarantor of security and the means of 
governing societies across the globe.  But perpetual efforts to know and contain risks have only 
generated more insecurity. I conclude that while founded upon freedom, modernity is a 
compulsion that draws us ever further from the soil of particularity. Using an historical 
interpretive approach and drawing on the histories of science, capitalism and insurance, as well 
as theories of modernity, property and risk, this project is an interdisciplinary effort to 
understand the making of key dynamics within modernity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The knowledge, guidance, and support of a great many people have contributed in no small 
measure to the completion of this work. Having been the recipient of so much wisdom and 
goodwill, I would like offer my sincerest gratitude to the following people. 
To my Supervisor, Professor Nergis Canefe, who has always inspired me with her boundless 
enthusiasm and who has shepherded me through the “radical uncertainty” that is the writing 
process with her inventive strategies, sage advice, and expertise. Most of all, for reminding me to 
approach work as play, I thank you. 
To my Committee Members: your involvement in my project has always struck me as a 
providential sign that someone up there likes me!  For her generous advice, her eye for detail and 
her contagious curiosity I heartily thank Professor Jody Berland. To Professor Brian Singer, 
whose attentive reading and thoughtful comments always reached through to the core meaning 
that I was grasping for, thank you!  
I am grateful to the many wonderful Professors at York, whose fascinating courses were the 
fertile ground in which the seeds of this dissertation were sown. Thank you, especially to 
Professor Jeanette Neeson, for “Modern British History,” to Professor John Dwyer, for “The 
Enlightenment Project,” to Professor Brady Polka, for “Modern European Thought in Light of 
the Bible,” to Professor Marlene Shore, for “Modern Cultural History,” and to Professor Douglas 
Hay, for “Western Legal History,” in which he once said something intriguing about insurance, 
and thus planted the seed of an idea. 
To SPT’s Graduate Program Coordinator, Judith Hawley, thank for so many years of cheerful 
guidance through the bureaucratic mire, and for always, always knowing the answer to my every 
question. Such certain knowledge is a rare and precious resource, as are you. 
Finally, my friends, my family and my partner have all gifted me such patience, understanding 
and encouragement throughout this process. Many thanks to Bryn and Mirka, for your advice 
and encouragement. Thank you Lori and Marsha for your kind support, and the always welcome 
reprieve of your friendship; thank you to my Mom and Dad, and to my brother Andy, for your 
steady support and love. Finally, thank you to Dan. Your forbearance, gentle reassurance and 
unwavering support allowed me the freedom to make this journey, and I could not have had a 
better companion along the way.  
 
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………......ii 
Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………….....iii 
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………..iv 
Chapter One: Introduction: The Problem of Uncertainty in Modernity……………………...............1 
My Argument……………………………………………………………………………………...2 
Defining Modernity?……………………………………………………………………………....3 
Historicity and Rootlessness: Classical Critiques of Modernity………………………………….6 
Twentieth Century Theories of Modernity………………………………………………………..9 
Literature Crucial to my Argument……………………………………………………………....15 
Interdisciplinary Methodology………………………………………………………………….. 19 
Historical Methodology………………………………………………………………………….20 
The Boundaries of this Project………………………………………………………………….. 28 
Capitalism and Modernity………………………………………………………………………..32 
Property and Modernity………………………………………………………………………….43 
Chapter Summaries……………………………………………………………………………....46 
 
Chapter Two:  Surveying and Mapping in Early Modern England……………………………....55 
The World as Object and the Future as Open……………………………………………………59 
Late Medieval Anxiety…………………………………………………………………………..63 
The Abstract Representation of the World: Vision and Quantification…………………………69 
o The Qualitative World View…………………………………………………………….70 
o The Abstract Standards of Quantitative Reality………………………………………...76 
o The Objectification of Time……………………………………………………………..78 
o The Objectification of Space…………………………………………………………….82 
o The View From Above…………………………………………………………………...88 
o The Rise of Cartesian Perspectivalism in Painting……………………………………...93 
Land and Knowledge in Sixteenth Century England…………………………………………...100 
V 
 
 
o Tudor Instability………………………………………………………………………..100 
o  Early Surveying Practices……………………………………………………………..102 
o The Advantages of Modern Surveying………………………………………………………..103 
o  Customary Knowledge of the Land…………………………………………………………..107 
o The Legitimizing Discourse of Scientific Surveying…………………………….................111 
o Moral Opposition to Surveying……………………………………………………................116 
o Defending the “Upstart Art” of Surveying………………………………………................118 
o Delegitimizing Custom………………………………………………………………...............121 
o The Discursive Power Maps...…………………………………………………………………124 
o Estate Maps………………………………………………………………………………………133 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………....138 
Chapter 3: Enclosing and Improving in England’s Transition to Modernity………………….....140 
Modernity as Boundary Breaking and Boundary Making………………………………………144 
Enclosure and Improvement in the Tudor period…………………………………………….....147 
o Early Enclosures………………………………………………………………………………...147 
Widespread Disapproval of Enclosures in the Tudor Period …………………………..151 
o The Practical Origins of the Idea of Improvement……………………………………….....158                                                
The Improvement of Knowledge………………………………………………………………..160 
o Francis Bacon’s Project……………….............................................................................160 
o Provisional Certainty and the Enclosing Logic of the Natural…………………………...166 
o Fact Determination in Early Modern Law and Science…………………………..175 
Enclosures and the Discourse of Improvement in 17th and 18th England…………………….....186 
o The Materiality of Enclosures: Hedges and Resistance………………………………186 
o The Discourse of Improvement…………………………………………………………...192 
- The Defensive Origins of Hard-selling Improvement………………………..192 
- Ideas and Events Shaping Improvement Discourse…………………............195 
- The Hartlib Circle and the Science and Spirit of Improvement…………….199 
- The Idea of Endless Expansion…………………………………………………206 
- Fertility and Abundance in Agriculture, Science and the Economy…….....207 
- The Appetite for Accumulation…………………………………………………211 
- Doubting Endless Progress: Cyclical History and Degeneration……........213 
- William Petty: Accumulating Proofs of Progress……………………………219 
- Improvement’s Other: Waste as a Potential Desert…………………………222 
- The Threat of Waste: the Horror of the Void……………………………........226 
- Contempt for Wastes and Commons…………………………………………...233 
The Eighteenth Century: Entrenching Private Property and Landscaping Nature……………...236 
o Legal and Historical Justifications of Private Property…………………………........236 
o The Law Steps in: The Parliamentary Enclosure Movement…………………………241 
o Nature Estranged and Imitated, Display/Erasure in English Landscape Gardens. 246 
VI 
 
 
o Enclosing and Accumulating Nature’s Objects: Linnaean Classification…………256 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………....267 
Chapter Four: Risk and Insurance in Eighteenth Century England…………….………...270 
Roots and Wings……………………………………………………………………………271 
What is Risk?.........................................................................................................................273 
o Risk Literature..........................................................................................................273 
o Defining Risk…………………………………………………………………........275 
o Games of Chance: Pre-modern Forerunners of Risk………………………...........278 
o What Makes Risk Modern?.......................................................................................281 
The Emergence of Probability Theory…………………………………………………….. 283 
o Real World Applications of Probability Theory…………………………………...286 
The Adventure of Investment: 1690s to 1720s……………………………………………..290 
o The Trade in Risk: a Crisis in Public Finance Resolved…………………………..290 
o Frenzied Investment: the South Seas Bubble and Critiques of Credit……………..296 
Early Insurance Schemes…………………………………………………………………...299 
Opposition to Insurance…………………………………………………………………….304 
o The Sin of Gambling in a Divinely Ordered World..................................................309 
o Gambling as a Threat to the Social Order……………………………………...….312 
How Insurance Achieved Legitimacy………………………………………………………317 
o From Faith in Providence to Trust in Abstract Systems………………….....317 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..323 
Chapter Five: Surveying and Mapping, Enclosing and Improving “The Social” in 
Victorian Britain……………………………………………………………………………....325 
Technologies for Overcoming Distance: The Census and Statistical Representation…330 
o The Census.........................................................................................................330 
o Opposition to the Census……………………………………………………...333 
o Resistance and Recognition: Public Responses to the Census………………..336 
o Statistics as a Surveying Instrument: …………………………………………342 
o The 1830’s Statistical Movement: ‘Objective’ Knowledge, Moral Reform…...348 
o Dickens’ Critique of the Statistical Societies………………………………….354 
Statistics and the State: the General Registry Office and Rational Bureaucracy………357 
Patterns in the Aggregate: The Law of Large Numbers and the Average Man………..371 
Statistical Fatalism?........................................................................................................378 
Binding and Dividing: The Constitution of the Social………………………………...383 
Developments in Nineteenth Century Insurance………………………………………395 
o Actuarialism………………………………………….........................395 
o Classifying Risks: Selecting Lives……………………........................398 
VII 
 
 
o Actuaries Professionalize, the Government Scrutinizes.......................400 
o Friendly Societies…………………………………………………….401 
o Industrial Life Insurance……………………………………………..404 
o Insurers as Investors………………………………………………….405 
The State’s Classification and Management of Risks………………………………….408 
o The New Poor Law: Containing the Risk of Pauperism………..409 
o Bentham’s Rational Calculus and Pauper Classification……...414 
o Malthus Returns: the Poor as Surplus Population or Waste…...418 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...423 
 
Chapter Six: Risk and Insurance since the late 19th Century: from ‘Social Property’ to 
‘Risk Society.’…………………………………………………………………………….........425 
  The Shift towards Socialized Insurance in the Late 19th Century………………426 
  Social Property?...................................................................................................431 
o Early 20th Century Insurance in Britain.............................................................431 
o Towards the Welfare State…………………………………………….......442 
o The Post-War Expansion of the Welfare State: A Global Story……………….449 
The Return of Insecurity: Neoliberalism……………………………………………….459 
The Insurance Industry since the Post-War Period……………………………………..466 
o Partners in Risk Management: Governments and the Insurance Industry…….467 
o Insurance and the Economy……………………………………………………471 
o Insurance and the Law…………………………………………………………474 
o Insurance as a Social Regulator……………………………………………….476 
o The Cultural Footprint of Private Insurance…………………………………..482 
- Risk Embracing……………………………………………....482 
- Risk Consciousness and the Hypermarketing of Insecurity….487 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...491 
Chapter Seven: Modernity as Compulsion: Symptoms of Unfreedom and Ideas for 
Recovery………………………………………………………………………………………..505 
Summary of The Dissertation…………………………………………………..506 
Modernity as Monster, Iron Cage, and Juggernaut…………………………….511 
Addiction to Modernity………………………………………………………...514 
Compulsion, Neurasthenia, and Doubt………………………………………....520 
VIII 
 
 
Modern Shelters from Modern Storms…………………………………………523 
o The Global Financial Crisis of 2008…………………………...524 
o Climate Change………………………………………………...533 
o The Global Refugee Crisis……………………………………...536 
 
Kicking the Habit? Practicing New Ways of Seeing and Being……………………….539 
o The Aesthetic Critique of Modernity…………………………....541 
o Contemporary Practices of Social and Aesthetic Critique…………..545 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………554 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
  
 
Chapter One 
Introduction: The Problem of Uncertainty in Modernity 
In the spring of 2014, a passenger plane flying from Kuala Lampur to Beijing went missing. 
After five years and more than US$200 million spent searching the depths of the Indian Ocean, 
nothing has been found that can explain what happened to flight MH370. While the prolonged 
media attention given to its disappearance might be explained by the 24 hour news cycle's 
unquenchable thirst for dramatic events and, less cynically, by the tragedy of 239 lives lost, it 
seemed to me also to reflect something of the larger condition of modernity.  Most of us can 
sympathize with the horror experienced by the relatives of the missing passengers. Yet, when we 
compare the attention and resources spent in searching for MH370, with what is spent in 
addressing, say, the regular and massive loss of life due to preventable water-borne diseases, the 
peculiarity of the way that we, as moderns1 contend with insecurity, uncertainty or mysterious 
misfortune is made a little more apparent. It was both the rarity of such a mystery- of something 
eluding the seemingly infinite reach of our knowledge today- and the refusal to accept the 
unexplained nature of the plane’s disappearance that struck me as particularly modern about the 
search for MH370. The idea that a planeload of people could vanish, in spite of advanced 
satellite technology, in spite of our faith in the science and abstract systems that safeguard our 
                                                          
1 I will address what I mean by “moderns” and “the condition of modernity” more fully 
below. For the moment, I will confine the definition of “moderns” to people, living in the 
condition of modernity, that is, large scale societies, founded not on tradition or a metaphysical 
system of belief but on an impersonal quest for objective truth and certainty. Because capitalism 
is a central carrier of modern values and social relations, the globalization of capitalism over the 
last half century has also globalized modernity. Even societies that continue to be founded on 
tradition are not untouched by modernity in its socio-economic arrangements. So when I say 
“we, moderns” I mean global society, not in its entirety perhaps, but generally. 
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improbable flight through the sky, strikes at the root of the problem of modernity, the lacunae at 
its core, and therefore, its greatest longing: the need for certainty, for a guarantee of security. 
  The absence of that guarantee is what gives shape and movement to modernity, what 
propels the fashioning of the projects, systems and devices in which we place our faith, and 
under which we shelter as we move through the world.  Under the condition of modernity, we 
attempt to anticipate, think up mitigating plans for, and hedge and insure against every 
contingency. These efforts betray an abhorrence of ambivalence, a hostility to mystery, a rage 
against the silence of the unexplained, which nevertheless fails to protect us from exposure to 
uncertainty.  This intolerance of and our particular exposure to uncertainty is both the root and 
the fruit of modernity’s obsessional drive to know and to control, and the subject of this 
dissertation. 
My Argument 
This work seeks to understand an essential dynamic driving modernity. I argue that in modernity, 
the assertion of freedom from rooted systems of meaning ushers in radical uncertainty. In 
response, new certainties are constructed for guiding human action, but being grounded upon 
indeterminacy, these are necessarily provisional and open ended. Uncertainty thus grows in 
proportion to the expansion of human freedom and the abstraction of foundations, making the 
twin drives to know and to control insatiable. To narrate a history of this dynamic, I frame it as a 
series of strategies for grounding upon groundlessness: surveying and mapping, enclosing and 
improving; risking and insuring. Each of these strategies is set in a particular historical moment 
of transition towards a modern way of being in the world, from the Tudor period in England to 
the globalized present. 
3 
  
 
 
Defining Modernity? 
Modernity is a slippery topic: its historical borders elude sure definition. Ask when it began and 
you might hear wildly diverging answers, stretching from the influence of the legal and political 
systems of ancient Rome, to Nietzsche’s declaration, in the late nineteenth century, that “God is 
dead.” 2 Similarly, while some, like myself, view the present time as belonging to modernity, 
others believe that modernity ended decades ago, and that ours is a post-modern period.3 The 
‘when’ of modernity depends crucially on the ‘what’ of modernity. Those who argue that the 
core feature of modernity is capitalism may draw the starting line at the changing relations of 
property and labour in sixteenth century England.4. Others have argued that modernity emerged 
with the rise of secularism, with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the expansion of 
European colonial power, or the domination of nature; each of these has its own starting point.5 
                                                          
2 José María Beneyto and Justo Corti Varela, At the Origins of Modernity: Francisco de 
Vitoria and the Discovery of International Law, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International 
Publishing 2017).  
 
3 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Vol. 10. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
 
4 Or they may see industrial production in nineteenth century England or the abstraction 
of money in thirteenth century Florence as the true start of modernity. This is because, as with 
modernity, consensus on the origins of capitalism has been elusive, because there are competing 
theories on what constitutes capitalism’s key features. I will discuss some of these theories, 
below, particularly those essential to my argument. 
 
5 For the division between nature and culture in modernity see Louis Dupré, Passage to 
Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture, (New Haven, CT; Yale 
University Press, 1995). For the role of the French Revolution in constituting modernity, see 
Fehér, Ferenc, ed. The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity 56, no. 1. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1990). I will discuss the relationship between European conquest, 
colonialism and modernity further below. 
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There are fair arguments to be made for any one of these beginnings, but I think that I am with 
the majority of scholars of modernity in contending that modernity encompasses all of these 
developments, which took place, for the most part, after the sixteenth century in Europe.  What 
matters is not pinning down a precise starting date for modernity but trying to see with greater 
clarity which of its elements have been continuous over time, and how such elements have 
shaped the way that people experience the world.  
In the process of writing this dissertation, when speaking to people outside of academia I 
was surprised to learn that many had never heard the term ‘modernity’.  They were, of course, 
familiar with the term “modern”, and I think that their general sense of what is modern- “now”, 
“recent times”, “not the ‘old school’”- is essentially correct. Most scholars identify “modernity” 
as a cluster of certain institutional, socio-economic, cultural and epistemological features and 
patterns. So, for instance, modernity is associated with increasing tendencies towards 
industrialization, urbanization, secular authority, nation states, social differentiation, instrumental 
rationality, and a scientific worldview. But the layperson’s instinct, that the modern is distinct 
from the past and its traditions, captures something crucial about its character.6  
Not only do we, in everyday language, still use ‘modern’ to distinguish ‘our times’ from 
the past, but we also use it to distinguish our way of life, now, from so-called ‘traditional’ ways 
of life. But this easy categorization of modernity as post-traditional is misleading, for modernity 
                                                          
6 In fact, this is how the term ‘modern’ has been used throughout its history. When it first 
appeared in the fifth century, as the Latin term modernus, it was used to indicate the present, 
Christian, period, as distinct from the pagan period of Roman rule. And when the word ‘modern’ 
first appeared in English in the early seventeenth century, it connoted “our age”, as distinct from 
past ages. See Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, (London: 
Verso, 1995), 9-11; and R.J. Johnston, D. Gregory, G. A  Pratt, and M. Watts, (eds.), The 
Dictionary of Human Geography, 4th ed. (Malden, MA, Blackwell, 2000), 513. 
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has become a tradition in itself. It has been a way of being in the world for centuries now and not 
only in the west.7 Knowing this, and tracing the development of that tradition, is important for 
the same reason that any historical study is important. Think of the array of problems, worries 
and even fascinations that draw our attention on any given day in today’s world: the bitter 
cultural and political divide in the United states, the rhetoric about “fake news”, the challenges of 
pluralisation and immigration in Europe, the protracted nature of the global refugee crisis, issues 
of surveillance and privacy on the internet, the looming end point threatened by global warming, 
the self-driving car, the dream of colonizing Mars. Each of these issue are the fruits of 
modernity. If we tell ourselves that they are wholly new, arriving from nowhere, then we are 
powerless before them, and cannot make any meaning of them, as if we were the paralyzed 
observers of a dream peopled with clowns and monsters. 
In the following section, therefore, I will introduce the features of modernity that are 
essential to my thesis, through a survey of key literatures. I focus first, on the historicity and 
radical uncertainty of modernity, as observed by three classical critics of modernity: Marx, 
Weber and Nietzsche. I follow this with a brief account of twentieth century theories of 
modernity, including Critical Theory and Risk Theory. Next, I highlight those scholars who have 
most influenced or helped me to articulate my core argument, including Kosselek, Bauman, 
                                                          
7 While most scholars of modernity do agree that the developments associated with 
modernity – which I will discuss in detail below- first emerged in Europe, non-European 
histories of modernity can also be said to extend as far back as European modernity. Aside from 
the fact that certain elements of what we call modernity may have been present in other regions 
in the world, it can also be argued that the trade with and conquest of non-European regions from 
the sixteenth century on thrust most of the globe into at least some socio-economic and cultural 
aspects of modernity. Some post-colonial theorists see the European encounters with the “new 
world” as the beginning of modernity. See, for example, Enrique D. Dussel, Javier Krauel, and 
Virginia C. Tuma, "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism." Nepantla: Views from South 1, no. 3 
(2000): 465-478. For an argument that modernity is itself a tradition, see , Eric Hobsbawn and 
Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983). 
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Heller and Giddens. Then, because my project is both interdisplinary and historical, I indicate the 
range of historical, legal, and philosophical scholarship informing my research. In the remaining 
sections of this introduction I outline my historical methodology, the boundaries and limitations I 
have had to place upon my topic, the role of capitalism and property in my account of modernity, 
and finally, a summary of the chapters to follow. 
Historicity and Rootlessness: Classical Critiques of Modernity 
One way of trying to grasp what is distinct about the ‘tradition’ of modernity is to compare it 
with other “pre-modern” traditions. Without wishing to efface the diversity of those other 
traditions, I do want to suggest that modernity involves a particular attitude to the past. It is not 
necessarily a rejection of the past, but it is a self-conscious differentiation of “our times” from 
the times preceding them. In attempting to understand this attitude to the past, and the essence of 
modernity itself, few can guide us better than the classical critics of modernity, Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Weber.  
In the 1848 Communist Manifesto, Marx wrote of the profound social transformations 
wrought by capitalist relations, noting that  
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier 
ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices 
and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can 
ossify. All that is solid melts into air….8  
In his 1872 work, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche seems to echo Marx in stressing the 
fragmented and weightless experience of modernity: “ [N]ow all the rigid, hostile barriers, which 
                                                          
8  Karl Marx (1818-1883) The Communist Manifesto. (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 38. 
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necessity, caprice or ‘impudent fashion’ have established between human beings, break 
asunder.… as if the veil of Maja has been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the 
mysterious primordial unity.” The modern person “has forgotten how to walk and talk and is on 
the brink of flying and dancing up and away into the air above.”9  In just a few sentences, both 
Marx and Nietzsche articulated much of the experience of modernity: the feeling that the 
foundations and solidity of the past are crumbling beneath us; that this evaporation is 
accelerating so that nothing can take root; and the resulting, dizzying, sense of being unmoored, 
weightless in a world emptied of reference points.  
At a later point in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche compares his own time to the culture 
of the Greeks, a culture powerfully nourished by the myths of Dionysius and Apollo: “Now place 
beside this type of mythical culture abstract man, without guidance from myth… think of a 
culture which has no secure and sacred place of origin and which is condemned to exhaust every 
possibility and to seek meagre nourishment from all other cultures; that is the present.”10 For 
Nietzsche then, modern, “abstract” people are rootless, and somehow orphaned, disinherited 
from their originating soil, and from the guidance and meaning provided by mythology. 
A few decades later, Weber described “the fate of our times” as characterized by 
“rationalization and intellectualization, and above all ‘the disenchantment of the world.” “Now”, 
he said, “ it is only within the smallest and most intimate circles, in personal human situations, in 
pianissimo, that something is pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma, which in 
                                                          
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, eds. Raymond Guess and 
Ronald Speirs, trans. by Ronald Speirs, (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 18.  
10 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 108-109. 
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former times, swept through the great communities like a firebrand, welding them together.11 
Pneuma, an ancient Greek word for the “breath of life,” was a generative force within the Stoic 
cosmology, and it corresponds roughly to “spirit” or “soul” in Judeo-Christianity. Thus, like 
Nietzsche, Weber viewed modernity as the dissolution of a cosmic and unifying force, the 
erosion of the grounds upon which meaning is made.  
If being modern means imagining the past as more solid, integrated and secure than the 
present, it can also mean imagining the future as frighteningly free. The future in modernity is an 
empty space beyond the precipice of the present: nothing is yet formed; so that to step into the 
future is to embrace a radical freedom and an obligation to shape the future. This conception of 
the future as open and contingent upon our actions in the present is central to the experience and 
history of modernity.12 Over the last five centuries this orientation towards an open future has 
manifested itself in strategies for containing uncertainty while retaining freedom. My thesis 
demonstrates such strategies at work in a series of particular historical processes set largely in 
English history: the emergence of scientific surveying and mapping in Tudor England, the 
practice of enclosure and the discourse of improvement in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
                                                          
 
11 Max Weber “Science as a Vocation” in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. H.H 
Gerth and C. Wright Mills; preface by Bryan S. Turner, 1991 (1948) (London: Routledge, 1998), 
155. 
 
12 I will discuss Kosseleck’s theory of modern time consciousness further below. Please 
see Reinhardt Kosseleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1985). On the historicization of temporality, see Michael Pickering, “Experience as 
Horizon: Koselleck, Expectation and Historical Time,” Cultural Studies 18, no. 2-3 (2004): 271; 
and Anders Schinkel, “Imagination as a Category of History: An Essay Concerning Koselleck’s 
Concepts of Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont,” History and Theory 44, no.1 (2005): 42. 
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centuries, and the rise of risk and insurance from the eighteenth century to today. I argue that in 
each of these processes,  new foundations- forms of certainty, authority and truth- were 
fashioned upon an ever-shifting ground of indeterminacy. I conclude that the impermanence of 
such foundations has only further exposed us to, rather than sheltered us from, uncertainty.   
Twentieth Century Theories of Modernity 
Whether they focused on its economic and political features (Marx and Engels), its philosophical 
meaning (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche), its sociological formations (Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, 
Tonnies) or its psychological (Freud) import, classical theorists recognized that modernity was 
made up of contradictory forces: accompanying ever greater scientific and technological mastery 
of nature and the freedom of individual subjects were tendencies towards social fragmentation, 
alienation and new forms of domination.13 Some of these theorists were more optimistic than 
others that these contradictions could be resolved. Marx, for example, who did not live to see the 
doubts of the fin-de-siècle era or the horrors of the First World War, was much more optimistic 
about our ability to control the progress of modernity than Weber could be. Twentieth century 
thought about the nature of modernity can be very roughly mapped according to the influence of 
such optimistic or pessimistic visions, according to its treatment as an object of either scientific 
                                                          
13 While each of these thinkers influenced the study of modernity in the twentieth century 
it was the discipline of sociology which was formed most directly in relation to modernity, and 
which remains, along with social theory, dedicated to the study of changes in the social order. 
For the link between modernity, sociology and social theory please see Gerard Delanty, “The 
Foundations of Social Theory” in The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, ed. Bryan S. 
Turner, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 19; Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty 
and Discipline (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), ix; and Bryan s Turner, Max Weber: 
From History to Modernity, (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), iiv. 
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knowledge or historical, philosophical or aesthetic interpretation, and according to American 
versus European intellectual traditions. 14 
Critical Theory was perhaps the most prominent theoretical response to modernity in 
Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. From the nineteen thirties, scholars associated 
with the “Frankfurt” school, including Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer and Fromm, pursued an 
alternative to the economic determinism and positivist methodology of orthodox Marxism. 
Drawing on Freud, Weber, and Lukacs, among others, Critical Theory was an interdisciplinary 
project that used an interpretive approach and incorporated culture and subjectivity in its critique 
of rationalization, capitalism and totalitarianism in modern society. Despite their ultimate 
objective of effecting social change that would lead to the emancipation of the human subject, 
Critical Theorists were generally skeptical of the Enlightenment project, and tended towards a 
pessimistic diagnosis of human agency within mass society and modern systems of domination. 
However, some, such as Marcuse, did see the possibility of new forms of human subjectivity 
emancipating people from repressive social structures. 15  
Another major European philosophical approach to the problem of modernity was 
Existentialism. First developing in roughly the same period as Critical Theory, and also drawing 
on phenomenology and psycholanalytic theory, Existentialism came to prominence with Sartre 
                                                          
14 One response to modernity that emerged in both American and Europe was the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century artistic movement called “modernism.” Architects, 
musicians, writers and visual artists began to break with traditional forms of representation and 
to express the experience of modernity through novel forms. See, for example, Tim Armstrong, 
Modernism: A Cultural History. Vol. 1. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005). 
15 Arnold Farr, 2013, “Herbert Marcuse,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marcuse/#PheMar.   
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and de Beauvoir in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Existentialists stressed the primacy of existence 
over essence and the responsibility of individual subjects to recognize and act on their freedom. 
16 By the late 1950s and early 60s, however, the tendency to focus on the subjective experience 
and openness of modernity was challenged by a number of theorists, including Levi-Strauss, 
Althusser, and Barthes. Drawing on Saussurean linguistics, and employing social scientific 
methodology, these theorists attended to the structural conditions and interrelations in which 
individual lives were constituted.17 Before long, structuralism itself was criticized for swinging 
too far in the directions of positivism, determinism and ahistoricism, While Foucault, Derrida, 
Barthes, Deleuze, Butler, and others did not deny the importance of the structural forces 
mediating human experience and meaning, they did emphasize the plurality, nuance and 
complexity of relations between structures and subjects. 18 
                                                          
16 Key works in this tradition include Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962); Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus (London: Penguin, 2000); and Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Being and Nothingness (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). 
17 See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, no. 340. (Boston; 
Beacon Press, 1969) and Structural Anthropology, trans. by Claire Jacobson and Brooke 
Grundfest Schoepf, (New York: Basic Books, Inc, 1958); Roland Barthes, Mythologies 
(Montreal, Canada: Le Seuil, 2015; Louis Althusser, For Marx, Vol. 2. (London: Verso, 2005); 
and Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2006). 
18 See, for example, Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human 
Sciences, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Julia 
Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez, 
trans.by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980); Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Anti-
Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, (New York: Viking Press, 1977). 
 
12 
  
 
In America, the Marxism, existentialism and psychoanalysis that were prominent in 
European thought were peripheral to theories of modernity. Instead, social theory in America 
was shaped by the pragmatist philosophy of C Pierce and William James, and the social 
scientific approach of classical sociological theory.  In the economic and political optimism of 
post war America, Parsons’s structural functionalist theory of modern society came to dominate. 
This theory described social change as a progressive evolution towards both functional 
differentiation and structures that facilitated social integration. It also served as the basis of the 
modernization theory of development, which constructed models of the transition from tradition 
to modernity, with a particular focus on economic and political development in third world 
countries.  
By the turn of the 1980s the poststructuralist and deconstructionist theories that had been 
circulating in literary criticism and in continental European social theory for decades began to 
gain a wider purchase across the social sciences. This constellation of ideas called into question 
the certainties, structures, and narratives that had prevailed since the age of the Enlightenment, 
and was given the moniker “postmodernism.” Some argued that the solid structures and identities 
associated with modernism- especially the belief in an objective reality - were in the present 
period giving way to a “post-modern condition”, in which the apprehension of reality was 
acknowledged to be contingent, fragmented, ambivalent, and socially constructed. You will note 
that this way of defining the present, as against a past period of stability and solidity, closely 
resembles the descriptions of the present by Marx, Nietzsche and Weber in the quotations above. 
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At the same time, this resemblance highlights a fundamental disagreement about the nature of 
modernity.  The “post” in postmodern suggests the transcendence of modernity as a historical 
period, but the contrast between a contingent postmodernity and fixed and stable modernity 
ignores the nineteenth century perceptions of the present as unmoored and abounding in 
uncertainty.19 Which is it then? Is modernity a condition of rigid orderliness or of restless 
uncertainty? I contend, along with some contemporary theorists, that it is both, and that the 
interdependence of these characteristics accounts for modernity’s dynamism. 
When postmodernism spread throughout the social sciences in the 1980s its definition 
and its relationship to modernity were widely debated, and this set of debates inspired a renewed 
scholarly interest in clarifying the nature of modernity itself. What followed, from the mid-
eighties to the turn of the century, were some of the most comprehensive attempts to articulate 
the nature of modernity since the classical theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. 20 One important response to the challenge of postmodernity can be found in the work of 
                                                          
19 While the name suggests that modernity has been left behind, the key claims of post-
modern theory do not centre on this point. Rather, like much of the twentieth century Critical 
Theory upon which it draws, post-modernism, or postmodernity, is much more complex. For 
some comprehensive accounts of the range of its positions see  Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, 
or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991); David 
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Vol. 14 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989);  Bryan S. Turner, 
Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity (London, Sage, 1990) and Stuart Sim, The Routledge 
Companion to Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 2013).  
 
20 Some of the many such books include: Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of 
Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990); Marshal Berman, All That is Solid Melts into 
Air (London: Verso, 1983); Stephen Toumlin, Cosmopolis: the Hidden Agenda of Modernity 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity (John Wiley & Sons, 2018); Leszek Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997); Stuart Hall, David Held, and Anthony McGrew, 
Modernity and its Futures: Understanding Modern Societies, Book IV, (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1992; Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of 
Modern Identity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Stuart Hall and David Held, 
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Beck, Giddens and Lash, who have argued that the experience of recent decades is not an end to 
modernity so much as a radicalization of its inherent reflexivity, in which its social formations 
(industrial work, national sovereignty, gender roles) begin to crumble under the weight of both 
its unintended negative consequences and its loss of legitimacy. 21 For Beck, this meant that in 
the current period ours had become a “risk society” responding to the unintended consequences 
of the industrial society.22 
Another important addition to the theories of modernity emerging in the eighties and 
nineties was the “geographical” or “topological” turn in social theory. Sociologists, geographers 
and critical theorists sought to redress the privileging of temporal over spatial analysis in the 
study of modern social processes. Drawing on Simmel and Durkheim, as well as on the seminal 
work of Lefebvre on the production of space, neo Marxist scholars such as Harvey, Soja and 
Castells have explored how social-spatial arrangements have been produced, colonized and 
                                                          
Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Hans Blumenberg, 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, (Boston: MIT Press, 1985). Bryan S. Turner, ed. Theories of 
Modernity and Postmodernity, (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Gerard Delantey, Modernity 
and Postmodernity: Knowledge, Power and the Self, (London: Sage Publications, 2000) and 
Social Theory in a Changing World: Conceptions of Modernity, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and 
Sons,1999) William W. Rasch, Nicholas Luhman’s Modernity: Paradoxes of Differentiation, 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2000); Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994); Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Macey 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: 
Liberty and Discipline, (London: Routledge, 1994); and Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary 
Institution of Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
 
21 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. Reflexive Modernization: Politics, 
Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1994). 
 
22 Beck, Ulrich. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Vol. 17 (London: Sage, 1992), 
and World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
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homogenized by capitalist and state processes.23 There has also been an emphasis on the 
interacting processes of time-space, or space-time, as well as on the distinction between space 
and place.24 
Literature Crucial to my Argument 
While I do address these and other theoretical approaches to modernity, my interest in the 
dynamic propelling modernity forward has drawn me closer to those theories that concentrate on 
modernity’s open future, its groundlessness and its relationship to uncertainty. The notion that an 
orientation towards an open future is crucial to the worldview of modernity was most 
comprehensively explored by the conceptual historian Reinhardt Kosseleck, in his 1979 work 
Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. According to Kosseleck the shift towards 
this future-oriented temporality first began in the early modern period, but it was solidified with 
the conception of history as a single, progressive phenomenon in the mid to late eighteenth 
century. This experience of time involved an increasing differentiation between the past and the 
                                                          
23 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) and Spaces 
of Hope, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Henri Lefebvre, The Production of 
Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) and State, Space, World: Selected Essays. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Manuel Castells, "An Introduction to the Information 
Age," in The Information Society Reader, eds. Frank Webster and Raimo Blom (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2004), 138; E.W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of 
Space in Critical Social Theory, (London: Verso, 1989); Jody Berland, North of Empire: Essays 
on the Cultural Technologies of Space (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), and Saskia 
Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 2008) 
24 Doreen Massey, Spatial Divisions of Labour. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984) and 
Space, Place, and Gender. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); A. Merrifield, 
“Place and Space: A Lefebvrian Reconciliation,” in Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 18 (1993): 516. Also see Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of 
Experience. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).  
 
16 
  
 
future, or between the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation”, and it was marked 
by both a sense of acceleration and a perception of the future as unknown. Meanwhile, the 
discourse of progress “opened up a future that transcended the hitherto predictable, natural space 
of time and experience, and thence- propelled by its own dynamic- provoked new, transnatural, 
long-term prognoses.”25 
In Modernity and Ambivalence, Zygmunt Bauman powerfully evokes this restless 
dynamic and its propulsion by the modern bifurcation of order and ambivalence, control and 
freedom, enclosure and unlimited aspiration. As with Nietzsche, Kosseleck, Luhmann and 
Habermas, he employs the spatial metaphor of the horizon to express the distinctly modern 
consciousness of time, history and meaning. He explains, for example, that the unattainable “foci 
imaginarii” of modernity- certainty, order, the end of history -serve as the horizons towards 
which we move and “Like all horizons, they can never be reached. Like all horizons, they make 
possible walking with a purpose. Like all horizons, they recede in the course of and because of 
                                                          
25 Kosseleck uses this term ‘prognosis’ for the calculative prediction of and planning for 
the future, which increasingly overtake prophesy and providence in modernity. See Reinhardt, 
Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985). Kosseleck’s concept of modern temporalization and historical consciousness was taken up 
in both Luhmann and Habermas’ theories of modernity. See Niklas Luhmann, “Describing the 
Future” in Observations on Modernity, trans. William Whobrey, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998) and Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity's Consciousness of Time and Its Need 
for Self- Reassurance” in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). For more on Kosseleck’s influence see Michael 
Pickering, "Experience as Horizon: Koselleck, Expectation and Historical Time," Cultural 
Studies 18, no. 2-3 (2004): 271; and Rodrigo Cordero, "The Temporalization of Critique and the 
Open Riddle of History: On Reinhart Koselleck’s Contributions to Critical Theory," Thesis 
Eleven 137, no. 1 (2016): 55. For other works on the particular time consciousness in modernity 
see, Nikolas Kompridis, "Time-Consciousness and Transformation: On Modernity’s Relation to 
the Future," in The Transformation of Modernity: Aspects of the Past, Present and Future of an 
Era, ed. Michael Hviid Jacobsen (London and New York: Routledge, 2017): 3. 
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walking.” 26 As “an obsessive march forward,” modernity can never arrive at its destination, 
which recedes with every step; and with every step forward the ground supporting the previous 
step is erased, like windblown footsteps in the desert sand. Modernity’s future orientation and its 
insatiability are thus part of a perpetual dynamic impelled by and impelling a consciousness of 
existence as indeterminate and without reference.  
Agnes Heller has described the indeterminacy propelling modernity as “groundlessness,” 
a metaphor I refer to in my title, as it is the “ground” of my own account of modernity. For 
Heller, it is the paradox of freedom which drives the modern dynamic. The freedom expressed 
by transgressing traditional boundaries also nullifies the foundations upon which people ground 
and orient their lives. Standards of truth, justice and authority are therefore constantly tested, 
found wanting, and replaced with new, abstract constructions.  Freedom is the foundation of 
modernity, but it is “a foundation which does not found.” Always coupled with contingency, the 
freedom in modernity takes the form of a constant migration, a pilgrimage in search of a home. 27 
Although I only refer to Bauman and Heller occasionally in this work, their illuminations 
of the dynamic of modernity have profoundly shaped my own questions about how modernity 
has moved through time, how it has been experienced, what is lost in its restless movement, and 
whether that movement can or should come to rest. Finally, because of the clarity he brings to his 
                                                          
26 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
2013), 13. 
 
27 Agnes Heller, “The Three Logics of Modernity and the Double Bind of the Modern 
Imagination” in Aesthetics and Modernity: Essays, ed. John Rundell (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2011), 141-142. For an extended discussion of the role of freedom in the modern 
dynamic and the modern social arrangement please see Agnes Heller, A Theory of Modernity 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1999). 
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articulation of the complex and multiple processes constituting modernity, I have relied at times 
upon Gidden’s sociological interpretation of modernity. For the chapters related to risk and 
insurance, I have found his concepts of time-space distanciation, and the development of trust in 
abstract systems particularly helpful.28   
Of course, it is not only theories of modernity that inform this project. The following 
chapters are primarily a study of modernity in history. And because modernity manifests itself in 
multiple social formations, and has done so over a period of centuries, in attempting to 
historicize its dynamic I have necessarily drawn on a wide range of scholarship. Rather than 
exhaustively listing each area of such secondary literature, I will briefly mention a few that were 
most important in fleshing out my work. One cluster of literature that I found myself relying 
upon throughout this book is the historical, cultural and philosophical study of science. This 
includes the work of Alfred Crosby on Renaissance and early modern innovations in 
quantification and visualization, to which I turn in my first chapter. However, most of the 
historians and philosophers of science informing the later chapters can equally be considered 
practicioners of ‘historical epistemology’. These include Theodore Porter, on quantification, 
Alain Desrosieres, on statistics, Mary Poovey, on statistics and the modern fact, and Lorraine 
Daston and Ian Hacking on probability theory. To this grouping I would also add Michel 
Foucault, for I found his account of the shift from the Renaissance’s ‘integrative’ episteme to the 
classical period’s ‘representational’ episteme in The Order of Things particularly helpful for 
conceptualizing the adoption of classificatory thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
                                                          
28 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
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I have also relied upon an abundance of social, cultural and intellectual histories of 
Britain, from the early modern period to the twentieth century. For the early modern period I 
drew on the work of both Paul Warde and Paul Slack on the discourse of improvement, Andrew 
McRae and Sarah Bendall on the role of the estate surveyor and Roger Kain, John Gregory, and 
J.B Harley, on the power of mapping. For the nature of the commons, the impact of enclosures, 
and its significance in the history of capitalism, I have drawn on classic works by E.P.Thompson, 
Jeanette Neeson, Karl Polanyi, and Ellen Meiksins Wood, as well as Nicolas Blomley, Jessie 
Goldstein and Robert Marzek and others.  
My project has also been informed by a number of theoretical works on both property 
and law, including John Locke, William Blackstone, and Jeremy Bentham, more recent 
contributions to property theory by Carol Rose, Margaret Radin, and Joshua Getzler, and by 
Harold Berman’s work on the history of the Western modern legal tradition. Finally, works on 
risk, insurance and governmentality by David Garland, Richard Ericson, Aaron Doyle, Simon 
Baker, Kevin Haggarty, Pat O’ Malley, Nicolas Rose and others have provided invaluable 
guidance for my chapters on risk and insurance. 
Interdisciplinary Methodology 
The interdisciplinary nature of my research is one of the unique features of this project. I have 
attempted to synthesize a wide array of scholarly contributions to provide a more richly textured 
historical account of modernity. While social theorists such as Heller, Bauman and Giddens have 
conveyed modernity’s dynamic, its interacting institutions and its logics, and its recurring themes 
of freedom, uncertainty, legitimacy, and order with unparalleled vividness, they do not 
historicize it. Meanwhile, those historical approaches to modernity that do combine cultural, 
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social and intellectual analysis tend to focus on more modest historical scales, while social 
historians, who have provided us with rich details in the long history of capitalism, tend not to 
link the enclosing and improving of property with the application of the same logics to the 
acquisition of and control of knowledge. This work attempts to bring together developments in 
the history of property and knowledge by drawing upon insights into the cultural, social, 
epistemological and economic manifestations of modernity, and by marrying theoretical and 
historical approaches to understanding modernity. Like modernity itself, this synthesis cannot be 
complete, but it is important and appropriate that I employ an interdisciplinary methodology in 
the study of such a multidimensional phenomenon.  
Historical Methodology 
As I have already mentioned, along with a particular perception of the future, modernity also 
gave rise a to a particular historicist sensibility, one that might best be described as a sense of 
distinction or removal from the past.29 In nineteenth century Europe, the drive to accumulate 
‘objective’ knowledge of the past was particularly fervent, as were efforts to raise history to the 
same scientific status as other emerging disciplines in the social sciences. Practitioners of the 
scientific approach to history held that, just as in the natural sciences, history followed certain 
general laws, and that by adhering to these laws, they could represent the objective truth about 
                                                          
29 Reinhardt Kossellek, situates this particular historical consciousness in at the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when a distinction began to be made 
between “historical” and “natural” time. See “Modernity and the Planes of Historicity” in 
Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004) 18-25.  Tang extends Koselleck’s analysis to the spatial realm, arguing that, along with the 
emergence of “historical time” at the end of the eighteenth century, there also emerged a new 
“geographic imaginary,” a modern geographic science which created the “geographical subject 
Chenxi Tang, The Geographical Imagination of Modernity: Geography, Literature and 
Philosophy in German Romanticism, (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2008), 2-3. 
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events of the past.30 Nietzsche not only opposed such claims, but also viewed the general 
“historical fever” of his period as a desperate attempt to escape the deracinated and disoriented 
present of modern European culture, by burrowing into the roots of past cultures. 31 Over time, 
Nietzsche developed a theory of history which recognized the fluid nature of time, as well as the 
subjectivity and necessarily interpretivist role of the historian. For Nietzsche, there was nothing 
wrong with using history to construct a foundation for a culture seeking orientation in the 
present. The problem, for him, was the falseness of all claims that an absolute truth about the 
past could be accessed. Not only did he see it as impossible to capture and contain the flux of 
history within systematic and rational concepts but he saw it as equally impossible for humans, 
uniquely burdened by the past, to perceive it with any objectivity because our subjective 
perception of the past is also constantly becoming.32  For this reason he thought that we should 
                                                          
30 Isaiah Berlin, “The Concept of Scientific History” in Concepts and Categories: 
Philosophical Essays, Ed. Henry Hardy (UK: Pimlico, 1999) 103-142; 128-9; and Chris Lorenz, 
“Scientific Historiography” in Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of History and 
Historiography, ed. Aviezer Tucker, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008) 398-408. 
31 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History For Life” in 
Untimely Meditations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 57-124. 
 
32 Anthony K. Jensen, “Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosophy of History” in Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/. Of course, Nietzsche was not the first, nor 
the only nineteenth century thinker to challenge the positivist or scientific approach to history. 
Kierkegaard, Dilthey and Weber all had sustained critiques of science. See Soren Kierkegaard 
and Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Vol. 5524, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2019); I.J Kidd, “Objectivity, Abstraction, and the Individual: the Influence of 
Søren Kierkegaard on Paul Feyerabend,” Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Science 42, 
no.1 (March, 2011): 125-32; Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences. Vol. 1. 
(Princeton University Press, 1991); Max Weber, “Objectivity in Social Science and Social 
Policy,” The Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. and trans. E.Shils and H. A. Finch (New 
York: Free Press, 1949). 
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approach history in the same way that we should approach the truth: as something dynamic, for 
which one needs to continually create a horizon of meaning to orient oneself in life. 
A hundred and forty something years later, it is no act of daring on my part to take an 
anti-positivist approach to history, or to invoke Nietzsche as a guide to my historical 
methodology. Nietzsche’s insights into the roles of rhetoric, metaphor and interpretation in 
writing history have long permeated scholarly debate among historians and philosophers, and in 
more recent decades have been central to methodological concerns across the social sciences. 
According to Jensen, the twentieth century saw two major waves of Nietzschean influence on the 
concepts and practices of history. The first occurred in the middle decades of that century, when 
continental philosophers, from Jaspers, Heidegger and Arendt, to Ricoeur, Levinas and Gadamer, 
grappled with the existential condition of historicity. The second appeared in the seventies, 
among those philosophers and “post-modern” historians who were instrumental in the 
“linguistic” or "interpretive” turn in the humanities and social sciences: Foucault, de Man, 
Derrida and Hayden White.  Using an epistemological rather than anthropological focus, these 
thinkers saw the new project of history as one of unmasking the grand narratives of the powerful.  
Each of these thinkers contributed unique ideas about how the past is or should be 
represented and their prescriptions range from acknowledging and embracing the linguistic 
human instinct for narrative and metaphor, to deconstructing, or rupturing narrative, as the story 
of the powerful. There was, in fact, a fair amount of overlap between these two waves of 
thinkers, and common to them all is the Nietzschean recognition of the constructed nature of our 
representations of the past- and of truth itself. I prioritize Nietzsche’s approach to history here 
because he saw through the new certainties of the modern age – rationality, system, science- to 
their constructed foundations. His intuition that modernity, history, and our very selves are social 
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constructs is thus a particularly apt starting point for an historical study of modernity as the 
ongoing construction of provisional foundations. In modernity, the awareness of the 
impermanence of all foundations (what counts as truth, authority, or knowledge) leads to a 
disorienting sense of uncertainty, which continually spurs the impulse to control and contain.  
This involves the making of horizons as a means of bringing order to an uncertain world, and I 
can only be reflexive about this horizon building in my own effort to represent this. 33 That is, 
taking into account the ordering functions of narrative and metaphor are appropriate for doing a 
history of modernity. 
As will be evident in the chapters to follow, modern attempts to banish uncertainty by 
asserting new forms of control have generated not only more uncertainty, but also more abstract 
frameworks for ordering the world. These universal, “objective” frameworks – systems, 
institutions, and philosophies of governance and knowledge- grow ever more distant from the 
dynamic particularity of life on the ground. Metaphor and narrative, while also being ordering 
frameworks, can serve to counter abstraction. Metaphor, in particular, reincarnates the phantoms 
of abstraction by clothing concepts in the apparel of the senses, by grounding ideas in familiar, 
physically relatable experiences and situations. And while narrative can be a tool of the 
powerful, it is also a tool that we all have for making meaning, for understanding and 
communicating. The abstract frameworks of modernity, by contrast, tend to name and sort rather 
than to communicate, and make no meaning beyond order itself. Being self-reflexive about the 
                                                          
33 Discussing the disadvantages of being “unhistorical” on the one hand, and having an 
unremitting sense of history on the other hand, Nietzsche argues that “a living thing can become 
healthy, strong, and fertile only when bounded by a horizon”, meaning that, without finding a 
way to frame or bracket a selected portion of all historical knowledge, (or memory, in the case of 
individuals) humans lose all orientation for living. See, Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life,” Untimely Meditations, Trans. RJ Hollingdale, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983): 57-123. 
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narrativity and the interpretive nature of historical work can therefore be seen as an act of 
critique against modern abstraction. 
While I see the value of the poststructuralist emphasis on the discontinuities, disjunctions, 
and reversals of history my own project is clearly less aligned with deconstructive efforts than 
with interpretative and constructivist approaches. It is, in fact, a work of synthesis, drawing 
together from a vast range of disciplines, a wealth of historical research and theoretical insights, 
and to use Nietzsche’s language, “binding them within the horizon” of a narrative structure. In 
my view, the multidimensional nature of modernity itself – a phenomenon which is at once 
social, cultural, economic, political, and epistemological- demands this interdisciplinarity, not 
only in terms of research content, but also in terms of the methods by which I represent this 
content. I have, in relating this story of modernity, followed elements of the methodologies of a 
number of different and sometimes competing schools of historiography.  This is, I think, 
probably not so uncommon, for not only have the differences between these historiographical 
“schools” and “turns” been overstated – many notable historians fall into several such groupings- 
but most historical work involves elements of both synthesis and analysis, traces both 
continuities and discontinuities, and recognizes, as Ricœur put it, that “at each scale one sees 
things that one does not see at another scale and that each vision has its own legitimate end.”34  
In marrying sociological and historical scholarship on complex processes of change over 
time, my work follows in the tradition of historical sociology. In paying attention to the long 
term structures and large patterns of modernity- both cultural and material-I follow the longue 
                                                          
34 Paul Ricœur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 218. 
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durée approach to history, exemplified by Braudel and the Annales School.35 In tracing the 
genealogy and historical contexts of concepts and discourses my work falls into the category of 
“history of ideas” or intellectual history. What the best practitioners of these methodologies 
share, aside from being of somewhat unfashionable vintage, is their wide ranging nature, their 
boldness in crossing over disciplinary boundaries, their engagement with the specialist research 
of other scholars, and their unflinching allegiance to their own curiosity.  
I share Braudel’s view that “history is the sum of all possible histories, a set of multiple 
skills and points of view- those of yesterday, today and tomorrow. The only mistake, in my view, 
would be to choose one to the exclusion of the others.”36 I am therefore sympathetic with aims 
and achievements of a great many approaches to history, too many to name here. However, there 
are two other major influences on my methodology which I think it important to mention here. 
First, while I do not subscribe to the deterministic or teleological strands of historical 
materialism, I do think that attending to the material specificity of history is essential to Marx’s 
critique of capitalism’s alienating effects. Because capitalism is such a crucial component of 
modernity, the historian’s role in denaturalizing it should also extend to the processes and 
discourses of modernity itself. Most recently, it was Ellen Meiksins Wood who best articulated 
the “denaturalizing” effect of historicizing capitalism, but the work of Polanyi and of “history 
from below” and social history.as practiced by E.P. Thompson and other British social historians 
                                                          
 
35 A number of prominent historians belonged to the Annales tradition, including its 
founding members Marc Bloch, and Lucien Febvre, as well as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, 
Ernest Labrousse, Georges Dube and Fernand Braudel. For an account of the intellectual 
trajectory of this historical movement from an insider, please see André Burguière, The Annales 
School: An Intellectual History (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009). 
 
36 Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue durée” trans. 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Review 32, no. 2 (2009): 171-3; 182. 
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shared this objective. Social history, particularly E.P. Thompson’s work, brought to life the 
everyday life of ordinary people from the past, and the specificity of their cultural and material 
realities powerfully challenged the Whig and other idealist histories from which they had been 
erased. While I have long been a student of social history, I have to admit that my project only 
faintly succeeds in bringing the lives of ordinary people to life. Because I pay attention to new 
techniques, projects and philosophies which we call modern in retrospect, the elites and experts 
who were their early advocates and practitioners are given far more attention than commoners. 
However, for each transition towards a modern way of seeing and being in the world, I do 
address discourses of opposition and resistance which include the voices of ordinary people. 
Finally, in attending to the processes and discourses by which knowledge, truth, and 
legitimacy have been produced in modernity, my methodological approach bears some 
resemblance to Foucault’s genealogical critique. At the same time, in suggesting certain 
continuities and large patterns in modernity’s history, it may appear that, contra Foucault, I am 
working to reveal the “underlying tendencies that gather force” and “movements of accumulation 
and slow saturation”37 or going “back in time to restore an unbroken continuity that operates 
beyond the dispersion of forgotten things”38 However, I do not see the recognition of continuities 
and patterns as a submission to a totalizing or evolutionary notion of history. To understand 
modernity as a way of being in and relating to the world that gained legitimacy and influence 
over time, I must ask what was continuous about it over its long period of becoming. On the 
                                                          
37 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002), 3.  
 
38 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. by D. F. Bouchard. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977). 146. 
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other hand, I recognize the importance of Foucault’s call to pay attention to the ‘disjunctions” in 
history, especially as a major theme of this work is that modern attempts to ground reality upon 
provisional certainties- private property, scientific categories, mathematical measurements- tend 
towards abstraction and the exclusion of the ambivalences of the particular.   
The story I tell is fairly conventional in its chronology. It generally, but unevenly, 
progresses from the late medieval period to the present day. Each chapter focuses on a period of 
about one to two centuries, during which a transition to a modern way of seeing or being in the 
world took place. I use the metaphors of surveying and mapping, enclosing and improving, and 
risking and insuring to emplot the large patterns I describe: in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, there emerges a distanced way of seeing and representing natural and social 
phenomena that turns them into objects of reform; in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we 
see the use of logics of containment for the pursuit of endless expansion; from the eighteenth 
century to the present day we see a repetition of surveying, mapping, enclosing and improving 
logics extended towards the realms of the future and of society, in order to objectify and manage 
the risks of populations. These are crucial components of the dynamic of modernity that I 
propose: the use of ever more abstract yet effective means of controlling the social and natural 
world in a continual attempt to vanquish uncertainty. However, these components or logics were 
not, in reality, locked tightly into the chronological frameworks I have chosen. For instance, 
surveying and mapping, both as material practices related to land ownership, and as ways of 
ordering and representing the social and natural world, continue to operate, not only throughout 
the periods I associate with enclosure or risk, but also in the digital surveillance and the 
accumulation of big data today.  
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My account does show how certain developments facilitated other developments (for 
example, the adoption of geometric knowledge and linear perspective in early modern Europe 
greatly shaped new standards and practices in estate surveying in England). To an extent, such 
developments accumulated in layers, amounting to a kind of tradition of modernity. And yet, it is 
not my wish to suggest any inevitable or steady progression in the unfolding of modernity. For, 
while the continuities in the patterns of modernity are important for understanding it as a unique 
kind of tradition in itself, discontinuities, and the break with traditional patterns are indeed 
essential to modernity’s character, as grounded upon groundlessness. 
The Boundaries of this Project 
Like capitalism or colonialism, modernity is an enormous phenomenon, stretching across vast 
swathes of time and place and shaping the lives of a multitude of different peoples. Only, 
perhaps, by presenting each of its facets in an abridged account could anyone comprehensively 
represent such a phenomenon. In seeking to understand the relationship in modernity between 
control and uncertainty I have told one sort of story. While this account highlights some features 
of modernity, such as increasing rationalization, or changes in the organization of property and 
knowledge, others are relatively absent. 
Notably absent in my historical account of modernity is any robust attempt to represent 
the geographical breadth and cultural diversity of modernity’s history. While I extend the setting 
of the story to an international context in the last two chapters, the great bulk of my account is set 
in England, from the Tudor period to the nineteenth century. In attending to this particular 
history, not only are the various and largely concurrent experiences of modernity in the rest of 
Europe underrepresented but so too are the roles of non-European peoples in the constitution of 
modernity.  I happen to be presenting a largely internalist account of modernity at the very 
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moment when the calls for more global, multiple and alternate representations modernity have 
become most compelling.  
Over the course of the last three decades post-colonial scholars have challenged some of 
the more enduring conventions in theories of modernity. One of these conventions has been 
Eurocentricism. The unquestioning association of modernity with the west had been evident in 
post-war Modernization theory of development.39 Against the conventional presumption that 
modernity is a singular, unitary phenomenon, some have proposed that we look at modernity as a 
multiple phenomenon. Scholars from the Global South meanwhile, have begun to focus on 
“alternative modernities” which explore non-European roots and formations of modernity. 40 
                                                          
39 Modernization theory, typified in the work of American economists W.W. Rostow and 
Seymour Lipsett, proposed a model of development in which societies progressively move 
through stages from traditional to modern. See, Wolfgang Knobl, "Theories That Won’t Pass 
Away: The Never-ending Story,” ed. Gerard Delantey, Engin F. Isin, Handbook of Historical 
Sociology, (London: Sage, 2003): 96; and W.W. Rostow (1960), The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).  In 
presupposing that Western societies represented the pinnacle of societal development, towards 
which “traditional”, non-Western societies must progress, modernization theory recalled some of 
the assumptions pervading European theories of history during the Enlightenment. See, for 
example, Ronald L. Meek, "Smith, Turgot, and the ‘Four Stages’ Theory," in Smith, Marx, & 
After (Boston, MA: Springer, 1977); and Frank Palmeri, State of Nature, Stages of Society: 
Enlightenment Conjectural History and Modern Social Discourse, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016). Wallerstein and Gunder Frank criticized modernization theory’s 
universalist and endogenous account of the path to modernity and highlighted instead, the global 
and systemic factors that historically shaped uneven development, such as global capitalism and 
colonization. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture 
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, vol. 1, (Oakland, CA: 
University of California Press, 2011) and Andre Gunder Frank. Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America, vol. 93 (New York: NYU Press, 1967). 
 
40 See Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, "Multiple modernities." Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000): 1. 
On “alternative modernities,” see Gurminder K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: 
Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); Dilip 
Gaonkar, and Michael Hanchard, "Alternative Modernities." (2001): 245; Saurabh Dube. 
"Introduction: Colonialism, Modernity, Colonial Modernities." Nepantla: Views from South 3, 
no. 2 (2002): 197; Satya P. Mohanty, ed., Colonialism, Modernity, and Literature: A View from 
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Work on alternative modernities seeks to give a voice to those who have been silenced in the 
dominant narrative of modernity, and in this, it is part of a larger project of “de-centring” or 
“provincializing” Europe, in Chakrabarty’s words. Others have insisted that rather than 
maintaining the binary of the West and the Rest, we should be focused on the interplay of the 
“connected histories” of different regions and peoples of the world, and the co-constitutive 
nature of modernity. 41 
The post-colonial critique of standard accounts of modernity has raised crucial questions 
about how we frame representations of the past: who and what is the focal point in these 
representations, who and what is cropped in half on the periphery, or left out of the frame 
altogether? While I see such questions as particularly fruitful for questioning the parameters and 
content of the topic of modernity, I also recognize that my own account of modernity does not 
contribute to the extension or repositioning the conventional Eurocentric framework. There are 
points at which I suggest that there is another and related story happening outside of the frame, 
but mine is largely an endogenous account of modernity. This does not mean that I deny the 
importance of work on modernity that repositions the frame away from Europe. Nor does it mean 
that my own framework is altogether conventional. 
                                                          
India, (Palgrave: New York, 2011); and Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and 
the Production of History, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995). 
 
41 Dipesh Chakrabarti, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference-New Edition. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009. For “connected” or “co-
consituted” accounts of modernity see Partha Chatterjee, Our Modernity, No. 1. (Rotterdam: 
Sephis, 1997); Amit Chaudhuri, Clearing a Space: Reflections on India, Literature and Culture, 
Vol. 8, (New York: Peter Lang, 2008). Gurminder Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: 
Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination, (New York: Springer, 2007); and Arjun 
Appadurai, Modernity al Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Vol. 1, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996). 
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As I mentioned early in this introduction, how one chooses to situate the “when” of 
modernity depends upon the “what” of modernity. Its early formations and key moments will 
vary according to which of its features one prioritizes as essential. The same is true with the 
“where” of modernity. If, like myself, one sees the reorganization of property and social relations 
according to capitalist requirements and “universal” measurements as an essential component in 
the history of modernity, then it is appropriate to set the early story of modernity in Tudor 
England. England is also an appropriate place for looking at how the pursuit of “improvement’ in 
scientific, agricultural and social discourses related to practices of enclosure. Finally, it is an 
appropriate setting for examining the rise of risk and insurance, in finance, trade and ultimately 
in the management of society.   
Thus, my methodological choice to set much of this account in England did not stem 
from any insistence that England is the fixed “origin” of modernity.  English history is 
paradigmatic, largely because of the precocity of its capitalist formations, such as the enclosure 
movement and insurance markets, and the wealth of material on the transitions to modern social 
formations contributed by British social historians.  However, I am not presenting this history as 
an ideal type, or a standard case against which all others are mere deviations. Rather, as a student 
of British history and of the history of capitalism, with an interest in the complex of relations 
called modernity, it was in encountering certain British historical developments that I first 
became interested in modernity as a historical phenomenon. Moreover, by limiting much of the 
work to one particular setting, I am better able to explore particular epistemological, social and 
economic developments and how they interacted to create a means of managing the uncertainty 
of modernity. 
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Capitalism and Modernity 
If I have chosen to explore the dynamics of modernity through historical cases largely set in 
England, in part because that setting is widely recognized as central to the history of capitalism, 
then the reader may justly wonder why I have not therefore made capitalism a more explicit 
component of my analysis of modernity. Some clarification of the role of capitalism in my 
project, and of what I see as the relationship between capitalism and modernity is necessary here. 
While capitalism has a nearly ubiquitous presence in this work, I do not address it in itself, but 
rather, as a recurring manifestation of and force within modernity- and by no means the only one. 
Just as important as the new economic relations of capitalism, and as constitutive of the modern 
way of seeing and being in the world, are the social, cultural, political and epistemic 
manifestations of modernity. Thus, I see capitalism as one of several interrelated developments 
through which modern societies re-evaluated and re-established their foundations, those being, 
what counts as truth, knowledge and authority. 
While capitalism impacts nearly all spheres of life and has given shape to many aspects 
of modernity, I do not believe it is the author of modernity. Rather, I see capitalism as a core 
element of and manifestation of modernity. To some extent, I see their relationship as co-
constitutive.  By co-constitutive, I do not mean that their historical development was completely 
symbiotic, or that they emerged or accelerated in exactly the same places and times. I mean, 
rather, that ever since they intersected and overlapped over the course of the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has been difficult to imagine one without the other. Would 
modernity have the same dynamic, accelerating, expanding character without capitalism’s own 
dynamism fueling the rearrangement of the social and material world? Could capitalism have 
gained purchase in an environment where the desires for autonomy and endless progress had not 
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begun to transgress the known boundaries? The answer is…maybe, but probably not. And thus I 
see the two phenomena as conjoined, not fatefully, but historically, and I prefer not to impose a 
hierarchy upon modernity’s economic, cultural, or epistemological developments. To put it 
another way, I do not wish to abstract any one of these components from the particularity of their 
historical context.   Like Modernity, Capitalism is an enormously complex phenomenon, and if I 
tried to give any comprehensive account of its history and its essential characteristics this would 
push to the periphery developments that that I do not believe belong there:  manifestations of 
modernity that while related to the economy, are not economic in themselves. Nevertheless, key 
developments associated with the history or capitalism do feature prominently throughout this 
work. 
The first two chapters cover the well- trodden terrain of social and economic histories 
that have explored the origins and development of capitalism. The surveying, mapping, 
enclosing and improving of land in England, from the Tudor period to the end of the eighteenth 
century, cleared the ground for capitalist development. They did the work of reorganizing the 
relationship between land and people, dispossessing labour from the means of subsistence while 
establishing exclusive private ownership of property as the legitimate relationship to land, and as 
the means of intensifying agrarian production for the economic and demographic wealth of the 
nation.42 Meanwhile, much of what I relate in the remaining chapters can also be viewed as 
                                                          
42 For the dispossession of commoners and the commodification of land, labour and 
money see Polanyi, Karl (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, Intro by R. M. MacIver. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). For her theory 
on the origins of capitalism in early modern changes to England’s agrarian property 
relations, and on the role of enclosures see Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of 
Capitalism: A Longer View, (London: Verso, 2002). For their ground-breaking social 
histories of the commoning economy and of enclosure movements from the perspective of 
the commoners, see E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular 
Culture, (New York: The New Press, 1991), and Jeannette Neeson, Commoners: Common 
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essential to the story of capitalism: the development of abstract financial instruments and of 
markets in investment and insurance in eighteenth century London, the increasing sophistication 
of insurantial technology for commodifying risks in large populations during the nineteenth 
century; the creation, in the twentieth century, of social insurance as a means of mitigating the 
insecurity and risks created by the capitalist economy; and the threat to such social protections 
posed by the re-commodification of ever more spheres of life under neoliberal reforms. 
Common to all of these developments is that they can be viewed as new expressions of 
property: the first two chapters deal with property in land; the third and fourth with insurance as 
a kind of property, the fifth, on social insurance, deals with social property. In each case property 
can be understood as a tool for organizing how people access social goods or power, or gain 
entry into the polity. Property, especially the legitimation of private property, is of course, a 
major feature of capitalism, but I do not treat it in this book solely in economic terms. I will 
discuss how property relates to my overall argument further below. But there is something else 
common to all- or most- of the above-mentioned developments. Readers familiar with the work 
of Marxist social historians, Marxist humanists, or Polanyi may recognize a certain line of 
critique linking together the aspects of capitalism that I have chosen to feature. In my account, as 
in many of theirs, the inscription of the boundaries of property is shown, again and again, to have 
simultaneously been the exclusion, disembedding, dispossession or alienation of something pre-
                                                          
Right, Enclosure, and Social Change in England, 1700–1820, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). For other related works, see E.P. Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class (London, Penguin 1991); Robert Brenner, "The Origins of 
Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," New Left Review, 104 
(1977): 46; Gordon Edmund Mingay, Enclosure and the Small Farmer in the Age of the 
Industrial Revolution, (London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2016); and 
Gregory Clark, "Land Rental Values and the Agrarian Economy: England and Wales, 
1500–1914," European Review of Economic History 6, no. 3 (2002): 281.  
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existing those boundaries. Indeed, the argument that alienation and abstraction are inherent to the 
capitalist mode of production and exchange, is, in my view, at the heart of Marx’s critique of 
capitalism. It is certainly the element of Marxist thought that I find most compelling when 
reflecting on the relationship between capitalism and modernity. And while they may be 
identified by different terms, such as rationalization, “science”, repression/superego, or 
disenchantment, alienation and abstraction are also central to the major classical critiques of 
modernity, including those of Weber, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Simmel and Freud.  
It was in his 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, not published until the 
1930s, that Marx most directly explicated his theory of alienation.43 There, he explained how the 
division of labour under capitalism separated people, as labourers, from themselves, from the 
process and products of their labour, and from each other. He called these separations 'alienation' 
(Entäusserung) or 'estrangement' (Entfremdung). I join the concept of abstraction to that of 
alienation because they seem to be part of the same process. I tend to see alienation as the social 
and psychological condition that results from the abstracting processes by which particularity 
and interconnectivities are erased.44 But whether we view abstraction as the cause or as the 
                                                          
43 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
and the Communist Manifesto, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009). 
 
44 Ollman, sees the relation as moving in the opposite direction: “What is left of the 
individual after all these cleavages have occurred is a mere rump, a lowest common denominator 
attained by lopping off all those qualities on which is based his claim to recognition as a man. 
Thus denuded, the alienated person has become an 'abstraction.'” Bertell Ollman, “The Theory of 
Alienation” in Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society: Part III, The Theory 
of Alienation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l97l); Accessed from 
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/books/a.php.  Twentieth century Marxist scholarship was riven 
by the topic of alienation, with “orthodox” scientific Marxists dismissing the topic as belonging 
to Marx’s immature stage, when he had yet to overcome the enchantments of humanism or 
“philosophical anthropology”.  Even among those Marxists  who did see alienation as a central 
element of Marx’s critique, there was a further division, between those who insisted Marx was 
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product of alienation, they both seem to be involved in the separation of what was once whole 
and integrated. 
As Derek Sayer and others have pointed out, it was not merely in his early writing that 
Marx wrote of alienation, even if that term was largely replaced by “fetishism” in his later 
writings.45 Indeed, I think it is in his discussion of the fetishism of commodities that Marx best 
explains the relationship between abstraction and alienation in capitalism.  In the opening chapter 
of Capital, Marx revealed in patient detail the fetishism inherent in the commodity, the “cell 
form” of the mode of production he set out to demystify. Explaining the distinction between the 
“use-value” and the “exchange-value” of commodities, Marx revealed how, at the heart of the 
production of commodities for the purpose of exchange, is a mystifying act of abstraction. Once 
commodities are produced for exchange they differ from one another only in terms of their 
quantity, for they are reduced to “a common element of identical magnitude.”46 It is this act of 
abstraction that erases from view the use value of commodities: the heterogenous, sensually 
perceivable, useful and particular qualities of a commodity evaporate, leaving only what he calls 
a “phantom-like objectivity.” With no intrinsic properties of its own, the commodity as exchange 
value “dangles”, phantom-like, mid-air, unconditioned by the forces of either gravity or time. 47 
                                                          
only talking about “objective” alienation, and those who interpreted his writings to include a 
“subjective”  that is, psychological experience of alienation. My own instinct to view alienation 
as a social and psychological response to abstracting processes seems to put me in the camp of 
existentialist and humanist Marxists, who were accused of privileging subjective alienation.       
45  Derek Sayer, The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytical Foundations of Historical 
Materialism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987): 43. 
 
46 Marx, Capital, 127-128. 
 
47 Ibid. 
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The exchange relation turns “an ordinary sensuous thing” like a table into something 
unnatural, metaphysical, and perverse: “the table stands on its head, and evolves out of its 
wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free 
will.”48 The autonomy that is projected onto the commodity is thus a form of fetishism in which 
things seem to be independent of human will, design or labour. In fact, in the abstracting process 
of the exchange relation, it is the very things that we produce that appear before us as alien 
forces with lives of their own. This is because the particular form of labour which produces each 
commodity is also extinguished in the exchange relation, its particularities reduced to simple 
average labour, the value of which is measured by the “socially necessary labour-time” expended 
to produce it. In fact, it is this reduction of all labour into congealed units of abstract labour 
power that Marx saw as the “third thing” against which the value of all commodities are 
measured and made equivalent.49 
But the conversion of particular and concrete products and producers into 
interchangeable homogolous units, does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, it occurs in the same 
new world he described in the communist manifesto, where all “fixed, fast-frozen relations …are 
swept away”. As Ollman puts it: 
It is because we do not grasp the ways in which the social whole is present in any factor 
that [each] factor seems to be independent of the social whole, that it becomes an 
'abstraction'. As an abstraction, what is unique about it is lost sight of behind its 
superficial similarities with other abstractions. And it is on the basis of these similarities, 
generalized as classes of one sort or another that alienated men set out to understand their 
world.50 
                                                          
 
48 Ibid. 
 
49 Ibid. 
 
50 Ollman, “The Theory of Alienation”  
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 Marx’s commodity fetishism thus occurs in a historically specific terrain, a social world 
in which abstract relations obscure concrete relations. For Marx, capitalism is what Derek Sayer 
calls “a distinctively modern form of sociation”, an arrangement in which seemingly autonomous 
and atomized individuals are embedded in spontaneously arising complex of social relations 
beyond their control or understanding.51 It is in pointing to the alienation attending this form of 
sociation that Marx’s critique of capitalism most overlaps with the major critiques of modernity. 
Indeed, a number of recurring themes related to alienation and abstraction in Marx’s thought 
would later be taken up and expanded by Max Weber. In highlighting a few of those themes 
here, I am also indicating where capitalism and modernity most overlap in my own project. 
Comparing Marx and Weber’s critiques of modernity, both Sayer and Brian S. Turner 
follow the example of Lowith in rejecting the earlier tendency of sociological scholars to 
dichotomize their positions.52  While the disempowering impact of the abstract division of labour 
was central to Marx’s critique of capitalist political economy, the leitmotif in Weber’s own work 
was rationalization. Weber argued that the legal, economic, and administrative systems by which 
modern societies are ordered are dominated by Zweckrationalität, known in English as “formal,” 
“instrumental” or “means-ends” rationality, and characterized by the values of calculation, 
efficiency, and predictability. Zweckrationalität involves making decisions “without regard for 
persons: but rather, according to universal rules, laws or regulations, and with the purpose of 
achieving a desired end through the most efficient and calculable means. Weber considered this 
                                                          
 
51 Derek Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber, (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1991), 36. 
 
52 Karl Lowith, Max Weber and Karl Marx, eds. Tom Bottomore and William Outhwaite, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1993) and Bryan S. Turner, Max Weber: From History to 
Modernity, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 6. 
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form of rationality to be most concentrated in bureaucratic organizations, scientific endeavors, 
the capitalist mode of production and formal systems of law. As a foundation for social or 
economic action, this sort of rationality has led to an unceasing accumulation of knowledge, the 
spread of impersonal forms of power and rule and an unprecedented ability to exert control over 
the natural and social worlds. However, Weber saw very clearly the cost to individuals and 
societies of such advancements: in the pursuit of world mastery, meaning recedes; the adherence 
to impersonal, abstract rules in the organization of social life severs personal ties between people 
and, in casting out the arbitrariness of the concrete and particular, formal rationality drains all 
vestiges of magic from social reality.53  
It is not only with regard to the depersonalizing and disenchanting effects of rationality 
that Weber’s critique of modernity overlaps with Marx’s concept of alienation. The emphasis on 
impersonal standards, generalizable rules, and calculative decision making in formal rationality 
aligns with the abstracting function of commodity exchange described by Marx, and discussed 
above. Indeed, as Sayer notes, it is the “unprecedented extent to which actions of economic 
agents are calculated” in modern capitalism that makes “it is the apotheosis of that form of social 
action which Weber calls Zweckrationalität.”54 But whether in commodity exchange or in 
bureaucratic organization, before any calculation can be made, equivalencies must be found: all 
that cannot be converted into a calculable, universal measure, is excluded from consideration. It 
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is in attempting to convert the social world to such universal measures that the formal rational 
framework organizing modern societies (including capitalism)  produces alienation, severing 
direct relations between people and disembedding them from organic systems of meaning. 
Two other related features of both Marx’s critique of capitalism and Weber’s critique of 
modernity are the irrationality and insatiability of their subjects. The irrationality that Marx and 
Weber identify in capitalism and formal rationality, respectively, relates to the inversion of the 
natural relations between people and their products. Marx explains, for example, that when 
commodities are produced for use, the money made from their sale is then used to purchase other 
useful commodities. But in capitalism this relation, C-M-C, is reversed, so that money, which 
was originally a mere instrument for the circulation of use values, becomes the never finished 
object of the exchange of commodities: M-C-M.55 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, Weber remarked upon the peculiarity of this relation, and the ethic of increasing 
capital: 
It is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that …it appears entirely transcendental and 
entirely irrational. Man is dominated by the making of money…[e]conomic acquisition is 
no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. 
This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive 
point of view, is evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism, as it is foreign to 
all peoples not under capitalistic influence.56 
Both Marx and Weber saw this reversal as a loss of freedom, a subjugation of the human 
will to something that was once our instrument but which now seems to stand outside of us and 
compel our actions. Where Marx expressed this as the “domination of things over men”, Weber 
saw it as the domination of means over ends. By this he meant that, through formal rationality 
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that which was originally a means to an end becomes an end in itself. If, in the natural relation, 
the desired end is the satisfaction of human needs, under formal rationality, the means 
(calculability, impersonality, generalized rules) overshadow that end, so that the end is endlessly 
deferred.  
It seems then, that this irrational, inverted relation between means and ends (or capital 
and commodity), is closely related to the peculiar dynamism characteristic of both modernity and 
capitalism. To say that the satisfaction of needs is endlessly postponed when the means to ends 
come to dominate, is to say that the means themselves become an endless project. So, for 
example, when the accumulation of capital becomes the end itself, capitalists must compete with 
one another through incessant innovation, while the conditions allowing for the accumulation of 
surplus value must be endlessly reproduced and augmented. Weber noted a similar insatiability 
not only in the colonizing reach of instrumental rationality- the endless conversion of the 
unknown into objects of knowledge and control- but also in people’s experience of modern life. 
In his 1918 lecture “Science as a Vocation,” Weber asked whether any substantive meaning 
could be attached to that vocation, and to the modern pursuit of progress more generally. In 
answer, he spoke of Tolstoy’s own inquiry into the meaning of death, and his finding that (in 
Weber’s words); 
[f]or civilized man death has no meaning…because the individual life of civilized man, 
placed into an infinite ‘progress,’ according to its own imminent meaning should never 
come to an end; for there is always a further step ahead of one who stands in the march of 
progress…civilized man, placed in the midst of continuous enrichment of culture by 
ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become ‘tired of life’ but not ‘satiated with life.’ 
He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew, 
and what he seizes is always something provisional, and not definitive, and therefore 
death for him is a meaningless occurrence.57 
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For Weber, the modern march of progress stems from the erosion of any ultimate value, 
or desired “end’ for human activity, and the simultaneous proliferation of plural and competing 
values.58 Individuals must choose which of these competing values can guide their actions, 
always being aware of their provisional nature. Scientific rationality may have helped to dissolve 
the religious foundation upon which an ultimate value once rested, but Weber saw that it could 
not offer any alternative ultimate value. That is, it could not answer the question “'What shall 
we do, and, how shall we arrange our lives?”59 In fact, in science, as in the accumulation of 
capital, the answer to this question is always postponed, for constant innovation is “the very 
meaning of scientific work, to which it is devoted in a quite specific sense.” But, Weber also 
noted that this same striving, this “progress [that] goes on ad infinitum” is generally 
characteristic of all the spheres of modern culture.60 Both capitalism, and modernity as a whole, 
are thus characterized by this “systematic imperative towards constant ‘progress.’” to use Derek 
Sayer’s phrase. 61 
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In the chapters to follow abstraction, alienation, irrationality and insatiability form a 
cluster of relations in which capitalism and modernity intersect. I show how in both economic 
and non-economic manifestations of modernity processes of abstraction facilitate both endless 
expansion and functional stability. At the same time, however, these processes have alienating 
effects, severing people from their previous relations and reversing the relations between people 
and their products, as well as the means and ends of their actions. With the endless accumulation 
of capital and knowledge and the expansion of techniques for mastering the social and natural 
world human fulfilment is continually deferred, and this gives modernity its peculiar striving 
dynamic.  
To give just one example, ‘modern’ surveying practices in the Tudor and Stuart periods 
reorganized property in land according to mathematical, geometrical measurements. This 
‘universal’ standard of knowledge helped to rationalize and give certainty to property claims, so 
that land could more easily be alienated and sold as a commodity. Customary knowledge of the 
land and of use rights were delegitimized through this process, as local social relations were now 
determined from the distanced perspective of mathematical knowledge, monetary value, and 
centralized law. The legitimation of these new standards facilitated the enclosure of lands as 
exclusive and private property. And against charges that these enclosures dispossessed and 
estranged commoners from the life-sustaining land, a powerful discourse emerged which made 
the ongoing reform and improvement of agriculture, the economy, science and society the very 
measure of civilization. 
Property and Modernity  
When I first began this dissertation I had imagined that property would be the lens through which 
I would view the modern response to uncertainty. I saw property as an enframing device for 
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creating provisional, instrumental foundations upon which to ground activities in the modern 
context of an indeterminate future. In fact, that is precisely the understanding of property 
articulated by a major tradition of property theory. As Joshua Getzler explains, there is one line 
of thinking about property, founded in the works of Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Kant and Hegel, 
which holds that the right to property is ‘natural’, or “prior to the state and the law.” Against this 
natural law conception of property, “there is a notion of property as social, a positive right 
created instrumentally by community, state, or law to secure other goals- the theory of Thomas 
Hobbes, David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber." 62 
And, while this understanding of property as something constructed and guarded by the 
laws of the state is central to the project of demystifying capitalism, it is its relationship to the 
uncertainty of the future that I think is most important for understanding the relations within 
modernity as a whole. Bentham, for example, explained that private property could not exist 
without the law to guarantee its security into the future. Unlike animals, who live only in the 
present, the human “disposition to look forward…the expectation of the future” allows us to 
“form a general plan of conduct... [e]xpectation is a chain which unites our present and our 
future existence.” This is why ‘man’ needs the security of the law, to “to guarantee to him, as 
much as possible, his possessions against future losses”:63 
The idea of property consists in an established expectation...But this expectation…can 
only be the work of the law. I can reckon upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as 
my own, only according to the promise of the law, which guarantees it to me. It is the law 
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alone which allows me to forget my natural weakness: it is from the law alone that I can 
enclose a field and give myself to its cultivation, in the distant hope of the harvest. 64 
 
Thus, it seems to me that property serves not only as a physical shelter, but as a 
metaphysical shelter from the uncertainty associated with a particular future-oriented 
consciousness. Property, backed by the law, provides a guarantee of the future in modern 
conditions where traditional guarantees of security in the future, such as Prophecy and Divine 
Providence have been eroded. Moreover, this sheltering role of property is an apt metaphor for 
understanding modern developments beyond the economic. The role of property in the 
development of the capitalism confirms its appropriateness as a defining element of modern 
societies. But it is equally and concurrently a legal category and just as important, it is 
intellectual and cultural. Property signifies not only a way of organizing socio-economic power 
but also particular ways of organizing thought and perceiving the world.   
I make this link between property and rational epistemology because they share a 
common set of gestures of control.  This wider conception of property houses distinctively 
modern forms of knowledge and power, the deployment and distribution of which manage the 
uncertainty of an open future.  Over the last several centuries in the west, property has been 
increasingly conceived of and organized as a series of discrete, bounded, (and alienable) 
locations of power and knowledge, an organizational pattern simultaneously produced in legal, 
philosophical, scientific and artistic thought. Thus, I have, in a sense, extended the metaphor of 
property, by looking at the logics by which property has been rearranged in modernity 
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(surveying, mapping, enclosing, improving, risking, insuring) as they have been applied to the 
control and acquisition of modern knowledge. 
Yet, while property evokes the key features of modernity, such as the need for certainty, 
capitalism, future orientation, abstraction, rationality and alienation, in the process of writing I 
began to think that the strength of the economic associations of property might overpower its 
metaphorical meaning as a shelter from uncertainty in modernity. After all, what I what I really 
wanted to highlight is what Heller suggested, the ongoing refashioning of (necessarily 
provisional) foundations in modernity. Furthermore, foregrounding property as the central 
metaphor tended to cast epistemic and other developments as part of the economic story, 
whereas I wanted to re-embed the economy in the complex context from which it came. Thus, 
although the reorganization of property, and property-related metaphors such as enclosing and 
boundaries, are still central to this project, I have declined to explicitly frame my argument in 
terms of property. 
Chapter Summaries 
In the second chapter, “The Removed Observer and the World as an Object of Reform: 
Surveying and Mapping in Early Modern England,” I argue that the first impulse towards 
modernity in European history appeared when the world began to be viewed as an object of 
reform, something that could be surveyed and reorganized from an external perspective. The first 
part of the chapter explores the gradual development of the perspective of the removed observer, 
from the late medieval theological re-conception of the secular world as malleable to the 
intervention of the clergy to the separation of subject from object and the idea of human self-
movement in Descartes. I also recount how the fourteenth century innovations in time-keeping 
and the adoption of linear perspective in Renaissance art, led to the quantification and 
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objectification of both time and space. By the sixteenth century, local, customary and religious 
ways of organizing and understanding time and space were first confronted with this new, 
“universal” standard or mathematics.  With an emerging consciousness of time as linear, 
irreversible, and forward moving, the future began to appear malleable to human intervention in 
the present. I consider whether, in addition to demographic instability of the period, this future 
orientation may account for a rising sense of cultural anxiety in the late medieval and early 
modern periods. In the second part of the chapter I focus on the emergence and reception of 
estate surveyors in early modern England. Using new techniques for measuring and representing 
the estate lands of their clients, surveyors challenged the customary knowledge and use of land. 
In response to opposition by commoners and religious and political leaders, proponents of the 
new surveying practices claimed the epistemological authority of this “impartial” science, 
arguing that only by mathematical measurement could the divine order beneath the soil be 
uncovered.  Estate mapping likewise served to clarify property claims and to legitimize the 
exclusive ownership of land. Meanwhile, like the military map, estate maps allowed owners to 
view their land from the distant seat of power and to strategize their interventions upon it, 
preparing the way for the enclosure and improvement of land.   
In the third chapter, “Boundary Breaking and Boundary Making: Enclosure and 
Improvement of Land and Knowledge in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century England,” my 
focus alternates between land and knowledge as objects of reform. While the practice of 
enclosure and the related discourse of improvement were crucial in facilitating the 
commodification of land and labour in the development of capitalism, I also look at their 
function as metaphors for the interacting logics of containing and expanding, or control and 
freedom in modernity. First, I show how the practice of enclosing land evolved from a response 
48 
  
 
to labour shortage in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to a practical estate management 
technique in the sixteenth century and finally, to a physical expression of exclusive legal claims 
to property from the seventeenth century onwards. Meanwhile, a discourse of agricultural 
improvement had evolved from a concern for practical management in the sixteenth century into 
a moral and national duty to cultivate and increase by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Commoners and many religious and political leaders were fiercely opposed to enclosures, for 
they extinguished the use rights of commoners, cutting them off from any means of subsisting on 
the land, and throwing them into precarious dependence upon waged labour. Thus, the discourse 
of improvement was largely defensive in the seventeenth century. However, in the eighteenth 
century, the twin projects of enclosure and improvement were powerfully endorsed by political 
philosophers, who affirmed private property as a natural right and a marker of the civilized stage 
in human history, and by the state, which intervened in enclosure disputes through hundreds of 
Parliamentary Acts. Meanwhile, the goals of establishing certainty and encouraging endless 
growth were also central to Bacon’s project of reforming knowledge. By re-grounding 
knowledge upon empirically and experimentally verifiable facts, and progressing through stages 
of increasing certainty, knowledge of the natural world could be endlessly accumulated. The 
Baconian project for the improvement of knowledge was carried on in the work of the Hartlib 
Circle and in the Royal Society. I close this chapter by illustrating the inherent instability of the 
foundations for the endless improvement of knowledge, in the example of the crisis of 
overaccumlation in Linneaus’ classificatory taxonomy, as categories had to be continually 
revised and redrawn to contain the ambivalence of natural phenomena. 
The second part of the dissertation examines how risking and insuring practices applied 
the logics of surveying, mapping, enclosing and improving to the reform of the future and of 
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society from the eighteenth century to the present day. I begin chapter four with a discussion of 
the development of the concept of risk, as a calculation and objectification of uncertainty. I then 
recount the development of probability theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the 
work of Pascal, Bernoulli, Leplace and Poisson. By accumulating available data, and mapping 
this data in such a way that patterns could be found, these theorists were able to determine the 
probability of future events, enabling what Hacking has called “the taming of chance’. 
Meanwhile, in London’s emerging stock market, investors and insurers employed new strategies 
for profiting from risk taking and for the transfer and distribution of risk. While the spreading of 
risk was not novel, what was new about maritime  and property insurance in the early eighteenth 
century was the distribution of risk through the commodification of insurance contracts and the 
increasing distance between the parties transferring risk and the parties undertaking it. Because 
of the increasing complexity and abstraction of these transactions speculative and sometimes 
fraudulent schemes flourished, bringing riches to some and ruin to others, and revealing the thin 
line between financial speculation, insurance and gambling. In response to the growing 
popularity of mutual aid societies, widows’ funds and the pooling of risks in proto-insurance 
schemes, critics condemned insurance as a kind of gambling, sinful not only because it exposed 
clients to financial ruin through predatory or incompetent schemes but also because playing with 
chance and having designs upon future events suggested a lack of faith in Divine providence. In 
the latter decades of the eighteenth century some insurance schemes, in an effort to ground their 
schemes upon a surer and more scientific foundation, began to draw on the data available in 
mortality tables, and to better distribute risk by widening their pool of clients. In such 
organisations we see evidence of a shift taking place, from faith in Divine Providence to the trust 
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in expert knowledge and abstract systems that would become hallmarks of modern liberal 
societies.  
The fifth chapter examines how, in the nineteenth century, Britain’s population was 
constituted as an object of knowledge and governance. For an increasingly centralized 
government to see, know, and control its population, techniques for overcoming distance had to 
be developed, and foremost among these were a national census and the emerging science of 
statistics. Facts were gathered about the inhabitants of Britain (as well as those of the colonial 
territories) and represented quantitatively. Such data allowed the demographic terrain to be 
mapped out and categorized in ways that were relevant to the state’s interest in security, 
productivity and health, ultimately facilitating the reform of certain problematic, risky, 
categories, such as the sick, the poor, the unemployed, criminals and the insane. I focus in 
particular on the British governments’ efforts to eradicate the risky and ambivalent presence of 
the poor, through strict categorization and deterrent intervention of the New Poor Laws. 
Meanwhile, as had happened with the emergence of the new practices of surveying, enclosing 
and insuring in the previous chapters, the census and the statistical movement were subject to 
opposition. The criticism of statistical knowledge touched on two longstanding philosophical 
problems: free will vs. determinism and the nature of truth. To many critics, the large-scale 
patterns identified and emphasized in statistical analysis seemed suggestive of an overly 
deterministic view of human life. And, related to this, critics challenged the ostensible objectivity 
of statistical representations of reality, for, even if the human agents producing these 
representations were capable of objectivity, the abundance of experience that could not be 
captured by quantification pointed to the elusive nature of truth and knowledge themselves. 
While doubts about the legitimacy of statistical knowledge have never been fully quelled, by the 
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latter decades of the nineteenth century the application of statistical and other scientific 
methodologies to the investigation of social phenomena had become institutionalized in the 
professionalization of numerous social sciences. Another important development I explore in this 
chapter is the way that, once statistical information began to be published in the 1860s, people 
began to identify both with the aggregate characteristics of their nation, and with the categories 
into which they fell as individuals. While this development did not fully displace local, 
occupational, or regional identities, it did create a new kind of social solidarity through which a 
population of free individuals could be governed through their own efforts to reflect statistical 
norms. This particular social arrangement, “liberal governmentality”, was also characteristic of 
the way that emerging insurance companies managed the risks of their clientele.    
The sixth chapter explores the interrelated roles of risk and insurance in containing and 
generating uncertainty from late-nineteenth century Britain to the globalized society of the 
present day. I begin with an account of how modern liberal governments in the late nineteenth 
century began to recognize the risk to the social order presented by the existence of an entire 
class of propertyless people excluded from the security of the polis. In the case of Britain, the 
government began to respond to this risk by gradually taking on the role of guarantor of security 
through the development of increasingly comprehensive systems of socialized insurance and 
welfare. In the first half of the century a host of organizations and institutions arose to manage 
those risks to which modern subjects of liberal capitalist societies were peculiarly exposed, such 
as unemployment, work-related injuries, and financial insecurity in old age. Over these decades 
of debate, institutional trial and error, and the massive disruptions of two world wars, informal 
schemes such as friendly societies were legislated away, leaving the security of populations in 
the hands of the insurance industry and the state, as partners in the risk management of society. 
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After the Second World War, most nations of the world developed comprehensive social welfare 
systems, including social insurance, social services and safety-net systems for the poorest 
segments of society. “Welfare states” also promoted full employment and strong regulatory 
regimes and were committed to Keynesian macroeconomic policies and international free trade. 
This “post-war consensus” thus aimed to integrate the objectives of economic growth and social 
welfare. However, by the early nineteen seventies, cracks in this arrangement began to appear, in 
the form of “stagflation” and recession.  Over the next few decades, government policy in most 
countries shifted back towards a “liberal” model of capitalism and governance. Under 
neoliberalism, welfare systems have been scaled back, and the role of risk management has 
increasingly been outsourced to the private sector. Already occupying an outsized, if barely 
acknowledged, role in shaping modern society, the insurance industry has now become the key 
institution for governing beyond the state. It uses sophisticated techniques to categorize and 
distribute risks, and surveil and regulate the behaviour of its clients, while defining and 
commodifying risks in ways that deepen insecurity across the broader population. Increasingly, 
the role of managing the risks of modern life has fallen upon individuals, even as they find their 
lives entangled within a host of compulsory and extraordinarily complex abstract systems which 
they do not understand, but upon which they depend for security and legitimate membership in 
society.  
In the seventh and final chapter of this dissertation I consider whether the modern 
response to the uncertainty of an open future – the repetition of strategies for controlling and 
transforming the world- has become a compulsion. First, I reflect on how the uncontrollable 
character of modernity has been expressed variously, through the metaphors of the monster 
(Marx), the iron cage (Weber), and the juggernaut (Giddens). I then propose that the 
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psychological conditions of addiction and obsessive-compulsion may serve as fruitful models for 
understanding the nature of our relationship to freedom and control in modernity. To explore this 
idea I review some of the socio-cultural literature which examines addiction and compulsion 
within the context of the dislocations and indeterminacy generated by modernity.  Next, I 
illustrate the addictive and compulsive character of modernity today, by reviewing our recent 
responses to the global financial crisis and the threat of climate change. Then, because 
compulsion is a matter of both unthinking habit and the fear of freedom, I argue that there are 
ways that we can exercise our courage to be free of the compulsive character of modernity. Thus, 
after drawing on key themes in the aesthetic critique of modernity, from Schiller to the 
Situationists, I consider the liberatory potential of a few current practices for seeing and being in 
the world differently.   
Exposure to uncertainty is not unique to the lives of modern people. Tomorrow has likely 
always cast a kind of shadow on today, since events to come are obscured from human 
knowledge. The threats of tomorrow, whether environmental, human or animal, were once 
disarmed by prophecy. The prophet- a holy authority- wove a story that joined the roots of the 
community to the uncertain terrain of tomorrow. Under this story people could shelter: terror of 
the unknown could be tamed with guidance and custom. 
In modernity, shelter from uncertainty is problematic and necessarily unstable. Whether 
through slow erosion or violent overthrow, the rending of divinity from authority, and of past 
from future was the unravelling of the woven story of the prophet. But a future unforetold could 
also mean a future shaped by human hands. Paradoxically, the greater the awareness of the future 
as open, its shape dependent on the decisions of the present, the more exposed we have become 
to uncertainty in the form of contingency. 
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The loss of permanent shelters provided by divine authority and community custom has 
meant the loss of any assured means of navigating uncertain terrain or sheltering from 
unforeseen weather. What guides us, shelters us and roots us now? In modernity the instincts and 
functions of prophesy have survived: we continue to frame the unknown, in such a way that it 
seems to submit to our management. The open future both invites and demands planning and the 
exercise of choice. From the necessity of choosing the shape of the future comes the impulse to 
impose order on all unassigned, unknown realms. But this kind of order, which seeks not to 
foreclose choice, is necessarily detached from any permanent ground.  
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Chapter Two 
Surveying and Mapping in Early Modern England 
In the mid sixteenth century a strange new figure appeared on the English landscape. He could be 
seen, treading the same bounds that each year the tenants themselves would walk in order to 
remember the custom of the land from time out of mind. He could be seen standing, sweeping his 
gaze across the rise and fall of the fields, and turning now and then, to stare with concentration 
into the curious instrument in his hands. This figure, the estate surveyor, was not a trespasser. He 
would have been in the employ of the landlord, charged with measuring the shape, extent and 
contents of his land with an uncommon degree of precision. But to the tenants who worked and 
lived upon this land, his presence would have felt like a violation. He was, after all, a stranger. 
And how could any just account of the land and its people come from such a solitary figure, who 
consulted his instruments as though authority somehow lay within them? 
By the close of the sixteenth century most tenants would have had good cause to view the 
figure of the estate surveyor with dread.  They would have heard from others that landlords were 
now having their land measured to the very inch; that rents would rise even as their rights by 
custom were curtailed.   The surveyor signaled a profound change to come in the relationship 
between people and land.  In his wake, the boundaries of land ownership would be sharpened and 
enclosed. Land, which had been the very ground of an entire social order, now came to be viewed 
as a measurable, alienable unit of property. 
I introduce the figure of the estate surveyor, not to point - as others have already done- to 
his role in facilitating the enclosure, improvement and commodification of land so essential to the 
development of capitalism. Rather, I want to suggest that the arrival of this figure on the scene of 
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the early modern English estate also embodied the arrival of a new consensus across Europe about 
what counted as knowledge and authority, and how truth and justice could be determined. I wish 
to stress the historical connection between the reorganization of property and the reorganization 
of knowledge in the European transition to modernity. 
Surveying, and all that it entails- the quantitative measurement of land and its visual 
representation in maps- was not only a crucial step in the transition to capitalism, but it also serves 
as an apt metaphor for a new way of seeing and relating to the world which can be called modern. 
I argue below that the transition to this new way of seeing and being in the world, taking place 
roughly between the thirteenth and seventeenth century in Europe, involved the adoption of the 
posture of the removed observer, whose impulse is to stand back from the world in order to map 
it. Such an impulse is part of a larger impulse to control which is a central feature of modernity. 
Below I will consider where this impulse came from, how it gained purchase in the culture and 
what its effects were.  
The urge to survey and map indicates a strong desire for orientation. I argue that chief 
among the many reasons for the profound sense of disorientation which pervaded late medieval 
and early modern Europe was a shift in the consciousness of time, and particularly, a developing 
sense of the future as open and contingent upon present actions. I suggest in the following that the 
posture and perspective of the removed observer was a response to this sense of exposure to a less 
determined future- a future no longer guided as before, by a divine authority. The spatial and 
phenomenological distance between the observing subject and the observed object allowed for the 
objectification of - and thus some degree of control over- a world which had begun to seem 
increasingly insecure. 
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I begin with a brief discussion of late medieval developments in law, theology, philosophy 
and science which may have contributed to a greater sense of the world as an object of reform and 
of the future as conditional upon human action. For it is here that we find the roots of the modern 
tendency to divide experience into subject and object.  In scientific and philosophical thought, this 
distancing of the subject and object leads to a greater confidence that humans could direct their 
own movements and fashion the world according to their wills. This realization leads to the further 
erosion of any sense of a fixed order, and thus to a profound sense of anxiety which pervaded late 
medieval and early modern European culture. 
Next, I look at the rise of two powerful techniques that were used for reestablishing a sense 
of order in the world. One of these was the rise of a quantitative apprehension of reality with the 
European adoption, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, of mathematical and geometrical 
knowledge from both classical Greco-Roman and contemporary Islamic thought. The second 
technique was the application of mathematical and geometrical thought to the visual representation 
of reality, particularly in Italian Renaissance painting. Both quantification and vision were 
originally seen as means to the end of penetrating through the chaos of the world into the sacred 
order lying within it. However, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries both had become ends 
in themselves. That is, both visual and quantitative representations of reality were, by then, 
invested with such authority that they became the very order that they were meant to represent. 
This new order of the world rests upon a new foundation: one constructed with abstract standards. 
In the second part of the chapter I try to bring to life the experience on the ground of this 
new way of representing the world, through the story of the estate surveyor in early modern 
England. First, I explain how the role of the surveyor began to shift in the Tudor period from one 
of stewardship and the preservation of an intricate social order, to the mathematical measurement 
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and economic valuation of landlords’ estates. I then underline how novel this quantitative 
measurement of the land was in the context of an existing customary knowledge of the land that 
was local, particular and embedded in the collective memory through the ritual practice of 
perambulation. Given this context, advocates of the new surveying methods sought to persuade a 
suspicious public of the justice and universal truth of knowledge that was founded upon 
mathematics, practiced by experts and the rightful expectation of the owners of land.  Against 
widespread moral opposition to the new surveying practices, advocates such as John Norden wrote 
surveying manuals which sought to legitimize the profession, often by questioning the motives of 
tenants resistant to the practice and by delegitimizing the customary standards by which they knew 
the land. 
 It is only in the final section of this chapter that I discuss the role of mapping in estate 
surveying for, while the theoretical knowledge of estate mapping existed in the sixteenth century, 
the application of this knowledge lagged behind the written survey, and was not widely 
commissioned by landowners, even in the seventeenth century. The ascendance of the “scientific” 
map was, however, a crucial component of the emergence of modernity. As a new way of seeing 
and representing the world, the scientific map rendered reality objective, and thus, something that 
could be captured, controlled, and reordered from a distant seat of power. Early modern states were 
the first agents to employ the emerging science of cartography in planning and actuating their 
power over both national and colonial territories. Before turning to estate mapping, then, I first 
draw on Harley, Klein and others, to explain how the maps commissioned by the Crown in the 
Elizabethan period were a key technology for binding power and knowledge together in the 
English state.  Estate maps would serve a similar purpose for the seventeenth century landowners, 
who came to recognize that the benefits of the map would far outweigh the extravagant cost of its 
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commission. The geometrical exactitude informing the creation of such a map meant that 
boundaries would be clarified and permanently stamped with expert authority, while the visual 
representation was such that one could view all of one’s land in one glance, easing plans for 
improvement and displaying one’s power and status in society. The estate map thus added a 
powerful visual component to the already abstract representation of land by the surveyor.    
The World as Object and the Future as Open 
As I have discussed in the introduction, a key feature of modernity is the perception of the future 
as contingent upon human action. However much this perception may appear to us now as 
“normal” or “natural” it was the result of a dramatic- albeit gradual- transformation in time 
consciousness which began in late medieval Europe. Much of this transformation can be traced to 
institutional and theological changes in the Roman Catholic Church after the Papal Revolution of 
the eleventh century. As Harold Berman explains, under the leadership of Pope Gregory, the 
church sought to free itself from the interference of imperial authorities. The resulting separation 
of authority in ecclesiastical and secular institutions, led to two competing legal systems, secular 
and canon, and to a shift in the theological divisions of the secular and the divine. Before the Papal 
Revolution, theologians had conceived of the saeculum, the secular realm, as the abode of the 
world and of time. The clergy and laity alike existed in this worldly time, which was delimited by 
a clear beginning and ending: from the Fall to the redemption of the Last Judgment. The realm of 
the divine, on the other hand, was timeless, and it was here that the real life of the spirit existed.1  
                                                          
1 Harold J.  Berman, Law and Revolution. Volume One: The Formation of the Western 
Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P, 1983) 109-113. Also see Ian Robinson, The 
Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century: the Lives of Pope Leo IX and Pope Gregory VII 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 2004). 
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After the revolution, the secular world stood apart from the Church. The clergy were now 
perceived to belong to the realm of the divine, which meant that the divine could be accessed in 
the world itself. Thus, the spirituality of the laity could be developed by the church, and the secular 
world itself began to appear as something that could be reformed. It is not as though the Church 
suddenly did away with the more static conception of worldly time as bound at both ends by the 
Fall and the Last Judgment. Rather, the conception of the world as an object of development and 
reform stretched worldly time to include an element of human control over its unfolding. The 
canon law became the instrument of that reform of the world, but so too did the legal order which 
developed to oversee the secular realm. In time these two autonomous legal institutions were 
themselves objects of reform, continually improving their efficacy in shaping society, by 
standardizing and rationalizing their content, and superimposing it upon heterogeneous local legal 
traditions.2 
In the same period, between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, theological thought itself 
underwent a process of objectification. Thinkers such as St. Anselm, Peter Abelard and Peter 
Lombard began to employ reason in demonstrating their faith. In fact, theology came to mean 
"rational and objective analysis and synthesis of articles of faith and of the evidence of their 
validity." 3 This idea of objectivity meant that these thinkers began to see concepts themselves as 
                                                          
2 Berman, Law and Revolution, 113. Other works discussing the separation between 
secular and canon law during the Gregorian Revolution include Kathleen G. Cushing, Papacy 
and Law in the Gregorian Revolution: The Canonistic work of Anselm of Lucca (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000); and Kriston R. Rennie, Medieval Canon Law, (Leeds, UK: Arc 
Humanities Press, 2018). 
 
3 Berman, Law and Revolution, 174-5. Also see Michael A. Gillespie, The Theological 
Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 5-9; Jorge J. E. Gracia, 
“Introduction,” A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, edited by Jorge J. E. Gracia and 
Timothy N. Noone   (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002) 4; and Alain Desrosières, .The 
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objects separate from their thinking selves, making it easier to alter and improve them. Thus, by 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the two key institutions of the late medieval world had 
begun to exhibit the modern tendency toward objectification. Not only had the law and the 
Christian church begun to be viewed and evaluated by their members from an external vantage 
point, with the aim of improvement, but in the process the future, the world, and thought itself 
were increasingly viewed from this distanced perspective.  
Objectification requires a separation and a distance between the observing subject and the 
observed object. By the early modern period, around the time that our estate surveyor arrives on 
the scene, subject and object were further dichotomized in philosophical and scientific thought. In 
particular, the notions of subjectivity and human autonomy seem to have developed in tandem 
with a growing perception of the world as dynamic. Of course, a greater notion of human agency 
had already been advanced in Renaissance humanism. But Copernicus’ finding that it is the earth 
that moves around the sun and not the other way around, played no small part in challenging the 
traditional Christian cosmology, which held that earth had no motion but that which originated 
from an external source.4 Copernicus’s findings challenged future thinkers to discover the cause 
of the movement observable in the heavens, on earth and in humans themselves. It was partly by 
                                                          
Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002) 69-72. 
 
4 Nicholas P. Leveilee, "Copernicus, Galileo, and the Church: Science in a Religious 
World," Inquiries Journal 3, no. 05 (2011), 1-2. For broader treatments of the relations between 
medieval scientific theories and the doctrines and authority of the Church please see, Edward 
Grant, God and Reason in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001); 
James Hannam, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern 
Science, (London: Icon Books, 2009); and Robert Westman, 'The Copernicans and the 
Churches,” in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between Christianity and 
Science, eds. David Lindberg and Ronald Numbers (California, University of California, 1986).  
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responding to this central question that Descartes discovered that in the “continuous flux of 
experience” the one constant, the one certainty, was his doubting, thinking self. Descartes 
conceived of that subject as Res cogitans- a substance that, in contrast with the object- res extensa 
- did not extend into space.5  
According to Ferguson, what is important in Descartes division is that both subject and 
object “are characterized in terms of an immanent tendency to change."6 Because Descartes’ 
subject is a “detached and omniscient observer” which can choose to change its perspective of 
objects at will "the human realm is a self-defining domain… not limited or subordinated to a 
presumed pre-existing and fixed cosmological order. Whatever order is revealed in the human 
world is the result of human activity itself that, in the event, might have been otherwise."7 But 
                                                          
5 Harvie Ferguson, Modernity and Subjectivity: Body, Soul, Spirit (Charlottesville & 
London: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 12. 
 
6 Ferguson, Modernity and Subjectivity, 6. For an interesting discussion of Cartesian 
dualism from the perspective of current neurological science, see Antonio R. Demasio, Descartes’ 
Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, (New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999). 
The “dualism” of Cartesian thought is often taken for granted and cast as an abrupt, even violent, 
and rending of the human relationship to nature. Such readings neglect the complex context of 
Descartes’ thought. Neil Robertson complicates Descartes’ dualism and situates it within its early 
modern intellectual and theological context, arguing that, “For Descartes and the early moderns 
generally, up to the turn to “critique” in the 1750s and later, the “externalization” of nature as res 
extensa or mechanism does not, or does not simply, mean that nature is reducible to technological 
will or subjective appropriation. Seeing nature as res extensa brings to nature as a whole an 
objectivity and substantiality which is grounded in its divine foundation. What for Descartes makes 
nature both knowable to us and divinely secured in its objectivity is the “idea”—binding on human 
rationality, nature and God… The very independence and externality of Cartesian nature is found 
not only in its mechanization—where the parts seem to fall away from an organic whole—but 
equally in a more complete unity of whole and part than could be attained in pre-modern science.” 
See Neil Robertson, “Introduction: Descartes and the Modern” in Descartes and the Modern, eds. 
Neil Robertson, Gordon McOuat and Tom Vinci (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars’ Publishing, 
2008), 7. 
 
7 Ferguson, Modernity and Subjectivity, 8, 13. 
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Descartes’ theoretical conclusion that humans have the potential to shape their futures would not 
have changed the worldview of most Europeans at this time. Most people remained subject to a 
fixed order –both socially and economically. And for those influential thinkers who had the leisure 
to contemplate it, the thrill of human self-movement was tempered by a heightened sense of the 
future as contingent and therefore uncertain.  
Late Medieval Anxiety 
In spite of the greater awareness and assertions of human agency and potential in the world, the 
centuries during which Europe transitioned from the "medieval" to the "early modern" periods 
cannot be characterized as optimistic.  Letters, essays, journals and other texts written by 
Europeans of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries reveal that their authors experienced an unusual 
degree of uncertainty and anxiety. Much of the research into whether and how this "age of anxiety" 
can be distinguished from the general human experience of anxiety, and if so, why that may be, 
was completed in the 60s and 70s by Huizinga, Lynn White and Bouwsma.8  
In some ways it is easy to see why these centuries were characterized by uneasiness. 
Massive fluctuations in population could certainly account for a sense of instability. Historians 
have estimated that the population of Europe doubled between the eleventh and fourteenth 
                                                          
8 Johan H. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, 
Thought, and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1969); Lynn White, Jr., "Death and the Devil," The Darker Vision of the 
Renaissance: Beyond the Fields of Reason, ed. Robert S. Kinsman (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1974);  William J. Bouwsma, "Anxiety and the Formation of Early Modern Culture," A Usable 
Past: Essays in European Cultural History, ed. William J. Bouwsma, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), https://muse.jhu.edu/. Also see Michael Seidlmayer, Currents of Medieval 
Thought, trans. D. Barker (Oxford, Oxford UP, 1960); M. B. Becker, "Individualism in the Early 
Italian Renaissance: Burden and Blessing," Studies in the Renaissance 19 (1972); and Charles 
Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).  
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centuries.9 Then, in the fourteenth century, the plague now known as “The Black Death” wiped 
out about one third of Europe’s population.10 When the population began to increase again in the 
following century, it seemed to do so particularly in urban settings, where people were strangers 
to each other and the pace of life seemed to accelerate, and to centre on the rising bustle of 
commercial activity.11 Confrontation with the newly Islamicized Near East, helped to create a 
sense of Europe's shared culture of Christianity and the Latin language. But this cultural identity 
was also marked by a new sense of the smallness of Europe's place in the world.12 Meanwhile, 
epidemic diseases, famine, the polarization of wealth and the resulting landlessness of a 
disappearing smallholder class all combined to foment unrest among peasants across the 
continent.13  Now, when popular uprisings occurred in one part of the continent, such as the peasant 
rebellion in 1380s in England, elites everywhere feared that they would spread to their own 
                                                          
9 In fact, Chris Wickham estimates that the population may have tripled in that time. In 
the case of England, he draws on the English Domesday survey of 1086, which records 
England’s population as 2 million, and estimates that around 1300 that population had peaked at 
5 million. See Chris Wickham, Medieval Europe (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2016), 121-3. For other, more modest estimates, see Josiah C. Russell, "Population in Europe, 
500-1500,” in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Vol. I: The Middle Ages, ed. Carlo M. 
Cipolla, (Glasgow: Collins/Fontana, 1972); and Poalo Malanima, Pre-modern European 
Economy: One Thousand Years (10th-nineteenth Centuries), (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 1-2. 
 
10 David Levine, At the Dawn of Modernity: Biology, Culture, and Material Life in 
Europe after the Year 1000 (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 335. 
 
11 Henry Kamen, Early Modern European Society (London: Routledge, 1999), 23-4. 
 
12 Kamen, Early Modern European Society, 1-3. 
 
13 František Graus, “From Resistance to Revolt: The Late Medieval Peasant Wars in the 
Context of Social Crisis,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 3, no.1 (1975): 5-6 and  
Rodney Hilton, Bond Men Made Free: Medieval Peasant Movements and the English Peasant 
Rising of 1381 (London: Routledge, 1988), 16-17. Also see Patrick Lantschner, "Revolts and the 
Political Order of Cities in the Late Middle Ages," Past & Present 225, no. 1 (2014).            
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countries.14 And spreading too, as a result of the population fluctuations, were people themselves. 
According to Kamen, "the growing pressure on land use, a rise in prices stimulated in part by 
higher demand, a crisis in the exploitation of labour and the level of wages" resulted in the “restless 
movement of migratory populations" across the continent.15 
A case can therefore be made for the material bases for a pervasive anxiety in this period. 
But, I am also persuaded by a different sort of explanation altogether, one that more closely reflects 
on the nature of "anxiety" itself. It is Bouwsma who reminds us that anxiety is a general state of 
uneasiness, or worry, which is not attached to any particular fear. It more like a haunting from the 
future: a vague and disturbing sense of uncertainty about what might come to be. Anxiety, 
therefore, is a sense of insecurity peculiar to a future orientation.16 As I have already discussed 
above, this awareness of the future as open and contingent had been growing since the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, when the Church began to blur the strict division between the earthly and 
time-bound on the one hand, and the eternal realm of the divine, on the other. Bouwsma suggests 
that the blurring of such boundaries- which had long provided people with a meaningful 
framework within which to live- was deeply disorienting.17  
The writing of this period reveals a new historical consciousness, a sense that "now' the 
                                                          
 
14 Kamen, Early Modern European Society, 27; Also see, Samuel K. Cohn Jr. Lust for 
Liberty: the Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200-1425 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006) and Justine Firnhaber-Baker and Dirk Schoenaers, eds., The 
Routledge History Handbook of Medieval Revolt (London and New York: Routledge, 2017). 
 
15 Kamen, Early Modern European Society, 24. 
 
16 Bouwsma, "Anxiety and the Formation of Early Modern Culture," 161-2. 
 
17 Ibid, 173.  
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time is out of joint, and people have wandered off the well-worn path of tradition. Nostalgia now 
dominates reflections on the past, when order, peace and wholeness were not yet broken. Eustache 
Deschamps’ lament that, "Now the world is cowardly, decayed, and weak, / All goes badly," 
expresses the sense of cultural degeneration giving rise to such nostalgia.18 This sense of being 
lost, or on the wrong path, came about because even those boundaries that had persisted were now 
being crossed. Previously, boundaries had been maintained in the minds and actions of the people 
who, by avoiding behaviours that trespassed the known margins, could assert some sense of agency 
over their fates. But with the unprecedented social and geographical mobility of this period this 
work of "boundary maintenance" faltered.19 
The relative confusion of the time meant that it was easy for someone to find themselves, 
"a violator of its sacred limits [and] the reluctant inhabitant of precisely those dangerous 
borderlands.” And once doubts about these boundaries began to creep in a person might feel 
"thrown, disoriented, back into the void from which it was the task of culture to rescue him." Thus 
Bouwsma attributes much of late medieval anxiety to the "growing inability of an inherited culture 
                                                          
 
18 Ibid, 166. On the anxiety of the age, and alternative means of coping with it, see Thomas 
Fudge, Medieval Religion and its Anxieties: History and Mystery in the Other Middle Ages, (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). According to Fudge, “later medieval Europe was an age 
characterized by fear, uncertainty, apocalyptic angst and visions of calamity…the arrival of the 
black death intensified the medieval preoccupation with the ‘four last things’: death, judgement, 
heaven and hell.” This “eschatological fear convulsed parts of Europe and the late medieval period 
was a time of disturbance,” 8. 
19 Allison P. Coudert, “Space, Time and Identity: Giovanni Battista Piranesi and the 
Epidemic of Ennui in the Pre-Modern West,” in Travel, Time, and Space in the Middle Ages and 
Early Modern Time: Explorations of World Perceptions and Processes of Identity Formation ed.  
Albrecht Classen, (Boston: Walter de Gruyter Inc., 2018), 648-9. 
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to invest experience with meaning."20  
How was this sense of disorientation overcome? For we do know, that by the turn of the 
seventeenth century, something had begun to change. There is still the sense, in Shakespeare's 
words, that "the time” was “out of joint" and there is extensive documentation from this period of 
a widespread fear of societal disorder.21 But the reversion to nostalgia appears to have waned by 
this time. Bouwsma explains that by this time "Man's true home was no longer in the past but 
increasingly in the future, whatever it might hold in store. And the growing belief in progress from 
the later sixteenth century onward attests that thoughts of the future were less and less accompanied 
by anxiety." 22 
I share with Bouwsma and Crosby the contention that the lessening of a generalized anxiety 
and cultural disorientation had much to do with the construction and ascendance of a quantitative 
framework through which to view reality. This "quantitative revolution" provided precisely what 
was lacking in western European culture at the time: a way of establishing certainty, signposts by 
which people could know their place in the world and which were written in a universally 
comprehensive language. 
As we will see below, much of the scientific and mathematical knowledge that spurred this 
revolution was gathered from other cultures, where it had been building for centuries. It seems odd 
therefore that this knowledge- received so late and at second and third hand- should ignite in 
                                                          
 
20 Bouwsma, "Anxiety and the Formation of Early Modern Culture," 173. 
 
21 A.L.Biere, Masterless Men: the Vagrancy Problem in England: 1560-1640 (London: 
Methuen, 1985). 
 
22 Bouwsma, "Anxiety and the Formation of Early Modern Culture," 182. 
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Europe a new, quantitative world view. One explanation, offered by both Whitrow and Crosby, 
suggests that the very fragility of European culture in the late medieval period may be the reason 
it was uniquely receptive to a quantitative revolution. Whitrow, following J.H. Plumb, suggests 
that Europe, with its mash-up of borrowed and conflicting cultural traditions, was more susceptible 
to historical uncertainty. In contrast, "the unity and 'all-embracing certainty' of China's traditional 
order was such that it was not necessary to question its place in history.”23  
Similarly, Crosby describes Europe as "intellectually as well as socially unsolidified."24 
Europe in the late medieval period was not centralized, and therefore had numerous centres, to 
which those dissenting from dominant ideologies could take refuge. This meant that novel 
scientific and philosophical thought could travel and pick up momentum, without being forced to 
harmonize with the views of an overarching authority. The west was "unique among the great 
civilizations in its lack of phylogenic classical tradition. The classical synthesis of the others were 
deeply rooted in their pasts" so such civilizations “did not feel obligated to rethink their basic 
concepts of reality."25 The two great cultural influences in medieval Europe, Greek and Hebrew 
thought, were "disharmonious". The former was rationalistic and the latter mystical. Thus "The 
West, unlike its rivals, had a chronic need for explainers, adjusters and re-synthesizers."26 The 
early modern turn towards quantitative explanations of the world therefore provided Europeans 
                                                          
 
23 J.H. Plumb, in G. J. Whitrow, Time in History: The Evolution of Our General Awareness 
of Time and Temporal Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 91. 
 
24 Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality: Quantification in Western Europe: 1250-
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25 Ibid, 55. 
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with the orientation that had been so lacking in the late medieval period.  
The Abstract Representation of the World: Vision and Quantification 
There were two tendencies in late medieval and early modern thought that facilitated ever greater 
abstraction in apprehending the world: one was the prioritizing of visuality over the other senses; 
the other was the ascendance of quantification as the universal language of reality. Both of these 
ways of representing the world, or "reality", tended towards abstraction, and both were used as 
evidence of the legitimacy either of an authority, whether divine or secular- or of a claim to truth 
and knowledge.   
By the time of the arrival of the estate surveyor in early modern England, the shift in 
European culture towards a quantitative approach to reality was well underway. Of course, as we 
will see when we return to the example of estate surveying, it was still perceived as foreign way 
of thinking in most people's day to day experience, and mathematical and geometrical knowledge 
were only just beginning to seem a respectable and appropriate area of study for the landowning 
class.27 However, the initial turn towards quantification had taken place in the late medieval period 
with the translation into Latin of ancient Greek and Roman texts, and the transmission of 
knowledge from the Islamic world from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries.28 
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28  For more on these translations and the influence of Islamic thought on late medieval 
intellectual developments please see Charles Burnett, Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: The 
Translators and their Intellectual and Social Context, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Variorum, 2009); 
George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2007); David C Lindberg, The  Beginnings of Western Science: The European 
70 
  
 
 Having studied with Jewish and Muslim scholars in Spain in the twelfth century, English 
Scholars Robert of Chester and Adelard of Bath brought back with them Latin translations of Plato, 
Ptolemy, and Avicenna. Other scholars brought back translations of Aristotle in the thirteenth 
century.29 Crosby suggests that this influx of long lost classical knowledge and of new knowledge 
from the Islamic world was particularly dramatic between 1275 and 1325 and compares this 
intellectually exciting and transformative 50 year period with the first half of the 20th century.30 
The Qualitative World View 
Because we live in a world long since conquered by quantification, to truly understand the nature 
of the change it brought to early modern society we need to understand what it was like to live, as 
pre-moderns did, in a qualitative world. By qualitative, I mean that the heterogeneity of the things 
and people of the world was paramount: difference mattered. In fact, the recognition of differences 
ensured the stability and rightness of the medieval world view. The medieval world, according to 
Bouwsma, was "above all...based on the notion of absolute qualitative distinctions rooted in 
ultimate reality ... The system depended on the clarity of these distinctions, and it could not tolerate 
ambiguity." 31 Crosby illustrates the medieval perception of "reality's essential heterogeneity" by 
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explaining how people then would have compared rocks to fire: "fire rose and rocks fell not 
because they had different amounts of the same abstract thing, weight, but because they were 
different, period." 32  
The absence of any one abstract or universal standard by which different phenomena are 
arranged rationally inside a grid is difficult to conceive of from our standpoint. But perhaps we 
can imagine it by considering how pre-modern peoples thought about time and space.  The first 
thing to note is that they would not have understood the use of the words "time" and "space" 
without their being attached to something in particular.33 Time, for instance, could not have been 
thought about as if it were a thing in itself: there was the time of winter, or the time of dawn, or 
the time it took for bread to bake. And space was even more foreign a concept. There was place, 
and the distances between places, but distances were marked by the experience of the time it took 
to travel them. Time was often not expressed in numerical terms, but in terms that related to a 
known experience of duration- such as “more than the time it takes to walk beyond that hill". 
Measurements of distance or duration were therefore marked by reference to everyday 
experience.34  
Thus, in addition to recognizing the heterogeneity of phenomena, the qualitative 
apprehension of the world was also subjective, sensually perceptible and embedded in the fabric 
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of the local community. Examples of how such qualities informed time perception can be found 
in Le Roy Ladurie's work on peasants in fourteenth century Montaillou.35 Ladurie explained that 
while the people of Montaillou and Ariege did have a calendar, it would have been held by the 
local priest. And what mattered in the calendar were not the numbers of the days but the feast days 
of particular saints important to the region. Meanwhile, if they wished to refer to a particular period 
of the night time, they would have done so “by means of visual, aural, or physiological references 
such as "after sunset", 'at nightfall', 'after the first sleep' ...'at the cock-crow..." 36 
Even when medieval people did mark the passage of time in terms of hours, they did so 
according to an array of different referents. Reviewing thousands of records of crimes in late 
fourteenth and early fifteenth century France, Claude Gauvard analysed if and how the hour at 
which a crime occurred was described. She found that, of the 35% that did specify the hour, 
14.5% referred to “clock-time”; 11.5% referred to ecclesiastical hours; 4% used “folkloric” 
expressions to indicate the hour; 27.5% referred to a meal time; and 29% referred to the 
placement of the sun.37 Clearly, as Camarin Porter notes, medieval people were aware of “a 
plurality of times.”38 
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Medieval references to “hours”, moreover, did not necessarily mean the equal hours of the 
24 hour clock as we know it. For instance, the hours in the “books of hours” kept by aristocrats 
were really just approximate estimates of the duration of particular activities to be carried out in 
the course of the day.39 Meanwhile, the canonical hours observed by monks, such as vespers, nones 
and terce were not only associated primarily with liturgy, but when they were attached to numbers, 
the numbers themselves were not neutral, equal units, as we think of numbers today. Numbers 
were meaningful symbolically..40 This is demonstrated in the evolution of the canonical hour nones 
into our understanding of "noon".  Crosby notes that, originally, nones was observed in the late 
afternoon, but since this caused practical problems, such as hunger, it was gradually shifted back 
to an earlier period in the afternoon. When it was decided that it should now take place in the sixth 
hour (that is, the sixth hour observed liturgically since waking) the decision was based on what we 
would call numerological mysticism- which claimed that 6, being the sum of 1+2+3, was perfect.41 
The awakening of scholarly interest in mathematics and geometry in thirteenth century 
Europe would not develop into a truly quantitative approach to knowledge for at least three 
centuries. Mathematics was of interest primarily as a philosophical tool.  According to Srincek 
numbers were considered "crucial to understanding the order of being, but as late as the thirteenth 
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century, physics had few measurements and few calculations, there were no quantified procedures 
and no rigorously quantified concepts available."42 
   Much would have to change to alter a mindset that saw each thing, distance, temperature, 
duration and even numbers themselves, as suffused with distinct qualities. This was a world in 
which nothing served as the neutral measure by which all other things could be ordered. To the 
contemporary mind, such a world seems disorganized- even chaotic. But this is because, for most 
of us, the old frame of reference which held everything in place is no longer felt powerfully. It has 
long been eroded by centuries of doubt and the disintegration of the old social order. Without 
understanding the cohesive power of the old framework, the qualitative approach to reality appears 
to rest on flimsy, inconsistent and illogical premises.  Medieval Europeans, Crosby reminds us, 
believed that the people of the Old Testament really did live for hundreds of years and that there 
was a time when people were giants. They even found credible Gregory of Tours’s claim (in the 
sixth century) to have known people who had seen -with their own eyes - the bottom of the Red 
Sea, the very ruts of the chariots that the Israelites used in their flight from the Pharaoh’s army.43 
As we understand time, and the pace of species evolution, such beliefs and claims appear absurd. 
However, our own perceptions of the passage of time are not always logically consistent either. 
Moreover, Crosby explains that to the medieval mind, "the exact year of Exodus was not 
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compellingly important. Perhaps not every very interesting. Time, beyond the individual life span 
was envisioned not as a straight line marked off in equal quanta but as a stage for the enactment 
of the greatest of all dramas, Salvation versus Damnation"44  
To medieval Christians the link between their own lives and those of the Old Testament 
figures was not the flow of time unfolding at a steady, uniform pace. Rather, they believed that 
people of the past had lived in a different time altogether. Time was, as Palti puts it, "a succession 
of 'nows' …every change in world history required a divine intervention which marked a radical 
difference between past and present." Thus, only the present moment "had a proper ontological 
status." 45 What linked all of these 'nows' was that they were each made possible by the presence 
of God in the world. God was the frame of reference which made sense of a heterogeneous world 
and his omnipotence made everything possible- even the idea that our ancestors were giants.   
Thus it isn't strictly true to suggest, as I did above, that an external standard of reference 
by which to measure and arrange the things of the world was absent from pre-modern European 
culture. God, and the immutable and eternal realm he occupied, was necessarily external to the 
world. But this standard of reference was also organic and local. It was part of the ground upon 
which people lived, because it was kept alive - along with all sorts of customary knowledge- in the 
collective memory of communities. In that sense it was not an external standard. 
It would take a very long time, until the period we call "high" modernity, for this standard 
of reference -the belief in a divine order upon which everything was founded- to give way entirely 
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to the new standard. As we shall see with the entrance of the estate surveyor into the world 
inhabited by manorial tenants, it was at the level of the community that this qualitative order was 
first overtaken by a grid of reference entirely external to people's experience: this was 
quantification. 
The Abstract Standards of Quantitative Reality 
Abstraction was the key to the transformation of a qualitative world view to a quantitative approach 
to reality. According to Srnicek a "double movement of abstraction" was required: "both the 
construction of a grid of reference and an abstraction from the particularities of phenomenal 
reality" 46 Quantification, he says, 
[R]equires and inaugurates a level of abstraction away from immediate phenomenal 
experience. It requires, first, the projection of a homogenous reality commensurable with 
measurement. If qualities and substances are heterogeneous, there can be no common 
measure to apply them. What is necessary is a reduction of quality to quantity. Secondly, 
it requires an abstract scale with which to measure reality against.47 
Aside from the philosophical interest in numbers and geometry among the Schoolmen, 
most of the earliest evidence indicating the rise of quantitative thought in Europe tends to relate to 
money and commercial activity.  By the close of the thirteenth century, commercial trading 
networks had been established that linked China to the Middle East and Europe while, within 
Europe, a degree of economic integration had been underway since the eleventh century. In this 
period, growing markets, new business techniques, urbanization and the increasing use of 
monetary transactions amounted to what some have called “the Commercial Revolution of the 
Middle Ages.”48 Monetization involved the use of currency as a standard for determining the 
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values of different goods being exchanged, and was thus a step towards abstraction of value.49 The 
"monetization" of currency first happened in Europe in the Italian city states of Florence and 
Genoa, each of which minted their own currency in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 50 By the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, large cities in France and Britain also began to mint their own 
currency.51 According to Joel Kaye, monetization is a “multifaceted social process” involving not 
only the use of coins but also, 
[T]he development of new modes of consciousness and new habits of thought and 
perception attached to that use. Among these: the attainment of literacy and numeracy on 
a wide scale; the routine translation of qualitative values into the quantitative terms of a 
numerable price; the acquisition of habits of calculation in which options are weighed in 
terms of cost and the opportunities for profit; a new sensitivity to measurement and the 
potentialities of measurement; and a new attention to the observation and recording of 
detail, with profound implications for literature, the plastic arts, and learning, particularly 
in the intellectual area that we now designate as science. 52 
One of the ways that monetization, and commercial activity in general, helped to inculcate 
new habits of quantitative thought among medieval Europeans was by bringing in their wake a 
host of practical problems that could only be solved through innovative approaches to mathematics 
and numbers. That is, in order to calculate more complex transactions, and to find a more universal 
means of measuring the value of heterogeneous goods, the mystical content of numbers had to be 
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sidestepped.53 Before Robert of Chester translated a book on Hindu-Arabic numbers by al-
Khwarizmi in the twelfth century, Europeans had depended on a counting board for their 
calculations.  The problem with the counting board was that as you worked out a problem you 
erased steps in your thinking, and this inhibited more complex or abstract problem solving.54 The 
need for a more sophisticated, efficient and adaptable approach to calculations explains the eager 
adoption of Hindu-Arabic numbers in the twelfth century and their eventual displacement of the 
Roman numerical system four centuries later.55 The new numbers could be employed in what 
Europeans began to call "pen-reckoning," allowing one to review each step in a calculation, and 
to make adjustments as needed. The new numbers were an important step towards the quantitative 
turn in European culture, for, as Crosby points out, just as " Western Europeans turned away from 
one super-national, superregional language, Latin, in favor of their several vernacular tongues, 
they accepted and embraced another and truly universal language, algorism."56  
The Objectification of Time 
It is not coincidental that the first mechanical clocks appeared in urban centres around the same 
time that money was beginning to be used as a standard of equivalence for the exchange of 
commodities. Just as money eased transactions at a time of increasing trading activity both 
within Europe and with regions beyond it, the standardization of time allowed merchants to 
                                                          
 
53 Srnicek, “Abstraction and Value,” 77-81. 
 
54 Crosby, The Measure of Reality, 111. 
 
55 Ibid, 112-113. 
 
56 Ibid, 116. 
79 
  
 
coordinate their activities.57 According to Crosby, reference to the mechanical clock can be 
found in texts such as Romance of the Rose, as early as 1270. After 1300 such references 
appeared more frequently. The new kind of Clock is mentioned numerous times in Dante's 
Paradiso, for instance.58 Appearing even earlier than these popular references were the theories 
of thirteenth century Scholastic philosophers Robert Kilwardby and Roger Bacon, who argued 
that time could be measured objectively. Bacon’s position, according to Mondschein and Casey, 
was that “time is independent, unitary, is abstracted from and does not adhere to individual 
things, and flows without reference to moving things, though we can know of its passage from 
moving things.”59  
While the first mechanical clocks appeared in Europe at the turn of the fourteenth century, 
clocks themselves were not new. Some version or other of clocks, including sun dials and some 
very complex water clocks, had been around for many centuries in China and the Middle East. For 
centuries, Europeans had been using sundials and graduated candles, but in the eleventh century 
they were introduced to the Islamic technology of the astrolabe, an “observational device for taking 
the time from the sun and stars so as to calibrate the water clock.” From the mid thirteenth century, 
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application of the astrolabe allowed for the reckoning of equal hours.60   
What made the mechanical clock of the early fourteenth century unique was the use of the 
"escapement" which allowed for an even and uninterrupted expenditure of energy that was self-
propelling.61 The introduction of this mechanism inaugurated a novel way of imagining time. 
Crosby explains that previously, "Time had seemed to most people as an unsegmented flow." For 
centuries people had tried to "imitate its flowing passage with the use of water, candles and sand." 
But the variable nature of these was a problem that was only overcome when “they began to think 
of it as a "succession of quanta."62  
By the fourteenth century it became more common to find public clocks in larger European 
towns.63  Now, according to A.J. Gurevich, "for the first time in history" time began to be "'isolated'  
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as a pure form, exterior to life."64 But even as they introduced people to a new abstract standard of 
time, public clocks also served to demonstrate a town's wealth, importance and scientific 
advancement. Moreover, as Le Pan notes, these "mechanical marvels" inspired awe in those who 
looked upon them: they were “a vision of time as part of the divine order: the functional 
implications of the objective time that the hands displayed were at first often quite incidental."65  
Thus, it should be remembered that the introduction of “objective” time did not suddenly and 
dramatically change how people experienced time or imagined their relationship to nature or the 
divine.  
But it was as a visible (and audible) reminder of time's incessant movement that the 
mechanical town clock had its greatest impact on the time consciousness of urban late medieval 
Europeans. A wholly new anxiety about time’s passage can be found in letters, diaries, and other 
texts from the fourteenth century. Petrarch, for example, wrote that "one unalterable speed is the 
course of life. There is no going back or taking pause. We move forward through all tempest and 
whatever wind. Whether the course be easy or difficult, short or long, through all there is one 
constant velocity."66 Elsewhere, writing to Emperor Charles IV, Petrarch suggests that time is "so 
precious, nay, so inestimable a possession that it is the one thing which the learned agree can justify 
avarice." 67 Passages in Piers the Ploughman, and in the writings of the painter Alberti, the scholar 
Vergerio, Rabelais' teacher Ponocrates, and even a merchant's wife, all express this sense that time 
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was a scarce commodity which should never be wasted.68  
From the fourteenth century, then, some Europeans at least, would have more sharply 
experienced time as moving irreversibly towards a future (about which the only thing known for 
certain was that death awaited everyone). Caught up in time's thrall, there was little such people 
could do but pay even closer attention to how they used the time they had. By treating time as a 
precious resource, the expenditure of which could be closely monitored and managed, people could 
lessen their sense of helplessness; they could proceed as though they actually had some degree of 
control in the matter. Vigilance with regard to time's passage led to the proliferation of mechanical 
clocks in ever more public, and even private settings. But the more widespread presence of clocks 
only sharpened the new sense of time as thing, external to and looming over the lives of people. 
When we speak of the "objectification" of time, which is what was happening here, it can sound 
like cold calculation and nothing more. In fact, it was the cumulative outcome of an ongoing and 
anguished struggle to overcome the uncertainty bred by time-consciousness.  Objectification 
seemed to harness and tame something frightening. But at the same time, it gave further power 
and life to something that was not actually an independent reality. 
The Objectification of Space 
A similar dynamic in which the cycle of objectification, anxiety and hypervigilance repeats and 
propels itself ever forward, can be found in the history of space in European thought. The 
quantification of space - the notion that it existed independently - lagged behind the quantification 
of time by at least two centuries.69 Just as medieval Europeans had no notion of time as one all-
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encompassing phenomenon, neither did they conceive of “space in general”. Instead places, 
spheres or realms were particular and finite. Nor could they be divorced from the symbolic 
meanings that had been attached to them. Space was, according to Crosby, “spherical and 
qualitative in structure". The spheres were: 
[T]ightly nested, one inside the other. There was no emptiness between them....All spheres 
and their visible freight (bodies) moved in perfect circles because the heavens were perfect 
and the circle was the most perfect and noble shape. Shapes had qualities, and the circle, 
like the number 6, was intrinsically noble. Motion in straight lines was antithetical to the 
nature of the heavens…everything below the moon was changeable and ignoble, that is to 
say composed of the four elements.70  
Meanwhile what maps there were may have contained basic information about what lay 
near and far, but they were also, like the first town clocks, suffused with symbolic and religious 
content. According to Kupfer, medieval maps served “a range and often a blend of didactic, 
religious, political, social and other pragmatic functions.” 71 The thirteenth century Ebstorf map of 
the world, for example, was as much a religious, mystical, and historical map as it was 
geographical. In it, Christ’s body is depicted, his arms outstretched as on the cross, with his head, 
feet and hands marking the eastern, western, northern and southern boundaries of the world. The 
heavenly city of Jerusalem is at the centre of the map, and within its walls, the figure of Christ 
rising from the dead. According to Pischke, the central message of this map was that “Christ keeps 
the world together, and is part of this world…and the world is part of Christ as his body.”  72 This 
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map, and others like it, contained text and images referencing both biblical and pagan history.73 In 
fact, as Kupfer notes, one of the most interesting characteristics of medieval maps is “the way they 
integrate temporal and spatial structures,” an assimilation that corresponds to the medieval notion 
of saeculum, meaning both the physical world and its perishability under the rule of time.  Viewing 
“space through the lens of time,” medieval maps “layered different epochs within [a] unified field” 
and are “often described as the visual counterparts of universal chronicles.”74   
In the late medieval period it was understood that heavenly bodies were very far away. Yet 
medieval estimates of their distance from the earth reveal to us how much smaller and more 
humanly relatable their sense of the universe’s size was compared to our own. In Crosby’s view, 
what seems to have changed everything, the way the escapement in the mechanical clock had 
changed time perception, was the arrival in Florence at the turn of the fifteenth century of Ptolemy's 
Geography from Constantinople. While Ptolemy's depiction of the universe reinforced the 
medieval conception of space as hierarchical it also included the innovation of projecting a grid 
onto pictures of the earth's surface.75 Points along the lines of the grid could be lined up "in 
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accordance with the positions of the heavenly bodies." The Geography also provided mathematical 
methods for representing the curved earth on the flat surface of maps.76 Once European 
astronomers learned to treat the surface of the earth as a neutral, geometrically measurable space, 
sophisticated calculations about the distance to the stars was possible. By the end of the sixteenth 
century, the calculations of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe led to the conclusion that the universe 
was almost inconceivably larger than had previously been estimated: 400,000 times larger in the 
Copernican system!77 
In fact, writing in the 1580s, Bruno described the universe in a way that resonates with our 
own perception of it: "there is a single general space, a single vast immensity which we may freely 
call Void: in it are innumerable globes like this one on which we live and grow; this space we 
declare to be infinite, since neither reason, convenience, sense-perception nor nature assign to it a 
limit."78 Elsewhere Bruno wrote "There are no ends, boundaries, limits or walls which can defraud 
or deprive us of the infinite multitude of things."79 
But if the possibility of infinite space inspired a sense of freedom and abundance to some 
thinkers, it was more often felt to be frightening. Bouwsma has argued that the disintegration of 
old cultural and physical boundaries was joined for some time by a "frantic if ultimately 
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unsuccessful, effort to shore them up." This was evident in the regressive character of the later 
Renaissance period, when Church authorities attempted to silence innovative thinkers such as 
Bruno and Galileo, and when secular rulers began to more emphatically define the boundaries of 
their states.80 
As I have already mentioned above, late medieval and early modern Europe was a time of 
notable anxiety, a sense of cultural degeneration, and widespread disorientation. Following 
Bouwsma, I posit that the ascendance of measuring, counting and calculating activities at this time 
may well have served to compensate for the erosion of traditional sources of certainty. The rise of 
quantification had already contributed to the dissolution of the old framework, and with it, the 
orientation and meaning it had offered. But in their absence, a quantitative approach to reality 
offered an endless series of solvable problems: "The mathematician could begin at any point in the 
welter of the phenomenal world, by measurement in units of his own devising define its relation 
to other phenomena, and so, like the artist in words or in paint, describe an order in the universe 
(if not the order of the universe), in accordance with his chosen purposes."81 Mathematics offered 
a new boundary or standard of reference, one that was more manageable because it was made up 
of homogenous units of quanta and ratio. 
If we pay attention to the influx of new language, as Le Pan has done with regard to time 
consciousness, we find clusters of new words minted at key points in the rise of quantification in 
European cultures. One such moment was at the turn of the seventeenth century, when the question 
"what time is it?" first appears in English, in 1597, and in 1600, when Shakespeare’s Falstaff asks, 
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"What is it o'clock?"82 These questions refer to time as an objective and measurable phenomenon 
existing independently of experience, and reveal the suffusion of quantification into the wider 
culture.  
In fact, we can already see the change to European culture four decades earlier, in Breughal 
the Elder's 1560 painting, Temperance. Apparently intended to celebrate the virtue of moderation, 
it is really an exhibition of the period's advancement in the arts and sciences of music notation, 
geography, surveying, mathematics, horology, and astronomy. Figures are shown looking into the 
heavens with telescopes, measuring distances on a globe, singing from written music, and painting 
with new geometrical techniques. The figure of Temperance stands at the center of the painting 
with a clock appearing above her head. We are given a sense of the excitement of the age not 
merely over technical advancements, but also over what Crosby suggests we might term “the 
West’s Renaissance dream...[i]t was a yearning, a demand for order. Many of the people in 
Brueghal's picture are engaged in one way or another in visualizing the stuff of reality as aggregates 
of uniform units, as quanta; leagues, miles, degrees of angle, letters, guildens , hours, minutes, 
musical notes.” 83  
The fact that sight is the primary sense being employed in each of these activities is not 
coincidental. A key argument in Crosby's book, The Rise of Quantification, is that the introduction 
of mathematical and geometrical knowledge into European culture in the late medieval and early 
modern periods are "necessary but insufficient conditions". What was needed for quantification to 
really take off was the "striking match" of visualization: "The choice of the Renaissance West was 
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to perceive as much of reality as possible visually and all at once, a trait then and for centuries 
after the most distinctive of its culture." Even music can be seen in this way, for a glance at a page 
of notations can tell the reader at once what its sweep over a given time will be.84 And just as music 
notation replaced variation and improvisation, the general ascendance of visuality, would, in time, 
have the same effect on nearly every aspect of European culture. 
The View from Above 
In recent decades scholars from across the social sciences have noted the privileged place of vision 
among the other senses in modern western culture.85 But the "ubiquity of vision as a master sense 
of modern era"86 and its association with power and authority long predate Debord's spectacle, or 
Foucault's (Bentham's) panoptican. In The Eye of the Law, Michael Stolleis recounts the long 
history of the eye as an iconographical staple in Egyptian, Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian 
images.87 Each of these traditions “converge in the notion of the omniscience and justice of a 
supreme being who unites providence and vigilance, good and caring rule, as well as the necessary 
and redemptive "oversight."88 Unlike her blind-folded descendant in eighteenth and nineteenth 
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century European depictions, the figure of the Roman goddess Justitia was often portrayed with 
wide-staring eyes, indicating a vigilance from which nothing can be hidden.89 Christian 
iconography adopted this motif of vigilance, for the eye that need not close, rest, or sleep can only 
belong to the Deity, who alone exists outside of time and its limitations.90 From the perspective of 
eternity, God's eye looks on providentially, seeing into the future of humankind.  
Stolleis also notes that God's eye is always singular. For monotheistic religions, which 
Luhmann calls “religions with an observer-god", the image of One eye, appropriately, yet 
abstractly, symbolized the indivisible and absolute nature of the Deity.91 In the Hebrew Bible, the 
New Testament, and the Koran alike, the one God is portrayed as an all-seeing witness to his 
creation, watching over humankind and the course of history. Stolleis' essay describes the 
evolution of the providential eye of God depicted in late medieval Christian iconography into the 
eye of the law in the early modern period. He explains that "By moving into the centre of the early 
modern doctrine of the state, the law brought with it from its theological origins the aura of an 
order established by the highest power and the highest wisdom."92  
In the intermediate point of this transition from god's eye to law's eye, the aura of divine 
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order was attached to the political authority of secular rulers. One common motif in the seventeenth 
century, with the rise of absolute political rulers, was the ruler holding a scepter with an eye at its 
top, or holding a scepter depicting "an open palm bearing an eye."93 As Resnick and Curtis have 
argued, sovereign rulers of the early modern period often had themselves depicted along with such 
images of justice, in order to associate their rule with virtuous or divine guidance.94 The eye 
suggests the legitimacy of the sovereign’s rule according to Divine providence, but it also "stands 
for all-encompassing solicitude and control, and the sceptre for authoritative power."95  
Like power itself, the power manifested in vision is not wholly benevolent. As Costas 
Douzinas reminds us in his foreword to Stolleis' work, "vision has an aggressive side…the eye 
identifies and separates, its discernment is a way of abandonment, and exclusion." 96 Thus, what is 
not seen is not seen to exist. What is not represented cannot be recognized. The actions of the eye 
are acts of legitimation, of claims to the real or the truth. These are the acts, not of vision, but of 
visuality, what Mirzoeff defines as “a discursive practice for rendering and regulating the real that 
has material effects."97 Mirzoeff suggests that, while vision itself is perceptual, visualization is 
imaginary, and because "what is being visualized is too substantial for any one person to see and 
is created from information, images and ideas... this ability to assemble a visualization manifests 
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the authority of the visualizer."98  But this is a modern form of authority that Mirzoeff is speaking 
of.  To be sure, visuality is a new tool of human power, but its authority is no longer grounded in 
the sacred and, being groundless, it is subject to doubt, and must fashion consent for itself.  
Visuality is therefore the means by which modern authority authorizes itself. The reality that it 
renders is legitimized through the acts of "categorizing, separating and aestheticizing.” First, it 
"classifies by naming, categorizing, and defining- a process Foucault defined as 'the nomination 
of the visible.' Next it “separates the groups so classified as a means of social organization and 
finally, it makes this separated classification seem right and hence aesthetic...". 99  
Mirzoeff argues that prior to and "claiming autonomy from" the authority of visuality is 
"the right to look." This right to look "refuses to be segregated" by the eye of authority and asserts 
the priority of right over law.100 We can see a similar arc from the right to look to the authority of 
visuality in the evolution of eye images charted by Stolleis. In earlier images (Greco-Roman, 
Egyptian, and Medieval Christian) the eye is associated with justice, which Stolleis calls 
"metaphysically grounded," that is, it represents an extra worldly standard. By the modern period, 
however, the eye is more and more often intended to represent a "formal legal order" which is not 
grounded on anything but itself. 101 Thus, the ascendance of visuality is also the ascendance of law 
over right.  
Stolleis also detects in the evolution of eye images a change in the nature of political and 
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legal authority. This is the gradual depersonalization of worldly rule, its "progressive 
objectification...as reflected in the famous maxim of a "government of laws and not of men." 
Stolleis explains that "the trends of the secularization, depersonalization and objectification of rule 
led from God to the earthly god-prince, from there to the mortal god of the Leviathan, and from 
there to the deified law, which in turn found its culmination in the constitution.” The constitution 
itself was "eventually placed under the providence of a deconfessionalized God acceptable to 
all."102  
But the potential for authoritarian power does not disappear with the depersonalization and 
objectification of rule. In fact, the distanced form of domination inherent in visuality is both 
consolidated and extended through abstraction. Modern domination is a project of naming, 
separating and categorizing according to a universal standard. In visual terms that universal 
standard is the single, disembodied view- particularly the view from above. We can see the modern 
distancing of subject from object in the depictions of the single eye of god or law, and in the 
adoption of the "monocular" perspective in renaissance painting- a singular gaze that paradoxically 
divides what it sees. In the transition to modernity, a transition from the sacred or metaphysical to 
the abstract, vision, like quantification, became an essential tool for the legitimation of authority, 
"rendering and regulating the real." 103 Before that transition, the authority to witness (and by 
witnessing to determine) the unfolding of time from the position of eternity belonged only to the 
Divine. After that transition omniscience and the view from eternity are now claimed by secular 
rulers and institutions, but not only by them. With the rise of single point and linear perspective in 
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renaissance art, the artist invited the viewer to look through God's eye.104  
The Rise of Cartesian Perspectivalism in Painting 
What one saw when looking through "god's eye" was a new visualization of space as rational. With 
the rediscovery of Ptolemy’s Geography in 1400, a new conception of space came to dominate 
geometric thought. Ptolemy’s work, written in the middle of the second century CE, was largely 
informed by the rational geometry of Euclid’s Elements, written in 300 BCE. The work of both 
authors had been lost to Europeans for centuries, but were eventually “rediscovered” through 
contact with Arab scholars.105 It would not be until the middle of the sixteenth century that 
translations from Euclid’s Elements would give Europeans a more direct understanding of 
Euclidean space. Martin Jay defines Euclidean space as "geometrically isotropic, rectilinear, 
abstract and uniform."106 Ptolemy’s Geography, Crosby explains, “provided rules for depicting 
with geometric rigor a curved surface (that of the globe) on a flat surface (a map) via a gridwork 
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(of latitudes and longitude).” Though these rules would become indispensable to cartographers, 
the first to apply them were Italian renaissance artists of the early fifteenth century.107  
In The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace, Margaret Wertheim describes the transition over time 
to the adoption of the linear perspective in art. We see the earliest attempts to represent three 
dimensional space on flat surfaces in the work of Giotto and other fourteenth century artists who 
tried to create the illusion of depth. Yet, she says, "Despite [Giotto’s] cleverness in simulating 
depth, there are limits to his illusionistic power. And it is in these limits that we gain a fascinating 
insight into the huge psychological shift that Western minds would have to undergo before a truly 
"modern" conception of physical space could emerge.”108 In St. Francis Banishing Devils from the 
City of Arezzo, Giotto had taken pains to represent depth in the details of the buildings. However, 
the buildings of the city of Arezzo, on the right side of the painting, and the cathedral, on the left, 
are shown from different perspectives. What was missing at this point was the creation of a unified 
space, something that would require the artist to draw the image from a single point. With the early 
fifteenth century translations of Ptolemy’s Geography into Latin and Italian, renaissance artists 
were able to develop methods of representing this unified space imagined by Euclid. Their works 
showcased a new “spatial integrity" in which "all objects appear to occupy one continuous, 
homogeneous, three-dimensional space.” 109  
Alberti, Brunelleschi, and Francesca studied methods for representing the “objective” 
reality of perspectival vision on a two dimensional plane. Alberti, for instance used two identical 
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pyramids, their apexes meeting in the middle. One apex corresponded to "the receding vanishing 
or centric point in the painting and the other (to) the eye of the painter or beholder."110 It is 
important, Jay says, that the viewing eye, was singular and "static, unblinking and fixated rather 
than dynamic, moving with ...'saccadic' jumps from one focal point to another…it followed the 
logic of the Gaze rather than the Glance, thus producing a visual take that was eternalized , reduced 
to one 'point of view' and disembodied."111 In contrast with this central singular point of the 
observing eye is the separation, categorization, splintering of the observed object. That is, in order 
to depict a scene or image on a flat surface in a geometrically precise manner, the artist had to find 
a way of dividing up the three dimensional image, the same way Ptolemy’s gridwork did with a 
globe. Crosby explains that Alberti achieved a “crude kind of spatial quantification” by:  
setting up a veil between oneself and the subject to be painted...'with larger threads 
(marking out as many parallels as you prefer) …the reality beyond the veil's network 
should be observed only through the veil ...one was to paint or draw not what one knew to 
be true about the scene- for instance, with parallel lines always the same distance apart- 
but strictly what one saw ...then one would transfer that to a flat surface on which one had 
carefully drawn lines equivalent to the veil's threads. The veil enabled the painter to 
quantify not reality, but...the perception of reality.112  
Alberti further advised painters to think of the canvas as a window which framed the scene 
before them. It is interesting to note that this new perspective was called in the Renaissance the 
construczione legittima.113 For that is precisely what it does: it constructs a newly legitimized 
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frame through which to view the world. 
The technique of linear or single point perspective has come to be known, in visual cultures 
studies, as "Cartesian perspectivalism" because it was Descartes who first postulated a recto-linear 
conception of space. Martin Jay explains that when we speak of a particular visual culture 
dominant in modernity it is this "scopic regime" that most often comes to mind.114 In Cartesian 
perspectivalism, the subject exists at a remove from the object. “The gaze of the painter,” writes 
Norman Bryson, “arrests the flux of phenomena, contemplates the visual field from a vantage-
point outside the mobility of duration, in an eternal moment of disclosed presence.”115 Under this 
gaze the relation between spectator and spectacle is severed, as “the objects depicted in 
geometricalized space” are “turned … into stone.” Thus, Cartesian perspectivalism is criticized for 
its "privileging of an ahistorical, disinterested, disembodied subject entirely outside the world it 
claims to know from afar."116 When we reflect on what this distanced depiction of objects in 
rationalized space means for our relationship with those objects we are better able to understand 
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why visualization is so powerful, how it opens the door to the reorganization of entire societies 
from a seat of power divorced from those societies. 
The adoption of single-point perspective in Renaissance painting was not simply an 
aesthetic innovation, but neither was it the unequivocal triumph of a quantitative or rational view 
of the world. The mathematical and geometrical knowledge informing the new techniques were 
also valued because they were thought to disclose to the painter and viewer the hidden order 
structuring reality. That is, the desire to represent or define reality through universal, “objective”, 
quantifiable measurements was new, but this does not mean that the metaphysical content of that 
reality was annulled. As Jay notes, "linear perspective came to symbolize a harmony between 
mathematical regularities in optics and God's will.117 Just as European interest in mathematics in 
the late medieval period was largely philosophical and mystical, the gridwork of geometry was 
initially incorporated into an essentially qualitative world view. While quantitative measurement 
was the means by which painters represented three dimensional images on a flat surface, it was 
not an end in itself. 
In fact, as Stuart Clark points out, perspectival painting could be viewed as no different 
from the optical illusions of magicians, who also drew on mathematics. Clark explains that in the 
early modern period the senses were not considered reliable conduits of the truth. The sense 
thought most likely to deceive- because it was the most powerful- was vision. This ambivalent 
attitude towards vision is said to have continued until well into the seventeenth century.118 Because 
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it straddled the categories of truth and illusion, vision could generate ‘radical uncertainty’. As a 
recurrent subject of philosophical, religious or occult consideration, it revealed a deeper 
uncertainty about what was “ontologically” real or not. Sixteenth century philosophical skepticism 
further challenged the relationship between vision and knowledge ‘radical[ly] calling into question 
… assumptions about the truth, certainty, and objectivity of sensory knowledge’”119 Just as doubt 
would lead Descartes to the certainty of the thinking subject, these questions about the foundations 
of truth would bring many early modern thinkers closer to new certainties, particularly the certainty 
that an impartial, objective order was discoverable. 
I include this brief account of Clark’s arguments not in order to dismiss the important role 
of vision in modernity but to remind the reader that the transition to modernity was the work of 
centuries, in which sacred and secular, mystical and scientific were intertwined. Moreover, as a 
site upon which foundational truths of the culture were questioned, and new foundations fashioned, 
vision was central to the formation of a modern world view. In time, the sacred meaning of linear 
perspective, rationalized space and the universal laws of mathematics and geometry declined in 
importance. What remained was the disembodied eye of the viewer, whose very removal from the 
scene rendered it “objective.” As Jay explains, if at one time, God’s will and the ‘mathematical 
regularities in optics” were linked, then “even after the religious underpinnings of this equation 
were eroded, the favourable connotations surrounding the allegedly objective optical order 
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remained powerfully in place."120  
 Renaissance and early modern innovations in visual representation both reflected and 
amplified a growing consciousness of space as an objective and calculable phenomenon. Visual 
representations of reality that placed the viewer’s perspective outside of depicted scenes helped to 
render that reality objective. Just as quantification provided a means of orientation in a world 
whose boundaries were shifting, the perspective of the removed observer offered a new framework 
through which to view the world. The rationalized conception of space that gained purchase in this 
period made it possible to organize the world in alignment with the will of the observer.  
Few professions arising in the early modern period can better demonstrate this new visual 
and quantitative representation of reality than that of the surveyor. By measuring and mapping the 
lands of estates, modern surveyors would facilitate the reordering of space in alignment with the 
desires of their employers, and with an ascendant conception of land as an objective, quantifiable 
and improvable commodity. Below, I will examine the contribution of surveying to the reordering 
of England’s socio-economic structure and the establishment of new standards of knowledge and 
legitimacy in the early modern period. However, because I have argued above that uncertainty and 
anxiety played a role in the turn to quantification and visuality in the formation of European 
modernity, I wish first to consider some of the preoccupations particular to the Tudor period in 
which the surveyor first appeared. 
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Land and Knowledge in Sixteenth Century England 
Tudor Instability 
 While the cultural disorientation distinctive to the late medieval period had lessened by the time 
the professional surveyor first appeared in the middle to late sixteenth century, early modern 
Europe was nevertheless steeped in its own insecurities.121 Some of these insecurities were a 
continuation of the same material factors which had plagued the continent for centuries: dramatic 
population shifts, rising food prices, epidemic diseases and popular uprisings. But what heightened 
the tensions felt with each such crisis was the marked polarization of wealth and the erosion of 
social relationships which had provided some shelter from the worst exposure to dearth and 
disorder.122 Across Europe, the feudal social arrangement was coming apart.  This was particularly 
the case in England, where the ruling class, fearful of a desperate and uncontained populace, 
disseminated an "ideology of order."123 
Sixteenth century England had witnessed dramatic upsurges in both prices and population. 
Agricultural prices, according to Coward, rose by 250% between 1510 and 1550, and the middle 
of that century saw sharp increases in population.124 When populations soared in urban settings 
the overcrowded conditions encouraged the spread of diseases.  In 1563, for example, a plague 
wiped out one quarter of London's population.125 Greater activity in the market for land raised 
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rents, throwing ever greater numbers of smallholders and other peasants off of the land and into 
wage dependence. But there were far fewer jobs than people seeking them, and as unemployment 
soared their wages plummeted, further pushing migration to the cities.126 
Caught at the intersection of all these factors, and exponentially exposed to their threats, 
were the masses of the poor. It is thus not surprising that the Tudor period saw a number of popular 
uprisings, including Kett's Rebellion in 1549, followed by one in Kent in 1554, and in the north in 
1569.127 What is rather surprising is that popular protests were not more prevalent in this period. 
However, as Walter and Wrightson note, the fact that uprisings such as grain riots were 
"geographically restricted in their incidence and clustered almost exclusively in years of dearth 
could make their threat the more alarming...in a society in which inequalities were marked, poverty 
endemic and powers of repression limited, any outbreak of disorder was potentially dangerous."128 
While the insecurity faced by the poor was such that their very survival was under threat, the 
propertied classes feared for the survival of the social order from which they benefited. 
If there is one figure, towards whom Tudor fears of disorder were channeled most 
vehemently, it was the vagrant.  In her landmark study of the Tudor and Stuart discourses on 
vagrancy, A. L. Biere explains that the perceived threat of hordes of "masterless men" roaming the 
countryside had its origin in actual social phenomenon. From the 1560s to the 1640s "population 
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growth, landlessness and the penury and insecurity of wage-labour" created a small but highly 
visible subpopulation of people, mostly men, who had little option but to travel from parish to 
parish in search of work or parish aid.129 The novelty and visibility of these wanderers inspired a 
torrent of fearful tracts which magnified the threat they posed beyond reason. Vagrants, beggars, 
and vagabonds were viewed as the primary agents responsible for spreading sedition and disease. 
They were said to have a secret subculture bent on thieving and confidence tricks, and, ultimately, 
on the undoing of the commonwealth. Above all, the fixation on the figure of the vagrant can be 
explained by his mobility: he was the incarnation of wider fears about both geographical and socio-
economic mobility. He was a stranger whose movements were uncontained and unpredictable. In 
short, "the masterless man represented mutability when those in power longed for stability.”130 It 
was this world beset by fears - both reasonable and exaggerated - of chaos, into which the 
professional surveyor first made his entrance. His practices were, in one sense, a response to the 
chaos. In another way they aggravated the real conditions of insecurity and instability.  
Early Surveying Practices  
I have so far been referring to surveyors and their practices as though they were entirely strange to 
those who first witnessed their arrival in the mid sixteenth century. This is not, strictly speaking, 
the case, for surveyors had for centuries played a semi-regular role in maintaining the feudal 
system, whether for the purpose of military reconnaissance of territories or in order to detail the 
layout of estates, usually as representatives of the Crown. 131 Even the taking of measurements and 
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the use of the visual medium of maps were not outside the scope of the surveyor's remit. In that 
these royal representatives obtained knowledge of the land's shape, contents and uses and 
transmitted that knowledge back to the distant power of the king, their work presaged that of the 
modern surveyors. And yet, this knowledge was attained with the objective of affirming and 
maintaining the existing social system. The "administration of the court of survey" according to 
McRae, focused on “examin[ing] records of tenure and receiv[ing] tenants for their performance 
of homage and fealty."132 This is the meaning given by Fitzherbert in his 1523 Boke of Surveying 
and Improuements, the first English text devoted to the art of surveying.  The surveyor's role, as 
described by Fitzherbert, was one of stewardship, and in this it aligned with the prescribed 
relationship between man and nature in the Bible. According to Klein, Fitzherbert saw the surveyor 
as an 
'overseer' who disregards details of topography and concentrates instead on a whole range 
of social and economic issues arising out of the complex network of duties and 
responsibilities that tied soil and subject, tenant and lord together. Regular surveying, from 
the perspective of a landowning aristocracy, was necessary to ensure both the continuity of 
possession and the inner stability of a cultural construct in which land was conceived of as 
the original source of a complex hierarchical sphere of social interaction. 133 
The Advantages of Modern Surveying 
But signs of a new role for surveyors can be detected in Fitzherbert's work as well, particularly 
when he advises landlords to attain 'parfyte knowledge' of their lands and tenants, and to make use 
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of "new standards of information regarding the size and legal basis of landholdings". According 
to Macrea "this knowledge is clearly structured around an economic appreciation of the land."134 
One reason for this new stress on the economic value of land was that there was a greater demand 
for land and with this, rents were increasing, necessitating “a clearer and more accurate delineation 
of property boundaries.”135  
The greater activity in the land market by the time of Fitzherbert's writing was a 
consequence of a number of, often contradictory, factors.  On the one hand, the population which 
had been so diminished by the end of the previous century had begun to rise again, which put a 
premium on the land available. On the other hand, as Macrea points out, with the dissolution of 
the monasteries, a considerable amount of land was suddenly made available, stimulating the 
market in private property. 136 An even more important stimulant to the land market stemmed from 
the fifteenth century demographic crisis: the nature of the relationship between tenants and 
landlords had begun to change, as had the primary objectives of landlords. The depopulation which 
followed the Black Death meant that the labour of tenants could no longer be taken for granted. 
The demand for labour was such that serfdom disappeared and what Wood calls "extra-economic 
coercion" was in decline.137 Landlords now preferred to rent out demesne lands to large tenants, 
                                                          
 
134 Macrea, “To Know One’s Own”, 339. 
 
135 Roger J. P. Kain, “Maps and Rural Land Management in Early Modern Europe” in The 
History of Renaissance Cartography: Interpretive Essays, The History of Cartography, Vol. 3; 
Cartography in the European Renaissance, Part One, ed David Woodward, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 716. 
136 McRae, “To Know One’s Own,” 339-340.  
 
137 Extra-economic coercion refers to the manner by which surplus labour is extracted in 
non-capitalist social formations. In capitalism, Wood explains, people are economically compelled 
105 
  
 
converting “servile tenures into rent-paying copyholds."138 What all of these conditions added up 
to was an unprecedented amount of social mobility, and an increase in the number of land transfers, 
necessitating more reliable and detailed information on the quality and quantity of land changing 
hands.  
As is evident in the title of Fitzherbert's book, "improvement" had now become an 
important objective in the management of lands. But, as Warde reminds us, at this early stage 
improvement -more often called "approement"- was much more narrowly defined than it would 
be by the following century. The aim of improvement, as used by Fitzherbert, was to increase the 
profit accruing from land, by raising rents and more prudently practicing husbandry.139 Fitzherbert 
also advised landlords to enclose lands as a way of raising rents. But, on the whole, the enclosures 
of land during this period were primarily for the purpose of grazing sheep. Despite the outrage of 
critics such as Thomas More- who charged that such enclosures depopulated rural areas so that it 
seemed that the "sheep were eating men"- Wrightson argues that depopulation was as much a cause 
as a result of enclosures:  "to the landlords involved, enclosure was less a strategy of improvement 
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inspired by commercial ambition, than a low-cost, second best solution to the problem of tenanting 
their lands."140  
At this time improvement and enclosure did not yet constitute the powerful and wide-
reaching discourse that they would in the seventeenth century. Nor had the commercial value of 
land become the dominant factor calling for its more precise measurement. In fact, the turn towards 
more quantitative and standardized measurements of land was as much precipitated by non-
economic changes to the feudal social organization. Just as there was a waning of military and 
other non-economic obligations tied to tenancy on estates, the authority of manorial courts was 
also in decline. Previously, disputes over land would be dealt with at the local level of the manor, 
but by the sixteenth century the common law had begun to extend its influence over such matters. 
Common law attorneys and barristers from the Courts of Inn from London began to step into the 
roles previously performed by local stewards.141  Clearly, it was easier for these representatives of 
the larger, common law system to convert local knowledge of the land into a more universal 
standard than it would have been to judge each case by the particular standards of its locality. As 
McRae explains, there was a "trend towards the solidification of the fluid customary claims of 
landlord and tenant into rights which could be maintained at common law."142 
Thus, the push for more accurate, precise and standardized measurements and 
representations of land did not, as opponents of the new surveying would charge, come only from 
the avaricious landlords. It was also a result of the growing interest in and legitimacy of 
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mathematical and geometrical knowledge among agents of the state. In fact, the new science of 
land measurement at once took shape from and fed into broader historical developments such as 
the professionalization of the practical arts, the spread of the common law, and the centralization 
of the English state.  
Customary Knowledge of the Land 
It should not be imagined that measurement, boundaries, and titles to land were unimportant before 
the modern surveyor or the common law lawyers stepped in.  The customary claims to the use of 
land may have been "fluid" in comparison with the system of property which would come to 
replace them, but the feudal arrangement of land and its resources was hardly a disorganized free-
for-all absent of any standards.  The difference was that the standards were local, and this means 
much more than a spatially limited scope of validity: these standards were embedded in modes of 
regulation and the social structure of the manor and village. They reinforced and were reinforced 
by the collective memory of the community, the particular relations between its members, the 
specific uses of each part of the land.  
One way to try to understand the integration of local knowledge of the land with every other 
aspect of community life is to look at the evolution of units of measurement used for land, 
particularly the acre. Traditionally, the land was divided according to the agricultural practices of 
a region, which included "dayworks, ploughlands, hides and knights' fees." For example, a 
“hide” signified the amount of land that could be tilled with a team of oxen in a year and a day.  
The acre, originally indicating any open -untenanted- land or forest, came to mean, with rise of 
agricultural land use, a piece of pastured or tilled land of a definite size.143 A legally prescribed 
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standard for the acre was enacted as early as 1305. This “statutory acre” was defined as a plot of 
land four by forty ‘perches’ or ‘rods,’ with each rod measuring 16.5 feet.  In practice, however, 
the rod's length continued to vary according to the region, the quality and particular use being 
made of the land.144 Moreover, as late as the publication of John Rathbourne's textbook 
Surveying in 1616, it was not assumed that tenants would be familiar with the statutory acre. 
Rathbourne advises surveyors to ask tenants what Meadow, Arable or Pastures they hold, “and 
their severall names and quantities, as he esteemeth them; and if he know not what acres they 
containe (as most tenants will seeme ignorant thereof) let him expresse of his Meadow how 
many daies mowing, of his Arable how many daies plowing, and of his Pasture how many Beast-
gates, and the like.” 145 Clearly, what mattered most in customary measurements of land was the 
experience of the particular forms of labour upon it. 
If the extent of land was known and expressed idiosyncratically and in terms of the land’s 
particular qualities and local uses, its boundaries were known and remembered collectively 
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through the performance of ritual perambulations. Perambulations were public ceremonies in 
which either a priest or steward of the estate walked the bounds of the parish in the company of 
community elders and a handful of young boys. The boys often carried boughs of willow and either 
used these to beat stones and other landmarks along the boundary, or were themselves beaten with 
the boughs, or thrown against the landmarks in order that they would remember them.146 This 
"beating of the bounds" is said to have originated in the late winter Roman festival of Terminalus, 
a celebration of the god of landmarks, but it also shares qualities with pagan rituals of Viking 
origin, which involved beseeching the divine to bless the land with bounty.  By the fifth century 
the Christian Church began to incorporate these practices into the observance of Rogation week 
and Ascension Day.147 Thus, in the medieval period it was usual for the parish priests to lead the 
procession and to bless the land. By the Tudor period the Catholic features of perambulations were 
disallowed but their practical and secular role in communally confirming of the boundaries and 
uses of the land was not discouraged and the surveyor took the role of leading the procession.148 
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Perambulations of the boundaries of land were therefore an exercise in collective memory.  
Customary knowledge of land was largely unwritten, its dimensions measured by daily 
experience, and its borders not imagined from a distance as in a visual map but landmark by 
landmark in the memories of old and young. In practice this way of knowing the land would remain 
valid for centuries, but it was in the middle of the sixteenth century that a more abstract grid of 
knowledge and representation was superimposed upon it. Gradually, this foundation of customary 
knowledge was translated into quantitative, visual, and legal representations of reality. 
Just as the ritual of perambulation was a way of recording the parish boundaries in the 
memory of the community, local memory was also the site where knowledge of rights to land and 
its resources was stored. Exploring the transition to modern property law through an 
anthropological lens, Alain Pottage explains how entitlements to land were transferred from the 
repository of local memory to written legal documents. Ideally, conveyancing contracts sought 
formal proof of title to land but ownership of land was often less certain or formally articulated in 
practice. Thus, local memory often "served as the medium through which doubts could be defrayed 
so as to reconcile theory with practice."149 Proof of the validity of a paper title, for instance, rested 
on the local reputation of the one claiming ownership- so that a potential purchaser of land was 
required to lay his trust in local knowledge. Often this knowledge took the form of narrative 
descriptions in which ownership and boundaries intertwined with local landmarks which were 
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themselves “constituted or recognized as such only according to the images which local culture 
superimposed upon the landscape." 150 Before the bureaucratization of land transfer, identification 
and proof of title could only come from someone with:  
A local sense of where rights began and ended, a local sense of place and property… lines 
of property followed lines of topography that were drawn not according to external 
standards of proportion and orientation, but according to a logic of localized practice....the 
scales of measurement were themselves the products of a local sense of space and time. 
Spatio-temporal relations were plotted not according to 'clock-time' but according to the 
temporality of a practical orientation to the world. 151 
Thus, customary knowledge of land entitlements, was "self-referential" and circular- enclosed and 
inaccessible from a distance, or from any outsider.  
The Legitimizing Discourse of Scientific Surveying 
So how could this knowledge of the land's extent, boundaries and ownership- the particular 
knowledge that was embedded in the local culture- ever become supplanted by an external regime 
of standardization? The answer, as I have already suggested above, is that in the early modern 
period, new kinds of knowledge and of property had begun to gain legitimacy, particularly among 
the gentry, the mercantile class, and the nascent profession of mathematically informed surveyors. 
I say that they had begun to gain legitimacy because the transition to wide acceptance of the new 
standards of knowledge and property was neither smooth nor sudden. There was a considerable 
and lasting resistance to these new standards, which I will discuss below. But even among some 
of the most vocal advocates of surveying, an instinct to protect the old social order persisted well 
into the seventeenth century, and many surveyors themselves were reticent to use new instruments 
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and methods.152   
Nevertheless, by the turn of the seventeenth century, there was a convergence of factors 
promoting the quantitative measurement and economic valuation of land. These include the rising 
prestige of mathematical and geometric knowledge, and its association with high social status; 
economic pressures which increased the value and exchange of land; and the professionalization 
of practical artisans such as surveyors. From the late sixteenth century, then, abstract 
representations of reality- quantitative, visual, legal and scientific- reinforced one another, and 
together they constituted an objective standard of validity. If this new standard of validity initially 
drew upon local and particular knowledge, once codified, its authority would come exclusively 
from geographically and epistemologically distant sources.  
Before the sixteenth century, according to Bendall, the landed gentry disdained detailed 
knowledge of and involvement with the management of their estates. Similarly, the practicality of 
science and mathematics meant that they were unsuitable subjects in the education of gentlemen. 
By the turn of the seventeenth century this attitude had begun to change, as scientific knowledge 
and education came to be more highly valued in European culture generally. 153  Barber suggests 
that in the case of map knowledge, certain schoolbooks were promoting the utility and 
“gentlemanly accomplishment’ of map making as early as the 1530s. Moreover, the Tudor period 
witnessed the “growing popularity of the concept that arithmetic could be of immense practical 
use in most fields of human endeavor and particularly in map- and chartmaking, where 
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mathematical precision, as made possible by scientific instruments, could assist in establishing 
geographical truth.” 154   
As discussed above, this European turn towards mathematics and scientific knowledge was 
stimulated by contact with Islamic scholars and the translation of classical Greek texts into Latin 
in the late medieval and renaissance periods.  The appeal of scientific and mathematical knowledge 
in sixteenth century England was stimulated by the translation into English of classical texts such 
as Euclid's Elements of Geometrie, as well as a number of husbandry manuals from the 
continent.155 According to Barber, the 1570 publication of the English translation of Euclid’s 
Elements accounted for the “increasing prestige enjoyed by Euclidean geometry and scientific 
measurement” in late sixteenth century England.156  
 The importance of mathematics to surveying was further disseminated by homegrown 
texts which taught readers the basic principles of arithmetic and geometry necessary for accurate 
land surveying. The more theoretical of these were Robert Recorde's 1551 The Pathway to 
Knowledge and Leonard Digges' 1562 A Boke Named Tectonicon. Other popular works offered 
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more practical advice on the new standards to be followed by practitioners, including Edward 
Worsop's 1582 A Discoverie of Sundrie Errours and Faults Daily Committed by Landmeaters, and 
Valentine Leigh's 1577 The Most Profitable and Commendable Science of Surveying.157 The 
message imparted in such titles was that objective and scientific standards distinguished the 
nascent profession of surveying from the antiquated, unreliable and even dishonest practices of 
pretenders and amateurs. If landlords wished to avoid being cheated by such pretenders it was 
necessary for them to gain a scientific understanding of the art of surveying themselves.158  
Blomley points out that the surveying manuals of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
century tended to be paradoxical on the subject of the credibility of their craft, revealing the 
insecure status of the profession at that time. On the one hand, the authors were emphatic that, 
when practiced according to mathematical principles, surveying guaranteed certain knowledge; 
on the other hand, to distinguish their own books as the more scientific and credible guides to 
surveying, authors tended also to stress the unreliable and dishonest nature of many surveying 
practitioners. 159  Such mixed messages may not have helped the cause of a nascent profession 
seeking social legitimacy. At the same time, Netzloff suggests, these authors underscored their 
“possession a specialized body of knowledge…as a marker of social distinction”, a “professional 
identity that differentiated them from practitioners lacking this level of expertise.”160 By 
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signalling the expert knowledge, inherent credibility and technical innovation essential to 
surveying, its advocates attempted to elevate a craft that was eminently practical into to a 
profession meriting the recognition of those with high social status.  In fact, as Blomley notes, 
surveying did become, by the turn of the seventeenth century, “entangled in and constitutive of 
emergent networks of social distinction and professionalism” 161  
The stress on mathematical expertise in the surveying manuals seems to have been an 
essential strategy for persuading the gentry of the indispensable authority of the surveying 
profession. According to Johnson, in the late sixteenth century, surveying was but one of a larger 
set of practical and mechanical arts populated by self-proclaimed “mathematicalls,” men 
committed to the promotion of mathematical knowledge. Of the many advantages to this 
knowledge that they touted, “a primary asset was that of certainty: the rigorous demonstrations 
of Euclidean-style geometry were proclaimed as a standard of truth to which other arts could 
only aspire.”162 Surveying advocates drew upon this discourse of mathematical certainty when 
advertising to landlords that their methods would achieve “parfait knowledge” of their lands. 
And this tactic, in turn, fed into the contemporary context, in which the value and purpose of 
land were undergoing reappraisal.  From the mid sixteenth century, price inflation, rising 
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population and an increasingly active land market had caused estate owners to see “Every acre of 
land” as “more valuable in itself and as a resource that had to be fully exploited.”163  Under these 
conditions, the manuals suggested, landlords would be wise to choose surveyors knowledgeable 
in mathematical principles and the latest instruments, for only they could uncover the true value 
of the land.  
The surveying discourse of this period was therefore at the intersection of two emerging 
trends in early modern England; the reevaluation of property as a measurable commodity, and a 
new standard of truth, as measurable, demonstrable, and universal. Both of these trends were 
disseminated among the gentry, as new means of maintaining their status. At the same time, the 
gentry’s very involvement in these trends conferred credibility upon the new notions of property 
and knowledge.164 
Moral Opposition to Surveying 
Ironically, while some of these early surveying manuals trumpeted the technical innovations and 
scientific standards of the new surveying, it was these very innovations and standards that most 
bothered its critics. The new emphasis on precise measurement of land seemed to go against the 
old spirit of surveying, the conservation of an intricate social system in which rights and duties 
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were interwoven and embedded in the land itself. Intent upon the land's extent, the gaze of the new 
surveyor seemed to overlook the social life that grew upon it. Such an omission offended Christian 
morality, for, as one Protestant critic argued in 1548, "God hath not sette you to surveye his landes, 
but to playe the stewards in his householde of this world, and to see that your pore below tenantes 
lacke not they necessaries."165 As God's steward, man had a duty to care for the things of the world 
and it was presupposed that in doing this he acted humbly as God's agent: the world was not his 
own property to measure and calculate "to the utmost acre." Modern surveyors offended on both 
of these counts: they did not nurture or protect what grew in God's garden and they acted not as 
agents of God but of the landlord. As it was the landlords who were guilty of the greater 
transgression of usurping God's role of absolute property owner, they did not escape moral censure: 
the ultimate cause of the new surveying, according to critics, was the "avariciousness" and 
"covetousness" of a new breed of landlords. But as the visible agents of both greedy landlords and 
a new calculative and metrological ethos, surveyors bore the brunt of criticism.   
Of the voices raised against modern surveying, those belonging to moral or political 
authorities naturally carried the furthest. Preachers such as Robert Crowley lamented the passing 
of a moral order in which the weak were protected and men did not overstep their assigned roles 
to trespass into God's own territory. Political leaders and other powerful members of the gentry 
likewise viewed surveying - with its "new methods of geometrical measuring, strict legal 
categorizations of tenurial relationships and mysterious tables for the determination of land 
values"- as a threat to the existing social order. 166 In fact, moral concern for vulnerable tenants 
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often overlapped with a fear of widespread social disruption.  
One common complaint against modern surveying was that it facilitated enclosures, which, 
in turn, led to the depopulation of rural villages. The fear was that if the tenants were made too 
unhappy, if they were deprived of the most basic shelter from dearth and ill fortune, they might 
add to the number of vagrants spreading across the nation like a virus.167 If the figure of vagrant 
was the personification of the Tudor fear of disorder and uncontrollable mobility, the figure of the 
surveyor was his unlikely counterpart. Both were necessarily strangers and outsiders. And while 
the surveyor, in contrast with the vagrant, represented the interests of property, this new conception 
of property was not yet synonymous with order. The novelty and impact of the new surveying 
methods introduced a different kind of disturbance and mobility by thrusting the people and land 
forward into an unknown future.  But the discourse against the surveyor was far less vociferous 
than that against the vagrant. And in just a few generations the suspicion of the former would fade 
away.  
Defending the “Upstart Art” of Surveying 168 
How did advocates of surveying manage to quell the voices raised against it in such a 
relatively short period of time?  According to McRae, at least twenty English language works on 
surveying have survived from the period between 1520 and 1650.169The earlier works, especially 
                                                          
 
167 Edwin F. Gay, The Midland Revolt and the Inquisitions of Depopulation of 1607,” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 18 (1904): 213. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3678075   
 
168 It was with this disparaging term that the character of the farmer in The Surveyor’s 
Dialogue dismissed modern surveying practise. See John Norden, John Norden’s The Surveyor’s 
Dialogue (1618): A Critical Edition, ed. Mark Netzloff, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate publishing, 
2010.) 
 
119 
  
 
those written before about 1620, constituted a defensive discourse on the profession. Because the 
early proselytizers of surveying were very much aware of the charges being levelled against the 
profession, their manuals often took the form of imagined dialogues between a representative of 
the profession and his various critics. John Norden's Surveyor's Dialogue, first published in 1607, 
is perhaps the best known example of this pedagogical approach. The work contains a series of 
fictional dialogues between the surveyor and different persons related to the land. The surveyor 
speaks with the tenant farmer, the landlord, and the potential purchaser of the land and responds 
to each criticism or concern in turn.  
The defensive stage of the surveying discourse took moral criticisms of the profession 
seriously. Authors were quick to assure critics that far from being a threat to the existing order, 
modern surveying techniques were the best means to its preservation. The result however, was 
often logically inconsistent, as authors such as Norden tried to fuse together the new scientific 
rationality and the patriarchal ideals of the feudal order. Tenants were encouraged to submit to the 
objective standards of measurement as an extension of their submission to their lords.170   
While this contradiction conveniently advanced the interests of the landlords over those of 
tenants, it also reflects the actual coexistence of “traditional” and “modern” worldviews at the turn 
of the seventeenth century. In his preface to the reader Norden is quick to assure the reader that, 
though spiritual things are greater, the worldly concerns associated with surveying are nevertheless 
divinely sanctioned. For though “no man taking an extraordinary care, can add of himself, one iota 
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of increase of any good thing, neither can he of his own proper industry, assure himself of any part 
of true prosperity in this life, yet must he not therefore dissolutely neglect his uttermost lawful 
endeavor to advance his own welfare."171 Here we have the coexistence of two quite opposing 
views of human potential and agency: Norden seems to cling to the pre-modern view that God is 
the source of everything, that, no matter how hard they work, humans cannot assure themselves of 
anything or determine future outcomes. Instead, they have a duty to care for their own welfare, 
because of "our original disobedience wherein is imprinted this Motto or Poesy of our shame: with 
the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat thy bread, all the days of thy life."172 Thus, far from being 
immoral, a concern for worldly things - such as the extent of one's lands - is part of our penance 
for original sin. All must work. Those of higher status cannot, of course, be expected to actually 
sweat, but they do have a duty to God, to their families and to the Commonwealth, to work by 
augmenting their revenues.173  
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Delegitimizing Custom 
Norden's 1607 Surveyor’s Dialogue, opens with an encounter between the surveyor and a tenant 
farmer. Only in such imaginary representations - and in the paternal concern for the tenantry 
expressed by elite critics of surveying - do we hear the voices of opposition to surveying from 
below. The dialogue is revealing. Upon discovering that he is speaking to a surveyor the tenant 
farmer says he "has heard much evil of thee profession."174 The surveyor responds that this is an 
unjust opinion, if he has no experience of the profession itself. To this, the tenant farmer retorts:  
My experience groweth by tasting of the evil that hath followed the execution of the thing 
…and often times you are the cause that men lose their land. And sometimes they are 
abridged of such liberties as they have long held in Manners and customs are altered and 
broken… or taken away by your measurements; and above all you look into the values of 
men's lands whereby the Lords of manors doe rack their Tennants to a higher rent and rate 
than ever before...and therefore not only I but many poor Tennants else have good cause 
to speak against the profession. 175  
But the surveyor turns the tables on the tenant farmer, aggressively suggesting that the 
tenants most critical of surveying are really just afraid of having their own treachery discovered: 
"they only spew out greatest scandals, that are by examination in this business found most 
deceitfull against their Lords... for the offender cannot speake well of the apprehender, nor scarcely 
of the most just Judge." He goes further, suggesting that, just as laws are needed to deter Beggars 
and Vagabonds, we need laws to prevent tenants from taking advantage of their Lord's property.176 
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By equating commoners’ use rights with theft or vagrancy, advocates such as Norden 
attempted to legitimatize the surveying profession by delegitimizing the customary social 
arrangement. Thus, the defense of surveying, as exemplified in Norden's dialogue, was often two-
pronged: spread doubt about the justice of the existing order and advocate for a deeper, preexisting 
justice, the divine order beneath the soil revealed by mathematical measurement. In response to 
the suspicions of measurement and to the charges that it is unjust, they drew on the mystical 
tradition of linking mathematical, geometrical order with the divine, in order to convince readers 
that, far from being new, metrology uncovers the “true” justice, beneath and prior to customary 
relations. Robert Recorde, for example, in his 1551 The Pathway to Knowledge, (speaking as the 
character ‘Geometry’) says “survayers have cause to make much of me and so have all Lordes that 
                                                          
officers could whip vagabonds and return them home; there was no need for quarter sessions to 
deal with every case.” See Paul Slack, The English Poor Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 10. Also see A.L. Biere’s classic 1985 study of vagrancy in Tudor 
England, Masterless Men, cited above in footnote 22.  As for laws “preventing tenants from 
taking advantage of the Lord’s property,” there were no such laws. Rather, for much of the 
sixteenth century, and in the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was the “copyhold” rights 
of tenants themselves that were protected by common law and the “prerogative” courts. 
However, according to Christopher Clay,  
In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, on manors all over the country, tenants 
who had thought they enjoyed the protection of custom had discovered that in law they 
were mere tenants-at-will. In some places, where the land was especially valuable, they 
had been evicted and their holdings enclosed and then re-let as large farms at much 
higher rent. Perhaps more commonly, after futile legal wrangling, they had been obliged 
to accept the new situation. They continued to occupy their lands, but as non-customary 
leaseholders they invariably had to pay more for them.   
In fact, it seems that Norden was writing his Surveyor’s Dialogue at the very time when the legal 
protection of copyhold, (the rights to land held by customary tenants and small-holders) was just 
beginning to be eroded. On the fate of copyhold, the changes to English land law in the 
seventeenth century and the quotation from Christopher Clay, see Charles J. Reid Jr, “The 
Seventeenth Century Revolution in Land Law,” Cleveland State Law Review 43, no.2 (1995): 
247-251. http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/4.  
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landes do possesse… But Tennauntes I feare will like me the lesse. Yet do I not wrong but measure 
all truely, And yelde that full right to every man iustely/ Proportion Geometricall hath no man 
opprest/ If anye bee wronged, I wishe it redrest."177 As Klein explains, “the tenants' mistrust of 
mathematical surveying is immediately disqualified by reference to geometrical impartiality”.178 
Perhaps the best known advocate of geometry’s inherent justice was John Dee, the mathematical 
mystic and astrologer to Queen Elizabeth. In his 1570 preface to Billingsley’s English translation 
of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, Dee enthused over geometry as "[t]he perfect Science of Lines, 
Plaines, and Solides" and gives, "like a Divine Justicier, ... vnto every man, his owne."179 
Surveying manuals provided their readers, especially those in the surveying profession, 
with plenty of practical advice, including the most up to date measurements, tools and charts. But 
they were equally focused on persuading readers of the wisdom and propriety of adopting this 
new, objective standard of knowledge. And this persuasion was not only achieved through 
argument, or through fictional dialogues: depictions and descriptions of the surveyors 
instruments- the theodolite, the plane table, the compass, the ruler, and a host of ever more 
complicated innovations - were also essential tools of rhetoric. The frontispiece of Rathbourne’s 
The Surveyor, for instance, displays a numbers of such tools, and centred at the top is the 
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theodolite, being used by a surveyor (who happens to be trampling upon a fool- meant to signify 
the uneducated pretender to the profession).180  According to Johnston, images of the instruments 
themselves served as the “material embodiment” of “claims to recognition and status,”181 and 
were “continuous with textual rhetoric of mathematical practice.”182   
 Not only were spatial rationality and quantification morally defensible because they 
derived from universal abstract standards, but they were also the most certain foundation upon 
which claims of private ownership of land could be made. As McRae has demonstrated, the 
surveying discourse urged landlords to see it as their duty to “know their own.” Landownership 
could and should be “objectively determined in a manner which precluded competing or loosely 
defined customary claims”183 Thus, surveying manuals did much more than to defend the scientific 
practices of a new profession. Their larger achievement was to disseminate a new conception land 
as exclusive property, along with a new conception of knowledge as legitimate only if it derived 
from the remote sphere of universal mathematical laws. In this way they helped to initiate the long 
process of unseating local and particular knowledge of the land, the standards, agreements and 
boundaries that had guided people on the ground. 
The Discursive Power of Maps  
In the seventeenth century, the success of surveying manuals in effecting a cultural acceptance of 
land as property was bolstered by the visual technology of the map. At the turn of the sixteenth 
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century most Europeans had never seen a map of any kind.184 A century later, this had begun to 
change.185 Like the internet in the latter decades of the twentieth century, the new technology of 
scientific mapping first spread relatively slowly among a small section of experts and their 
patrons. Specifically, it was the agents of early modern states - their surveyors and cartographers- 
who first made use of the new mapping techniques in order to extend territorial power. It was not 
until the 1580s that this kind of mapping began to be incorporated into estate surveying practice 
at all. Moreover, for much of the seventeenth century estate maps were generally considered an 
ancillary element of the survey itself. 186  Nevertheless, while it was gradual and limited, the 
growing appetite for estate maps in the seventeenth century can tell us something about how 
space, property and knowledge were all being reimagined and newly represented in the early 
modern period.  
I begin this section with a brief account of the emergence and dissemination of a new, 
scientific, approach to mapping over the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Then, before 
turning to estate maps themselves, I discuss the relationship between maps and state power, 
particularly in Elizabethan and Jacobean England. The maps commissioned by the Crown in this 
period were generally prior to –and the larger political expression of- the estate map’s role in 
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constituting the power of the landlord as property owner.  
First, I should clarify what I mean by calling this new approach to mapping “scientific.” 
Simply put, I mean that the maps that had begun to be produced in sixteenth century Europe 
were much closer to our understanding of what a map is today, than they were to the maps of the 
medieval period. Medieval maps, as I discussed briefly in an earlier section, contained a great 
deal of qualitative information. Geographic references were mixed together with historical, 
religious and symbolic content. In contrast, the new kind of mapping that developed in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was increasingly secular and shorn of temporal and 
allegorical elements.  Cartographers began to use projection, measurement and scale, drawing 
upon geometrical knowledge and a conception of space as something that could be measured and 
represented objectively.187 If some maps in this period continued to demonstrate a view of the 
world as made up of resemblances- with heavenly and earthly points made to correspond with 
one another-others expressed an emerging representational epistemology, wherein the image was 
self-consciously presented as an object of knowledge separate from, but constitutive of the object 
that it represented. 188 According to Woodward, the modern map, in which accumulated 
observations of the world are plotted onto a framework, serves as an apt metaphor for modern 
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188 Foucault distinguishes between the “integrative” epistemology of the sixteenth 
century, wherein knowledge involved the interpretation of signs and the recognition of the 
corresponding relations between things, and a dispersive, differentiating epistemology emerging 
in the seventeenth century, in which signs had no content but their representation of known 
objects. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences, 
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that these representations were the creations of cartographers, that is, they were understood to be 
distinct from the reality that they represented. See Woodward, “Cartography and the 
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science itself.189  
As we have seen above, Europeans had already been introduced to a new conception of 
space, and to new methods of representing that space, when Ptolemy’s Geography was translated 
into Latin and Italian in the early fifteenth century. It was from Ptolemy that European 
cartographers first learned, as Brotton puts it, “to throw a net across the known world,” a net 
“defined by the enduring abstract principles of geography and astronomy and the measurement of 
latitude and longitude.” As noted previously, the same calculations which made it possible for 
Renaissance painters to represent three dimensional scenes on a flat surface also made it possible 
to represent the globe on a flat surface. 190 
It was through Ptolemy’s system that Europeans were first introduced to “Euclidean 
space,” which Brotton describes as, “empty, homogenous, flat, uniform in all directions and 
reducible to a series of circles, triangles, parallels and perpendicular lines.” This conception of 
space meant that “all terrestrial space, could, in theory, now be measured and defined according 
to enduring geometrical principles and projected onto a frame made up of a mathematical grid of 
lines and points that represented the world.“ 191 As Harley notes, once European cartographers 
adopted this “Euclidean syntax” it thereafter “structured European territorial control.”192  
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 Although maps became more accessible with their increasing publication in the 
seventeenth century, mapping itself was not new, nor was its usefulness in maintaining and 
advancing territorial power.193 According to Harley, mapping has always been the “science of 
princes.” In classical and medieval Europe, in ancient China and throughout the Islamic world, 
maps had been invaluable tools for bureaucratic, military, political or religious purposes.194 In the 
early modern period, as in these earlier times, “maps anticipated empire. Surveyors marched 
alongside soldiers, initially mapping for reconnaissance, then for general information, and 
eventually as a tool of pacification, civilization, and exploitation in the defined colonies.” Just as 
important, maps served the rhetorical function of legitimizing empire.195  
Perhaps in part because it was first applied in the service of ruling powers, cartographic 
science itself had gained legitimacy by the turn of the seventeenth century. According to the 
historian of science, Westfall, cartography was transformed into a science through the innovations 
of a number of sixteenth century continental thinkers. Among the most important of these 
innovations were triangulation, the calculation of latitude according to celestial observation and of 
longitude according to Jupiter’s satellites. Westfall goes so far as to claim that “The most 
developed scientific technology during the 16th and 17th centuries… the first truly scientific 
technology, was cartography.”196 For early modern Europeans themselves, wider recognition of 
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this cartographic science came with the publication of several key maps and texts in the late 
sixteenth century. In 1569, Dutch cartographer Gerardus Mercator published a world map which 
was a refinement of Ptolemy’s method of transposing the spherical shape of the earth onto a flat 
plane. 197 And in 1570, the English public was given access to the geometrical foundation of 
cartographic science with Henry Billingsley’s English translation of Euclid’s Elements of 
Geometry. With this publication, D. K. Smith says, “the possibilities of mathematical calculation 
took on an increasingly central role in Elizabethan culture.” In his introduction to this publication, 
John Dee rhapsodized about the new standard of knowledge made possible by geometry. All 
knowledge now rested on “the perfecte knowledge and instruction of the principles, groundes, and 
elements of geometrie.” According to Smith, “as the influence of both Dee and Euclid spread, the 
objectivity of maps, their commensurability with both nature and truth, became a central tenet of 
their new and complex meaning.”198 That the reading public was receptive to the new science and 
its truth claims is suggested by the increasing use of words and phrases such as “modern,” “new,” 
“universal,” “True description,” “faithful,” and “with the utmost accuracy,” in map titles of the 
period. 199   
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Moreover, in England, by the turn of the seventeenth century, we see evidence that maps 
were becoming part of the wider consciousness in references to them in the work of Shakespeare, 
Donne, Marlowe and others- references which reveal an astute understanding of the immediate 
relationship between the knowledge objectified in maps and the viewer’s ability to wield control 
over the represented space.200 In Marlowe's Tamburlaine, for instance, the protagonist says "Give 
me a map; then let me see how much is left for me to conquer all the world”.201 
As cartography advanced as a science in the late sixteenth century, the map was 
increasingly “appropriated as an intellectual weapon of the state system.”202 The importance of 
maps to statecraft and to control of conquered territories was recognized by Queen Elizabeth. As 
early as 1567 she sent the surveyor and map maker Robert Lyeth to Ireland to “make the perfect 
description,” for, “having all Ulster at her commandement and disposition” she “was verie desirous 
to have a true plot of the whole land, wherby she might in some sort see the same." 203 Lyeth’s 
maps and documents translated Ireland - an inhabited place full of manifold local customs, into 
the abstractions of text and image.204 Composed by cold calculation, the “perfect description” and 
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“true plot” of Ireland could be replicated and transferred to the Queen, who, seeing it all in one 
glance, could more easily plan her strategy for conquest and settlement. The “objective” 
knowledge constituted in the making of the map and the survey, was the crucial precondition for 
exerting political control over a territory. 
The map is therefore one of the key technologies that bind power and knowledge together 
in the modern state. It is not surprising then, that in the early modern period states strictly guarded 
their cartographic knowledge. As Harley explains, the secrecy with which states kept this 
knowledge gave rise to all kinds of 'intentional silences” on the map. “The map image itself was 
becoming increasingly subject to concealment, censorship, sometimes to abstraction or 
falsification.” Thus, the omissions of information on maps were not only passive, but very often 
strategic.205  Sometimes these omissions were “rooted in often hidden procedures or rules" that 
were intended to preserve the status quo.206  Harley identifies standardization as one such rule, 
which, 
[w]ith its Euclidian emphasis on space as uniform and continuous, generates the silences 
of uniformity. For instance, in many of the topographical atlases of early modern 
Europe…much of the character and individuality of local places is absent … Behind the 
facade of a few standard signs on these atlases, the outline of one town looks much the 
same as that of the next; the villages are more nearly identical and are arranged in a neat 
taxonomic hierarchy; woodland is aggregated into a few types; even rivers and streams 
become reduced into a mere token of reality; objects outside the surveyor's classification 
of 'reality' are excluded. 207 
Once maps were printed, this tendency towards standardization was even stronger: “map 
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images acquire[d] a tidiness and inevitability lacking in the manuscript age.” Achieved through 
the exclusion of the human, the local, and the particular, this tidiness facilitated the planning of 
interventions into the represented space, while also serving to “legitimize and neutralize” such 
actions. 208  
The ease with which a represented space could be viewed proprietorially from a distance, 
the erasure of the particular, inhabited character of the places represented on maps, and the 
legitimacy that standardized symbols and ‘objective’ measurement conferred upon the conquest 
of a territory, all served to reinforce and extend the power of the ruler who commissioned this new 
kind of map. These very same qualities were characteristic of the estate maps commissioned by 
seventeenth century English landowners, and likewise reinforced their power over property and in 
society. 
Estate Maps 
The maps produced by estate surveyors were not intended to stand alone, or to replace written 
surveys. Instead, they were seen as a supplementary component and visual expression of the 
surveyors’ work in measuring the land.  But the spatial representation of what landlords owned, 
added a new dimension to the discourses of both private property and scientific knowledge in the 
early modern period. To view the layout of one’s land as if from above, and to see with ease its 
boundaries and its functions, was to see one’s ownership underscored and formalized. 
 Historians seem to agree that it was during the seventeenth century that it became more 
common for landowners to have maps, often referred to as ‘platts” or ‘plots’, made of their estates. 
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However, there is less agreement or certainty about exactly when in that century this change 
occurred and just how widespread the adoption of this technology was.209 While John Norden 
advised his readers to use maps to identify improvable wastes in 1607, he barely mentions maps 
in his book.210 Bendall likewise suggests that "well into the seventeenth century" most landowners 
felt no need to have maps included in surveys of their estates. At the same time, she notes that the 
data on the production of estate maps between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries “shows 
that it increased at a roughly exponential rate....as awareness of maps increased so more were 
produced."211 It appears, in any case, that it took some time for landowners to appreciate the 
practical benefits and the social and economic power constituted by and symbolized in the estate 
map.  
What is clear, is that when landowners did have estate maps drawn up, there were a host 
of different reasons for doing so. In their earliest incarnations, estate maps were often initiated by 
the Crown, in order to settle property disputes that had come before the courts. According to 
Barber, many of the first estate maps in England were commissioned by corporate bodies such as 
hospitals and colleges, for whom, “prudence dictated that it was preferable to map estates 
comprehensively in advance than wait until an emergency compelled hasty action.”212  The most 
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common sort of property dispute that the clarity of a map might resolve, involved “pretended or 
defended rights of pasture over land formerly considered common or waste,” especially as the 
boundaries of the latter were not well defined. In time, therefore, estate owners themselves had 
maps drawn up as a similar “prophylactic” against both litigation and claims to common rights. 213 
A visual record of clear boundaries indicating ownership provided landowners with a formally 
recognized and legally certain claim to the land. Additionally, when one estate owner had maps 
commissioned with future litigation in mind, the owners of neighbouring estates often felt 
pressured to take the same preventative action.214 
In addition to the precautionary advantage of establishing of permanent record, estate maps 
were recommended as an important supplement to the written survey in helping landowners more 
precisely locate the boundaries, features and layout of their lands, and as a tool for facilitating their 
management. 215 By the seventeenth century the focus of rural land management had shifted away 
from maintaining the status quo and had become instead a series of proactive interventions in the 
land intended to augment its productivity and profitability. Surveying manuals thus advised 
landowners that along with accurate surveying, estate maps were an essential precondition for 
identifying necessary improvements, such as watering meadows, draining fens, or enclosing 
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wastes.216 Agas, for example, encouraged his readers to use maps as an aid for envisioning their 
land and how it might be reorganized and improved.217 And in his English Improver Improved 
(1649), Walter Blith advised landlords, “Plot out thy Land, into such a Modell or Platforme as thou 
mayst be sure that all thy Land thou designest to this Improvement, may not faile therein” and 
“Take a most exact Survey of thy Water, not by the Eye onely.”218 Estate maps were thus conceived 
as essential tools in the new approach to estate management, which, according to Blomley, was 
increasingly “premised on the management of space, best realized through visual surveillance and 
organization.”219 
Estate maps also served an important role in reinforcing the social status of estate owners. 
In fact, estate maps were important objects in themselves, which, when displayed prominently in 
the owner’s home, communicated his high status to visitors and his command over the land to 
himself.220  Estate maps often included, along their borders, coats of arms and other emblems 
exhibiting the owner’s membership in an enduring family dynasty. But the estate map was itself, 
in Harley’s words, a “seigniorial emblem, asserting the lord of the manor’s legal power within the 
rural society. For him the map was one badge of his local authority” 221 Related to its role as an 
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object for display, the estate map was uniquely able to offer those who looked upon it a 
commanding view of the land. From such a view, according to Blomley, “[l]and becomes an object 
of distanced calculation.”222 From Norden and Worsop to Leybourne and Lucar, surveying 
advocates touted the convenience for the landowner of having a comprehensive view of the estate 
while “sitting in his chair.” 223 But it wasn’t just a matter of convenience. The technology of this 
commanding view from the seat of power inaugurated a new era in the relationship between 
landlord and tenants. The landlord, now able to view his estate from a distance, no longer needed 
to interact with the tenants at the level of the soil. 224 Moreover, this distanced, comprehensive 
view of the land solidified the idea of total ownership, stimulating in the landowner a hunger to 
consolidate his lands so that the map would communicate his total control over the space it 
represented.225   
Finally, just as in the atlases produced by nation states, the silences on estate maps 
formalized, through the epistemological authority of objective science, a very particular 
conception of the land. If national maps legitimized the territorialization of represented land, estate 
maps legitimized the idea of land as exclusive and private property. Meanwhile, evidence of the 
                                                          
 
222 Blomley, “Disentangling Property,” 18.  
 
223  The surveyor in Norden’s dialogue, for example, explains to a farmer that the map 
allows the Lord ““sitting in his chayre, [to] see what he hath, where and how it lyeth, and in 
whose use and occupation every particular is, upon the suddaine view”. Similarly, Worsop 
explains to the reader that with the map, the Lord, “sitting in his chayre at home, may justly 
knowe, how many miles his Manor is in circuite, and the circuit of any particular grounds, and 
wasts.” Both Norden and Worsop are quoted in Blomley, “Disentangling Property,” 18. 
 
224 McRae, “To Know One’s Own,” 351; Barber, “Map Making in England,” 1622. 
 
225 Gregory, “Mapping Improvement”, 66-7. 
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land’s inhabitants - the dwellings of the labourers, the boundaries recognized and rehearsed by 
commoners from “time out of mind” - were not included on these maps. The customary social 
arrangement was easily erased, forgotten in the formal record of the estates.226 Wood, however, 
cautions us not to contribute to this erasure by overstating its extent. Estate maps, he argues, could 
not have been made without the cooperation of the land’s inhabitants: “Much as lords may have 
wished that the men …whom they appointed to map and survey their estates would produce 
documentation that did nothing more than validate their claims upon the land, the muddy, everyday 
nature of customary arrangements and collective opinion often produced rather more complicated 
readings of landscape and ownership.” Rather than being produced in a simple top down manner, 
Wood contends that maps and surveys emerged from processes of contestation and negotiation 
with local inhabitants, whose first-hand knowledge of the land was indispensible to the surveyor. 
Thus, he suggests that “[w]e need, then, to look beneath the surface of the map…for the hard-
edged confrontations and subtle negotiations that underwrote (its) production.”227 However, as 
important as it is to recognize the agency of the inhabitants of estates in the production of maps 
and surveys, the very fact that we have to look beneath the map’s surface to find evidence of that 
agency underscores the estate maps’ role in excising from view “the muddy, everyday nature of 
customary arrangements.”  
We should remember that the emergence of new kinds of knowledge and property that I 
have recounted in this chapter did not entirely or suddenly displace all customary knowledge and 
uses of the land. The ritual of perambulation, for example, survived well into the age of capitalism. 
                                                          
226 E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture, (New 
York: New Press, 1993). 
 
227 Wood, “The Memory of the People,” 272-3.  
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Instead, what I have tried to demonstrate here is the arrival, resistance to and increasing 
legitimization of these new ways of thinking about the world. There was a growing tendency in 
early modern England, to view space, land, and knowledge as objects of measurement. And, while 
estate maps themselves were not widely commissioned in this period, few cultural artifacts can 
better illustrate the modern perspective of the removed observer and its view of the world as an 
object of reform.  
Conclusion 
I introduced this chapter by conjuring the image of the unknown figure of the surveyor , arriving 
on the lands of the early modern estate. He may have been the object of suspicion and rancour, not 
only on the part of the inhabitants of those lands but also from the perspective of the moral and 
political authorities who witnessed and commented on the changes he represented. But I hope that 
what I have related in the discussion above may persuade the reader of the peculiar power inherent 
to the surveyor’s status as an outsider.  This is because the view from outside is distanced, removed 
from the obligations and attachments that embed the inhabitant in the particular context on the 
ground. In the early modern context, mathematical and geometrical knowledge melded with 
conceptions of divine order to creating a distanced, external perspective that could find the clear, 
clean lines beneath the soil, lines drawn by some universal source of order. Such a perspective 
afforded the viewer the power to see the land as an object, and this way of seeing was eventually 
divorced from the objective of uncovering a divine order. Once the dimensions of an object (like 
land) could be apprehended and represented according to a universal measurement, the reordering 
of that object could be more easily imagined. The surveyor’s distanced view, encapsulated in the 
object of the estate map, is the view which became predominant in the European transition to 
modernity, and which cleared the ground for new planting.      
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I have described in this chapter the emergence of this view of the world as an improvable 
object in the late medieval changes to Christian cosmology and time consciousness. The growth 
of centralized and standardized legal institutions was itself a sort of mapping and surveying of a 
territory to be controlled. The objectification of the world in the Church and in law, and of thought 
in theology, science and philosophy, created a sense of greater human agency in the world and 
control over future outcomes. When this new vision of a contingent future produced anxiety and 
disorientation in a culture whose boundaries were losing clarity, abstract standards of quantitative 
thought were welcomed as a new framework through which to experience and navigate the world. 
In the Renaissance, the single point perspective adopted by painters and informed by Ptolemaic 
geometry, initiated a view of the world from the eyes of the removed observer. Once the witness 
of a sacred order, the perspective of divine providence was now transferred to secular rulers and 
other powerful humans. By the seventeenth century the objective knowledge grasped and 
represented by quantification and visuality had itself become the order of the European world. 
In the context of the early modern English estate, surveying and mapping prepared the 
ground for reform, by removing from view customary knowledge of and claims to the land.  A 
new and objective knowledge legitimized the transformation of land into private property. 
Suspicion of and moral opposition to surveying and mapping were answered with the claim that 
mathematical and geometrical laws were universal and thus revealed the truer justice underlying 
customary uses and knowledge of land. The formalization of this view of land as property invited 
its reorganization and lent legitimacy to the nascent discourse of improvement.  
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Chapter Three 
 Enclosing and Improving in England’s Transition to Modernity 
If you are an English speaker who was raised as a Christian the odds are that you first came across 
the word “to trespass” when you were taught to recite the Lord’s Prayer. It was something you 
asked God to forgive you for- and something you forgave others for if they did it against you. 
Since it required forgiveness, you probably understood that it had something to do with sinning- 
with hurting other people. Only later, wandering around wherever it was you lived, would you see 
the word in a different context; on a sign affixed to a fence or a building, reading something along 
the lines of: “private property: trespassers will be prosecuted.” You would have understood then 
that trespassing had something to do with entering a space you weren’t supposed to. And you 
might then have begun to do something that it took hundreds of years for Western societies to learn 
to do: to consider as a sin the crossing of the boundaries of private property.  
In both contexts, to trespass means to pass over the boundary marking proper behavior: the 
first boundary divides neighbourly from anti-social behavior while the second divides legal from 
illegal occupation of a space. But when modernity and private property were young this second 
kind of boundary- the enclosure- was widely considered a form of trespass against the first. That 
is, to claim a realm as belonging only to yourself and to exclude others from it was widely 
considered a sin against community and God.  
Boundaries marking “proper” behavior may be built with bricks or wood or barbed wire, 
but they will not stand for any amount of time without a substantial social belief in their validity. 
In this chapter I want to explore how the boundary of enclosure – widely censured in early modern 
England- came to be seen as morally and legally valid by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
To this end, I present the story of enclosures chronologically, from its early use as a means of 
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adjusting to a shortage of labour in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to its employment as 
practical tool for estate management in the sixteenth century and finally to its role in facilitating 
agrarian improvement and capital accumulation from the seventeenth century on. 
While it remains crucial that we continue to ask how and when private property became 
“proper”, in order to historicize what continues to be taken for granted as natural, that is not my 
chief purpose here. The history of enclosures and the extinguishment of common right has already 
been related most powerfully in the works of Karl Marx, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, Jeannette 
Neeson and others.1 This history involves the dispossession of the commoners, their separation 
from the means of subsistence and subsequent dependence on wage labour, a “primitive 
                                                          
1 One of the first cases to attract Marx to the study of economics, was the experience 
of Moselle peasantry in Germany in 1842, when the Law of the Theft of Wood was first 
enacted. These laws criminalized what had been customary rights to collect wood in the 
forest. He criticized these laws in a series of articles for the Rheinische Zeitung. See Karl 
Marx, “Debates on the Law of the Theft of Wood,” Rheinische Zeitung 298, no. 303 
(1842):1. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1840/rhe-zeit/1842wood.htm.  For 
a recent and detailed discussion of this case and Marx’s articles see Peter Linebaugh “Karl 
Marx, the Theft of Wood, and Working-Class Composition: A Contribution to the Current 
Debate,” Social Justice 40, nos. 1–2 (2014): 137. For Marx’s discussions of the English 
Enclosure movement and his theory of primitive accumulation see, Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels (1859) Collected Works, Volume 1 (New York: International Publishers, 
1975); A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, translated by N.I. Stone, 
(Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1904); and (1867) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 
Volume One, translated by Ben Fowkes, introduced by Ernest Mandel (London: Penguin, 
1990). Also see Polanyi’s account of the dispossession of commoners and the 
commodification of land, labour and money in Karl Polanyi (1944) The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, introduction by R. M. 
MacIver (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). For her theory on the origins of capitalism in early 
modern changes to England’s agrarian property relations, and on the role of enclosures see 
Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, (London: Verso, 2002). 
For their ground-breaking social histories of the commoning economy and of enclosure 
movements from the perspective of the commoners, see E.P. Thompson, Customs in 
Common (New York: The New Press, 1991), and Jeannette Neeson, Commoners: Common 
Right, Enclosure, and Social Change in England, 1700–1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). 
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accumulation” which “cleared the ground”, so to speak, for the capitalist mode of production and 
the imposition of new property relations in England and across the globe. While none of these 
events is absent from this chapter, my focus is on something else that enclosures might be and 
might mean. That is, my larger purpose in recounting key moments in the story of enclosures is to 
reflect on the nature of boundaries –and their trespass- in the constitution of modernity. 
My account thus diverges from other accounts of enclosure in two ways. First, I see 
enclosure as not only a crucial event in the history of capitalism, one whose social and material 
consequences continue to unfold to this day, but also as a powerful metaphor for a logic of 
containment which is a recurrent feature of modernity. Considered in this light it is impossible to 
ignore any longer the intimate relation between the containing impulse of enclosure and the 
expansive impulse apparent in the discourse of improvement, an impulse which is equally 
characteristic of modernity. The territorial expansion of European powers throughout the history 
of colonialism is one of the clearest manifestations of this impulse. The colonialist project was 
concurrent with the development of modernity and was intricately linked with the rise of both the 
modern state and capitalism, particularly with regard to the accumulation of wealth and the 
theoretical and practical development of private property. While I do address colonialism at some 
points in this chapter, my primary focus here is on the expansive impulse evident in the discourses 
of both agriculture improvement and the acquisition of knowledge in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England. Secondly, my account of enclosure alternates between describing the enclosure 
and improvement of land-as-property and the enclosure and improvement of knowledge in order 
to demonstrate how the reorganization of property relations took place in relation to a 
reorganization of knowledge. Both of these processes are part of a larger transformation – the turn 
to the modern view of the world as an object of reform. 
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In the opening section I recount the early meanings and manifestations of enclosure and 
improvement in the Tudor period. While both were features of a developing discourse on practical 
estate management, many sixteenth century enclosures involved the large scale conversion of 
arable to pasture land. Because of the dramatic effect such enclosures had on rural populations 
they were widely condemned by Tudor authorities and commoners themselves. Next, I look at the 
early years of the seventeenth century, when a more ambitious understanding of improvement 
features in Francis Bacon’s 1620 work, The Great Instauration. Bacon’s plan to rebuild the human 
understanding of nature was founded on a logic of enclosure and oriented towards endless 
improvement: the determination of natural facts would act as stepping stones in an ongoing 
progression towards greater certainty. At the same time, an early and defensive discourse of 
improvement developed in response to the continued resistance of commoners as well as some 
elites to the material effects of enclosures.  
The third section recounts the elaboration and expansion of the improvement discourse in 
seventeenth century England. As Bacon’s successors in the Hartlib circle and the Royal Society 
pursued projects for social and scientific reform, belief in the possibility of endless progress 
infused the culture and began to intersect with a growing sense of English nationalism, and the 
political and economic ambitions of the state at home and abroad. In the fourth section I explore 
the turn to a more aggressive discourse of improvement from the mid seventeenth century on, 
when agricultural improvement was wedded to national and imperial ambitions and to notions of 
providential design. The imperative of improvement was increasingly articulated in opposition to 
dangerous waste lands and corrupt commons. Finally, the last section describes the further 
entrenchment of the logics of enclosure and improvement in the eighteenth century. Against the 
continued resistance to enclosure and the robust defense of common rights, these logics are 
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legitimized in property theories, enforced through the Parliamentary Acts and naturalized in the 
landscaped gardens of large estates. I close this section and the chapter with an account of the 
unforeseen effects of Linnaean classification to illustrate how the accumulative and enclosing 
logics of modernity produce ever more ambivalence and instability.  
My argument draws primarily upon two areas of scholarly literature: historical work which 
places the origins of capitalism in the changes to property relations in England between the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and theories of modernity which assert the peculiar role of 
boundaries in the development of modernity. As I have already given a brief outline of the first of 
these areas of scholarship, I will now turn to the second. 
Modernity as Boundary Making and Boundary Breaking  
Together, the erection and crossing of boundaries form a central dynamic of modernity. I choose 
the word dynamic here advisedly, for I am not speaking of a historical dialectic in any formal 
Marxist sense, but simply identifying a pattern in modernity in which contradictory tendencies are 
exhibited simultaneously, and appear to progress in tandem, possibly out the interdependence of 
their relationship to one another. There are a number of such paired countertendencies evident in 
modernity, such as social integration and fragmentation, or individualization and the growth and 
centralization of governments. What may link all of these contradictions, and what is certainly 
pertinent to the modern tendencies to both circumscribe and transgress new boundaries is the 
indeterminacy of the future in modernity. As I have already discussed in the introduction and the 
first chapter, the transition to modernity in Europe involved a shift away from a world in which 
time belonged to the divinely circumscribed realm of the secular world, towards one in which the 
future was perceived as open and contingent upon human action. It is my contention that adjusting 
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to the uncertainty of this open-ended future may have stimulated the assertion of limits and 
boundaries in new ways, so that certainty and stability could ground the radical freedom of open-
endedness.  
While the theorists of modernity that I draw on do not necessarily use the terms “boundary” 
or its “trespass” to express this dynamic, their own metaphors illustrate comparable qualities of 
order, orientation and security on the on hand, and transcendence or growth on the other.  In A 
Theory of Modernity, for instance, Agnes Heller describes the modern dynamic as arising from its 
paradoxical foundation of freedom. That is, the modern impulse to freedom transgresses and 
invalidates the traditional foundations by which people orient themselves in the world. But in 
delegitimizing its foundation freedom itself becomes groundlessness. The conditions arising from 
acts of freedom create new conditions of disorientation requiring new acts of foundation building. 
A new form of legitimation or direction (of truth and of authority) is thus constructed, but it cannot 
remain. The impulse to freedom, once set in motion, continues as the unstable foundation of 
modernity.2 
In Bauman’s Modernity and Ambivalence, it is the escape from the past that orients the 
modern subject forwards. Rootless, we move in an “obsessive march forward” towards a 
continually receding horizon. The future is “open” as Kosseleck and Luhmann put it, but it is never 
arrived at.  The march towards this horizon provides us with what meaning we have- a pursuit of 
meaning never satisfied. For Bauman and Heller, modernity’s restless dynamic is derived from 
both the receding horizon and the impermanence of the ground. To move forward is an act of 
freedom from the constraints of the previous foundation. But a direction is needed, so a new kind 
                                                          
2 Agnes Heller, A Theory of Modernity (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1999), 15. 
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of foundation constructed, only for it too to be transcended as the forward march continues.3 For 
Bauman too, the impulse to define boundaries between the things of this world can never be 
realized with the desired precision. Ambivalence always returns. A sense of disturbance, impurity 
and loss of control follows, spurring renewed efforts at categorization.  
Finally, the horizon was also a favoured metaphor of Nietzsche’s. In “The Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life,” for instance, he stresses the need to cultivate “the art and power 
of forgetting” as a way of “enclosing oneself within a bounded horizon.” Without this boundary 
the weight of the past is paralysing. In a similar vein, he warned that, without constructing some 
sort of enveloping atmosphere for oneself, the absence of meaning and direction in modern life 
simply inhibits growth.4 
Each of these theories identify in modernity an impulse to grow or to move forward.  But 
the impermanence of boundaries in modernity divests this growth and movement of meaning and 
direction. Modernity’s triumph of transcending boundaries is always accompanied by a terror of 
the infinite. Growth thus requires a delimiting of options and directions. Inherent to modernity 
therefore, is this dynamic interaction between freedom and security, between the impulse to 
expand and advance into the future and the need for the protection offered by some sort of 
enclosing framework. Below, I present evidence that illustrates just such a dynamic in England’s 
                                                          
 
3 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1991) and Liquid Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 10-11. 
 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, (1873), “The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” in 
Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 63-4. 
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transition to modernity. From the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, as the traditional 
boundaries shaping that society eroded the discourse of improvement was always accompanied by 
various practices of enclosure, both on the land and in the methods and categories of knowledge.  
Enclosure and Improvement in the Tudor period 
Early Enclosures 
The enclosure movement played a crucial role in the transition to a capitalist conception and 
system of property. It was far more than the fencing off of an area of land, or the boundary itself. 
Instead, most historians understand it as a process, by which one set of relations between people 
and land is gradually replaced by another. Specifically, as Blomley defines it, this was the process 
of converting “commonable lands, whether on wastes, commons, or village fields, into exclusively 
owned parcels, and the concomitant extinction of common rights.”5 This loss of common rights 
was essential to the development of capitalism because it blocked off of access to resources for 
survival and pressed the dispossessed population into wage labour.6 But the completion of the 
transition from a complex network of customary rights to land, to the fungible, and absolute form 
of private property took centuries.7 
                                                          
5 Nicholas Blomley, “Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work 
of Hedges” in Rural History 18, no. 1 (2007): 2. 
6 For comprehensive accounts of how English commoners were dispossessed and 
disciplined into capitalist labour please see E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common (New 
York: The New Press, 1991); J.M. Neeson Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure, and 
Social Change in England, 1700–1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
and Karl Polanyi (1944). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of Our Time. Introduction by R. M. MacIver (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).  
 
7 Getzler, Joshua. “Theories of Property and Economic Development” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 26, no. 4 (Spring, 1996): 643-7. 
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When we refer to this process as the “enclosure movement” we are being somewhat 
misleading, since there were not one, but two, quite distinct enclosure movements in British 
history. The first such movement –when the customary practice of enclosures was first altered in 
character- took place in the early Tudor period. The second enclosure movement, “parliamentary 
enclosures,” didn’t occur until the mid-eighteenth century and lasted into roughly the mid-
nineteenth century. During this period, special Acts of Parliament permitted landowners to enclose 
without the consent of affected parties.8 The massive cultural and economic transition which 
spanned the centuries between the two movements can also be divided into two periods. First, 
between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, members of the elite who had been 
suspicious and disapproving of the new profit-oriented approach to enclosure were gradually won 
over by the proliferation of a defensive literature espousing its practical benefits to agriculture, 
estate management and the national economy. Then, from the mid-seventeenth century, the 
defensive tone of the improvement discourse gave way to a more aggressive tone, claiming the 
moral and national imperative of enclosures.  By the time of parliamentary enclosures the moral 
legitimacy of enclosures had been firmly established in the culture of the upper classes. The private 
and exclusive nature of enclosed property was redefined in legal, moral and political thought as 
natural and as divinely sanctioned. 9 
                                                          
8 Of course, this is not to suggest that the enclosures only took place during these two 
periods, for, after the sixteenth century they were a fairly regular agricultural practice in England, 
their frequency tending to increase in periods of dearth and crisis and to decline at other times. 
Thus, in a sense it is accurate to think of the process of enclosure as one continuous movement - 
from common right to private property- taking place over a period of at least three centuries. I 
focus on the Tudor and Parliamentary enclosures as two movements because the cultural and socio 
economic impact of enclosures was most remarkable during these periods. 
 
9 William Blackstone, for example, argued that private property was sanctioned by natural 
law. See William Blackstone, (1766) The Oxford Edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
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The origins of enclosures, however, were eminently practical, and often protective in 
nature. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they were used in response to the devastation of 
populations across Europe by the Black Death. In England, landowners mitigated the problem of 
severe shortages of labour by engrossing and enclosing larger tracts of land.10 Later, in the reigns 
of King Henry VII, and King Henry VIII, enclosures of another kind appeared, involving the 
conversion of crop land into pasture, primarily for the grazing of sheep. The resulting displacement 
of those who had lived and worked on the crop land was the cause of Thomas More’s famous 
complaint that the sheep “may be said now to devour men.”11 The Tudor enclosure movement also 
involved the dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII, and the Crown’s appropriation of 
Church land.12  
                                                          
Laws of England: Book II: of the Rights of Things, ed. Simon Stern (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). Other legal theorists defending private property on the basis of natural law included 
Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Kant and Hegel. See Getzler, “Theories of Property,” 641. I discuss 
both Blackstone and Locke’s ideas about the origins of property rights in the section of this chapter 
entitled “Legal and Historical Justifications of Private Property.”  
10 Keith Wrightson, Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 99-100; and Roger J.P. Kain, “Maps and Rural Land 
Management in Early Modern Europe” in The History of Cartography: Vol. 3: Cartography in the 
European Renaissance, Ed. David Woodward, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2007), 706.  
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/HOC/  
11 “The increase in pasture… by which your sheep, which are naturally mild, and easily 
kept in order, may be said now to devour men and unpeople, not only villages, but towns; for 
wherever it is found that the sheep of any soil yield a softer and richer wool than ordinary, there 
the nobility and gentry, and even those holy men, the abbots not contented with the old rents which 
their farms yielded, nor thinking it enough that they, living at their ease, do no good to the public, 
resolve to do it hurt instead of good. They stop the course of agriculture, destroying houses and 
towns, reserving only the churches, and enclose grounds that they may lodge their sheep in them.” 
See Thomas More, (1515) Utopia, available at 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/more/works/utopia/index.html  
 
12 Charles J. Reid Jr. “The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the English Land Law,” 
Cleveland State Law Review 43, no.2 (1995): 237-8; 253. 
Available at  http://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/4  
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Because engrossment and enclosure had been established rural practices for centuries, 
these early to mid-sixteenth century enclosures were not perceived as being entirely anomalous.13 
What was new and threatening, however, was their deployment on a larger scale and at a faster 
pace, and, increasingly, their erection across areas customarily accessible by common right.14  
From the middle of the century a new rationale for enclosures began to emerge, one that was at 
odds with the customary approach to land use.15 But, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, 
often the first visible sign of changes to come was the appearance of surveyors on the manorial 
lands, measuring and evaluating those lands with strange instruments and according to unknown 
                                                          
 
13 Joan Thirsk describes the difference between enclosing and engrossing: “to enclose land 
was to extinguish common rights over it, thus putting an end to all common grazing.” This was 
usually put into effect by erecting a hedge or a fence. Meanwhile, to make it worthwhile, 
“enclosure was often preceded by the amalgamation of several strips by exchange or purchase.” 
Engrossing, on the other hand, “signified the amalgamation of two or more farms into one.” Thirsk 
notes that both engrossing and enclosing were “frequently referred to in the same breath as twin 
evils in the countryside but they did not inevitably accompany one another.” Nevertheless, she 
says, they did both cause depopulation. See Joan Thirsk, “Enclosing and Engrossing” in The 
Agrarian History of England and Wales: 1500-1640, Vol. 4. ed. Joan Thirsk and H.P.R. Finberg, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 54-55. 
 
14 Blomley, “Making Private Property,” 2. 
 
15 McRae notes that the seeds of this rationale can be found as early as 1520s, in Fitzherbert 
Boke of Surveying. He explains that Fitzherbert’s use of the terms surveying and improvement 
connoted something quite different from their later use: the "administration of the court of survey” 
involved at this time the “examin(ing) (of) records or tenure and receiv(ing) tenants for their 
performance of homage and fealty." Nevertheless, he also suggests that The Boke of Surveying 
"documents the tentative development of a distinctly new discourse of surveying” associated with 
"new standards of information regarding the size and legal basis of landholdings" and that these 
new standards of knowledge facilitate an economic valuation of land. McRae, “To Know One’s 
Own,” 336; 339. Warde also notes that Fitzherbert counselled his readers to use enclosures in order 
to increase profits, however, he reminds us that the new concern for the economic value of land in 
the sixteenth century did not yet amount to a desire for an extensive agricultural transformation. 
Rather, for most of the sixteenth century enclosures were seen as one tool among many in the 
prudent management of estates. See Paul Warde, “The Idea of Improvement: c.1520-1700” in 
Custom, Improvement and the Landscape in Early Modern Britain, ed. Richard Hoyle, (Ashgate: 
England, 2011) 130-131. 
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standards. 
Widespread Disapproval of Enclosures in the Tudor Period  
It was in the surveying manuals of the sixteenth century that enclosures were first advocated as a 
means to more efficient management of estates. A heightened interest in estate management 
followed the influx of continental literature on the subject.16 The incentive to have one’s land 
measured by surveyors, expressed visually in a map, and ultimately, to have its perimeters marked 
or made impenetrable, was that rents could be raised on the newly valued land, and revenues 
increased. It seems that, in the early to mid-sixteenth century, it was often the Crown that was 
concerned with extracting revenues, and which therefore mobilized surveys.17  
As Andrew McRae notes, however, the emergence of a new attitude to property in land 
could be found throughout sixteenth century surveying manuals which frequently counseled 
landlords to “know one’s own.”  McRae argues that this phrase, 
assumes a social and economic order in which rights to the land can clearly and objectively 
be determined, in a manner which precludes competing or loosely defined customary 
claims. Landownership is thus figured as reducible to facts and figures, a conception which 
inevitably undermines the matrix of duties and responsibilities which had previously been 
see to define the manorial community. In the perception of the surveyor, the land is defined 
as property, as the landlord’s “own”.18  
In reality, it would be centuries before ownership of property would be absolute in the 
sense that we understand it today. The legal triumph of enclosures over commons, and of private 
                                                          
16 According to Warde, the English translations of Claude Estienne’s La Maison Rustique 
in 1554 and Conrad von Heresbach’s Four Books of Husbandry in 1577 were two popular 
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“The Idea of Improvement,” 130.   
17 Warde, “The Idea of Improvement,” 129, 132-3. 
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and exclusive ownership over a complex of use rights, took many centuries.19 Nevertheless, the 
spread of enclosure did signify a shift towards a new idea of land as property, and of property as a 
bounded, territorialized space.20  
What really distinguishes the Tudor enclosure movement from its parliamentary 
counterpart was its often illicit status and the widespread condemnation with which the practice 
was received outside of a small circle of agricultural innovators. Ironically, though enclosures were 
once used as a solution to the problem of depopulation, they were now understood to be a cause 
of depopulating villages.21 Enclosures which either converted arable land to pasture, or blocked 
                                                          
 
19 Getzler, “Theories of Property and Economic Development,” 643-4. Some feudal 
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Law?”  Amicus Curiae, no. 23 (January 2000): 21-25.  
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21 Bill Shannon, “Approvement and Improvement in the Lowland Wastes of Early Modern 
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access to common grazing land and a host of other customary rights, eliminated a major source of 
commoner’s resources for survival, pushing them out of their villages in search of a livelihood 
elsewhere.  
Some elites, such as clergymen, deplored enclosures because they so clearly undermined 
the fabric of community life, and by extension, the social order itself. Moreover, the abandonment 
of social responsibility in the pursuit of personal profit was judged to be a major transgression of 
Christian morality. Among those who voiced such complaints were what Juliet Amy Ingram calls 
the “commonwealthsmen”, a group of evangelical protestant preachers and pamphleteers for 
whom religious and social reform were linked.22 The sermons and protest literature of Robert 
Crowley, Hugh Latimer, Thomas Lever and Thomas Becon did not fall on deaf ears. Indeed, early 
in Edward VI’s reign, they had a powerful ally in the Lord Protectorate Edward Seymour- the 
Duke of Somerset after 1547. It was Somerset who opened the enclosure commissions of 1547 
and 48. Meanwhile, Hugh Latimer often preached before the King himself. In fact, Latimer gave 
substantial attention to the subject in his first Sermon: 
You landlords, you rent-raisers, I may say you steplords, you unnaturall lordes, you have 
for your possessions yearly too much. For what herebefore went for xx or xl pound by year, 
(which is an honest portion to be had gratis in one Lordeship, of another man’s sweat and 
labour) now is let for L (fifty) or a C (hundred) pound by year. Of this too much commeth. 
This monsterous and portentious dearth- is made by man, …which these riche men have, 
causeth such dearth, that poor men (which live off their labour) cannot with the sweat of 
their face have a living, ……these grasiers, inclosers, and rente-raisers, are hinderers of the 
kings honour. For whereas have been a great many of householder and inhabitants, there 
is now but a shepherd and his dog, …But let the preacher preach till his tongue be worn to 
the stumps, nothing is amended. We have good statutes made for the common wealth as 
touching commoners, enclosers, many meetings and Sessions, but in the end of the matter 
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their commeth nothing forth.23 
For other elite critics, however, the depopulating effects of enclosures were problematic 
for political reasons. By swelling the ranks of the landless, - a necessarily unstable population 
which wandered the countryside and entered the cities- enclosures exacerbated the vagrant 
problem. In a society undergoing massive social and cultural change, vagrancy was a favourite 
target of blame, often cast as both a disease and a form of sedition that was spreading throughout 
the body of the commonwealth. The fear that this sedition and disease would spread up to the head 
of the body- the King- was so great that vagrants were demonized, and punished severely for their 
presence outside of their own parishes.24  
The Crown was sufficiently concerned about the problem of depopulation to hold two 
“inquisitions” on the problem: The first in 1517 and the second, in 1607.25  Furthermore, in periods 
of dearth, when food and employment were in short supply, popular protest against enclosures was 
forceful enough to compel Tudor authorities to prohibit the practice. In fact, enclosures of waste 
grounds had been permitted since the Merton Acts of the thirteenth century. But with the 
prevalence in the mid sixteenth century of enclosures for the conversion of arable land to grazing 
land, tenants, feeling that their livelihoods were under threat, grew more aggrieved. In response to 
their complaints that tillage was in decline and their commons overrun with large flocks of the 
landlord’s sheep, Lord Protector Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset, made a proclamation 
                                                          
23 Hugh Latimer, (1549) “Seven Sermons Before Edward VI, on Each Friday in Lent,” 
Selected Sermons of Hugh Latimer, ed. Allen G. Chester, (Associated University Press, 1978) 65. 
24 A.L. Beier. Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England 1560-1640 (London and 
New York: Methuen Press, 1985), 10; 141. 
 
25 Edwin F. Gay, “The Midland Revolt and the Inquisitions of Depopulation of 1607,” in 
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against enclosures and in 1547-1548 sent out a commission to investigate their grievances, led by 
the reformer MP. John Hale.26 
Apparently many commoners interpreted the instigation of the enclosure commissions and 
the anti-enclosure rhetoric of Somerset and other powerful men, as a confirmation of the illegality 
of enclosures, and thus felt encouraged in their protests. Some of Somerset’s fellow members of 
the court even felt that it was he, rather than the poor harvest of 1548, who was ultimately 
responsible for the Ketts’ rebellion of 1549. 27 Robert Kett, for whom the Norwich rebellion has 
been named, was actually a prosperous yeoman tanner, who took up the cause against landlords 
enclosing common grazing land when his own enclosing fences were broken by rebels from 
neighbouring Attleborough. In sympathy with their cause he led the group to the common land of 
Mousehold Heath, where the rebels established and held a camp until they were finally defeated 
by a large contingent of the Royal army in late August.28 Kett’s rebellion was just one of several 
popular uprisings against enclosure in Southern England in the spring and summer of 1549.29  
According to Bill Shannon, it was in response to these popular uprisings that the centuries 
                                                          
26 Andy Wood, “Kett’s Rebellion in Norwich,” in The History of Norwich ed. C. 
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old statute of Merton (1235), and the second statute of Westminster (1285), which condoned the 
enclosure of waste land for the purpose of turning it to arable land, were re-enacted in 1549 as “an 
act concerning the improvements of moors and waste grounds.” Rather than repealing Merton, the 
new act simply “increased the penalties for breaching it, and added some new clauses.” 30 It seems 
that the 1549 act was intended to channel enclosure activity towards the somewhat more popularly 
palatable conversion of waste lands to arable land. Nevertheless, this reiteration of the legality of 
enclosing waste lands was personally advantageous for a number of the men who were assigned 
by the House of Lords to read the Bill for ‘approving’ (legally allowing for the enclosure of) 
commons and waste grounds.31   
If a certain zeal for enclosures was detectable in gentry circles, anti-enclosure legislation 
continued nevertheless. According to Maurice Beresford, the first Act against enclosure was in 
1489, and in the 150 years that followed “there would be a further eleven acts of Parliament and 
eight Commissions of Enquiry on the subject”. 32 Not all of the Acts banned enclosures outright. 
Some simply demanded that compensation for the destruction of buildings be paid, or that “half 
the profits from conversion would go to the Crown until the arable land was restored.”33  
In spite of popular protest, legal prohibitions and the disapproval of many religious and 
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political leaders, there was no slowing of the rate at which land was enclosed in the last half of the 
sixteenth century. According to Rose Hentschel, it became apparent early in Elizabeth’s reign that 
the many acts against enclosure were simply not being enforced. Therefore, in 1569 a Royal 
Proclamation was made “Enforcing Statutes on Tillage and Enclosure.”34 Later, following the 
Oxfordshire uprising of 1596, authorities again attempted to deal with the problem of enforcing 
anti-enclosure acts, in an effort to forestall more popular agitation. The result was the 1597 “Act 
for the Maintenance of Husbandry and Tillage.” 35 It was Francis Bacon who wrote the bill for this 
act and who argued in parliament that enclosure had four particular ill effects: “foreclosure of 
grounds brings depopulation, which brings forth idleness, secondly, decay of tillage, thirdly, 
subversion of houses and decrease of charity and charge to the poor’s maintenance, fourthly, the 
impoverishing of the state of the realm”.36 
If elite critics disparaged enclosing landlords as “caterpillars of the commonwealth” and 
the cause of dearth, idleness, and social disorder, how is it that by the turn of the seventeenth 
century the practice was increasing rather than declining in frequency? And what incentive did 
landowners have to proceed with the costly and unpopular project of erecting fences or hedges 
along the perimeter of their land? To understand this we must turn, finally, to the concept of 
improvement. Only for the first half or two thirds of the sixteenth century can we talk of enclosures 
without any mention of improvement. After that, improvement became ever more important. 
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Enclosures- with all of their unfortunate social side effects- were merely the precondition for 
effecting improvement. 
The Practical Origins of the Idea of Improvement 
Paul Warde has traced the development of the idea of improvement from its first appearance in the 
sixteenth century to its discursive prominence in the eighteenth century. The word seems to have 
originated from the French "approuement", a common law word for the full examination of an 
owner’s estate land and an augmentation of the profits that could be gathered from it.37 This early 
sixteenth century term was therefore virtually indistinguishable from the term "survey," meaning 
to inspect land with the aim of finding greater profit or by raising the rents of tenants to increase 
the King’s revenue. 38 While the term “approuement” included the notion of augmentation, the 
general focus at this time was less single-mindedly trained on obtaining profit than it was on 
maintaining power by keeping track of one’s holdings or estates, or by seeking revenues for the 
crown.  
For most of the sixteenth century, the goals of improvement were modest and practical. 
Mention of the practice was first made in the surveying manuals as an element of estate 
management. As improvement became a more central feature of these manuals, it began to be used 
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in reference to “innovations in the practical aspects of land management.”39  The list of such 
innovations is long, and the emphasis on particular innovations depended upon the physical 
characteristics of particular regions. In Fenlands and Marshes it was drainage which was most 
needed, and where the climate was arid sometimes floating or watering of lands was required. 
Land considered to be overgrazed required ploughing, and land overtilled could be set aside for 
grazing or left fallow for recovery of the soil .40 
Every such intervention in the land required an investment of capital, labour and time. 
Returns on these investments were generally long term, and though their success was never certain, 
the continuation of customary uses of the land by tenants was considered obstructive to that 
success. The most obvious example of land being used at cross-purposes would be if tenants 
continued to graze on land now set aside exclusively for cultivation. Without enclosure, land 
couldn’t be “cultivated according to the rational and scientific standards of improved husbandry.”41  
Nevertheless, Warde reminds us that when sixteenth century surveying manuals shared the 
aforementioned innovations with their intended readers, landlords, they did so in order to illustrate 
the techniques of prudent husbandry.  That is, improvement was not yet associated, as it would be 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a revolution in agriculture.42 So, if in the sixteenth 
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century enclosures were so vociferously condemned by both commoners and elites, and if the 
purpose of improvement was often practical rather than profit-seeking or revolutionary, how did 
the discourse of improvement become as powerful, wide-reaching, and revolutionary as it would 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? And how did enclosures and private property meet 
with ever more elite approval, at the expense of the long held rights of commoners?  I will attempt 
to answer these questions in the remainder of this chapter. But before I do, I want first to introduce 
the idea that enclosure and improvement, as new interacting logics that began to shape early 
modern projects and practices, were not confined to the sphere of agrarian economics.  
The Improvement of Knowledge 
Francis Bacon’s Project 
At the turn of the seventeenth century, thinking about Improvement did not constitute a master 
discourse, as it would a century later. However, one can already sense an enthusiastic reaching for 
the new in the writings of contemporary European thinkers from a number of fields. For nearly a 
century Europeans had been exchanging ideas about new techniques in the surveying and 
profitable management of landed property.43 In England, there was an increasing thirst among the 
gentry for scientific and mathematical knowledge, and practical education.44 And as European 
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explorers sent back from the new world reports of foods, peoples, lands and other wonders 
previously unknown to Europeans, there spread a sense of excitement over the newly extended 
horizons of the world and a new self-consciousness of the place of Europe in this larger world.45 
Few thinkers articulated- and even anticipated – the thirst for discovery, and the belief in the 
possibility of continual betterment, as thoroughly as Francis Bacon.  
Having served as both Lord Chancellor and Attorney General, Bacon held considerable 
influence in political and legal matters, but he also had a keen interest in education and the natural 
sciences. In his lifetime he would write manifestos calling for major reforms in each of these areas- 
but it was his treatise on the advancement of knowledge that would best be remembered (and for 
which he has come to be called the father of modern science). In his Great Instauration Bacon 
hoped to achieve no less than “to lay more firmly the foundations and extend more widely the 
limits of the power and greatness of man,” by demonstrating a novel approach to the acquisition 
of knowledge. 46 This approach would forge the middle path between those who saw little need to 
search further into the laws of nature –thereby “quenching and stopping inquiry” and those, on the 
other hand, who “asserted that absolutely nothing can be known.”47 Bacon thought that at both 
extremes these attitudes to knowledge encouraged inertia and stagnation. 
 Inspired by the abundance of new knowledge brought back to Europe by explorers of the 
New World, Bacon saw his project as the natural extension of Columbus’s journey, a breeching of 
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the boundaries of the known.48 Like the “breath of hope which blows on us from that New 
Continent,” his book, Novum Organum, was intended to breathe into its readers the hope that 
human understanding could be vastly improved upon. 49 Bacon proclaimed, “Surely it would be 
disgraceful if, while the regions of the material globe…have been in our times laid widely open 
and revealed, the intellectual globe should remain shut up within the narrow limits of old 
discoveries.” 50 Indeed, Bacon recalls Daniel’s prophecy that "Many shall go to and fro, and 
knowledge shall be increased" as proof that “the thorough passage of the world…and the 
advancement of the sciences, are destined by fate, that is, by Divine Providence, to meet in the 
same age”51 
While Bacon acknowledged that important intellectual discoveries had been made in past 
ages, it was his belief that knowledge could only be advanced by new discoveries. Bacon felt that 
this forward movement would only be possible if the current structure of human knowledge was 
completely overhauled. For, as it stood, “the entire fabric of human reason which we employ in 
the inquisition of nature, is badly put together and built up, like some great magnificent structure 
without any foundation.” What was needed was “to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, 
arts, and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations”52 
                                                          
 
48 Ibid, 37. 
 
49 Ibid, 46. 
 
50 Ibid, 31. 
 
51 Ibid, 3. 
 
52 Bacon, Francis, (1620) “The Great Instauration” 423-451 in Selected Writings of Francis 
Bacon, Introduction by Hugh G. Dick, (New York: The Modern Library, 1955), 424. 
163 
  
 
Before turning to the specific materials and methods with which he planned to lay the 
foundation of a new philosophy, let us first consider some of the dominant themes in his critique 
of the current state of knowledge, themes that would reappear in the improvement discourse over 
the following decades and centuries.  In his impassioned preface to The Great Instauration, Bacon 
points to three tendencies in the prevailing approach to acquiring knowledge which he hopes his 
project will reverse. The first of these is contentment or satisfaction with the current store of 
knowledge, an attitude that Bacon finds wholly unacceptable, for “satisfaction with the present 
induces neglect of provision for the future”53 Even those who build upon past discoveries or who 
claim to “improve the condition of knowledge” are guilty of inertia if “their aim has been not to 
extend philosophy and the arts in substance and value.” 54 One only had to look at how the sciences 
“stand almost at a stay without receiving any augmentation worthy of the human race” to see that 
they “have no life in them.”55 For Bacon, the progress of knowledge is compulsory. Once it ceases 
to grow it is no longer living. 
While Bacon wished to infuse more energy and vitality into the pursuit of knowledge, he 
considered activity (knowledge) without purpose and movement without direction to be as 
disgraceful as inertia. Aware that his project of re-founding the entire structure of the sciences 
might seem overly ambitious, he nevertheless felt that that was necessary, since “what is now done 
in the matter of science there is only a whirling round about, and perpetual agitation, ending where 
it began.” Thus, “it is better to make a beginning of that which may lead to something than to 
engage in a perpetual struggle and pursuit of courses which have no exit.”  Energy expended 
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without the kind of purpose and guidance with which his own project was vested, merely led to 
chaos or endless circling. Too often, those seeking knowledge have allowed themselves to be 
“carried round in a whirl of arguments, and in the promiscuous liberty of search have relaxed the 
severity of inquiry,” pursuing only “a kind of wandering inquiry, without any regular system of 
operations.”56 If knowledge pursued in such an unfocused, meandering fashion leads to “pathless 
and precipitous places”, the difficult but disciplined path that Bacon set down “leads out at last 
into the open country”57  
This brings us to the third tendency of current knowledge, to be reversed by Bacon’s 
project. For Bacon, if knowledge did not lead to open country -country full of possibility and 
promise- then it did not lead anywhere. That is, there should be an end to knowledge –in the sense 
of a purpose, but not in the sense of finality. Bacon frequently described the acquisition of 
knowledge in agricultural language, comparing its current sterility with the abundant yields that 
would come from his own approach. He described the unfocused efforts of the current sciences as 
productive only of “contentions and barking disputations, which are the end of the matter and all 
the issue they can yield.” The knowledge inherited from the Greeks, he saw as equally fruitless, 
since their wisdom was “but the boyhood of knowledge, and has the characteristic property of 
boys: it can talk but it cannot generate, for it is fruitful of controversies but barren of works.”58 
The sciences should generate not only useful “works” which would benefit mankind, but also, 
crucially, the seeds with which to sow future crops. That is, knowledge should be ongoing and 
                                                          
 
56 Ibid, 432. 
 
57 Ibid 424. 
 
58 Ibid, 429. 
 
165 
  
 
cumulative. 
The natural history developed in Novum Organum, would make possible such boundless 
growth, for it would “supply a suckling philosophy with its first food. For though it be true that I 
am principally in pursuit of works and the active department of the sciences, yet I wait for harvest 
time, and do not attempt to mow the moss or reap the green corn.”59 Finally, Bacon envisaged his 
improved system of knowledge yielding fruit even in the most neglected areas of study, “[f]or 
there are found in the intellectual as in the terrestrial globe, waste regions as well as cultivated 
ones.”60 
Clearly, the flaws that Bacon identified in the prevailing approach to knowledge- 
complacency, aimlessness, and barrenness- were closely related to one another. Each represented 
a way of being in the world that, to Bacon’s thinking, was no longer legitimate, for they lacked the 
necessary forward momentum.  In both The Great Instauration and the Novum Organum we find 
an extended metaphor comparing geographic with intellectual exploration. Thus it is not surprising 
that Bacon described his project in terms of a journey through a forest, or across the seas. The old 
approach to knowledge was insufficiently or ineffectually active, either lacking movement by 
failing to venture beyond the known paths, or moving wildly, without design, or ending its progress 
too soon. Bacon advocated a new kind of movement for a new age: ordered, linear, progressive, 
cumulative, purposeful and ongoing.  This is the movement of improvement; upward, forward, 
and infinitely outward. In the coming decades Bacon’s successors would, in the process of 
articulating a discourse of improvement, sharpen their criticism of the old ways of knowing and 
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moving in the world.  By the mid-seventeenth century, frustration with the complacency of the 
current store of knowledge would be tied to a frustration with the static nature of a social order 
still mired in feudal social relations. Contempt for the meandering approach to knowledge would 
intersect with contempt for the untamed wilderness of the New World and the “promiscuous 
liberty” of its nomadic inhabitants.61 And the impatience with all corners not yet exposed to the 
light of knowledge would be manifested in an impatience with wastes and commons- nature not 
yet made to yield fruit. 
Provisional Certainty and the Enclosing Logic of the Natural Fact  
While Bacon clearly wished to infuse a new striving spirit into the sciences and philosophy, he 
was equally concerned that such striving be supported by as solid a foundation as possible.  
Without this grounding element the spirit of inquiry would wander in all directions until it 
dissipated. Unshepherded, the impulse to discover could lead us astray. The problem with the 
current foundation of knowledge was that the two materials with which it was constructed- the 
senses and human reason- were fundamentally unstable. The senses could not be trusted entirely 
because the insight they provided was only partial: the truth it captured was confined to what was 
detectable by humans. Meanwhile, human reason tended to lead to the opposite mistake of 
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declaring general principles which “floated in the air” and were too distant from the conditions on 
the ground to be accurate.62 
By drawing attention to such limitations in human understanding, Bacon’s critique reflects 
an emerging reflexivity of knowledge in his culture. But if he was skeptical about whether the truth 
could be accessed by human understanding, he was also optimistic that such limitations could be 
overcome with what he called “helps.” Technological innovations that amplified and refined the 
human senses are the most obvious form of such “helps”, and Bacon was indeed, enthusiastic about 
the role of such tools.63 But “helps” also meant the social and intellectual practices that could 
constrain the volatility, balance the partiality and challenge the prejudices which plagued human 
understanding. And such practices are what Bacon hoped to initiate with the second part of his 
project, Novum Organum.  
Literally meaning “new tool” or “new method,” Novum Organum worked like a surveyor’s 
estate map, laying out the contours and categories of knowledge in order to more easily identify 
areas in need of improvement. As Bacon saw it, this gathering and organizing of information about 
the facts of nature would lead to a “more perfect use of human reason in the inquisition of things, 
and the true helps of the understanding…this view (which I call Interpretation of Nature) is a kind 
of logic” different from ordinary logic in “the end aimed at; in the order of demonstration; and in 
the starting point of the inquiry.” 64 If the purpose of “ordinary logic” was “to overcome an 
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63 He claimed, for example, that “in every great work to be done by the hand of man it is 
manifestly impossible, without instruments and machines.” See Novum Organum, 2. 
 
64 Ibid, 441 
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opponent in argument” with abstract demonstrations of syllogisms, the purpose of his logic 
(induction) was to “command nature in action.”  Whereas ordinary logic tended to “fly at once 
from the sense and particulars up to the most general propositions,” his plan was “to proceed 
regularly and gradually from one axiom to another so that the most general are not reached till 
last.”65 This way, each stage in a line of inquiry could be tested for the firmness of its grounds.  
Finally, all inquiry must begin with the observation of particular natural phenomena, “facts 
of nature” observed in experimental trials.  At this, the first step in the pursuit of knowledge, 
observation and experiment are the specific ‘helps’ that Bacon recommends for correcting the 
weaknesses of the human senses and reason. In prescribing the careful observation of natural 
phenomena Bacon shared in the modern tendency to elevate vision above the other senses.  As we 
have “seen” in the second chapter, the eye has long been associated with truth, justice and divine 
knowledge. We also saw how, in Renaissance art and in late sixteenth century surveying and 
mapping, the perspective of the distanced, removed observer was thought to attain a universal 
truth, especially when directed by the laws of geometry. At the same time, however, early modern 
attitudes to vision’s relationship to the truth were ambivalent, for the eye could deceive as well as 
it could reveal.66 
Aware of this potential to be deceived by sight, Bacon stressed that the advancement of the 
sciences depended on “keeping the eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature and so receiving 
their images simply as they are.”67 For he was quick to caution his readers that observation (which 
                                                          
 
65 Ibid, 442 
 
66  Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture (Oxford, 
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is, after all, a fallible human sense) must submit to the context provided by experiment: 
For the testimony and information of the sense has reference always to man, not to the 
universe; and it is a great error to assert that the sense is the measure of things….. To the 
immediate and proper perception of the sense therefore I do not give much weight; but I 
contrive that the office of the sense shall be only to judge of the experiment, and that the 
experiment itself shall judge of the thing.68 
Thus, the experiment mediates between the senses and the object being viewed and in its 
role of framing experience it is reminiscent of the construczione legittima, the ‘open window’ 
technique used by Renaissance artists to paint the scenes before it in alignment with geometric 
rationality. As a framework which contains or constrains both the natural phenomenon being 
viewed and the sense itself, thus “giving reference to the universe,” Bacon’s experiment is like an 
intellectual version of the costruczione legittima. 69 However, unlike Renaissance perspective, his 
notion of the “universal” was not confined to geometric rationality. In fact, Bacon was aware of 
the limits of rational thought and he thought that ideally rational and empirical thought should 
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69 Crosby describes the technique by which constuzione legittima was achieved: "one 
should resort to a crude kind of spatial quantification by setting up a veil between oneself and the 
subject to be painted...'with larger threads (marking out as many parallels as you prefer' " ..."the 
reality beyond the veil's network should be observed only through the veil" ..."one was to paint or 
draw not what one knew to be true about the scene- or instance, with parallel lines always the same 
distance apart- but strictly what one saw" ..."then one would transfer that to a flat surface on which 
one had carefully drawn lines equivalent to the veil's threads. The veil enabled the painter to 
quantify not reality, but...the perception of reality." In addition to the veil, Crosby says, "painters 
needed…geometrical technique." What Alberti suggested was to think of the picture plane as a 
window and then divide the person in the foreground into three parts. See Alfred W. Crosby, The 
Measure of Reality: Quantification in Western Europe: 1250-1600, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 184-187. 
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work together.70 In this way Bacon’s “helps” corrected the shortcomings of both the human senses 
and human reason. The partial information of the human senses was made more complete when 
observation was made to follow the thorough examination of an object in experiments. At the same 
time, the abstract principles of rationality had no place in an inquiry which began with observation 
and experiments. The object of inquiry was not only particular in comparison with its general 
concept, but it was also particularized, for inductive logic and experiment “shall analyze 
experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and rejection lead to an 
inevitable conclusion.”71    
The experiment itself was an artificial construct, intended to reveal as many “facts” about 
a natural event or object as possible. Bacon wanted his natural history (the gathered facts of nature 
on which his philosophy would be built) to be: 
a history not only of nature free and at large (when she is left to her own course and does 
her work her own way)- such as that of the heavenly bodies, meteors, earth and sea, 
minerals, plants, and animals- but much more of nature under constraint and vexed; that is 
to say when by art and the hand of man she is forced out of her natural state and squeezed 
and moulded…I do in fact…count more upon this part both for helps and safeguards upon 
the other, seeing that the nature of things betrays itself more readily under the vexations of 
art then in its natural freedom.”72 
                                                          
70 It should be noted, however, that Bacon’s idea of experimentation was much closer to 
empiricism than to rationality, for, unlike rationality, empirical thought was always grounded on 
concrete and particular experience.  See Bacon, The Great Instauration, 435. Also See Jürgen 
Klein, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, s.v. “Francis Bacon,” ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Winter 2016 Edition), accessed March, 18 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/francis-bacon/ 
71 Ibid, 443. 
 
72 Ibid, 447. Italics added. 
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As Bacon famously remarked, we “have to obey nature in order to command it.”73 That is, 
he thought it crucial to find and follow nature’s hidden laws so that those laws could be 
manipulated for human purposes. But to discover those laws, Bacon clearly felt that some human 
intervention was required to better access and understand it. His natural history therefore was not 
a matter of simply collecting information on the “found objects” of nature, but of submitting such 
objects to “the vexations of art”, an intensive mining and testing of their properties to discover 
their instrumental potential. 
In this sense, then, Bacon’s project not only articulated the upward and onward extending 
movement of improvement, but in its methods for correcting the imperfections of the human 
understanding, it also exhibited a logic of enclosure. Induction- his order of demonstration- 
ensured that inquiry didn’t wander or jump impulsively from facts to general theories, but followed 
a regular and systematic sequence of steps. The senses submitted to the confines of each 
experiment, and experiment itself placed “nature under constraint” in order that it yield a greater 
bounty of answers. Just as enclosures fenced off all competing claims to and uses for land in order 
to concentrate upon its improvement, Bacon’s methods fenced in the objects of inquiry in order to 
obtain a greater harvest of useful knowledge.  
Certainly the balancing of the general and the specific, and the need and ability to separate 
objects of knowledge from one another, or group them together by some shared trait, are all 
common features of the human understanding itself, not novelties invented by Bacon. But Bacon 
                                                          
 73 Quoted in W.A. Sessions, W. A. (ed.), Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts (New York: 
AMS Press, 1990), 136. 
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himself thought that his methods of ordering and examining nature diverged sharply from the 
approach to knowledge which had so far prevailed in human history. Rees explains that in contrast 
to previous approaches to knowledge, which depended upon “encyclopedic repetition” and 
rhetorical persuasion, Bacon’s project stressed original investigation and interpretation, and called 
for the ongoing revision and accumulation of knowledge by a wider community. Where previous 
approaches tended to look backwards, “deferring to authority” and focusing on “conservation of 
traditional knowledge,” Bacon’s looked forward, envisioning “a new, functional realization of 
natural history” and a “thoroughgoing attempt to improve the material conditions of the human 
race.” 74 The purpose of his project was not to advance knowledge for its own sake, but to glean 
from nature all that might be useful in the advancement of human progress.    
At roughly the same time as Bacon was broadcasting his vision of nature as an instrument 
of human improvement, early modern surveyors were beginning to view and represent land from 
the distanced perspective afforded by empirical and rational methods and measurements.  Bacon’s 
methodology, a similar mixture of empiricism and rationality, likewise facilitated a distanced 
perspective of nature as an object of interpretation, with a view to its reform. 75 Equally, however, 
                                                          
74  Graham Rees, The Oxford Francis Bacon, Volume XI: The Instauratio Magna: Part II. 
Novum Organum, ed.  G. Rees and M. Wakely, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), xlii. 
75 In fact, according to McRae, Bacon’s program, which would help to shape the 
seventeenth century discourse in agricultural improvement, was important not because it was 
original, but because, in  Christopher Hill’s words, it elevated ‘to a coherent intellectual system 
what had hitherto been the only partially spoken assumptions of practical men.’ That is, it gave 
voice and structure to the empirical knowledge employed by surveyors, cartographers and other 
“practical artisans” from the mid sixteenth century on. See Andrew McRae, God Speed the Plough: 
the Representation of Agrarian England, 1500-1660 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 136, 
158. On the influence of other practical arts on Bacon’s method see Cesare Pastorino, “The 
Philosopher and the Craftsman: Francis Bacon’s Notion of Experiment and it Debt to Early Stuart 
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his methods were intended to excise as much as possible from the process of knowledge acquisition 
the prejudices, delusions and partialities to which the human mind was subject. Thus, it was also 
knowledge itself that his methods put at a distance and submitted to experiment and reform. 
Bacon’s project, and the scientific revolution that would follow him, thus exhibited a tendency 
towards reflexivity, an awareness of the constructed nature of knowledge that is associated with 
modern epistemology. As Levao puts it, The Great Instauration was largely concerned with “the 
attempt to employ yet contain the mind’s active construction of its own forms of coherence.”76 
For every assertion that his method would lead to certain knowledge, Bacon also expressed 
his doubt about the possibility, or even wisdom of resting upon any claim to have arrived at a 
certainty. His recognition of the contingency of human knowledge and his double message of 
certainty and uncertainty, feature consistently throughout his writing. For this reason, when 
schola.rs critiquing the scientific epistemology of modernity characterize his project as the 
quintessential conquest of nature by the imperial tool of objectivity, they are surrendering to a 
formula that is far too neat, and missing something crucial not only about Bacon’s project but 
about the role of certainty in modernity itself.77  
                                                          
Inventors,” Isis, 108, no. 4 (2017): 749. 
 
76 Ronald Levao, “Francis Bacon and the Mobility of Science,” Representations, 40 
(Autumn 1992): 1-32, 3. On the reflexivity of Bacon’s project also see Dennis Desroches, 
Francis Bacon and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge (London: Continuum, 2006), 6. 
 
77 In summarising such readings of Bacon’s project, Levao primarily uses the work of 
Timothy Reiss as an example See Timothy J. Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1982). Levao demonstrates the instability, and mobility, of Bacon’s 
thought and method. 
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While objective certainty and “true knowledge” may have been the ideals towards which 
Bacon aspired, he was evidently aware that such a condition could not be attained. According to 
Levao,   “Bacon hopes for an objective certainty that will eventually overtake and complete his 
method, but it is this method itself that makes the objective ideal possible, even as it eludes its 
requirements or, as Mary Hesse has put it with  regard to the ladder of axioms, ‘the conditions of 
Bacon’s method can never be fulfilled.’” Far from inflicting upon nature some fixed commitment 
to objective certainty, Bacon’s method involved containing devices like the experiment precisely 
because he saw both nature and the mind as inherently ungrounded, and mobile.78  
The objective of Bacon’s measured and deliberate advancement of knowledge was “to 
establish progressive stages of certainty,”79 so that the human mind is not “left to take its own 
course, but guided at every step.” 80 He understood that whatever certainty could be attained was 
only temporary because the future was as yet unknown, and all knowledge was open to revision.   
Thus his method “established provisionally certain degrees of assurance for use and relief until 
the mind shall arrive at a knowledge of causes in which it can rest.” 81 And yet, he himself knew 
that such rest was unattainable because “of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and 
appetite are perpetually interchangeable.” 82 Provisional certainty was thus a way of closing off a 
matter in order to proceed; if no questions were bracketed and put to the side, if all remained open 
                                                          
 
78 Levao, “Francis Bacon and the Mobility of Science,” 15.  
 
79 Bacon, Novum Organum, 1. 
 
80 Ibid, 2. 
 
81 Bacon, The Great Instauration, 450. 
 
82 Bacon, The Great Instauration, 218. 
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to question, then no conclusions could be drawn upon to serve as a foundation for a succeeding 
stage of inquiry. Provisional certainty is very much what I propose modernity is about; ever 
crossing new boundaries, and opening the future, necessitates the creation of smaller boundaries 
for what Bacon called “use and relief.”  Arising from the uprooting of old foundations, modernity 
must continually fashion new foundations upon which to ground itself, until they too, are uprooted. 
This approximate, functional, and provisional certainty is facilitated by a logic of 
enclosure, whether it is manifested spatially, as fenced-in agricultural land, or conceptually, as the 
artificial conditions of a scientific experiment. Enclosure establishes a boundary between the 
object of reform or inquiry and the context in which it is embedded. This boundary is not 
necessarily complete or representative of an absolute truth. Rather it separates the object from the 
complexity of context just enough to allow action (dissection, improvements) to proceed. It works 
as scaffolding, a rough structure with which to build a more ambitious structure. 
Fact Determination in Early Modern Law and Science  
Such extensive consideration of how Bacon’s project aligned with what I am calling ‘the enclosure 
and improvement of knowledge’ is not intended to suggest that the cultural preoccupation with 
improvement originated solely or even primarily with him. In fact it is likely that many of his 
contemporaries shared his way of thinking about the advancement of knowledge, as well as his 
repeated use of metaphors for cultivation and bounty, or new world exploration. Nevertheless, 
Bacon’s Great Instauration and Novum Organum were remarkably influential for the generation 
that followed him, especially among the Hartlib group and those involved in the creation of the 
Royal Society. And it is through Bacon that we can see an important link between seventeenth 
century legal and scientific thought and practice. This is particularly so when we consider the 
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impact of Bacon’s experience in the legal profession on his methodology of progressing through 
stages of provisional certainty. Cohen, for example, notes how Bacon’s approach to legal and 
scientific reasoning followed a similar inductive pattern: 
Bacon held that as a common lawyer arrived at greater and greater generality in the 
formulation of his legal rules as he moved higher and higher up what Bacon called 'the 
pyramid of axioms' the lawyer would find his rules beginning to approximate to standard 
moral principles….So for Bacon all the basic patterns of inductive reasoning could be 
applied in a normative context just as well as in a factual one: variation of evidential 
instances, increase of certainty via increase of generality, avoidance of trivial increases in 
generality via the requirement that every increase should lead to new knowledge” 83 
                                                          
 
83 Jonathan L. Cohen, "Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way," The Monist 65, no.3, 
(1982): 287. The relationship between Bacon’s legal experience and his project to reform both 
natural philosophy and epistemology has been curiously neglected in the literature on Bacon.  
Among the few who have looked in detail at this relationship, there is disagreement about the 
direction of influence. Levack and Coquillette have argued that it was Bacon’s scientific thought 
that shaped his efforts to reform the common law. See Brian P. Levack, "Francis Bacon by 
Daniel R. Coquillette," The American Journal of Legal History 39, no. 1 (1995): 112-113; and 
Daniel R. Coquillette, “Past the Pillars of Hercules: Francis Bacon and the Science of 
Rulemaking,” University of Michigan. Journal of Law Reform, 549 (2013). Others have 
contended that Bacon developed his ideas concurrently in both spheres. Martin, for example, has 
claimed that "Bacon's reformed science of the law and his reformed natural philosophy have the 
same purpose, the same techniques, the same vocabulary and the same hierarchical 
organization." See Julian Martin, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural 
Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 170.  Sarjeantson argues that it 
was the legal approach to investigating matters before a court that influenced Bacon’s overall 
theory of the ‘interpretation of nature” while, for Wheeler, it was jurisprudence helped to shape 
Bacon’s inductive epistemology. See Richard Serjeantson, 2014. "Francis Bacon and the 
'Interpretation of Nature' in the Late Renaissance,” Isis 105, no. 4 (2014): 681; and Harvey 
Wheeler, “The Invention of Modern Empiricism: Juridical Foundations of Francis Bacon's 
Philosophy of Science," Law Library Journal, 76 (1983): 78. The gathering and determination of 
‘facts’ in law and in Bacon’s scientific method has been discussed by Martin and Serjeanston, as 
well as by  Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2000), Roger T. Simonds, "Bacon's Legal Learning: Its Influence on His 
Philosophical Ideas,"  Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Sanctandreani, Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Congress of Neo- Latin Studies, ed. D. McFarlane, (Binghamton, NY: Center for 
Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1986) and Kenneth Cardwell, “'Francis Bacon, 
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  According to Shapiro, one of the most important practices that Bacon imported from the 
legal realm and applied to the scientific or intellectual, was that of ‘fact determination’. When 
Bacon makes the “facts of nature” the concrete foundation for the new philosophy of sciences, he 
plays a key role in the transmission of the legal and historical concept of the “fact” to the realm of 
natural phenomena. 84 
The legal concept of the fact has its origins in Roman law. Glenn explains that the factum 
was the term for “the formal document in law representing solemnized reality.”85 Poovey, 
meanwhile, points to the double meaning to the word factum in Latin: in Classical Latin it referred 
simply to an event or occurrence, whereas in scholastic Latin it came to mean “something that 
really occurred or is actually the case.” Thus the modern fact derived from this ambiguity in the 
Latin word, wherein the fact meant both that which is real or actual, and that which simply 
happened. Poovey notes that, likely in order to distinguish it from this ambiguity of meaning in 
scholasticism, the scientific thinkers defined the fact as “a datum of experience, as distinguished 
from the conclusion that may be based upon it.” Poovey therefore see Bacon’s use of ‘facts’ in the 
Great Instauration, as  an ‘attempt to reorder the priorities of modern knowledge production in 
such a way as to elevate the ‘discovery’ and use of observed or historical particulars and to demote 
the scholastic ‘cultivation’ or contemplation of accepted commonplaces.”86 
                                                          
Inquisitor,'” in Francis Bacon's Legacy of Texts, ed. William Sessions, (New York: AMS Press, 
1990), 281-284. 
84 Shapiro, A Culture of Fact, 110. 
 
85 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 148. 
 
86  Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of 
178 
  
 
In England, the spread of the fact from a legal to a scientific and then to wider cultural 
context between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries may also indicate that there was a growing 
appetite in this period for fixed references to the real and the true, and a hunger for greater certainty 
about all sorts of matters.87 Indeed, Poovey points out that Bacon wrote his works on the 
reformation of knowledge at a time when England was experiencing a “crisis of knowledge,” and 
an abundance of “religious and epistemological heterodoxies” 88  
In medieval Europe legal disputes were largely settled at the local level, and proof of claims 
was determined by oaths and ordeals, interpreted as divine testimony of the truth. By the late 
medieval period the Romano-civil legal tradition of law began to rationalize its system of evidence, 
promoting the use of witnesses to verify events in question, and of professional judges to weigh 
evidence. By the mid sixteenth century, the English common law system began to follow suit, and 
                                                          
Wealth and Society (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 96. 
87 Konnert has suggested that the search for order implicit in the scientific revolution 
stemmed from the religious and political controversies and general turmoil of the seventeenth 
century Europe. See Mark Konnert, Early Modern Europe: The Age of Religious War, 1559-
1715 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 313. In fact, the seventeenth century has 
been defined as a period of general crisis across Europe. See Eric Hobsbawm, "The General 
Crisis of the European Economy in the seventeenth Century," Past & Present 5 (1954) and Hugh 
R. Trevor-Roper, "The general crisis of the seventeenth Century," Past & Present 16 (1959). 
These two articles sparked a debate among historians that lasted for 40 years and which is 
considered more recently in Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, The General Crisis of the 
Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge, 2005). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203992609. 
  
88 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, 97. Poovey also reminds us that Bacon was a 
statesman, and that in this period of epistemological insecurity, his ideas were intended to support 
“the monarch’s ability to adjudicate and use what counted as truth” 97-8. On this topic, also see 
Julian Martin, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
179 
  
 
added to their system of evidence the further innovation of juries. 89 By the time of Bacon and 
Coke, a “matter of fact” was distinguished from a “matter of law”, the former being an event or 
act or deed the proof of which was determined by a jury, and the latter an issue to be decided by 
the judge.90 
The rationalization of the common law, whereby witnesses, judges and juries replaced 
oracles and oaths, marked the arrival and acceptance of a new way of thinking about knowledge. 
As Shapiro explains, in the legal context the “need to make decisions about events that are no 
longer present… requires faith in the possibility of reaching adequate and reasonable belief about 
such events and a mode of thinking about what is knowable, who can know it, and under what 
conditions it is knowable, as well as institutional arrangements and processes for knowing.”91 The 
rationalization of the common law, thus, was part of the process of one legal tradition gradually 
being replaced by another: In the “chthonic” tradition, disputes were judged and resolved at the 
local level, by members of the community, who used their own discretion in practices such as 
oaths and ordeals. But as the courts in London became the centre for the common law across 
England, norms and standards extended outwards from that centre, universalizing the practice of 
law. The imposition of the “modern” common law had a similar effect as the introduction of 
scientific surveying in the late sixteenth century: just as land was no longer measured and allotted 
by local and traditional knowledge but by the “common units” of geometry and numerical 
                                                          
89 Shapiro argues that the jury system in English law played a crucial role in the 
transmission of fact to other disciplines and to the wider culture: “the spread of ‘fact’ in England 
was facilitated by widespread familiarity with and esteem for lay fact finding by juries.” See 
Shapiro, A Culture of Fact, 209. 
 
90 Shapiro, A Culture of Fact, 208 
 
91 Ibid, 208.  
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calculation, the truth or justice of events was measured less and less by local standards and 
authorities and more and more by the standards of visual first hand testimony, professional 
judgement or jury determined facts.92 
Bacon’s optimistic view that all natural phenomena could be made knowable -once the 
common limitations and distortions of the human understanding were recognized and corrected- 
clearly developed out of his own efforts to further rationalize the English Common law system.93 
By the turn of the seventeenth century a number of new “institutional arrangements” and 
“processes for knowing” had been introduced to strengthen the legitimacy of the evidentiary 
system.94 In courts across Europe for example, it had become customary to require the testimony 
of at least two eyewitnesses. And these witnesses- as well as jury members in England- were also 
vetted for their credibility, in order to rule out bias and hearsay in the determination of facts. Such 
changes brought clarity to the discovery of the truth. According to Shapiro, “legal systems that 
treat fact-finding as a rational rather than ritualistic process or invocation of divine intervention 
require methods of fact determination comprehensive to litigants and to the culture as a whole.” 
They have “an underlying epistemology... as to the human ability to arrive at “true” and “just” 
decisions.”95  It is important to clarify here that “facts” were by no means understood to be 
synonymous with “truth” the way they often are today. Rather than being proof of something, they 
                                                          
 
92 For more on the comparison and relationship between the “chthonic” and the modern 
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93 Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early Modern 
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were the matter to be proved. As Shapiro puts it, “early modern English facts (legal and non-legal) 
remained in the realm of probability.”96  
In the Great Instauration Bacon did more than simply apply the legal term “fact” to the 
study of natural history. His method of determining “the facts of nature” also corresponded to the 
above mentioned rules of evidence in law, rules which were meant to minimize the human 
tendency to bias and distortion and to ensure a minimum degree of “moral certainty”. For example, 
both the scientific experiment and the legal trial are artificial constructs designed to closely analyze 
and evaluate matters of fact. And though the facts of nature are not determined by a jury, the 
scientific experiment has the advantage of being endlessly replicated- allowing for even greater 
consensus on its results. Moreover, like the legal requirement that testimony is derived from 
eyewitnesses, the importance of observation to Bacon’s method assumes the greater credibility- 
and objectivity- of sight over the other senses. 97 
The transmission of these techniques and rules of fact determination from the realm of law 
to that of natural history points to a deeper cultural transformation taking place at the turn of the 
seventeenth century. We have already touched upon one aspect of this transformation, which is 
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97 It should be noted that the concept of the fact did not pass exclusively from the legal to 
the scientific realm or through the exclusive intervention of Bacon. Rather, the legal fact had its 
counterpart in historiography since at least the sixteenth century. Just as in the legal context 
historians followed the standards of credibility such as Eyewitness testimony and documentary 
evidence that would ensure the accuracy of recorded events. And, as Shapiro argues, by the time 
that Bacon wrote the great Instauration, there were a host of already existing discourses which 
were receptive to the concept of the fact, such as chorography and topography. See Shapiro, A 
Culture of Fact, 209 and J.B. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge and Power,” in The Iconography of 
Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments” ed. 
Dennis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 299-300. 
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that the “truth”- about events that happened or about the laws of nature- was now considered to be 
knowable in a way that it had not been before. 
Shapiro reminds us that Vico, as late as the early eighteenth century, still distinguished 
between factum and verum.98 The first signified the knowable realm of the human made world, 
while the latter signified the “unknowable world that God made.” This distinction had already 
begun to erode in the seventeenth century, as verum –the unknowable- was increasingly colonized 
by factum- the known. Bacon played his part in that process, for “the innovation of Bacon and his 
successors was to apply the techniques and conceptions developed to deal with human deeds to 
natural phenomena, that is, to the works of God.”99  Foucault has also argued that the major 
discontinuity in the history of thought that took place in the seventeenth century stemmed from 
“modifications that affected knowledge itself” such as “the substitution of analysis for the 
hierarchy of analogies.”  That is, an episteme of integration was replaced by one of 
discrimination.100 From the renaissance to the late sixteenth century the known world was full of 
resemblances, hierarchies, microcosmic patterns corresponding with macrocosmic patterns. 
                                                          
98 Shapiro, A Culture of Fact, 106. Vico’s maxim “verum ipso factum” meaning that truth 
is man- made, is an early example of both constructivist epistemology and the modern reflexivity 
of knowledge. But as Shapiro’s points out, the maxim reveals the presumed distinction between 
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100 In the Order of Things, Foucault describes his notion of the episteme as an 
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particularly with regard to knowledge. It is the “condition of possibility” of all knowledge. See 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage Books: 
New York, 1973), xxii; 54-5. 
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Foucault calls it a “total system of correspondence.”101 Within that totality there was an infinite 
“interplay of similitudes”, but as a totality it was, by definition, a closed system:  
…understood as a general configuration of nature”, the “epistemological configuration 
of this period”… “poses real, and as it were, tangible limits to the indefatigable to-and-fro 
of similitudes relieving one another. It indicates that there exists a greater world, and that 
its perimeter defines the limits of all created things; that at the very far extremity of this 
great world there exists a privileged creation which reproduces, within its restricted 
dimensions, the immense order of the heavens, the stars etc.102  
In the new “epistemological configuration” the ordering function of this perimeter begins 
to vanish, the system is open, and the order given by borders can now only be established between 
things. What had been integrated in a whole is now separated and made discrete. Thus, 
paradoxically, the same process which brought the human and divine realms into unity, also 
dissected what had been whole.  As Foucault explains: “From now on every resemblance must be 
subjected to proof by comparison…until its identity and the series of its differences have been 
discovered by means of measurement with a common unit.”103 
In the old episteme, everything is situated and oriented by the boundary dividing the human 
and divine realms. As that boundary is extended in the seventeenth century, the objects of 
knowledge are plotted by reference to a common unit of measurement. We saw an early example 
of such a way of framing experience in the renaissance innovation of perspectival drawing, 
whereby each point in a drawing led geometrically back to the eye of the artist or the viewer.  
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 This transformation of knowledge from the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries paralleled 
changes in the practice of Christianity introduced by protestant reformers, such as the removal of 
intermediaries- priests, rituals and idols- in order to bring God and the believer into direct 
relationship and the translation of the word of God into vernacular languages so that the meaning 
of the scriptures could be discussed in community with fellow worshippers. Similarly, the symbols, 
hierarchies, mysteries, and microcosms that made sense of the world in the renaissance and up 
until the seventeenth century, were now seen as so many veils obscuring a knowable order. It was 
no longer acceptable to write outside the boundaries of one’s map of the world, “there be dragons”, 
for it was no longer acceptable to offer an incomplete map. Whatever lay beyond the border of the 
known world could no longer remain blank. Replacing mystery and myth, human reason was the 
new tool for digging up the truth.  Thus, as Shapiro says, “Bacon’s new natural philosophy was to 
be built on natural histories expunged of literary, mythical and symbolic elements” or “traditional 
lore.”104  
The spread of facts from a legal and historical context, to a scientific one was only the 
beginning: from the mid-seventeenth century, England became a “culture of fact”, wherein fact in 
English law became part of the “generally held habits of thought characteristic of late seventeenth 
century and early eighteenth century English culture.”105 Facts would become the key means of 
claiming the truth across the culture. It is my hypothesis that the cultural hunger for certainty grew, 
in direct proportion to which the horizon of the known receded. That is, the more it appeared that 
the realm of the knowable was limitless, the less effective traditional frames of reference, or forms 
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of guidance were in sheltering people from uncertainty. Perhaps this is why the instrumental value 
and techniques of fact determination were largely drawn from the legal context. Law, as we have 
seen in chapter two, was the first institution to separate itself from the hierarchy of divine authority; 
it was the first institution of secular, or consciously human-made authority. The rational and 
empirical methods of determining a probable truth and the aura of authority that surrounded the 
legal tradition lent legitimacy to the scientific process, a process which could be carried out – and 
carried – anywhere: a portable framework for asserting reality. 106  
But a culture which has begun to transgress or “trespass” over its traditional boundaries, 
which has begun to push back the limits of the knowable, soon suffers from the vertigo of infinity 
and from exposure to uncertainty. This only further whets the appetite for knowledge, control and 
certainty, sharpens the need to fix objects of knowledge or improvement within artificial 
enclosures, as expressions of provisional certainty. And the more facts that are accumulated, or 
acres enclosed, the less that guidance can be gleaned from the evaporating boundaries of the old 
order. And, of course, we can’t forget that before the fact could ascend to a “representation of 
                                                          
 
106 At the same time, Berman notes that the relationship between law and science in the 
seventeenth century was not unidirectional: the scientific revolution reshaped the legal order in 
two ways. First, whether through deduction or induction, “Cartesian” or “Galilean” forms of 
reason stressed the identification of truth with “what the mind can weigh, measure and count and 
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mathematical certainty, the second used empirical methods, such as experimentation, to reach 
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verified reality”107 it required the removal of (irrational) obstacles between the seeker of 
knowledge and the object of knowledge. This process was mirrored in the removal of customary 
rights to make way for enclosures. 
Enclosures and the Discourse of Improvement in 17th and 18th England 
The Materiality of Enclosures: Hedges and Resistance 
I have suggested above that legal and natural facts achieved a provisional certainty about an object 
of inquiry by abstracting it from the complexity and variability of its context. But I also want to 
emphasize that this abstraction of the object is simultaneously the excision and erasure of that 
context. In the determination of natural facts this excision usually takes the form of experimental 
controls and is thus largely intellectual or representational. But when this logic of enclosure was 
enacted on the ground, as it was with property, the excision and erasure of context impacted people.  
As much as I have been exploring the logic of enclosure in relation to the new approach to 
knowledge (thus metaphorically, symbolically), I am in agreement with Nicholas Blomley that we 
should be careful to remember the materiality of enclosure itself. There is, of course, a long line 
of scholars who have done just that, by bringing to light the social history of enclosures. From 
Marx and Polanyi to E.P. Thompson to Jeanette Neeson, we have learned that private property, far 
from being a natural phenomenon, was created out of the destruction of common right, and the 
disembedding of people from their habitats. 108 What’s more, they have taught us that, unlike the 
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108 Marx, in “Debates on the Law of the Theft of Wood”; Polanyi in The Great 
Transformation, relates how land and labour were commodified through dispossession of 
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context erased in the making of natural, legal or historical facts, those dispossessed by the 
enclosure of land were not mute; they resisted their exclusion from the beginning, as so many 
continue to resist enclosure in all its forms today.  
Blomley reaffirms both the popular resistance to and the material history of enclosures by 
drawing attention to the role played by a key artefact of that history: the hedge. He notes that, 
under the sway of the cultural turn, recent “scholars have tended to focus on enclosure as a largely 
imaginative undertaking produced through a bundle of signs, discourses, and representations."109 
Recent legal theories of property have likewise tended to treat property as representational, an 
abstract set of rights, rather than a physical thing.110 To a certain extent Blomley sees these 
discussions as valid, however, given the longstanding propensity of Western thought to “disavow 
objects”, he wants to "try to think about property as if things mattered." 111 
                                                          
resistance of commoners to the extinguishment of their common rights, in Thompson, Customs in 
Common, and Neeson, Commoners. 
 
109 Blomley, “Making Private Property,” 2. 
 
110 For an array of nuanced but accessible discussions about the various meanings of 
property, please see Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1993) Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, 
and Rhetoric of Ownership (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994); Margaret Davies 
Property: Meanings, Histories, Theories (London: Routledge, 2007). 
 
111 Blomley, “Making Private Property,” 4.  The phrase “disavowel of the object” comes, 
I think, from Peter Stallybrass. In his article “Marx’s Coat,” Stallybrass brilliantly disenchants us 
of the notion that ours is a “materialistic” culture, and persuades us of the relationship between 
capitalism, abstraction and modernity. Classic critiques of abstraction in Christianity, Western 
philosophy, and of course capitalism, can be found in Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Blomley 
refers us to some of the more recent work on this topic: B. Brown, "Thing Theory," Critical Inquiry 
28, no. 1 (2001): 1; Dick Pels,  Kevin Hetherington, and Frédéric Vandenberghe, "the Status of 
the Object: Performances, Mediations and Techniques,"  Theory Culture and Society 19, no. 5/6 
(2002): 1; and Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" in Daedulus 109, no. 1 (1980): 121-
188 
  
 
According to Blomley, this preference for the idea of the non-material is exemplified in the 
scholarship on enclosure, which has attributed to maps a constitutive role in the process, while 
overlooking the role of hedges. He recognizes that the map, “in creating a divide between land and 
law, and between material and ideational realms, may have played a critical role in creating an 
abstracted view of property”; however, he reminds us that the map “did not, in itself, take the 
commons from the poor.” While it is true that maps were often prepared for and facilitated the 
enclosure of lands, hedges were used to demarcate enclosure long before maps. 112 
As mentioned above, enclosures and engrossments had been used in English agriculture 
from at least 1,000 CE. 113  From this time, areas to be protected (either from roaming livestock or 
wind) were physically bounded either by stones, fences, or, hedges. Whitethorn and hawthorn were 
the most popular bushes used in making hedges. In fact, Hawthorn, is derived from ‘haga’- an Old 
English word meaning both enclosure and hedge.114  
Until the late sixteenth century, hedges were a part of the English landscape, and far from 
being a signal of private property, they were part of the commoning economy: the right of 
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customary tenants to collect firewood, berries, or even small animals from hedges was called 
“hedgebote.” However, as resistance mounted against the practice of enclosure in the late sixteenth 
century, hedgebote – a right of estover- was increasingly redefined as theft. And the construction 
of hedges involved ever more elaborate means of deterring attempts to collect from or penetrate 
them.115  In this way, hedges did not just represent private property, or introduce “space discipline” 
as maps did, but they also “materialized and enforced” it. Hedges, Blomley suggests, became both 
the metaphor and the means to impenetrability and “the prevention of misrule.” 116   
In modernity, boundaries are paradoxical constructions: the protection they offer those 
inside the boundary ensures a freedom to cultivate and transform the space within. At the same 
time they represent a limitation, an obstacle to freedom of movement, and an obstacle which can 
transgressed. Early modern hedges in England took on this paradoxical character. They allowed 
enclosing landowners to improve their land without the “obstacle” of the practice of common right. 
At the same time, they prohibited the free movement of commoners, and were therefore viewed as 
illegitimate obstructions to their long-standing enjoyment of common rights. But as Blomley puts 
it, the very materiality of the hedge made it both effective in inhibiting commoner’s movements 
                                                          
115 Roger B. Manning, Village Revolts: Social Protest and Popular Disturbances in 
England, 1509-1640 (New York; Oxford University Press, 1988), 26. Manning explains how the 
construction of hedges reflected the changing purpose of enclosures from the medieval to the early 
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and vulnerable to destruction. 117 At the turn of the seventeenth century, when the legitimacy of 
common right was under attack, but the legitimacy of enclosures and private property was by no 
means established at law or in thought, hedges were at the centre of the struggle to define property. 
Hedge breaking, or “hedge-levelling,” as it was often called, soon became, if not a “national 
pastime,” as Manning quips, at least a common feature in rural protests against enclosure. In 
response to instances of hedge-levelling, husbandry manuals gave estate owners advice on how to 
grow hedges “ever higher and thicker, so that not so much as a small bird is able to pass thorowe 
it, nor any man to looke through it. 118 Gervaise Markham advised:  
Know then that if after your hedge is come to sixe or seven yeeres of age, you shall let it 
grew on without cutting or pruning, that then although it grow thicke at the top, yet it will 
decay and grow so thinne at the bottome, that not onely beasts but men may runne through 
it, and in the end it will dye and come to nothing, which to prevent, it shall be good once 
in seaven or eight yeeres to plash and lay all your Quick-set hedges… For this plashing is 
a halfe cutting or deviding of the quicke growth, almost to the outward barke, and then 
laying it orderly in a sloape manner… and then with the smaller and more plyant branches, 
to wreathe and binde in the tops, making a fence as strong as a wall, for the roofe which is 
more then halfe cut in sunder, putting forth new branches, which runne and entangle 
themselues amongst the olde stockes, doe so thicken and fortifie the hedge, that it is against 
the force of beasts impregnable.119 
Rural protests included other forms of expressing contempt for enclosures, such as setting 
                                                          
117 Blomley, 5. Blomley notes that there were other ironies in the relationship between 
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 118 Conrad Heresbach, Four Books of Husbandrie, 1586, quoted in Blomley, “Making 
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animals upon enclosed crops, throwing down fences or filling in ditches. But so prominent a 
feature was hedge-levelling that, Manning says, “after the suppression of the Midland Revolt of 
1607 it became axiomatic that those who levelled hedges were bent also upon levelling social 
distinctions - and it was from this time onwards that the term 'leveller' began to acquire the 
connotation of political radicalism.” 120 Popular uprisings aimed at enclosures were not new with 
the Midland revolt. The sixteenth century witnessed countless uprisings across the country, 
including the 1549 Kett’s rebellion and the Oxfordshire rebellion of 1596. And while many 
concerned other social grievances, such as food shortages, the obstruction of common areas by 
fences or hedges was an increasingly common cause of uprising as the sixteenth century came to 
a close.121  
There were also many instances where the contest between enclosures and customary rights 
was played out in the courts of the Star Chamber. McDonagh has studied the cases of litigation of 
landowners against customary tenants in the Star Chamber in the Yorkshire Wolds region, in order 
to “ [reclaim] something of the materiality of the events reported in the court “ and to reveal how 
“enclosure and common rights could be negotiated ‘on the ground.’” 122 She notes, for example, 
that: 
Some defendants were explicit about the fact that they had removed hedges specifically 
with the intention of reasserting common rights. For example, Marmaduke Grimston Esq. 
of Goodmanham submitted two bills to the Star Chamber in 1599 complaining that various 
inhabitants of the parish had thrown down the fence at Wood Nooke, a close which 
contained spring and young wood which Grimston had fenced at his own cost. Grimston 
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complained that in casting down the fence and filling in the ditches, the defendants had laid 
the close open and beasts had depastured the wood. In their answers, the defendants argued 
that the ground was a part of the common of Goodmanham which Grimston had caused to 
be enclosed and fenced for his own profit.123  
But in the Midland Revolt of 1607, discontent with the continued injustice of enclosures 
was expressed on a scale not seen before, with thousands of participants in three midland counties, 
spreading from Northamptonshire to Warwickshire and Leicestershire, from late April to early 
June and culminating in the death by hanging of over 50 people.124 
And of course, it was not only the hedge-levelling commoners who voiced their contempt 
for enclosures. Together, the published speeches, sermons and tracts of various members of the 
government, the Church, and the landowning gentry formed a vehement discourse against the 
practice, deeming it beneficial to covetous landlords, at the cost and suffering of the poor, a threat 
to the order and health of the commonwealth, and a transgression against Christian morality. By 
the eighteenth century this would no longer be the dominant opinion among the elite. Enclosures, 
for the purpose of improvement, would become acceptable. 
The Discourse of Improvement 
The Defensive Origins of Hard-selling Improvement 
Early in the seventeenth century poor tenants and powerful elites seemed to agree that by selfishly 
pursuing profit, enclosing landlords caused suffering and idleness among the poor, and failed in 
their duty to God, community and the commonwealth. Ironically, the very force and endurance of 
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these criticisms may have played a part in the development of a powerful discourse on 
improvement, one that moved beyond the limited and practical matters of estate management 
towards an all-encompassing and even revolutionary force in the culture. Like the mushroom 
which grows up under a root, the obstacle of censure from traditional mores and socio-economic 
organization only served to make the discourse of improvement stronger. By devoting so much 
energy to defending the practice, it seems that improvement’s advocates were newly persuaded of 
its benefits, and eventually found ways to use the chief criticisms of the practice to their own 
advantage. 
Authors of surveying and other husbandry manuals were aware of the many claims made 
against enclosures, and they addressed these criticisms either by refuting their accuracy, or by 
claiming that surveying, enclosures and improvements could and should be carried out without 
any anti-social motives or effects. In the preface to Norden’s Surveyors Dialogue (1607), for 
example, he reminds his readers that the duty of the surveyor is: 
by industry and diligence, (to) produce an exact discovery and performance of the work he 
undertaketh, to the true information of the Lord, whose benefit and uttermost lawful profit 
he is to seek, in a good conscience, dissuading him yet from distasteful Avarice, the greatest 
blemish that can befall a man, seeking reputation and renown, by his Revenues.125  
In general, charges of avarice came from a moral and religious basis, and implied that the 
improving landlord was unduly concerned for his own welfare above others’. Norden was not 
alone in carefully dismantling this criticism, by admitting that avarice is a sinful motive that 
improving landlords should never engage in, while at the same time stressing that to profit from 
one’s land is both lawful and a divinely sanctioned behavior. In fact, it is with this latter point that 
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Norden begins his preface.  Admitting that, of the two “prescript cares” God has enjoined us to 
observe, the spiritual is the first, “yet hath he not omitted, to give unto all men an expresse 
commandment, to be mindful of the second”, the worldly. Therefore (man); “must he not therefore 
dissolutely neglect his uttermost lawfull indevour to aduance his owne welfare”, especially when 
we remember the punishment for our original sin: only “with the sweat of thy face thou shalt eate 
thy bread, all the days of thy life.” He bolsters this argument by citing all those in the scriptures 
who worked the land: “Adam digged earth and manured it. (Tubal) wrought metal, Noah planted 
a vineyard, Abraham, Lot, Moses Elizeus and Amos were shepherds...” 126 Thus, no one should 
neglect “ the duty in earth which every man, even the greatest oweth unto the Commonwealth, his 
own family and posterity: And he is censured even by the mouth of God , Worse than an Infidel, 
that neglecteth these duties.” 127  
In these examples from Norden we can see how the very charges against enclosure and 
improvement provided the foundation of a pro-improvement discourse. In response to the criticism 
that landlords’ self-interest was sinful Norden found verses and examples in scripture that 
authorized both self-interest and the work of physically reforming the earth’s resources. To the 
charges that these landlords transgressed against the law, the community and the commonwealth, 
he made the reverse claim that it was those who neglected to reform the land who failed in their 
duty to their families and the commonwealth, and who were censured by God as infidels! As the 
discourse of improvement developed, these techniques - turning the criticisms of improving 
landlords against non-improvers and borrowing authority from scripture- became commonplace.  
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The first half of the seventeenth century, the formative stage in the development of the 
improvement discourse, witnessed the transition from a more traditional socio-economic 
arrangement in which extensive enclosures were heavily censured to one in which elites tolerated 
and even approved of the enclosures as symbols of socio-economic reform. It is thus not surprising 
that advocates of improvement practices at both ends of that period appear to us to hold 
inconsistent ideas about the sort of society they wanted. Writing in 1607, Norden dismissed critics 
of surveying and enclosures as “prejudiced” and backward. At the same time, he counseled tenants 
not to forget their dependence on and their “fearful love” of their lords. Meanwhile, Walter Blith, 
writing as late as the 1660s, still felt the need to placate critics on the issue of the depopulating 
effects of enclosure by teaching readers how to “enclose without offence” or “enclose without 
depopulation.” 128 Nevertheless, there was a definite shift in the tone of the discourse from the 
early to the mid-seventeenth century, as ever more of the arguments against enclosure were 
appropriated and reversed by the advocates. It was now the landlord who didn’t improve who was 
selfish, who weakened the nation; it was the commons themselves that caused the poverty and 
idleness of the displaced tenants.   
Ideas and Events Shaping Improvement Discourse  
Of course, the need to defend against criticisms of enclosure and improvement was not the only 
factor leading to the success of the improvement discourse. To return to our mushroom metaphor, 
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if traditional mores were the root beneath which the mushroom (of improvement) was compelled 
to grow ever stronger, a wealth of other contemporary events and conditions served as its water, 
soil, and light. Among the trends and preoccupations which intersected with the idea of 
improvement were the intellectual, economic and national impact of the colonial conquest of the 
new world; the growing legitimacy of scientific knowledge and quantitative forms of 
measurement; a greater disposition towards change due to the political upheaval in the middle of 
the century and the ethics and beliefs of the highly influential Puritan community.129 
With the European “discovery” of the new world, British elites were introduced to novel 
foods, artefacts, ideas, and- most important- a novel awareness of the vastness of the world and 
the smallness of their own island. Information reaching home about unfamiliar flora and fauna 
stimulated a curiosity about and desire to accumulate knowledge of the natural phenomena to be 
found across the globe. The goods brought back from the new world were also seen as new 
commodities to be traded, and even those goods with little practical use were valuable as exotic 
luxury commodities, the possession of which communicated high social status. Perhaps more than 
anything, it was the new global perspective which helped to give the British a self-consciousness 
of their own nation. This new perspective intersected with the growing esteem for quantitative 
forms of measurement by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
Together, the global perspective and the rise of quantitative measurement inspired in the 
British a desire to improve as a nation. Comparison with other regions of the world and with other 
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trading nations, particularly within Europe, fed a growing sense of nationhood and focused the 
Crown’s attention on the relative status of the nation. As the science of comparison, measurement 
was therefore a key part of the expansion of the idea of improvement from an agrarian to a national 
concern.  And measurement was not only applied to other places and peoples but also to other 
times. As Paul Slack explains, the idea that something can be made better in the future requires an 
awareness of and an ability to observe change over time. "English improvement depended on 
knowledge that it was happening. It could only be perceived, thought about, and articulated as a 
concept, if people knew something about the present state of England, how it was changing, and 
how it compared with other countries and other times."130 
This awareness and observation of change over time contributed to the development of a 
modern identity and orientation within the world in several ways. As was noted in the introduction, 
a number of theorists of modernity identify historical consciousness as a central characteristic of 
modernity, and inseparable from this sense of history is a greater vision of the future as conditional 
and therefore malleable to the human will.131 The very conditionality of the future invests it with 
a new meaning. In seventeenth century England, one can see the coexistence, even the confusion 
of different meanings of the future. For the Calvinists and millenarians who believed that the 
apocalypse was imminent, the future was awaited with passivity- albeit a passivity laden with great 
anxiety.132 But others, such as Francis Bacon and his successors, began to envision the future and 
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providence as requiring active involvement in its unfolding.  
While many who thought this way were highly educated and devoted to the reform of the 
sciences, they were by no means secular. In fact, many of those who took up Bacon’s project of 
the advancement of knowledge, and who shared in an “increasing appetite” for the accumulation 
of information in the seventeenth century, were deeply motivated by religious belief. Warde 
explains that for these people, 
"The idea of improvement was allied to the argument that man was not simply a passive 
recipient of nature's bounty, or the force of providence…man's godly mission was not only 
to harvest what was provided but actively to seek out the truth of how nature functioned, 
and through this to achieve mastery over it. Nature could be shaped if it could be 
understood, and this was the task of the true Christian."133  
The acquisition of ever greater stores of knowledge was therefore seen by many to be a 
duty to God. This was particularly true for one strand of Calvinist thought which saw the search 
for knowledge as the only means by which man could be restored to the perfect condition, and 
command over nature, that he enjoyed before the Fall.134 It was at this time, early in the seventeenth 
century, that Puritan sermons began to employ the term “improvement” in this sense. The preacher 
Joseph Hall, for instance, declared that “like as every flame of our materiall fyre, hath a concourse 
of providence; but we may not expect new infusions; rather know that God expects of us an 
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improvement of those habituall graces we have received."135  
The Hartlib Circle and the Science and Spirit of Improvement 
The change which the improvement discourse underwent between the first and second halves of 
the seventeenth century cannot be attributed to any one source. Nevertheless, there was one group 
of thinkers, known as the “Hartlib circle,” who did much to turn the tide of elite opinion in its 
favour. Because of the diversity of its members’ interests and projects, they helped to bring the 
idea of improvement into the center of nearly every sphere of contemporary thought. 
The Hartlib circle were a loose alliance of thinkers who shared a belief in the perfectability 
of the world and a general desire for social, political and intellectual betterment. Their decades of 
exchanging of ideas about reform began at Cambridge in the 1630s when Samuel Hartlib, for 
whom the circle was named, first met Presbyterian minister John Dury and scholar Jan Comenius. 
All three men were exiles of political or religious strife. Hartlib came to England in 1625 from 
Prussian Poland, Dury from Elbing and Jan Comenius from Bohemia.136 Each of these men had 
witnessed the devastation of war in Germany, and, hoped therefore, to play a role in restoring 
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harmony to mankind.137 Their spiritual ideals were inspired by the writings of Joseph Mede and 
Johann Heinrich Alsted which focused on the “apocalyptic expectations of an imminent fulfillment 
of the millennium, when the Christian perfection of the world and universal peace would at last be 
achieved.” 138 But they were equally shaped by Bacon’s project of a universal advancement of 
knowledge, as is evident in Hartlib’s declaration that "learning ought to be used, and improved as 
the means to bring us unto the universal knowledge of all things" ..."all things that are, were, or 
shall be throughout the world may be numbered, and summed up, that nothing escape our 
knowledge"..."to serve the improvement of our age."139 
Hartlib, Dury and Comenius seemed to share the aspiration of applying the reformation of 
Christianity to objects beyond the sphere of religion itself. Dury and Hartlib were particularly 
inspired by Comenius’ 1637 tract Pansophiae Prodromus, the aim of which was to enact a 
“universal reformation and enlightenment.” Together, the contacts that the three men made at 
Cambridge represented virtually every subject: Gabriel Plattes studied metallurgy, mining and 
husbandry, and was the first to gain a following outside of the immediate circle with his 1639 
publication The Discovery of Infinite Treasure Hidden Since World’s Beginning; merchant Henry 
Robinson sought to reform hospitals and to bring about an increase in trading and navigation; 
banker William Potter wished to follow the example of the Dutch in erecting banking 
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infrastructure; Rice Bush wanted to set up employment schemes and free schools across the 
nation.140 Other members of the Hartlib circle, such as Kentish squire Cheny Culpeper, were more 
focused on aligning the groups’ goals with millenarianism. Meanwhile, Benjamen Woresly and 
William Petty would become architects of the settlement of Ireland, particularly Petty, whose 
science of “Political Arithmetik” first applied techniques of economic and demographic statistical 
analysis to statecraft. 141 
Hartlib himself was engaged in a diverse range of projects, from the political and national 
transformations outlined in his treatises The Parliament’s Reformation (1646) and England’s 
Reformation (1647), to the spiritual ideals of Comenius’ Pansophia, and the more practical plans 
for an “office of address” in every town - a place where anyone could go for information, from job 
vacancies to the latest academic theories. 142 Together, this coalition of thinkers would conceive 
of projects for reforming medicine, social welfare, trade, mathematics, metallurgy, agriculture, 
chemistry, education, politics, theology and many other disciplines. By the 1660s there was an 
outpouring of books linking the idea of improvement with all of these areas and more. As 
J.T.Young puts it, the Hartlib circle had “ a definable centre but an almost infinitely extendable 
periphery” for  “as soon as one looks any further than this from the centre, the lines of 
communication begin to branch and cross, threading their way into the entire intellectual 
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community of Europe and America. ”143  
At the centre of the circle was Cambridge, and as a site where many of the nation’s elite 
congregated, it was not surprising that some of the contacts made there by the Hartlib circle would 
one day become powerful allies in Parliament.144 In this way, at least some of the Circle’s various 
projects might come to fruition in social and economic policy. Nevertheless, it was not merely on 
a practical level, through specific projects or political influence, that the Hartlib circle left its mark. 
Rather, as Slack says, it was in “their influence on public attitudes and sometimes on private 
practice," especially in the area of agriculture, "the arena where the private profits made from 
inventions and improvements had for a century been defended because they promoted the general 
good."145  
Looking back at the cultural suspicions towards improvement evident in the 1640s, 
commentators in the latter decades of the century could observe the massive influence that the 
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Hartlib circle had had on cultural reception of the idea of improvement. John Aubrey, for example, 
remembered that the earlier attitude held that it was a “strange presumption” to “attempt 
improvement of any knowledge whatsoever, even of husbandry itself, they thought it not fit to be 
wiser than their fathers, and not good manners to be wiser than their neighbours.”146 
If the culture in the 1640s had been adverse to change or progress in general, it was at least 
as uncomfortable with the deliberate pursuit of material wealth. As Yamamoto points out, this was 
not helped by the flurry of “spurious ‘projects’” and “bogus schemes” in the Stuart period, which 
“emerged under the colour of serving the commonwealth” but whose authors were intent on their 
own financial gain.147  But members of the Hartlib circle were not reluctant to place material 
progress at the centre of their visions of a reformed society. Potter claimed that “providence must 
now bless this nation with greater riches and prosperity than ever before” while Platte called for 
“a college of experts in medicine, trade, husbandry, fishing and new plantation’s, bringing plenty 
and prosperity before judgment day.”148 Benjamen Worsely, as secretary of the Counsel of Trade 
in 1649, told Hartlib that, together with improved agriculture and fisheries, the imports from the 
Virginian plantations “might make England in a few years the richest and happiest country in the 
world”149 Thus it was by linking material progress with national and spiritual progress that the 
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Hartlib circle helped to overcome the cultural suspicion of wealth.150 
Of course, the political upheaval of the middle seventeenth century also made the culture 
more receptive to the idea of change. With the organization of the body politic and the authority 
of the king now brought in question, it seemed, in Cheney Culpeper’s words, that  “the monopoly 
of trade, the monopoly of  Equity, the monopoly of matters of conscience and scripture… all these 
& many more…we shall have in chace…thus will Babylon tumble, tumble, tumble, tumble.” 151 
In the politically fluid environment of the interregnum years, the Baconian method of fact 
determination provided all the direction needed for the generation of improvers succeeding him. 
Because the empirical and experimental approach to knowledge was intended to minimize the 
human tendency to prejudice and partiality, Bacon’s legacy was, in Macaulay’s words, “the 
liberation of the human mind from the yoke of Authority.” This independence of knowledge from 
the influences of authority and tradition was renewed and sustained with the formation of the Royal 
Society in 1660.152 The Royal Society grew out of an informal, “invisible college,” a network of 
thinkers similar to that of the Hartlib circle, but with a greater emphasis on “carrying forward 
Bacon’s programme for reforming natural philosophy.”153 The motto of the Royal Society is 
                                                          
 
150 Ibid, 112. According to Slack the idea of “happiness,” not as a rare event but as a general 
and continuing state of contentment which could be sustained, took hold in second half of the 
seventeenth century. Focusing on the conjoined conditions of wealth and happiness may have 
served as a “strategy as well as rhetorical function in the language of the Hartlib group” for 
deflecting charges of “endorsing avarice” which were often attached to any discourse of material 
progress. 112-113. 
151 Culpeper quoted in Yamamoto, “Reformation and the Distrust of the Projector,” 375. 
 
152 J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: an Inquiry into its Origin and Growth (New York: 
Dover Publications, 2014), 96. 
 
153 Sarah Hutton, British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, Oxford 
205 
  
 
Nullius in verba, which translates as “take nobody’s word for it.” According to the Royal Society’s 
website, ‘It is an expression of the determination of Fellows to withstand the domination of 
authority and to verify all statements by an appeal to facts determined by experiment.” 154 
As much as the anarchic political events between the 1640s and 1660s contributed to a new 
cultural tolerance for change and brought into question the permanence of any rule, the nature of 
the change envisioned or actualized by improvement was anything but anarchic. That is, 
improvement did not mean the complete overthrow of authority, traditional or otherwise; nor was 
it revolutionary in the sense that it aimed to replace one fixed social system with another. As 
Polanyi, E.P. Thompson and others have shown, the effects of the improvement of property were 
certainly dramatic and sudden from the point of view of those whom it uprooted from land and 
habitat.155 But the idea of improvement itself was not consistent with sudden or dramatic 
transformation. Instead, it was closer to Bacon’s description of the advancement of knowledge as 
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the establishment of “progressive stages of certainty.” 
The Idea of Endless Expansion 
Individuals associated with the Hartlib circle and the Royal Society may have had particular 
projects which they wished to bring to fruition immediately. Yet, the overall pace and shape of the 
change envisaged as Improvement was gradual, progressive and open-ended. Take for instance, 
the contradictory desires of the many improving advocates who were fervidly nationalist: even 
while they were determined to increase England’s wealth and power across the globe, they 
repeatedly expressed the belief that beyond these immediate benefits, schemes to accumulate all 
forms of knowledge or to better all kinds of conditions were for the ultimate benefit of mankind 
as a whole. Bacon, despite his powerful political and legal position, and obvious interest in 
improving England, was consistent in describing his projects as aimed at a universal betterment of 
mankind.156 
What was new about the larger objective of improvement was the notion that modest or 
practical achievements would build upon one another, and that the imagined beneficiaries of these 
accumulated improvements lived in an indefinite realm of the future. Thus, whatever their personal 
beliefs in a looming judgment day, or in the finite nature of the earth's resources, the proponents 
of improvement were beginning to speak of it as an ongoing, cumulative, project, which was, if 
                                                          
 
156 In Novum Organum, Bacon distinguishes “three grades of ambition in mankind. The 
first is of those who desire to extend their own power in their native country, a vulgar and 
degenerate kind. The second is of those who labor to extend the power and dominion of their 
country among men. This certainly has more dignity, though not less covetousness. But if a man 
endeavor to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the 
universe, his ambition (if ambition it can be called) is without doubt both a more wholesome and 
a more noble thing than the other two.” Bacon, Novum Organum, 55. 
207 
  
 
not endless, open-ended. 157 That is, both the knowledge that could be uncovered and the designs 
that could be made in order to achieve wealth and wellbeing for the nation, and for humanity, were 
now being seen as potentially infinite. 
Whatever the doubts and contradictions attending the notion, the very prospect of infinite 
improvement seemed to invoke a twofold response which reverberated through the improvement 
discourse thereafter. A world without limits could mean either potential abundance or a formless 
void. Improvers saw that only a commitment to the former would liberate us from the latter. 
Fertility and Abundance in Agriculture, Science and Economy  
Considered from this view, the ubiquitous references to “fruitfulness” and “fertility” in the 
improvement discourse are particularly meaningful. Such references can also be found populating 
the surveying manuals of the previous century. An increase in the productivity of one’s land was, 
of course, chief among the promised outcomes of surveying. Once landlords had a knowledge of 
the extent, make-up, and current usage of their land, they could target areas that had the potential 
for greater productivity and apply to them the latest practices in husbandry. But intensive 
cultivation or redevelopment of land could not be achieved when it was being used for multiple 
purposes by multiple parties according to their common rights. Thus, enclosures were needed to 
physically and symbolically restrict access to the land, for the exclusive use of the improving 
landlord.  
In light of repeated episodes of dearth, food shortages, and the accompanying social 
protests, it was no wonder that fertility and abundance were national preoccupations in the 
                                                          
157 Warde, “The Idea of Improvement,” 128. 
 
208 
  
 
sixteenth century and seventeenth centuries.  This cultural motif had another source. According to 
McCormick, many believed that an increase in population signaled the health and prosperity of 
the commonwealth.158 This concern for demographic increase may have been an inheritance from 
the devastation of the population in fifteenth century plague, but it was also a preoccupation rooted 
in Protestant adherence to Scriptural directives calling for the multiplication of mankind.159  
In much of the seventeenth century improvement literature, the fruitfulness of mankind 
was conflated with agricultural bounty and the material wealth of the nation. Together, these were 
proof that God's grace had been granted.160 God’s grace had been withheld after the Fall of Adam 
and Eve, when he had expelled them from abundant Eden. Only by cultivation and industry could 
mankind be redeemed from its original sin, and reclaim Edenic bounty. As Tory Clergyman, 
Timothy Nourse put it: "the same spot of ground, which some time since was nothing but heath 
and desart, and under the original curse of thorns and bryers, after a little labour and expence, 
seems restor'd to its primitive beauty in the state of Paradise."161   
Cultivation was not only a metaphor for redemption through toil. The compulsion to 
cultivate was also expressed in terms which evoked an older idea about the hidden, sacred order 
of the universe. To cultivate the land was to dig down through the disordered layers of the earthly 
existence until one reached the fundamental and divine structure beneath. In Chapter two we saw 
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two earlier examples of this idea that reality is veiled, buried or beyond the capacities of sight: the 
late-medieval belief that numbers held a sacred meaning, and the sixteenth century claims by 
surveying advocates that geometry and measurement could reveal the pre-existing order beneath 
the soil. 162  
  “Cornucopianism,” the belief that an abundance of knowledge and wealth could be 
infinitely divined from the earth, ran through much of the seventeenth century improvement 
literature.163 Remember, for example, that the title of Gabriel Plattes’ treatise on the mining and 
refinement of minerals was The Discovery of Infinite Treasure Hidden Since World’s Beginning”. 
Similarly, Walter Blith, in his England’s Improvement Improved, declared that we must "draw 
forth the earth to yeeld her utmost frutifulnesse." As Warde puts it, labour was the "the means by 
which the fertility hidden by God in the soil could be unlocked" (in contrast idleness meant 
"barrenness and penury"). 164  Of course, if the soil and its fruits were legally and physically 
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accessible for use by multiple parties, such intensive divining of the earth’s fertility would be 
compromised; thus the need to enclose land as exclusive private property before improvement 
could commence.  
Indeed, the soil itself became a site for intensive study and improvement. Gervaise 
Markham, writing in the early seventeenth century, was among the first to stress the importance 
of soil in agricultural improvement. According to Warde, he "introduced a novel logic into 
agronomic writing; traditional practices and yields could be bettered by skilful and informed 
manipulation of the qualities of the soil and with the explicit intent to convert the 'sterile' soils of 
the kingdom to tillage."165  In the mid-century Petty, Boyle, Platte, Culpeper and a number of other 
thinkers associated with either the Hartlib circle or the Royal society, were drawn to the study of 
soil as an extension of their involvement in the fledgling sciences of agronomy, experimental 
chemistry, and mineralogy. 166 William Petty, for example, was “entranced by the transformational 
notions of chemistry” in the way that “barren grounds made fruitfull, wet dry, and dry wet."167 The 
improvement of the soil could, in Markham’s words, bring “the most vilde and barrenest grounds 
in this kindome...to as great fertility and fruitfulnesse inn the bearing and bringing forth of corne, 
as the best and most richest soyle under the suune can doe, and that...with as little cost and much 
lesse labour."168  In his English Improvement Improved, Blith was also concerned about 
“enhancing the productivity of the soil,” but by this time “productivity” was as much about an 
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increase in economic profit, as it was as it was the increased yields of crops.169  
The Appetite for Accumulation  
Metaphors related to cultivation and organic growth were not exclusively used in relation 
to agricultural improvement. Bacon, for instance, often referred to the evidence and consensus 
arrived at by experimental natural philosophy as ‘fruits’: “Wherefore, as in religion we are warned 
to show our faith by works, so in philosophy by the same rule the system should be judged of by 
its fruits, and pronounced frivolous if it be barren, more especially if, in place of fruits of grape 
and olive, it bears thorns and briers of dispute and contention.”170 Likewise, In The Great 
Instauration, he distinguished between “experiments of light” and “experiments of fruit” 
suggesting that experiments should not only shed new light on an object of study, but that they 
should be productive of new and useful knowledge.171 
The way to realize the potential fruitfulness of knowledge was to harvest ‘facts’ of all 
kinds. Facts arrived at through observation or experience were the fruits- the accumulated proof- 
of improvement. Slack notes that, while an extensive collection of information had already begun 
in the late sixteenth century, with the surveys by Elizabeth’s cartographers and the publication of 
Harrison’s “Description of England,” the seventeenth century witnessed “increasing appetite for 
its accumulation.”172 At the turn of the seventeenth century the most basic of England’s conditions, 
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such as its size, wealth, and population, were not known. By the end of that century these 
conditions “had all been calculated within acceptable margins of error and were widely known.”173 
One area where this appetite for information was first demonstrated was in the economic sphere. 
The gathering of economic facts was fuelled both by the example of a “systematic search for hard 
facts” in French and Italian political theories and by the Crown’s concern for how England 
measured up with European trading rivals. According to Slack, the “1620s were formative for 
English economic thinking” and witness to the “ascendance of an economic conception of the 
purpose and power of the state.” That is, people were beginning to assess England’s power, vis-à-
vis its neighbours, according to its economic wealth. Detailed analyses of the balance of trade 
revealed the crucial role of “seaborne and international commerce” in creating England’s wealth. 
174 But agricultural land could also generate wealth. From the mid-seventeenth century, members 
of the Hartlib circle, among others, paid increasing attention to disseminating new techniques in 
husbandry for extracting the most value from the land.  175  
Like the Hartlib Circle, the Royal Society contributed to the accumulation of information 
of all kinds. 176 The Society, which was founded in 1660, followed Bacon’s example both in the 
                                                          
 
173 Ibid, 3, 
 
174 Ibid, 88-89. 
 
175 Matei, “Gabriel Platte,” 210-16, 216: According to Hartlib, husbandry was “the most 
profitable Industry unto Humane Society; wherein the providence, the Power, the Wisdom and the 
Goodness of God, appears unto man more eminently then in any other way of Industry,” 216. 
 
176 William Petty was among the founding members. Two years later, Robert Boyle and 
Christopher Wren joined the Society. There was a fair amount of overlap in membership and 
objectives between the Royal Society, the Hartlib circle, the “invisible college,” Gresham 
College, the Dublin Philosophical Society and other intellectual networks in the mid seventeenth 
century. One of the major differences between the Hartlib circle and the Royal Society, was that 
religious ideas were less explicitly tied to the objectives of the latter. See Charles Webster, 
213 
  
 
spirit of collaborative knowledge and in the method. Just as Bacon had “advised travelers to collect 
information related to antiquities, libraries, fortifications etc.,” Petty sought traveler’s collected 
data on “wages, currency, prices, interest rates, and rents” and Boyle, on “natural history, climate, 
diseases.”177 The Royal Society also sought to improve choreographies and travelers’ reports “by 
promoting a more uniform and systematic mode of organizing properly observed ‘matters of 
fact.’178 To achieve this they “disseminated ‘articles of inquiry’ that provided grids on which 
travelers might organize their observations.”179 They also published and distributed questionnaires 
and periodicals. The result was a “nationwide intellectual community” dedicated to compiling data 
from across the globe.180 As Hooke soon recognized, without the strict division of data into 
separate categories, the abundance of all of these facts would be chaotic rather than useful.181 The 
categories and disciplines by which the Royal Society organized its harvested facts, have become 
themselves, a major part of their legacy. 
Doubting Endless Progress: Cyclical History and Degeneration 
If this bounty of gathered facts was meant to provide proof of the nation’s historical and 
international progress, then that was not always the way it played out in reality. While Petty’s 1665 
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Verbum Sapienti, and 1670 Political Arithmetick presented quantitative proofs of England’s 
material and economic progress, other data gathered by both himself and the demographer John 
Graunt showed that England’s population was stagnating and even declining.182 This was a 
disappointing discovery for those –William Petty among them- who thought material progress and 
population increase went hand in hand.183 The irony was that the stagnation of the population may 
have been the very factor responsible for a higher per capita income.184   
While the Hartlib circle had done much to shift the culture from one of nostalgic longing 
for previous traditions to one that was more accepting of improvement and change, there were 
nevertheless many who doubted that progress could continue without limits. In the 1660s and 70s 
economic depression and commercial pressures kindled a new “fear of finitude,” a fear that there 
was a “finite limit to the nation’s economic growth” and that stagnation or even a decline in 
fortunes was imminent. Some were even concerned that politically the nation might “descend back 
into the chaos of the 1640s.” 185 Among other factors supporting this pessimistic view were 
contemporary theories about economic growth in a world with finite resources and about the nature 
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of historical change. There has been wide consensus among historians that many seventeenth 
century thinkers “took it for granted that the world’s supply of raw materials and markets was 
strictly finite, and thus believed that the economic growth of one nation came at the expense of its 
competitors.186  
Doubts about the progress of the English state were also informed by a popular view that 
all forms of government were subject to a cyclical pattern of history which involved ”birth, growth, 
decay, and death.”187 This view of history had antecedents in both the classical Greek idea of 
cyclical history, anakuklosis, and in the Christian notion that the world of the flesh was inevitably 
subject to the “relentless decay of time.”188 For Slack, the “fear of finitude” that emerged in the 
mid to late seventeenth century England can be expressed as the idea that “whatever the immediate 
circumstances, material progress could never be endlessly sustainable, and must soon come to a 
halt if it had not already done so.”189 Historical and economic studies seemed to support this idea. 
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One unhappy sign that material progress was not all that it appeared to be was that the problem of 
poverty persisted, and if one took account of the rising poor rates across the nation, it was in fact 
increasing. 190 And even if per capita wealth was increasing, there was plenty of historical 
precedent to suggest that a reversal could not be avoided. The ancient Empires enjoyed by Rome 
and Athens showed a pattern of giddy growth leading up to a peak of cultural and political 
supremacy, only to be followed by an inglorious decline. There were contemporary examples of 
this cycle too: with the Spanish Succession in the 1690s, Spain’s once great empire appeared ready 
to crumble. Slack explains that “Cyclical models were implicit in contemporary histories of trade, 
which showed the 'commercial ball' being tossed from one place to another..." thus, “many 
countries had 'degenerated from the great achievements of virtue and industry.'"191 
As Slack notes, support for the idea that progress was always followed by a sharp decline 
also came from one side of a debate which raged across Europe at the end of the seventeenth 
century: the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns.192 Originally a dispute between literary 
critics in France, the quarrel came to revolve around the question of which era could claim literary 
and artistic superiority: the Ancients or the Moderns. Those arguing on the side of the Ancients 
averred that no modern work could surpass the beauty and wisdom of classical literature, 
particularly its poetry, while those on the side of the Moderns countered that, just as modern 
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science had surpassed the ancients, so could contemporary literature and other forms of knowledge 
achieve an enlightenment unknown in antiquity.193 What was fundamentally at issue in the Quarrel 
was the nature of historical change itself. Did all civilizations rise and fall according to a cyclical 
model as those in antiquity did, or could they move ever forward and upward in an endless linear 
progression? 194 In England, the discoveries of the Royal Society and the role of improvement in 
amassing greater wealth for the nation were interpreted by some as proof of historical progression. 
But others, such as William Temple and Jonathan Swift, saw these developments as proof of the 
degeneration of traditional values. The poet Dryden captured this sense of degeneration in 1683, 
when he lamented that “not only the Bodies but the Souls of Men, have decreas'd from the vigour 
of the first Ages. How much better Plato, Aristotle, and the rest of the Philosophers understood 
nature; Thucydides and Herodotus adorn'd History; [and] Sophocles, Euripides and Menander 
advanc'd Poetry, than those Dwarfs of Wit and Learning who succeeded them in after times."195  
While anxieties about degeneration were not unique to England in the late seventeenth 
century, there they constituted a counter-discourse to improvement. Some of those witnessing the 
unprecedented rise in luxury consumption felt uneasy about the true cost of material prosperity. 
Such critics viewed the new taste for luxury as a sign that the commonwealth was falling into vice 
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and corruption. 196 This was a period of self-examination, in which the “Condition of England” 
was the subject of uneasy debate and greater affluence was seen by some, such as Charles Povey, 
as the cause and not the cure for “The Unhappiness of England.” 197 Yet, while the discourse 
against degeneration and the vice of luxury consumption was never wholly vanquished, by the end 
of the seventeenth century they were weakened by new conditions and new arguments that came 
to the fore. 198 
Whereas the pursuit of profit was seen by many at the start of the century as avaricious, 
and in the case of enclosing landlords, an endangerment to the health of communities and the 
commonwealth, by the latter decades of the century such self-interest was now being recast as a 
“public good.” This reversal was achieved, in part, by the “domestication” of consumption. When 
luxury goods such as coffee and tobacco, were foreign imports, it was reasonable to argue that 
their consumption weakened the economic health of the commonwealth by benefiting other trading 
nations. But, when cheaper versions of some goods were produced ‘at home’, and others goods 
such as tobacco were produced under colonial rule, the goods were considered domestic. 199 Under 
these new conditions then, some contemporary thinkers began to boldly argue that the consumers 
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of luxury goods were enriching the commonwealth.  For example, John Houghton, a fellow of the 
Royal Society and a writer of tracts on agriculture and trade, argued that such consumers inspired 
others to acquire wealth, thereby stimulating a general improvement of productivity. The very 
insatiability of consumption meant that this trend would continue “till they [the English] engross 
the trade of the universe.”200 A similar theory was put forward by Barbon, who reasoned that “the 
wants of the mind,” like the resources of the earth, were infinite and thus “can never be consumed.” 
Therefore, the pursuit of such desires would act as a “perpetual spring” keeping “the great Body 
of trade in Motion.” 201 In fact, anticipating Adam Smith, Barbon argued in his ‘moral essays’ that 
self-interest would promote both economic growth and social cohesion. Thus, Slack explains, “the 
'self-love' which a speaker on the Enclosure of the Commons had considered inimical to the 
common good in 1597, in 1669, was now presented by Barbon as promoting social harmony and 
material progress."202  
William Petty and the Accumulated Proofs of Progress 
If the promotion of self-interest and consumption as economic virtues helped to quell fears of 
moral degeneration, the prognoses of economic degeneration were countered with quantitative 
proofs to the contrary. According to Slack, it was William Petty’s 1670 book Political Arithmetick 
that most successfully demonstrated the facts of economic improvement. In Political Arithmetick, 
Petty drew on his knowledge of mathematics and physiology to produce a quantitative survey of 
the progress of the nation.203 Expressing himself not with “superlative Words, and intellectual 
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Arguments” but “in Terms of Number, Weight, or Measure” and using “only Arguments of 
Sense,”204 Petty claimed that “the Power and Wealth of England hath increased this last forty 
years,” citing the acquisition of new territories and dominions, a greater volume of shipping trade, 
falling interest rates (which proved the “increase of money”) and extensive agricultural and 
infrastructural improvements.205 Petty’s Political Arithmetick would “shew the uses of knowing 
the true State of the People, Land, Stock, Trade…that the King subjects are not in, so bad a 
condition, as discontented Men would make them.” 206 
Although the facts gathered and analyzed by Petty were useful for persuading cynics that 
the progress of the English Nation was real, they also signalled the scope and direction of intended 
changes. That is to say, Political Arithmetic did not merely diagnose the body of the nation: its 
ultimate goal was to effect a cure or an improvement of its condition. And just as Ireland had been 
the test case for the first comprehensive surveys and maps in Britain in the late sixteenth century, 
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it was also the site where Petty first practiced his Arithmetic upon the body politic.207 After 
Cromwell’s invasion of Ireland in 1654, Petty was assigned to survey the territory with the aim of 
creating “a quantifiable measure of the island’s potential value.”208 Once the scientific survey of 
some 8.4 million acres of Irish land was completed, Petty compiled and published the data in the 
1656 Down’s Survey. The survey was invaluable in determining the fertility and market value of 
lands to be parcelled out as a repayment to those who had contributed to Cromwell’s campaign.209 
As McCormick notes, Political Arithmetic “centered initially on the stabilization of English 
colonial power in Ireland.” It is important to keep in mind that it was more than “an embryonic 
political economy informed by a scientific outlook. It was a Baconian science of colonial 
improvement and social engineering.”210  
By the end of the seventeenth century, Petty’s use of quantitative analysis as evidence of 
improvement and as a means to social engineering had become a new standard in political and 
economic argument. A host of published works presented the progress of England’s condition in 
exhaustive detail. Some of these works, such as Robert Morden’s New Description of England, 
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gathered “precise knowledge of the area of every county,” including “up to date maps, soil, natural 
history, products, size of counties in acres, contribution of land tax…and estimates of population.” 
Such information was an invaluable tool for more strategic and systematic governing of the 
kingdom. By the 1690s there was a new generation of “political arithmeticians” carrying on Petty’s 
work. In fact, Slack notes that there was a “growing influence in government and parliament of 
'men of numbers'… members of the educated elite intrigued by measurements, calculations of 
proportions, and speculations about trends in population and the national wealth.” 211 Increasingly, 
fears of finitude or regression were not so much allayed as quashed by a new and sturdy confidence 
in numbers and quantitative data.  
Here, we see the formation of a pattern we can recognize in our own modern cultures: the 
response to expressions of profound uncertainty about the meaning, nature and direction of human 
movement through history is to bury them under an avalanche of metrics, units of knowledge 
infused with authority by their very abstraction. Thus, in seeking to persuade the doubters, 
advocates of improvement gathered and presented quantitative evidence of progress, solidifying 
the epistemological foundations of the discourse in the process.  But what most embedded 
improvement in the culture of modern England was a parallel discourse which presented the 
absence of improvement as an intolerable and dangerous state in urgent need of reform.   
Improvement’s Other: Waste as a Potential Desert 
Improvement, as expounded by advocates like Walter Blith, was both an assemblage of practical 
husbandry methods and techniques for enhancing the productivity of all sorts of land, and a solemn 
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duty to God and the commonwealth to commit to increasing the land’s fertility. Writing in the mid 
seventeenth century, Blith disdained the current agricultural practice in much the same way that 
Bacon had disdained the meandering and static state of knowledge at the turn of the century. His 
discourse was aimed at those content with "only receiving and living upon the present profits of 
their Lands” and “not minding their Lands advance.” 212 But the edification of his target audience 
consisted as much in describing the many causes of the land’s barrenness and the wickedness of 
waste land as it did in informing them of the many ways that land could be advanced to greater 
productivity. 
If the potential for abundance and the duty to advance beckoned improvers to cultivate and 
accumulate, it seems that a fear of oblivion impelled them to do so.  Indeed, the idea of 
improvement may not have embedded itself so deeply into English culture had it not been defined 
so emphatically in relation to its opposite: waste. While wastelands were not new in themselves, 
as a category juxtaposed against improvement, waste was a mid-seventeenth century invention. 
The venom and the horror with which improvement advocates wrote about waste reveals to us 
their worst fears about the prospects of the nation, and of humanity as a whole. The fears of 
stagnation and degeneration that were articulated in debates about the condition of England were 
consistently projected onto the landscape wherever improvement was absent. Unimproved land 
was either waste- empty, undefined and desolate- or a chaotic and dangerous wilderness. In either 
case, if left unreformed, these sorts of land represented a threat, as did the sort of people attached 
to them: commoners, Irish Catholics, or Native Americans.   
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When applied to land, ‘waste’ generally signifies an uncultivated state, and this meaning 
did not change from the medieval period to the modern period. What did change in the seventeenth 
century was the characterization of wastelands as being unused. And yet, this characterization 
depended on a practice of selective blindness, for commoners had regularly found a variety of 
ingenious uses for the Wastes.  As Neeson explains, “sauntering after a grazing cow, snaring 
rabbits and birds, fishing, looking for wood, watercress, nuts or spring flowers, gathering teazles, 
rushes, mushrooms or berries, and cutting peat and turves were all part of a commoning economy 
and a commoning way of life invisible to outsiders.”213 Along with their numerous uses, there were 
also a great many names for waste lands. According to Everitt, in Kent alone they were called: 
“chart, minis, warren, hoath, leacon, lees, tye, scrubs, bushe, roughs, roughetts, frith, shaw, weald, 
hurst moor, plain, wold.”214 
If wastes were so varied in name, in kind and in the resources they offered, how could 
improvement’s advocates claim, as they regularly did, that they were “barren”, “deserts”, desolate 
tracts of sterility? How could they be called unused? The answer is that they had learned not to see 
the fecundity of unenclosed land and the value of common use rights.215 Only plant and animal 
life that flourished under human management counted as fertility and the only use that had value 
was productive value- the increase in profits from changes made to the land.216 From this 
perspective, waste was any land which had the potential to be improved in this way, but was not. 
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As a strict division developed between improved and unimproved land, all the variations of the 
latter were erased, so that common lands, open fields and wastes were “collapsed into a general 
category of unused or inefficiently used lands, interchangeably called waste, or commons.” 217 
Thus, the barrenness so often complained of in the improvement literature rarely referred 
to land that was truly infertile. Rather, it was a statement on the different social groups who 
obstructed the economic growth of the nation’s agriculture as a whole. Take for instance Walter 
Blith’s second chapter in English Improvement Improved, on “the causes of Barrennesse upon all 
Lands”. He argues that the first general source of barrenness lies "in man naturally,… in him as I 
conceive the Cause of Causes, which is Ignorance, occasioning the prejudice men bar against 
Improvement,… as all men naturally hate the true light of God because it discovers their 
darkness”218 In this way, Blith manages to impugn the morality of all who expressed doubts about 
improvement! For example, the cause of barrenness “in respect of the owner, or occupier thereof, 
is Idleness, Improvidence, and a slavish Custome of some old form, or way of Husbandry.” 
Another “particular cause in man of the Earths unfruitfulness,” writes Blith, is the shortage of laws 
encouraging work and improvement, punishing idleness and the “Rogues and Vagrants that 
wander the Country.” Only after enumerating all such man-made causes -including a half a page 
on drunkenness alone-does Blith turn to the second general cause of barrenness, in “the earth 
itself.” This includes overgrazing and overtilling, and “obscure causes” such as “Coldness, wet, 
stoniness and mountainousness”219 Here the language of improvement infertility and waste 
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stemmed less from the conditions of the soil than from the economically unproductive segments 
of society.  
The Threat of Waste: the Horror of a Void 
Waste lands, according to a recent edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, are “uninhabited, or 
sparsely inhabited and uncultivated country, a wild and desolate region, a desert, a wilderness.”220 
This definition makes clear the impact, even today, of improvement and enclosure on how we see 
land undefined by private property. We are so accustomed now to the official assignment of land 
to categories of property that, as Goldstein puts it, “it is difficult to imagine alternative conceptions 
that have not already been flattened into an abandoned, empty, or socially vacuous space of one 
form or another.”221 The eighteenth century juxtaposition of waste with improvement led to the 
erasure of waste’s former meanings. Ironically, this flattened, emptied meaning of the word 
captures something of its roots. Waste shares its origin in the Latin word “vastus” with the English 
words “vast” and “void.”222 While the lands that improvers labelled Waste were often neither vast 
nor void, these are the very images and the feelings evoked when improvers describe them. Why 
should this be so? 
One answer may be that the practice of map making and map reading - that view of the 
scene from above - had begun to colonize improvers’ perceptions of land: the abstract, geometrical 
and linear reference points began to appear more real than the life on the ground not captured on 
the map. Similarly, the adoption of a Newtonian perception of space as empty encouraged 
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improvement advocates to view unnamed land as a vacancy to be filled. What could or should be 
in that space had begun to matter more than was already there. The problem with the trick of not 
seeing what was there was that nothing remained that could register as a reference, no landmarks 
were left to offer direction. Commons and wastes were full of references to guide behavior- 
traditional, customary, moral and practical references, but, as things of the past, these were not 
valued by improvers, focused as they were on the future. The improvement discourse had so 
thoroughly delegitimized the existing references that it was only as dangerous obstacles that they 
were seen at all.  
The perception and description of unimproved land as vast and void was no doubt a 
convenient way to invalidate forms of land use that conflicted with improvers’ plans. But beneath 
the rhetoric – or in its very excess -we can hear real murmurs of unease, the unmeant emission of 
a sense of dread. Encountering lands in the form of commons and wastes, the improving advocate 
was confronted with a space without meaning: his own belief in the ideology of improvement had 
divested that land of the meaning given it by the old order, while the new meaning had not yet 
been implanted. At this in-between moment the land therefore lay before him bare and 
unhusbanded. This glimpse of land unmediated by any regime of human interpretation, in turn, 
exposed the shallow roots of the improvement project itself. The customary use of the land was no 
less a regime of human interpretation- but the centuries had lent it authority, and allowed the roots 
to anchor. The order imposed on the land by Improvement was, by comparison, a new, alien and 
therefore precarious enterprise. No wonder they were so impatient to implant it.  
The dread occasioned by that in-between moment, that glimpse of land unadorned by 
human design, is an archetypally modern fear. As Bauman tells us, the ordering impulse within 
modernity, by creating ever more boundaries of containment, simultaneously produces more 
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ambivalence:  
Ostensibly, the naming/classyfying function of language has the prevention of ambivalence 
as its purpose. Performance is measured by the neatness of the divisions between classes, 
the precision of their definitional boundaries, and the unambiguity with which objects may 
be allocated to classes. And yet the application of such criteria, and the very activity whose 
progress they are to monitor, are the ultimate sources of ambivalence and the reasons why 
ambivalence is unlikely ever to become truly extinct, whatever the amount and the ardour 
of the structuring/ordering effort.” 223 
If so-called “waste” lands evoked feelings of deep unease and an anxiety to “convert the 
sterile soil” through improvement, this was especially so in improvers’ encounters with wilderness 
or unknown land. That this became the characteristic reflex of not only the improvement discourse 
but also of Britain’s imperial encounters is illustrated in Marzek’s discussion of the Crusoe 
Syndrome. Daniel Defoe, who was himself a keen proponent of agricultural improvement, wrote 
the tale of Robinson Crusoe’s adventures in 1719. The character, Crusoe, narrates a series of 
adventures which ultimately lead to his now famous shipwreck and decades-long captivity on a 
deserted island. Though he is the only survivor, he finds himself as terrified of the land as he was 
of the sea and so his first impulse is to climb a tree. He spent his first night sheltered there, from 
all the unknowns in the space below: 
"Fearful of unknown space, he spends his first night inhabiting the land not on its own 
terms but metaphysically above it in a tree. Uncontrollably thrown into the space of 
uncultivated land, he is unable to immediately establish a frame of reference, which triggers 
a response of dread: The land appears as an example of the Lacanian Real, a 
nonsymbolizable, meaningless presence that bewilders Crusoe’s sensibility, and by 
extension the sociosymbolic order of the British Empire that he carries on his back." 224 
  Crusoe’s early days on the island are spent in a state of paranoia. Upon waking that first 
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morning he descends the tree and sets himself the task of building a “wall” up against a cave. It is 
to protect against all the unknown threats of this strange space, including predators, human and 
animal.  In time, he would build ever more walls and fences for his own habitation, and in order 
to enclose the livestock he breeds and the crops he raises. In this way he becomes a confident and 
comfortable husbandman, who has tamed the land and rearranged it on his own terms. It is only 
years later, when he spots the human footprint, that his dread returns. But when he sees the 
footprint it “throws into high relief the ontological dread concealed behind these acts of enclosure 
and their essential relation to identity formation” 225 
In a sense, there is nothing very peculiar about Crusoe’s first two acts on the island: his 
impulses to survey and to enclose are both reasonable self-protective strategies in a survival 
situation. But his “ontological dread” of the unknown space is symptomatic of a modern syndrome: 
unable to tolerate the ambivalence of undefined land, he must transcend it, divide it into parts and 
assign each part its function. Rather than inhabiting the land (which means “standing upon” and 
“being supported by” the land) he imposes the relation of enclosure upon it.226  Just as the extension 
of the horizon in modernity triggers the division of order and chaos into opposing forces, enclosure, 
“overcodes the land, placing on the land a gridwork of oppositions,” notably, nomad versus settler, 
indigenous inhabitant versus imperial improver. Enclosure then, is “the socio-symbolic order of 
the British empire.” It is Crusoe’s frame of reference, his constructed horizon in a space without 
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meaning. 227 Moreover, as Marzec argues, this grid, 
[s]tands as a formal diagram for future colonial developments: Before England began to 
colonize open, wild, and uncultivated land and subjects abroad, it created an apparatus for 
colonizing its open land and subjects at home—an apparatus that could readily be 
transplanted to distant territories. Enabling the British subject to establish a sovereign sense 
of identity, enclosures precipitate and prepare the way for England’s relocation in the 
expanding circle of the colonial world map. It was in the enclosure act that the ideology of 
imperialism became a material reality.228 
As an isolated individual stranded on a desolate island, Crusoe’s dread, his sense of 
exposure to unknown dangers, is understandable. What is more difficult to understand is how the 
powerful class of men who wrote improvement tracts could consistently signal their own dread, 
their sense that some amorphous menace emanated from the commons and wastes of their own 
nation. How could these M.Ps, political philosophers, scientists and members of the landed gentry 
persuade themselves that they were endangered by the very commons their own enclosures were 
erasing? 
The most obvious reason for the portrayal of the commons and wastes as wild and 
dangerous was also the most practical. Improvers hoped to convince other members of the elite 
(who were their target audience) to come over to their own way of thinking. With enough repetition 
and vehemence, their fearful rhetoric might persuade fellow elites who continued to oppose 
enclosure that in defending the commons they were defending the morally indefensible.229 This 
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anti-commons propaganda aimed to eliminate the most immediate threats to the improvement 
movement: economic obstacles and social resistance to enclosures. 
Every commons that was allowed to remain “threatened the entire landscape of value 
production, by enabling peasants to continue self-provisioning and therefore to avoid wage 
dependence.”230 But this was not the language used to turn opinion against the commons. Instead 
of portraying the commons as an obstacle to a novel economic practice, authors such as Walter 
Blith portrayed them as a disorder which could only be eradicated through the intervention of 
enclosures and improvement. Indeed, he compared this intervention to God’s own intervention at 
Creation: "So God was the Original, and first Husbandman, the pattern of all Husbandry, and the 
first projector of that great design, to bring that old Masse and Chaos of confusion unto so vast an 
Improvement, as all the world admires and subsists from."231 
Blith argued that the commons simply did not provide enough for the poor to live on, that 
confusion reigned because the land was not divided into parts for each user, and that this 
encouraged “Oppressors” to overuse the land to the detriment of others. While it was by no means 
accurate, the image of the commons he impresses on his readers is one of “chaos and confusion.” 
To add to the malevolence of this image, he closes his section on the commons with a lengthy 
reproduction of a “verse” by Thomas Tusser comparing enclosures with the “champion” system 
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of land use:232 
The Champain robbeth at night 
And prowleth and filcheth by day 
Himself and his Beasts out of sight 
Both spoyleth and maketh away 
Not only thy Gras but thy Corn 
Both after and ye'er it be shorn 
His household to feed and his Hog 
Now stealeth he, now will he crave 
And now will he cozen and cog 
In Bridewell a number be stript 
Less worthy than Thief to be whipt 
For “Commons” these Commoners cry 
Inclosing they may not abide; 
Yet Some be not able to buy 
A Cow with a Calf by her side 
Nor lay not to live by their work 
But Theevishly loyter and lurk 
Where Champains ruleth the rost 
There daily disorder is most"233 
 
Too histrionic to count as rational argument, such depictions of commoners as devious, 
thieving and lurking might, however, have had enough emotive power to persuade some elites 
against protecting the commons. Was it really worth defending the commons if they were full of 
bullies and thieves, if the commons were, in Joseph Lee’s words 'the seed-plot of contention, the 
nursery of beggary.' 234 Such language achieved two ends at once: it cast doubt on the legitimacy 
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of common rights, and it raised the specter of treachery among the common people. For what lay 
at the root of such rhetoric was the same fear that always haunts the powerful: the fear that a newly 
obtained power will be taken away from them, that those whose rights were trampled in the 
attainment of that power would exact revenge through uprising.  
While it is true that by the end of the seventeenth century the moral consensus among elites 
had turned in favour of improvement, this was still a period of transition between two forms of 
socio-economic organization. Advocates and practitioners of improvement could hardly deny that 
their regime was being resisted both on the ground and in the tracts of elite critics. The 
precariousness of the new order may have magnified their sense that commoners were dangerous. 
Moreover, the distanced relation to the land encouraged by the practice and discourse of 
improvement may have given improvers a greater level of control but it also alienated them from 
the land and its inhabitants. Being “metaphysically above” them but no longer in relation to them, 
improvers could more easily reimagine the commons as the malignant lair of foreign enemies. 
Contempt for Wastes and Commons 
In the improvement literature from the eighteenth century, one detects changes in the tone and 
pattern of the anti-commons rhetoric. The fearful tone doesn’t so much disappear as it becomes 
steeped in layers of contempt. Now, everything that evades the grid of English improvement 
becomes the source –and target- of contempt. This includes anything reminiscent of the earlier 
stages of human history or of customary social and agricultural practices, or of Nature untamed, 
and anyone whose character is incongruous with the emerging English national identity. As the 
improvement discourse intersected with the entrenchment and expansion of English colonial 
power, all of these Others of modern civilization- the past, custom, Nature, nomadism and foreign 
234 
  
 
peoples- were fused together into the category of enemy, and the terms of abuse levelled at them 
were used interchangeably: wild, barren, idle, corrupt, barbaric, primitive. 235 
As was illuminated so powerfully in Edward Said’s Orientalism and Culture and 
Imperialism, for centuries, in cultural expressions like the novel, Europeans have constituted the 
non-European Other as the reverse image of their own cultural preoccupations. The English, for 
example, for whom industry, foresight, and rationality were moral and social imperatives, 
represented the Other as “indolent,” “improvident,” and “irrational.”  English national identity, 
and European identity as a whole, were thus actively shaped in relation to this projected 
representation of the Other and this identity was largely affirmed as superior and civilized. 
Applying the concepts of discourse and hegemony as explicated by Foucault and Gramsci, Said 
argued that these European cultural discourses were not simply works of description, but actually 
prepared the way ideologically for, legitimated and perpetuated the colonial exploitation and 
subjection of non-Europeans. 236 Thus, the contemptuous discourse on “wastes” not only prepared 
the way for enclosures but was also part of a much wider European discourse. Enclosure and 
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improvement were part of global colonial project of land-grabbing and “primitive accumulation” 
achieved through the assertion and imposition of private property.  
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Marzek explains, the characterization of the 
land as an enemy “come[s] to rule imperial consciousness and novelistic re-representation in the 
modern era: the imperial encounter with land emerges as a syndrome and land comes to be 
represented in the sociosymbolic order of empire as a hostile being needing to be enclosed, “cured” 
and cultivated” 237 According to Goldstein, by the late eighteenth century “commoners at home 
and colonial others abroad” who resisted improvement were perceived as “economic and political 
foes” whose recalcitrance was “an affront to ascendant understandings of capitalist value 
production.” In 1793, partly to combat these foes, “parliament created a Board of Agriculture to 
serve as the unified mouthpiece for land reform domestically and abroad.” In 1803 the Board’s 
first director, John Sinclair, wrote: 
We have begun another campaign against the foreign enemies of the country ... Why should 
we not attempt a campaign also against our great domestic foe, I mean the hitherto 
unconquered sterility of so large a proportion of the surface of the kingdom? ... let us not 
be satisfied with the liberation of Egypt, or the subjugation of Malta, but let us subdue 
Finchley Common; let us conquer Hounslow Heath; let us compel Epping Forest to submit 
to the yoke of improvement.238 
Included among the propaganda in the war against unimproved land was a way of writing 
about commons, wastes and forests as though they were possessed of personalities and wills intent 
on corrupting those who lived upon them. According to Goldstein, “it was held that the land itself 
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was responsible for breeding laziness and inefficiency.” 239 Meanwhile, unmanaged forests were 
thought to nurture lawlessness, acting as a “nest and conservatory of sloth, idleness, and 
misery.”240 Some thought the fenland produced the worst commoners, who “' lurk like spiders, 
and, when they see a chance, sally out, and drive or drown or steal just as suits them.”241 That the 
land “bred” or served as a “nest” for intolerable characters who “lurk[ed] like spiders” only further 
emphasized the otherness, the repulsive animal nature of those inhabiting rather than supervising 
the natural world. 
The Eighteenth Century: Entrenching Private Property and Landscaping Nature 
Legal and Historical Justifications of Private Property 
This inappropriately embedded relation to nature seemed to prevail not only among commoners 
but also among the indigenous peoples that the English encountered abroad. Both groups were 
thought to persist in behaviors that properly belonged to the past. This was not merely the view of 
advocates of agricultural improvement. By the eighteenth century the idea that historical change 
was linear and progressive had been given new momentum by the historians of the “Scottish 
school.”242Particularly popular was the idea that history progressed through stages, from hunting 
to shepherding to agriculture and finally, to commerce.243 This “conjectural” theory of human 
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social progress had its origin in seventeenth century French and English historical thought, but it 
was the Scottish philosophers Ferguson, Milar, and Adam Smith, who first articulated this specific 
“stadial” version of the theory. Since hunting was identified as the most primitive stage in human 
development this seemed to justify the view that the indigenous of North America – for whom 
hunting was a dominant subsistence activity- were themselves “primitive” humans. 244As Fabian 
noted in Time and the Other, after the western conception of time was secularized in early 
modernity, there emerged a tendency for European thinkers to project onto other societies their 
ideas about their own historical origins, so that a pattern of “progress” was traced onto the 
contemporary map of humanity. The conflation of non-Western peoples with past stages in human 
development transformed the “Other” into an object of science, along with history and nature.245 
Because the commoners of England also hunted and gathered in the open land, they were 
often compared with the indigenous of other lands. As Neeson explains, improving advocates such 
as Pennington thought that “Next to notions of modern agriculture the idea of sharing land in 
common was barbaric.” Because the common-right economy was considered primitive, “it made 
as much sense to preserve it as it did to leave North America to the Indians.” In Pennington’s 
thinking, they might as well “let the poor native Indians (though something more savage than many 
in the fens) enjoy all their ancient privileges, and cultivate their own country their own way.”246 
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Neeson notes that the “critics of commons loathed commoners with a xenophobic intensity. They 
were a 'sordid race', as foreign and uncultivated as the land that fed them. Like commons they were 
wild and unproductive.”247 It would not be long before the commoners themselves were considered 
ideal objects of improvement. For improvers were trying to facilitate the transition from the 
penultimate stage of human development –agriculturalism- to the final stage of commercial 
society. And standing in their way, at home and abroad, were people content to remain at the first 
stage.  
In time, such obstacles to progress were removed, both by the force of law and by force 
itself. But persuasion was also a vital tool in reinforcing what was viewed as the bridge between 
agriculturalism and commercialism: the enclosure of land into units of private property. According 
to property theorist Carol Rose, theories of property are, above all, forms of persuasion or self-
persuasion.248 And it is easy to see with the passing of centuries that the first theories of private 
property relied heavily on self-persuasion and story-telling to justify the extinguishment of pre-
existing systems of property. In his Second Treatise on Government (1689), John Locke articulated 
his labour theory of property, arguing that individuals could claim exclusive ownership of any 
resource into which they had intermixed their own labour.249 Locke made it clear that the nature 
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of this labour should be productive. That is, with respect to land, anyone who 'tills, plants, 
improves, cultivates” is the original appropriator. Because he considered the peoples of North 
America to be living in a state of nature or at the earliest stage of civil society (where all land was 
owned in common by mankind) any claim they might make to ownership on the basis of original 
appropriation was invalid.250 Just as so many improvers had learned not to see the fecundity and 
usefulness of commons and wastes, “European ideas of settling vast 'empty' and 'wasted' continents 
was based on a failure to see, or a dismissal of, the land uses of indigenous peoples.” 251 Locke did 
not acknowledge the settlement and cultivation already present in North America. Instead he 
“seemed to think that most of America was vacant. Native Americans wandered wherever they 
wanted in a vast, empty continent; Locke seemed quite concerned that they might get lost (II, 
36).”252  
Common law theorists also seemed intent on persuading themselves and others of the 
validity of private property by justifications based on “first possession.” This was Blackstone’s 
theory, expounded in the second volume of the Commentaries, “The Rights of Things” in 1769. 
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By this time the discourse of “improvement” had developed into a mantra for the progress of the 
English nation. Outlining the history of property conventions in his introductory chapter, 
Blackstone portrays private property as the turning point in a providential march towards the 
convention of improvement.  In the earliest stage, because the inhabitants of the earth were few, 
its resources were enjoyed communally. One’s possession of a property was only acknowledged 
for as long as he was actively occupying or using it.  Eventually, with increased population and 
the relative scarcity of resources, nomadic ways were displaced by settlement and the art of 
agriculture. With the need for a regular and constant means of subsistence, “it became necessary 
to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion. And to appropriate to individuals not the 
immediate use only but also the very substance of the thing to be used.” Without this change, 
Blackstone suggests, humans would remain within the disordered realm of nature.253 
The proper, productive, use of land (improvement) was not possible without the convention 
of individuals unambiguously claiming their intentions for and ownership of property.  Thus, as 
Purdy notes, Blackstone founds his justification of private property ownership upon both the 
“information rationale” and “first occupancy”, this latter not applying to those whose use of land 
was insufficiently permanent or improving.254 Now that this convention of the individual’s “sole 
and despotic dominion” over property has been established, Blackstone says, “so graciously has 
providence interwoven our duty and our happiness, the result of this very necessity has been the 
ennobling of the human species by giving it opportunities of improving its rational faculties as 
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well as exerting its natural”. To insure this property, a host of modern institutions arise: laws, 
states, governments and civil society. 255 
The Law Steps in: the Parliamentary Enclosure Movement 
In Britain the creation of a legal infrastructure supporting private property in land was a 
complicated affair. While it is true that by the eighteenth century land was increasingly being 
thought about and treated as a commodity rather than a habitation, the ease with which it could be 
alienated or transferred was severely restricted by common law and chancery courts. In fact, 
property in land would not become fully disembedded from its feudal structure until well into the 
twentieth century, largely because of the political influence of aristocratic families who wished to 
ensure their dynastic stability. The general muddiness of English land law makes all the more 
extraordinary the intervention of Parliament into the struggle between common rights and 
enclosures in the eighteenth century,256 
Whereas the Tudor government had often legislated against enclosures, the Hanoverian 
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government of the eighteenth century supported enclosures by passing private acts in Parliament. 
Historians estimate that in the period of Parliamentary Enclosure -from the 1750s to the passing 
of the General Enclosure Acts of 1836- 5,265 of these private acts were passed, allowing the 
enclosure of roughly seven million acres, or between a fifth and a quarter of England’s land area.257 
In the earlier half of that period the majority of the land enclosed was open arable land upon which 
many common rights had been enjoyed. Later the majority of the focus was on waste lands.  
In genera, obtaining parliamentary authorization for enclosure was a long and costly affair, 
which began with a petition, and followed with the presentation of the bill to Parliament, two 
readings in the commons, and committee reports. The reports alone involved the hiring of experts 
from numerous fields to investigate land claims, acreage, tax assessment, land values and other 
details.258 On average the process took about three years. Even though the cost and duration of the 
private Act of Parliament were prohibitive, it nevertheless became “the predominant technique for 
enclosure” by the late eighteenth century.259 
Before this time, the enclosure of areas affecting the interests and rights of others involved, 
as Cornish and Clark put it, “much commandeering on the part of the powerful- rough injustice 
and gross pressuring that could provoke violent reaction. Later, the process began to acquire a 
more seemly aspect of negotiation; influence was more subtlety applied and the resulting 
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agreement might well be enshrined in a decree entered upon the record of the court of 
Chancery.”260  Before the eighteenth century such agreements meant that there no need to seek 
“legislative fiat” in order to enclose one's land.261 
Why then, was “enclosure by agreement” overtaken by Parliamentary Enclosure in the 
eighteenth century? Mingay suggests three reasons for this. First, Parliamentary Acts were a way 
of reaching greater legal certainty because “once the work of the Commissioners was completed 
and their Award sealed and delivered” the reorganization of property was “highly unlikely to be 
challenged.” Secondly, once they embarked on a private Act of Parliament, landowners could also 
get approval for other desirable changes, “particularly commutation of the tithes and improvement 
of roads.” Finally, Mingay suggests that the most common reason landowners used Private acts of 
Parliament to enclose was in order to side-step opposition to the enclosure. 262   
Indeed, as E.P. Thompson noted, “the great age of parliamentary enclosure , between 1760 
and 1820 is testimony not only to the rage for improvement but also to the tenacity with which 
“humoursome” or “spiteful” fellows blocked the way to enclosure by agreement, holding out to 
the last for the old customary economy.”263 Popular resistance did not disappear with the advent 
of Parliamentary Enclosures. Rather, many commoners, whose interests in the lands to be enclosed 
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were largely discounted at parliament, continued to resist enclosure in a variety of ways. Their 
determination to resist enclosure suggests that, while the law did not recognize their common rights 
as it once had, they continued to believe in the legitimacy of those rights. As Neeson says: “They 
contested enclosure Bills with petitions, threats, foot-dragging, the theft of new landmarks, surveys 
and field books; with riotous assemblies to destroy gates, posts and rails; and with more covert 
threats and arson.”264 Cornish and Clark explain that, in light of the ongoing resistance to 
enclosure, “Parliament’s most delicate role was to judge whether opposition could safely be 
ignored. This it was mostly prepared to do if the objectors amounted to no more than a fifth or a 
quarter of the landowners by value (not number). Significantly no precise proportion was ever laid 
down, nor how the valuation was to be arrived at.”265 
By no means was opposition to enclosures exclusive to those who actually depended on 
the commoning economy. In the 1730s, elite advocates of the commons, such as John Cowper and 
Thomas Andrews, argued that enclosure would lead to depopulation and bring an end to the 
independence of small farmers and other commoners.266 According to Neeson, these and other 
commentators framed their defense of the commons in terms of what was good for the nation as a 
whole. The loss of the commons, they argued, would negatively impact the health of England’s 
manufactures, food and labour supplies, and military. Even Timothy Nourse, who was unsparing 
in his contempt for the denizens of the commons, thought that common field agriculture could 
sustain a greater number of people than enclosed lands and that when they were no longer available 
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as a standing reserve of labour, or soldiers and sailors, the nation would suffer.267  
In the latter half of the eighteenth century the national interest remained at the centre of 
arguments both for and against enclosures. 268 According to S.J. Thompson, many of the elites who 
opposed enclosure did so on the basis of classical republican ideas. 269Among the most prominent 
exponents of these ideas were the dissenting Protestant ministers Richard Price and Stephen 
Addington, who argued that the modern policy of enclosures would lead to greater inequality, 
moral decay and military weakness. By contrast, they argued, the Roman agrarian laws and Tudor 
tillage Acts were wiser and more just, for they safeguarded the independence of the yeomanry and 
did not allow the liberty of the many to be sacrificed for the riches of the few. 270 
Advocates of enclosure countered that these historical examples were irrelevant, for 
eighteenth century England was “a society based on the interdependence of agriculture, 
manufactures, and commerce.” 271 Moreover, their idea of liberty was different: what mattered 
most was that people be allowed to improve, innovate, and pursue economic profit without the 
interference of policy makers. They did not seem to see the irony of insisting on non-interference 
even as they defended the intervention of Parliament in authorizing enclosures. 272 As Cornish and 
Clark put it: “To no other purpose did the aristocracy and gentry use their legislature more regularly 
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than for the adjustment of private rights. By the mid-eighteenth century it had become the 
predominant technique for enclosure.” 273  
Nature Estranged and Imitated: Display/Erasure in English Landscape Gardens 
By the eighteenth century, enclosures had already been altering the complexion of English land 
for centuries. But the arrangement of “natural” spaces was drawing a new and acute kind of 
attention just as enclosures were being granted legitimacy through Acts of Parliament, theories of 
private property and the wider discourse of improvement. This attention often took the form of 
aesthetic representations of ‘natural’ scenery, in poetry, novels, and paintings and in the design of 
gardens and landscapes.  As with all aesthetic expression, these representations of nature reveal 
the particular cultural and political preoccupations of their time. The eighteenth century is widely 
considered the moment in European thought of a new sense of rupture between culture and nature, 
a moment when ‘Nature’ seemed separate and external to the human world.274  
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Much of the eighteenth century attitude to nature is continuous with the attitudes of previous 
centuries. For example, in many previous centuries there appears to have been some version of the 
idea that, beneath its varied and capricious surface, nature was shaped by a fixed and divine order. 
Meanwhile, the natural sciences of the eighteenth century, which were becoming increasingly 
specialized, were largely an extension of the Baconian impulse to order human understanding of 
the natural world. The peculiarities of the eighteenth century attitude to nature and its hidden order 
appear more clearly in aesthetic expressions of the period, particularly in the landscaped gardens 
of the largest estates. Indeed, this was the century during which the English countryside was first 
shaped into what continues to be admired as a quintessentially English scene.   
If enclosure was the legal and material assertion of one’s exclusive ownership of a territory, 
the landscaping of that property was a display of one’s status and power. To some extent the 
surveyor’s map had fulfilled the same function. As Bendall notes, "Maps can be seen as part of a 
continuum of which views, prospects and landscape paintings form a part.”275  In each of these 
media, power and status are displayed and consumed aesthetically. In the case of maps, for 
instance, Gregory says that, ““it was in cartographic form that the pleasing regularity of … 
enclosures- in stark contrast with the expanses of heath and common- could best be appreciated.”  
The open spaces on the map indicating common lands were a source of embarrassment to estate 
owners.  If instead they enclosed “large tracts of land…in a compact unit” they could display 
through the map their family’s power to “reshape the landscape”276 The estate map also allowed 
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the landowner to survey all the land he owned in one glance. This, the ‘pleasing prospect’, the 
distanced, all-encompassing view, was precisely the effect that many eighteenth century estate 
owners hired their landscape architects to produce.  
A century earlier, the view of an endless prospect from a seat of power belonged 
exclusively to the absolute monarch.  The landscape gardens of the Stuarts were influenced by the 
theatrical scenes designed by architect and surveyor Inigo Jones, which placed the king at a central 
and elevated point in order that he could survey all before him.277  As in other early modern 
European states, the royal gardens and court were characterized by symmetrical, symbolic and 
geometrically precise arrangements of space. Such arrangements represented the body politic as 
the mirror image of the natural order itself. However, according to Olwig, this courtly view of the 
natural and political order did not extend to the country, where the rival powers of the non-noble 
gentry, freemen and ‘the people’ tended to conceive of nature in more organic terms.  In his preface 
to Olwig’s Landscape, Nature and the Body Politic, Tuan describes the dichotomous worldviews 
of court and country: 
…to one side were the absolutist, purist, and universalist aspirations of court and monarch, 
to the other side the customs and traditions, the rights and obligations of the people ; to the 
one side, high art and artifice, to the other side, closeness to earth and organic 
wholesomeness. Even the senses were differently engaged. The court privileged sight: 
think again of the spectacles of the court theatre and beyond it the splendidly landscaped 
gardens that stretched into the distant horizon. The country by contrast was multisensorial 
- more egalitarian and communal in political terms."278 
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By the eighteenth century, however, the opposition between these two models of political 
and natural order was no longer meaningful. It is not that a balance was found between them, but 
that power had shifted from the court to the country, bringing with it the spatial expression of the 
court.  Olwig demonstrates this shift of power and its manifestation in the eighteenth century 
country estate by tracing the evolution of the word landscape itself.  Landscape derived from the 
Germanic word landschaft, a term used in Northern Europe to mean not merely a territory, but 
also a legal and political domain and the community it represented. 279  While the word was adopted 
into English at the end of the sixteenth century as ‘landscape’, that word came to be more strongly 
associated with a view or portrayal of a natural scene. Much more comparable to landschaft was 
the already existing term “country.” More than physical territory, ‘country’ also signified the 
interests of the people within that territory as determined through customary law. The Whigs who 
fought for the rights of Parliament, and who sought to wrest power from the court, saw themselves 
as champions of this ancient customary law, and of the people of the country.  
But in the eighteenth century, when that power had been achieved and the Whigs 
constituted an oligarchy, it was with the aesthetics of the court that they wished to design their 
country seats. This was much more than an aesthetic preference.280 As Olwig notes, “the power to 
define the meaning of country gave the power to define the social and political legitimacy of 
political and economic power.’ The ‘party of the country’ may have been the victor in the glorious 
revolution but, in fact, “the court came to dominate- that is, its attitude of mind that favors 
centralized planning and rational processes, that is intolerant of messy, multiple viewpoints.” As 
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with the surveyors map, the landscaped gardens of English estates redefined the meaning of what 
it represented.  Landscape as community and local, customary laws was now supplanted by 
landscape as “the top-down power of the lord.” 281  
One of the most popular styles with which the gentry expressed this new power of the 
country seat was neo-Palladianism. In the late sixteenth century the Venetian architect Palladio 
had used the geometrical techniques of renaissance artists, particularly single-point perspective, in 
order to recreate the spatial rationality of classical Rome in the estates and landscapes of the 
terrafirma and nobility.282 Inigo Jones had been deeply influenced by Palladio’s approach, and 
used similar techniques to create the illusion of three dimensions in his theatrical scenes at the 
Stuart court.  Olwig notes that in the masques designed by Jones, the scenery in the foreground 
was arranged in such a way that it blended seamlessly with landscape in the background. Using 
“the science of perspective” had the effect of blurring “the distinction between the world out there 
and the world of the theatre” so that the landscape was “perceived as a ‘natural’ sign that 
transcended the ‘conventions’ of human communication.”283 With the resurgence of interest in 
Jones’s designs in the eighteenth century, the Palladian and Jonesian techniques of geometrical 
rationality and the blending of artificial and natural scenery were adapted to the English landscaped 
garden.  
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As has been discussed in chapter two, the role of geometry in modern European 
representations of space can be traced back to the influence of Ptolmey and the innovative 
techniques renaissance artists. It was also central to the development of cartography, surveying 
and estate mapping in early modern England. Nor was the application of geometric rationality to 
garden design a novelty of the eighteenth century, for the seventeenth century gardens both in 
England and on the continent explicitly expressed the courtly view of nature as rational order itself. 
The eighteenth century English garden was likewise shaped by geometry, Reason’s “most 
transparent emblem and effective instrument.” As Tuan notes, reason was not at odds with nature 
but rather it was “nature at its most lucid and intelligible.”284  
Nevertheless, the English gardens of the eighteenth century appeared less formal or 
geometrically precise than those of the seventeenth century, or of their counterparts on the 
continent. Anne- Louise Sommer illustrates this change in the case of Viscount Cobham’s garden 
park at Stowe in Buckinghamshire: 
With a formal garden of a rather modest size as its starting point from the late 17th century, 
Stowe changed radically and expanded through the first half of the 18th century. In the 
1730s and -40s gardener and landscape architect William Kent contributed substantially to 
the renewal with a masterly choreography of series of picturesque landscapes and a unique 
staging of the dialogue between framed landscapes of the 'nature' outside the garden, and 
the cleverly arranged and varied micro landscape scenes of the garden.285  
Thus, the true innovation of the early eighteenth century English landscaped garden was 
this apparent blending of the artificial design of the garden with the natural scenery beyond it. In 
the 1730s and 40s William Kent and Royal gardener Charles Bridgeman drew on the techniques 
                                                          
284 Tuan, “Foreword,” xviii. 
285 Anne-Louise Sommer, “Nature Choreographed: The eighteenth Century Garden as a 
Knowledge-generating Feature,” Erfurt Electronic Studies in English 4 (2007). 
http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/edoc/ia/eese/artic27/sommer/4_2007.html.  
252 
  
 
of Palliadian design and Jonesian scenery to create the effect of a more expansive prospect, one 
that stretched into the natural realm itself. 
The gardens of the seventeenth century had been obvious artificial environments, formal 
and symbolic representations of nature which were limited in scope and separate from the world 
around them.  Now,  just as the natural world was being objectified more than ever before, 
dissected and rearranged in scientific study, refined, standardized and commodified as industrial 
inputs, the landed gentry wished to replicate its dynamism and complexity, to take as their aesthetic 
model, what they had instrumentalized. Most of all they want to blur the boundary between man-
made and natural, between their property and the distant hills at the horizon, between first and 
second nature. William Kent achieved this effect with the ‘ha-ha,’ a sunken fence or ditch which, 
when viewed from the house by the landowner, hid the perimeters of his property and ensured the 
prospect of a sweeping uninterrupted view. 286  
In the second half of the eighteenth century new approaches were used to shape landscape 
gardens on the model of nature. Lancelot “Capability” Brown designed the lands of hundreds of 
properties in such a way that the natural forms of the landscape itself were laid bare; he emphasized 
“ the lines and shapes and contours of its ground, waters, and trees. He neglected statues, mottoes 
and inscriptions and to some extent buildings; he swept the lawn straight up to the walls of the 
house, eliminating all terraces and other remains of the ‘specific garden.’”287 The “studied 
elimination of designed elements” in Brown’s “landscape parks” struck some observers as far too 
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radical an attempt to mirror nature. As Joshua Reynolds protested, “if the true taste consists, as 
many hold, in banishing every appearance of Art, or any traces of the footsteps of man, it would 
then no longer be a Garden.”288 Partly in response to Brown’s more austere representation of 
nature, and partly inspired by the seventeenth century paintings of Claude Lorrain and Nicola 
Poisson, the rustic details of Dutch painting and the graceful spontaneity of Chinese gardens, the 
picturesque movement dominated the landscape designs of the late eighteenth century. The 
picturesque landscape idealized nature in a different way than Brown’s had, shaping the landscape 
to appear as a painting, using the shading of trees shrubs and other features to give a dramatic 
effect, and dividing the scene into foreground, middle ground and background. Humphrey 
Repton’s later designs followed the picturesque, but by showcasing formal and classical elements 
of design in the foreground, the bare contours of the Brownian landscape park in the middle 
ground, and wilder vistas in the background, he managed to incorporate the three dominant styles 
of the eighteenth century into his landscapes.  
Common to each of these conventions- the staging effects of Pallido and Jones, the 
landscape park, and the picturesque – is, as Raymond Williams says, “an apparent standard for 
‘natural’ fidelity” which is also “an invitation to arrange and rearrange nature according to a point 
of view.”289 Specifically, they are intended to appeal to a proprietorial gaze. As Daniels notes of 
the clumps of planted trees and shrubs in Capability Brown’s parks, “the site, size and tonality … 
enhanced the size of a park and the pleasure of running one’s eyes possessively over its contours." 
Repton himself wrote that improving the design of estates was about "appropriation...that charm 
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which only belongs to ownership, the exclusive right of enjoyment, with the power of refusing that 
others should share our pleasure." 290   
Moreover, with their conscious emulation of natural elements and artful attempts to 
disguise human intervention, these landscapes betray an increasing sense of alienation from nature. 
The impulse to “naturalize” nature could only come from the sense of its separation.  It was a way 
of borrowing the authority of nature to legitimize an extra-natural order. And one doesn’t borrow 
an authority to which one still feels subject. 291  As Raymond Williams notes, the legitimization of 
the improved estate through the naturalization of its landscape occurred at the same moment that 
theorists were legitimizing- by framing as natural- the convention of  private property and the “new 
natural economic laws and the natural liberty of the entrepreneur.”292  
As both Williams and Mitchell argue, what was being hidden in these landscapes was not 
merely the work of the architect, but also the labour from which the landlord’s wealth and property 
derived, the wage labour into which commoners were now pressed by enclosures. Just as the 
surveyor’s maps excluded any markings of the customary relations of the commoners who 
inhabited the land, the landscape garden was, in Williams words; 
a rural landscape emptied of rural labour and of labourers; a sylvan and watery prospect , 
with a hundred analogies in neo-pastoral painting and poetry, from which the facts of 
production  had been banished: the roads and approaches artfully concealed by trees, so 
that the very fact of communication could be visually suppressed: inconvenient barns and 
mills cleared away out of sight …avenues opening to the distant hills, where no details 
disturbed the general view’ and this landscape seen from above…is a commanding 
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prospect that is at the same time a triumph of ‘unspoiled’ nature: this is the achievement, 
an effective and still imposing mystification.293  
The English landscape garden concealed the conditions that created it and presented itself 
as already always there.294 In fact, this idyllic rural scene became -and remains- a central image of 
English national identity.  295  Moreover, the commanding view of this scene and the erasure of 
labour and of the local markers and meanings of “the country” were replicated wherever the British 
Empire staked its claim.  British Plantations and estates in Ireland, India, North America and 
beyond were designed according to the conventions of the English landscape garden. Often these 
were “the overseas extensions of the large-scale operations of absentee owners” whose estates in 
the English countryside were therefore not merely the seat of power nationally, but “the seat of a 
world empire constituting a global commonwealth of British power.”296 For, as Mitchell has 
suggested, “the representation of landscape is not only a matter of internal politics and national or 
class ideology but also an international, global phenomenon, intimately bound of with the 
discourses of imperialism.”297  
Indeed, with its commanding view of a scene that stretches out toward the horizon, the 
English landscape garden visually expressed the reaching impulse of both imperialism and 
improvement.  It represented the aspiration to push beyond territorial and natural limitations.  
Meanwhile, the act of gardening itself exhibits a logic of enclosure and has served as a potent 
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metaphor for modernity.  While Bauman primarily uses the metaphor to illustrate the classificatory 
work of modern states, it is also applicable to the ordering imperative within modernity. According 
to Cosgrove, as early as the Renaissance, the garden was a central “trope for European's 
imaginative domestication of a new, global spatiality … characterized above all by the disruption 
of previously established spatial, ethnographic and conceptual boundaries.  And we know that 
fixing a boundary between the wild and the cultivated is the primary act of gardening."298 But 
while the formal gardens of the renaissance and early modern period were symbolic expressions 
of an ideal political and natural order, their eighteenth century counterparts made that order a 
material reality, which expanded across the English countryside and the world beyond it, 
transforming the visual and social reality. 
Enclosing and Accumulating Nature’s Objects: Linnaean Classification 
The transformation of the English countryside was not the only manifestation of the modern 
impulse to order Nature in the eighteenth century. Increasingly, the natural historians of that 
century imposed a logic of enclosure upon objects of the natural world by attempting to assign to 
each a place within their systems of classification. I do not intend here to imply any causal relation 
between the enclosures of land into property, and the enclosures of natural objects of knowledge 
within categories. Instead, I wish to stress that they are kin, born of the same episteme, as Foucault 
puts it.  Proof of that kinship can be found in a number of common markers: both kinds of enclosure 
are abstractions, which attempt to contain objects of the natural world by separating them from the 
variation and complexity of their context; for both, each act of containment is also an act of division 
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between inside and outside; and finally, the repetition of these twin acts of containment and 
division lead to both fragmentation of all into discrete enclosures/categories and  to the 
accumulation of these enclosures/categories.299  This last feature leads me to a characteristic of 
enclosures that I have not yet addressed in this chapter: in terms of both property and knowledge, 
enclosure is deployed as a means of grasping control and enforcing stability in an uncertain and 
unstable world. And yet, as a process which unfolds over time, enclosure ultimately slips the reins 
and becomes uncontrollable. The accumulation of enclosed objects is simultaneously the 
fragmentation of the larger terrain -the framework- into ever smaller units. Ultimately the weight 
of this accumulation collapses onto itself and the fragmentation disintegrates the very ordering 
system framing modern experience. 
We are not wrong to picture enclosure as a circle- or as any shape closed off from a 
surrounding space. Yet, when we consider the application of the logic of enclosure over time we 
see a pattern in which this closure is continually evaded: first, the object of enclosure is contained; 
then the contained objects accumulate until they overburden any means of containment; and 
finally, to solve this crisis, ever more precise means of containment are deployed, and the cycle 
begins again. We can get a clearer understanding of how the logic of enclosure plays out over time 
if we reflect on the novel means by which eighteenth century natural historians attempted to know 
and represent the objects of the natural world. The classification system created by Swedish 
botanist Linnaeus is particularly illustrative not only of what Foucault calls  the “grid of knowledge 
constituted by natural history” but also of the relationship between order and ambivalence that 
Bauman identifies as central to modernity.300  
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With his Systema Naturae, published in 1735, Carolus Linnaeus set out to bring all 
knowledge of natural objects into one efficient system, a sort of grid which allowed one to identify 
and assign a place to any specimen from nature’s variety. While the Systema Naturae also included 
the animal and mineral kingdoms, it was through Linnaeus’s botanical taxonomy that Europeans 
came to know his name, and to know the names of plants. In fact, “binomial nomenclature,” which 
introduced the standard of giving one generic and one specific name for each living being (ie. 
Homo-sapiens), remains one of Linnaeus’s lasting contributions to the biological sciences. The 
benefit of binomial nomenclature, and of Linnaeus’ classification system as a whole, was that it 
simplified and standardized the process of identifying species and their relation to one another.301 
For Linnaeus, “the foundation of botany consist(ed) in the division of plants and systematic 
name-giving.” Plants were divided from each other according to the differences of their organs of 
reproduction, and these differences were determined by four variables only. Every note made about 
a plant’s organs (such as petals, stamens, apexes, pistils, and fruits) ‘”should be a product of 
number, of form, of proportion, of situation.”302  
Linnaeus’s “descriptive order” for natural history, which focused on just a few visual and 
countable elements, Foucault saw as typical of the epistemology of the “classical” age of the 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.303 This was a “period of purification” in which the thing 
observed and the signs that the culture had collected around it over time were separated. Now “it 
is the thing itself that appears, in its own characters, but within the reality that has been patterned 
from the very outset by the name.” To convey the novelty of this approach to history, Foucault 
describes the histories of natural objects before the mid seventeenth century, when, 
History was the inextricable and completely unitary fabric of all that was visible of things 
and of the signs that had been discovered or lodged in them: to write the history of a plant 
or an animal was as much a matter of describing its elements or organs as of describing the 
resemblances that could be found in it, the virtues that it was thought to possess, the legends 
and stories with which it had been involved, its place in heraldry, the medicaments that 
were concocted from its substance, the foods it provided, what the ancients recorded of it, 
and what travellers might have said of it. The history of a living being was that being itself, 
within the whole semantic network that connected it to the world... signs were then part of 
things themselves, whereas in the seventeenth century they become modes of 
representation.”304  
Like the constuzzione legittima - the window the renaissance artists looked through to 
represent reality “objectively”- and indeed, like enclosures superimposed onto complex networks 
of customary rights to the land, these “modes of representation” are abstractions made possible 
only by severing the object from its environment. Foucault explains that the locus of natural history 
is “ a non-temporal rectangle in which, stripped of all commentary…creatures present themselves 
one beside another, their surfaces visible, grouped according to their common features, and thus 
already virtually analysed, and bearers of nothing but their own individual names.”305 
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The great advantage of severing and erasing the relations in which an object is embedded, 
is that it allows the object to be presented without ambiguity. Like the visual maps drawn up by 
surveyors, classificatory systems like Linnaeus’ communicate immediately to any viewer the place 
of the object in the larger system, and the most important of its constituent parts. At a glance the 
viewer is assured of the orderly arrangement of the natural world, and of the firmness with which 
modern systems of knowledge can grasp that arrangement. According to Foucault, it was in pursuit 
of further certainty and order that natural history reduced the sensory apprehension of the natural 
object to the visual.  From the seventeenth century on, the observations of natural historians 
excluded hearsay and also taste and smell “because their lack of certainty, and their variability 
render impossible any analysis into distinct elements that could be universally acceptable…” 
leaving “sight with an almost exclusive privilege, being the sense by which we perceive extent and 
establish proof and in consequence, the means to an analysis partes extra partes acceptable to 
everyone.”306 Natural history’s mode of representation had the effect of bringing “language as 
close as possible to the observing gaze, and the things observed as close as possible to words”. 
Thus, he concludes that “natural history is nothing more than the nomination of the visible.”307 
That is, the apparent simplicity of taxonomic systems makes it appear as though the objects 
enclosed in their categories, and assigned names by Linnaeus and others, were always arranged 
thus, and always named that, as though they had merely waited to be observed and articulated 
before they could appear.  
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There is something in the apparent eternity of these categories and names that is 
reminiscent of the fetishism of the commodity form described by Marx. Indeed, like Marx’s 
wooden table dancing on its head, the Rosa Canina (dog rose) placed next to the Rosa Palustris 
(swamp rose) are each presented without history. They share the burden or benefit of having been 
translated into a universal grammar- exchange value on the one hand, and taxonomic classification 
on the other. This arrangement of particularities into an easily understood order required only that 
they be measured against a universal standard.  Linnaeus’s categories- species, genus, class and 
order- and his variables -form, number, proportion and situation-, served as the universal standard 
by which any of nature’s variety could be positioned. His system shared the ingenuity of his age, 
which was, Foucault says, “if not to see as little as possible, at least to restrict deliberately the area 
of its experience…, to be content with seeing… a few things systematically. With seeing what in 
the rather confused wealth of representation, can be analysed, recognized by all and thus given a 
name that everyone will be able to understand.308 
Linnaeus was not the first to create a system of classification for plants, but his system 
improved upon others in its efficiency and ease of use.  By reducing the great variety of natural 
specimens and their features to a few identifiable characteristics, he created a standard frame 
through which anyone could observe and know the object and its place within a larger order. 
According to Wellmon, the great popularity of Linnaean taxonomy was due both to its 
reproduction in widely circulated texts and to the simplicity of its methods, which made it like a 
“miniature grid that anyone could lay over nature."309 The portability of this “grid” made it an apt 
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tool for those travelling throughout Europe and across the globe, so that by the middle of the 
eighteenth century Linnaean practices had become ubiquitous and even fashionable. 310 
The efficiency of Linnaean categories and nomenclature was a welcome solution to what 
Charles Godfrey has called the “first bioinformatics crisis”.311  According to Wellmon, Linnaeus’s 
system “reduced the pressure of the increasing number of plants that had only become visible to 
the scientific eye with the emergence of botany as a science. It was designed to make the objective 
variability of nature- the variety of plants –navigable.” Yet, even as it offered a way to manage the 
overabundance of information, the dissemination of Linnaean taxonomy also perpetually recreated 
that overabundance.  As professional and amateur botanists identified, collected and categorized 
ever more plant and animal species from across the globe, the initial categories proposed by 
Linnaeus lost their effectiveness as containers. Linnaeus’ successors were able to “stabilize and 
make the flow of information more efficient by delimiting categories,” continually dividing plants 
into ever more refined categories.312  
But the response of continually refining categories actually did nothing to stop the 
overwhelming accretion of new species. Wellmon notes that the first edition of Linnaeus’ Systema 
Naturae contained 549 species, “the tenth edition had 4387; the eleventh had 5897 and the final 
edition had over 7000. As new species were discovered, not only were new genera established but 
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old genera were subdivided.”  This over-accumulation of species put pressure on and “threatened 
the categorical stability of the genus.” 313 
The result was not the collapse of Linnaean taxonomy. In fact, Linnaeus’ system is still 
with us today, in well-known divisions between kingdom, phylum, genus, etc. Only very recently 
has it been challenged by another system, “cladistics.” 314 Nevertheless, the ongoing restructuring 
of its categories in response to the overaccumulation of species tells us a few things about the 
ordering impulse in modern epistemology. First, it led to an awareness of the artificiality and the 
impermanence of the categories intended to enclose knowledge, and of the distance that it created 
between the observing subject and the object being observed. In the late eighteenth century one 
botany enthusiast recognized the shortcomings of the modern conception of order exemplified in 
Linnaean taxonomy, and offered an alternative approach to knowledge of the natural world.   
This early critic of modern epistemology was Goethe, better known, of course, for his 
literary works. Wellmon compares the Linnaean taxonomic representation of living beings with 
Goethe’s own morphological approach. Goethe was an avid amateur botanist who had admired 
and practiced Linnaean methods for decades.  Having first learned these practices and the Linnaean 
conception of order through his friendships with Linnaeus’ German acolytes, he found the system 
to be an effective aid to the memory and an invaluable reference when travelling. Like so many of 
his time he enjoyed the ease of the system. But later in his life, reflecting on his experiences with 
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the science of botany in The Metamorphosis of Plants (1790), he described his growing awareness 
of a crisis within Linnaean classification. For Goethe, the crisis of overabundance of information 
was an opportunity to reflect on and to question the some of the assumptions pervading modern 
epistemology.315 Wellmon explains that, 
for Goethe, the increasing specialization of knowledge was a distinctive feature of a 
modern age that had come to overestimate itself based on “der grossen Masse Stoffes, den 
sie umfasst” [“the great mass of material that it encompasses”]. By breaking knowledge 
down into discrete fields…the modern age was able to accumulate, process and manage 
more information. The modern age’s aggregative ethos of knowledge, then, was facilitated 
by the specialization of knowledge”, “what Thomas Pfau refers to as modernity’s 
“accumulative mode of inquiry.” 316 
It was through his own attention to the life cycle of plants that Goethe first began to 
question the legitimacy of Linnaean taxonomy and of the “accumulative mode of inquiry” itself. 
While Linnaeas advised the student of plants to identify each species according to the number, 
form, proportion and situation of its reproductive organs, Goethe came to recognize that 
throughout a plant’s life each of these organs underwent numerous changes. Thus, while the 
taxonomic approach allowed observers to easily identify and place each species in relation to 
others, its observation of each plant was a mere glance. And basing the identity of the plant on 
what was seen in that glance was like freezing it in time and rendering static what was, to Goethe, 
so undeniably dynamic. This way of representing the natural object of knowledge - enclosing and 
isolating it from both its environment and its history - revealed to Goethe “the prior assumption of 
a static nature” within the modern epistemology. This, Wellmon tells us, “when combined with 
taxonomic instability had revealed a chasm between the human being and nature” and the 
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assumption that knowledge and order were dependent upon “a strict distinction between observer 
and observed.” 317 Rather than “simply tracing the edicts given by the divine lawgiver,” Goethe 
saw that the gaze of the human observer was as subject to change as the natural object being 
observed.318 Devoid of any sense of the relationship between observer and observed, Linnaean 
taxonomy exemplified “a modern age that fragments, isolates and obfuscates the relationship of 
all knowledge.” 319 Goethe’s morphology proposed an alternative notion of order and knowledge, 
one which centered on relations and on the changes to both knowledge and living beings over time. 
What we learn from the example of Linnaean taxonomy is how the modern ordering 
impulse itself unfolds through time. On the face of it, classification systems like Linnaeus,’ which 
have had to continually divide their categories to house new information, appear to be highly 
adaptable. However, the logic of enclosure never ends, and in fact it progressively creates 
conditions requiring its repetition. Enclosure, as a means of containing and controlling the 
unknown, becomes both compulsive and propulsive. In modernity, the more that enclosing logics 
are deployed to contain and name the wild and undefined realm just beyond the horizon, the further 
that horizon recedes, and the greater the impulse to vanquish ambivalence. Order and ambivalence 
are, according to Bauman, modernity’s original division. They are its twin creations, separated at 
birth. They relate to one another in a dynamic of co-dependence and mutual propulsion: 
Ambivalence is a side-product of the labour of classification; and it calls for yet more 
classifying effort. Though born of the naming/classifying urge, ambivalence may be fought 
only with a naming that is yet more exact, and classes that are yet more precisely defined: 
that is, with such separations as will set still tougher (counterfactual) demands on the 
discreteness and transparency of the world and thus give yet more occasion for ambiguity. 
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The struggle against ambivalence is, therefore, both self-destructive and self-propelling. It 
goes on with unabating strength because it create its own problems in the course of 
resolving them.320  
I should admit here that an analysis of Linnaean classification is an imperfect means of 
illustrating the inherent instability of the ordering imperative at work in the enclosure movement 
in eighteenth century England. Nevertheless, because it is imperfect as an analogy, a brief 
discussion of how it parallels and diverges from the logic of property enclosure may help to 
better illuminate a few key points. Foucault saw Linnaean classification as quintessentially of the 
classical episteme, in its imposition of order upon nature, its erecting of boundaries dividing 
inside from outside, its “nomination of the visible,” and its severing objects of nature from the 
complex and dynamic relations to which they belong. There are clearly parallels here with 
enclosure. Moreover, I think that, in their relationship to improvement and the system of private 
property, enclosures are, like Linnaeus’ classes, part of an “aggregative ethos” and 
“accumulative mode.”  
But if Linnaean classification revealed, according to Goethe, “the prior assumption of 
static nature,” the same cannot really be said of the modern property regime, in which enclosures 
played a critical role. Private property was a means of establishing security and certainty, not 
with the purpose of fixing nature into an unchanging order, as in the systema naturae, but in 
order to guarantee individuals the exclusive freedom to use the land in whatever way they 
wished. At both the individual and systemic levels, then, private property facilitated a dynamic, 
flexible and transformational use of land. Not only did enclosure clear the ground for agricultural 
improvement and economic profit, but it also unmoored the fixed social arrangements of 
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feudalism. Closing off an exclusive domain from a nexus of customary and feudal relations, and 
founding the value of property upon the common measure of exchange value, made property in 
land alienable, fungible, so that there was movement in the system. So there does seem to be a 
difference here, not only between Linnaeus’ classification system and property enclosures, but 
also in the ordering imperative described by both Foucault and Bauman, and what I am trying to 
articulate about the relationship between certainty and uncertainty in modernity. As I have 
stressed in my account of both Baconian science and the improvement discourse, enclosure in 
modernity is not a straightforward matter of closure, but work rather as provisional foundations 
which are continually revised in order to balance security and the freedom attached to 
uncertainty. As I will demonstrate in the remaining chapters, the propulsive accumulation of 
such provisional foundations in modernity does produce greater instability and uncertainty. 
Conclusion 
I close this chapter not with an English example of either enclosure or improvement, but with the 
European crisis of overaccumulation of collected species and the instability of the categories 
intended to contain them. In doing so I wish to indicate not only that the logic of enclosure and the 
spirit of improvement extended beyond England, but also to stress the instability and uncertainty 
which feed and are fed by modern efforts to contain and to expand.  The quality sought most, in 
Linnaeus’ classification system, in Bacon’s experiments, and in the enclosure of common lands 
and wastes, was some kind of certainty. To some extent this certainty was achieved. Linnaeus’s 
system still stands, observation and experiment are still the cornerstone of modern science and the 
boundaries of private property remain fixed in law. And yet, sown in the soil of doubt, each of 
these certainties cultivates more doubt. 
Enclosed and exclusive property, legal and natural facts, the constraints of experiments and 
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classification systems, all began as conscious and artificial constructions, boundaries within which 
a plan of reform, profit or knowledge might grow. Such boundaries are necessarily impermanent, 
and thus require constant repair and restoration. In the sciences, new separations must constantly 
be made to house the influx of ever more species and ever more disciplines of knowledge. And to 
protect the boundaries of private property, ever more legal rules and discourses of legitimization 
are deployed to buttress them. The enclosure movement creates massive instability wherever it 
goes. Dispossessed commoners, now wage-dependent, are driven to seek work in newly 
industrializing cities, the armies and navies, and the colonial territories, while those who remain 
in the country are erased from paintings and landscapes of the landlords’ estate. In a sense, modern 
certainty is like the English landscaped garden- a polished facade behind which lies a ruptured or 
forgotten scene. But if we remember that the enclosure of property and the Baconian fact were 
viewed as tools for improvement, facilitators of endless growth, then a better analogy for modern 
certainty might be a series of stepping stones, allowing one to journey upon the unsound ground 
of an indeterminate world. 
In any case, these boundaries do not vanquish ambivalence. As Bauman explains, 
modernity’s ordering imperative responds with ever more precise classifications, fragmentations, 
and enclosures. As we will see in the following chapters, the English state responds to the disorders 
of unemployment and poverty by following Petty’s lead- accumulating quantitative data on 
populations. Like the map or the survey in chapter two, this data prepares the way for reform, 
systematically classifying and targeting particular categories for improvement. Meanwhile the 
same aggregation of data is carried out by actuarial scientists working for insurance companies. 
They find that future uncertainties can be tamed through probability. Following the “law of large 
numbers”, the various harms that might afflict the population can be foretold, and on this basis, 
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the risks of individuals can be contracted out to the insurance provider. In finance, property 
becomes more fungible and abstract. The risk associated with investment, and speculation can also 
be contracted out to insurers, a move that only encourages wilder and more abstract forms of 
investment. In the twentieth century, individuals become dependent upon large institutions such 
as the state, the banking system and insurance companies, for shelter from future uncertainty. But 
just as enclosures ultimately disrupt more than they protect, these modern forms of protection only 
generate instability and risks that are ever more difficult to contain. 
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Chapter Four  
The Emergence of Risk and Insurance in Eighteenth Century England 
Failing again and again to heed the signs of providence, Robinson Crusoe finds himself imprisoned 
on a deserted island and reflects on the choices that led him there:  
my head began to be full of projects and undertakings beyond my reach...I was still to be 
the wilful agent of all my own miseries...all these miscarriages were procured by my 
apparent obstinate adhering to my foolish inclination of wandering abroad and pursuing 
that inclination, in contradiction to the clearest views of doing my self good in fair and 
plain pursuit of those prospects and those measures of life which nature and Providence 
concurred to present me with and to make my duty. ….only to pursue a rash and 
immoderate desire of rising faster than the nature of the thing admitted.1  
Among critics and advocates of classical political economy, Robinson Crusoe’s adventures 
on the island have long been viewed as an allegory of capitalist enterprise. Relying only on his wit 
and resourcefulness to convert a hostile wilderness into a model English farm- by enclosing and 
improving the plants and animals he found and domesticated- Crusoe was favoured by classical 
political economists as the quintessential incarnation of "homo-economicus."2 
But, as is evident in his reflections above, Defoe’s character is filled with ambivalence 
about his own behavior. His story is much more than an early version of the self-made man. And 
it reflects something larger and more complex than the emergence of the self-interested individual 
in the formation of the capitalist society.  Crusoe is not, in fact, alone on his adventure: his most 
constant companion is Divine Providence, and his relationship with Providence is a recurrent 
feature of the book. It is this relationship which gives tension to the story, drives the plot and 
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develops his character. Crusoe has been raised to consider it his duty to adhere to God's design. 
As a young man of the middling order, his duty is to settle and devote his energies to industrious 
husbandry. And yet, he cannot keep himself from overstepping the boundaries of that design. 
Crusoe is a late seventeenth century English man torn between the two contradictory 
callings of his time and place: on the one hand, English society at this time denigrated ways of life 
not ruled by reason, moderation and the civilization. Settlement was esteemed as the mark of 
civilization and investment in agricultural production was among the most acceptable ventures.3 
On the other hand, adventure and the possibility of riches beckoned from the world beyond, and 
the instinct to venture beyond the known borders of the nation was followed by ever more ships 
full of men hoping to find their fortunes. 
Roots and Wings 
The tension between the desires for freedom and risk on the one hand and the desires for 
security and certainty on the other, can be found in all human societies. As property theorist 
Margaret Radin puts it, in order to thrive humans do seem to need both roots and wings: both to 
be embedded in a context and to be able to transcend that context.4 But Robinson Crusoe’s 
dilemma and that of the society to which he belongs, is particularly pertinent to the tensions which 
gave shape to modern European society.  
At about the same time that Daniel Defoe was writing Robinson Crusoe, in the early 
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eighteenth century, men were meeting in coffee-houses in London, engaging in exchanges that 
seemed to solve the dilemma of the contradictory needs for freedom and security. The owners of 
merchant ships about to set off on long journeys, the hazards of which were numerous but 
uncertain, would now stop first at coffee houses such as Lloyds to find a broker. The broker would 
take the ship-owner’s risk in exchange for a premium. He would then shop this risk around so that 
those who wanted to make the gamble on the fortunes of the ship could do so.  The owner of the 
ship now could take his adventure- with all of its potential riches- while protecting himself from 
the worst of its potential hazards. This was the beginning of insurance, a technique for managing 
risk that would put the previous risk management technique- Providence- out of business.  
In this second half of the dissertation, I argue that, with the rise of insurance and the 
calculations of probabilities which made it possible, a new kind of shelter was found to protect 
people from modern exposure to the uncertainties of the future. The same mapping and enclosing 
logics which had been used in the apprehension and reorganization of property and knowledge 
were now being extended to the unknown realm of the future and to the improvement of society. 
In chapters five and six I will demonstrate how, just as math and geometry made space objective 
and easier to control from a distance, the collection of data on populations and the mathematical 
analysis of likely outcomes for those populations objectified risk and made it manageable. But the 
objectification and commodification of risk did not mean that a balance was found between the 
needs for “roots and wings.” If anything, roots were now propelled forward by wings, to rest on 
ever more abstract foundations. That is, as risks were contracted out through investment and 
insurance, the management of risk depended ever more on relations between strangers, and was 
anchored only by trust in the expert knowledge through which future patterns could be predicted.  
In this chapter I discuss current scholarship on risk, its meaning and its crucial role in modernity. 
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While I recount a number of premodern and often ancient practices associated with risk, I argue 
that it is a modern phenomenon, largely shaped by probability theory and its application to the 
social realm in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I then turn to the story of the rise of 
investment and insurance in the early eighteenth century London stock market, to show how, by 
objectifying and commodifying risk, uncertainty could be both contained and courted in profit-
seeking ventures. Finally, I recount how, over the course of the eighteenth century, cultural 
discomfort with gambling’s heretical embrace of chance and with the calculative assessment of 
lives in insurance, was gradually replaced by a grudging trust in the expert, actuarial knowledge 
and abstract systems of the first large scale insurance organizations.  
What is Risk? 
Risk Literature 
Only a few decades ago academic research on risk was limited to the business, economics or 
scientific disciplines. But, ever since the publication of Ulrich Beck’s landmark work Risk Society 
in 1982, risk has become an enduring topic across the social sciences. In Risk Society, Beck argued 
that late twentieth century societies were forced to confront the unforeseen outcomes of modernity, 
risks which were now beyond the reach of the calculations which had advanced modernity.5 Now 
risk has become an important area of research not only in legal and economic studies, but also in 
social sciences such as psychology, political science, international relations, social theory and 
sociology.6 While the topic of risk is now being explored in a variety of disciplines, the social 
                                                          
5 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, (London: Sage, 1992). 
  
6 Gerda Reith, “Uncertain Times: the Notion of ‘Risk,’ and the Development of 
Modernity,” Time & Society 13, no. 2/3 (2004), 384.  
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theories of risk tend to fall into two major camps: the “risk society” approach and the Foucauldian 
inspired approach to risk as a form of governmentality.7 The former, drawing on the work of Beck 
and Giddens, tends to focus on contemporary, and often global and catastrophic risks that have 
emerged over the last few decades, such as global warming and AIDS.8 Those associated with the 
latter approach, such as Tom Baker, Robert Castel, Francois Ewald, and Pat O’Malley, tend to 
focus on discourses of risk as a means of social control.9 Following Aaron Doyle, as well as 
Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, I see the risk society and risk and governmentality theories 
as essentially compatible, for both view risk as constituting a late modern society in which lives 
are heavily managed and yet deeply insecure.   
This chapter draws on insights from both literatures. Like many of the governmentality 
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theorists, I also see discourses of risk and the institutions that manage risk as means by which 
modern states control and categorize large populations. Following Giddens, I draw attention to the 
relationship in modernity between risk and trust, particularly the trust that people place in abstract 
knowledge, systems and institutions.  And I conclude, along with Beck and Giddens, that in 
response to attempts to control risks, they have only proliferated beyond our control. Yet my 
treatment of risk here differs from the above mentioned approaches in focusing on its role in the 
historical development of modernity. I do not argue that risk society is an exclusively late modern 
development, but rather that it is one of the originating drives constituting modernity.  “Risk 
Society” emerged as an inherent part of modernity, for, as I will demonstrate in chapter five, the 
awareness of risk helped to create the very concept of “society,” a uniquely modern kind of human 
organization. Risking and risk management developed out of and alongside the drives to survey, 
map, enclose and improve, from the late seventeenth century on. While many of the developments 
in the story of risk occurred throughout Europe, and ultimately across the globe, I continue to focus 
largely on the British case, where the risk oriented activities of investing and insurance emerged 
in the context of a culture of improvement.  
Defining Risk 
As words go, risk is (relatively) new: some claim that the first use of the word can been traced to 
sixteenth century Italy, where “risicare” meant “to dare” or “to run into danger.”10  It is interesting 
                                                          
10 Peter Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1998), 8. There are, in fact, a number of different claims about the origin of the word 
risk. According to Catherine Althaus, some have argued that it comes from the ancient Greek word 
rhiza, meaning, “the hazards of sailing too near the cliffs,” while others locate its origin in the 
Latin word risicum “challenge posed by a barrier reef to a sailor” or to the Arabic word risq 
“anything that has been given to you (by God) and from which you draw profit.’ See Catherine 
Althaus, Calculating Political Risks (Sidney: University of New South Wales Press, 2008), 20-21. 
Giddens, meanwhile, suggests that the word “seems to have found its way into English in the 
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to note, as Bernstein does, that in this definition risk is a choice “rather than a fate.”11 A current 
definition of risk, from the Oxford dictionary, identifies it as “a chance or possibility of danger, 
loss, injury or other adverse consequences.” 12 Meanwhile, Webster’s defines the transitive verb 
‘to risk´ as “exposure to hazard or danger.”13 But as a verb, risk can also mean something 
potentially positive- it is to dare to expose oneself to danger, in the hopeful expectation of a reward. 
Risk is therefore inherently ambivalent: it is simultaneously about adventure and coverage, 
expansion and containment. As with the quest for improvement and the logic of enclosure, risk 
taking and risk management are examples of the modern dynamic between freedom and control. 
They act upon each other, propelling each other ever forward. The dynamism of risk is, according 
to Garland, conditional, reactive, relational, continual and interactive.14   
Risk is such a rich, many-sided concept that, as Garland points out, were Raymond 
Williams alive today he would surely include it in his Keywords (1983). Garland explains that, 
“Today’s accounts of risk are remarkable for their multiplicity and for the variety of 
senses they give to the term. Risk is a calculation. Risk is a commodity. Risk is capital. 
Risk is a technique of government. Risk is objective and scientifically knowable.  Risk is 
subjective and socially constructed. Risk is a problem, a threat, a source of insecurity. Risk 
                                                          
seventeenth century and probably comes from a Spanish nautical term meaning to run into danger 
or to go against a rock.” See Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 30. Luhmann discusses 
the origins of the term and the concept risk in Niklas Luhmann, Risk: a Sociological Theory (New 
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is a pleasure, a thrill, a source of profit and freedom. Risk is the means whereby we colonize 
and control the future. “Risk society” is our late modern world spinning out of control.”15  
It may thus appear as though risk, being so many things at once, is nothing in particular. 
Yet all of these meanings are related historically. All form a cluster of relations which will be 
apparent in the following account of the rise of risk as a central element of modernity. This is 
because modernity itself is about calculation, commodification, capital, governmentality, 
objectivity and subjectivity, insecurity and freedom, and the compulsive character of the impulse 
to control. 
Above all, to understand what makes risk modern, we must compare it with danger. 
Dangers exist whether we know about them or not. Risks, however, cannot exist without an 
awareness of them. Risk is an intentional inquiry into or a measurement of the likelihood of a 
(future) exposure to dangers. As Giddens puts it, risk is a danger that is “actively assessed in 
relation to future possibilities.”16 The eye that recognizes risk is necessarily a measuring, assessing 
eye. As Garland points out, there are no “unmanaged” risks, for the awareness of risk is already a 
kind of management. A “Risk Society” is therefore “characterized by a heightened awareness of 
risk,” and by “efforts to know and control that risk.” 17 
This chapter charts the emergence and development of this awareness of risk, and of efforts 
to control it, from the late seventeenth century to the turn of the nineteenth century. I concentrate 
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on a period of cultural and intellectual transition between the 1660s and 1800, when risk was first 
measured, objectified, exploited and managed by mathematicians, state actors and the “moneyed 
men” of the market. In the early eighteenth century, quite separately from continuing advances in 
probability theory, London became a bustling centre for both speculative financial investments 
and insurance schemes. Because they focused a calculating eye on future events, these activities 
were deemed impious deviations from faith in divine providence and were heartily opposed by 
many moral, religious and political authorities. The management of risk would not begin to be 
viewed as legitimate until the end of the eighteenth century, when the culture began to accept the 
role of chance in the events of the world, and when a new faith appeared: faith in the objectivity 
of the sciences and the authority of expert knowledge and abstract systems. 
Games of Chance: Pre-modern Forerunners to Risk 
Emerging in the latter decades of the seventeenth century were a host of apparently unrelated 
practices which were characterised by risk:  financial speculation, lotteries, annuities, insurance 
contracts and institutions.  Each of these involved placing a stake on the future in order to secure 
or to avoid, to profit or protect from uncertain outcomes. Like gambling, these activities courted 
the favour of chance. Indeed, for much of this period speculation, insurances and lotteries were so 
closely affiliated with gambling that they were likewise condemned by moral and legal authorities. 
In time, however, these activities would come to be distinguished from gambling as they developed 
alongside a new, “objective” scientific epistemology, modern techniques of statecraft aimed at 
managing large populations, and the commodification of capital in the emerging market society. 
Together, such practices constituted a modern response to the uncertainty of future events.  
And yet, none of these practices were, in themselves, entirely novel. It may help us to 
define more sharply the modernity of “risk”, if we look first at some of the forerunners of these 
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practices. The oldest of these seems to be gambling itself. The odds are not long that games of 
chance have been around as long as modern humans have.   One of the strongest indications that 
this is so, is that archeological digs have uncovered astragali or “tali” -the ankle-bones of deer, 
sheep or oxen- in human settlements around the world.  These bones are considered the forerunner 
to modern dice, because when they are thrown, they can only land on one of four flat sides. 
Engravings and paintings in Egyptian, Sumerian and Assyrian sites depict the tali being used in 
much the same way as dice are today. The tali and the depictions of their use date back at least as 
far back as 3000 BC. 18 Meanwhile, there is some evidence that card games were used in Asia at 
as early as the Tang Dynasty (618-907). 19 
In these early incarnations, the function of cards, dice and other games of chance went 
beyond mere recreation. They were often central to rituals of divination. They were essentially 
spiritual tools for prophecy, for attaining foreknowledge of future events, or divine guidance in 
decision-making.20 Because they were contingent upon the future- a realm invisible to human eyes- 
games of chance were a way of mediating between human and divine realms. Thus, the early card 
games in both Asia and Europe were primarily employed in the telling of fortunes. 21 Meanwhile, 
dice games in ancient Greece reflected that culture’s prevailing attitude of submission to the fate 
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that governs the world. Indeed, as Bernstein notes, a dice game features in the first scene of the 
origin story of Greek mythology, wherein “three brothers rolled dice for the universe, with Zeus 
winning the heavens, Poseidon the seas, and Hades, the loser, going to hell as master of the 
underworld.” 22  
One game of chance that has endured for millennia is the lottery. In lotteries, the outcome 
is known- prizes will be won. What isn’t known is who will win them. Participants risk the price 
of a ticket, or “lot,” for the chance of winning a share in the accumulated proceeds. The word 
‘lottery’ derives from old English ‘hlot” meaning “an object used to determine someone’s share,” 
but c. 1300, “lot” also meant “that which is given by fate, God, or destiny.”23 Lotteries thus retain 
some connection to divine knowledge and fate, which were so central to early games of chance. 
However, they have also long been used as a tool by states in order to extract revenue from 
governed populations. One form of lottery, Keno, is descended from the Chinese betting game 
baige piao, dating from the Han dynasty (206-BCE-220 AD). Apparently, proceeds from baige 
piao helped to finance government projects, such as the building of Great Wall of China.  24 Other 
games working on the same principle, the drawing of lots, are referred to in texts from the same 
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period. The Romans also had lotteries, and in England, the first chartered lottery was during Queen 
Elizabeth’s reign, in 1569, with the purpose, again, of raising funds for the public works.25  
Nor was the management of risk in economic pursuits, either by pooling resources, or 
spreading or transferring risks a novelty introduced in early modern Europe. There is evidence that 
as early as 7,000 BC, Chinese merchants avoided depending on the fate of one ship, and instead 
literally spread the risk of lost cargo by sending their wares in multiple vessels.26 And the 
Babylonian Hammurabi Code of 1790 BC is widely considered a forerunner of socialized 
insurance, for it decreed that farmers’ debts be forgiven in years in which their crops were 
destroyed by floods.27 Similarly, Roman and Greek merchants who sent their wares by sea would 
not have to pay debts on loans if the ships were lost at sea.28 
What Makes Risk Modern? 
If pre-modern peoples gambled or risked small amounts of money for large but unlikely windfalls, 
agreed to forgive debts for those who suffered misfortunes, and managed the risks of trading by 
transferring or spreading risks, what, after all, makes risk an especially modern concept? For 
Bernstein, the difference between these early activities and the risk related activities which 
emerged in late seventeenth century Europe can largely be explained by the quantitative turn that 
took place in the west in the intervening centuries. Like Crosby and Srnicek, whose accounts of 
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the rise of quantification I related in the second chapter, Bernstein sees the adoption of the Hindu-
Arabic numerals in the twelfth century as the crucial first step towards a quantitative culture. While 
it would take centuries for it to wholly displace roman numerals, the Hindu-Arabic numeric system 
offered benefits that were first recognized by merchants, bookkeepers, and scholars.29 
Perhaps the most important novelty of Hindu-Arabic numbers was the concept of zero. 
Zero allowed for ““use of only 10 digits, zero to nine” so that “a sequence of numbers like 1, 10, 
100, would indicate that the next number in the sequence would be 1000. Zero makes the whole 
structure of the numbering system immediately visible and clear.”30 The simplicity of the system 
meant that calculations could be made without using an abacus. Instead, by “pen reckoning” an 
infinite number of steps in a calculation could be recorded, which meant that far more complex 
calculations were possible. Because the zero to nine were repeatable, they could serve as a sort of 
universal equivalent- a general standard by which different entities such as such as weights, or 
currencies, could be converted, an advance that was essential to long distance trade.31 Being clear 
and predictable, the law-like regularity of this system allowed for greater confidence in projects 
that extended not only over distances, but into the future. 
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But the ascendance of a quantitative interpretation of reality was not the only necessary 
precondition for modern risk.  As Bernstein makes clear, there were cultural attitudes that had to 
change too: there would have to be a greater belief that human agency could trump fate, and that 
the future could be deciphered and made malleable.32As we have seen in chapter three, this striving 
stance towards the world and the future was evident in the culture of improvement that pervaded 
eighteenth century England.  Bacon, his disciples in the Hartlib Circle and the Royal society, and 
many others, concentrated on a future improved by human design. By exhaustively accumulating 
quantitative data and empirical evidence they sought to progress through greater stages of 
certainty. This ambition to convert all that was unnamed and unseen into an accumulation of units 
of knowledge was part of what Foucault has called the Classical episteme. It is the transition to 
this form of knowledge which makes probability possible. 
The Emergence of Probability Theory 
As I discussed in chapter two, in the Renaissance episteme which prevailed in Europe until the 
seventeenth century, knowledge was a matter of interpretation, of deciphering signs to uncover “a 
language which God had previously distributed across the face of the earth. The object of its 
divination was divine”.  From the seventeenth century on, the “entire organization of signs” and 
their conditions changed. 33 Knowledge was no longer a matter of discovering the affinities 
between all things, but rather of distinguishing between and ordering the things represented by 
signs.  
                                                          
32 Bernstein, Against the Gods, 20-21. 
 
33 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage 
Books: New York, 1973), 58-59. 
284 
  
 
Foucault explains that “the sign ceases to be a form of the world, bound to what it marks 
by the solid and secret bonds of resemblance, affinity” but now exists separately from it.  
“Knowledge breaks off from its old kinship with divinitio” when the condition arises in which “the 
sign can only be constituted by an act of knowing.” What this means is that there are no pre-
existing signs “out there” to be uncovered and deciphered, nor can there be any as yet “unknown 
signs” or “mute marks.” The accuracy, the certainty, or “truth” of signs are no longer derived from 
an external source- such as an underlying cosmic design- but from this mode of knowledge itself: 
representation. In the classical age, “knowledge having enclosed the signs within its own space, is 
now able to accommodate probability”. 34 
In The Emergence of Probability Hacking draws on Foucault’s description of the classical 
episteme to explain how the notion of probability was transformed in the 1660s. Previously, he 
argues, claims to knowledge were either supported by demonstrations of certainty- as in the high 
sciences such as astronomy -or by the “moral certainty” given by the testimony or consensus of 
respected authorities. In the latter case, those notable for their “probity” or important thinkers from 
the past lent legitimacy to a knowledge claim. However, Hacking notes that in the seventeenth 
century a different understanding of probability emerges from low sciences such as medicine and 
alchemy, in which signs themselves become evidence. “What happened to signs, in becoming 
evidence, is largely responsible for our concept of probability.”35 
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Hacking argues that before the birth decade of probability in the 1660s, there had been 
“isolated calculations on chances” but one necessary precondition had been lacking.36 This was 
inductive, or what Hacking also calls ‘Internal evidence,’ “that by which one thing can indicate 
contingently, the state of something else”. This distinction between external evidence of testimony 
and internal evidence of probability is first articulated in the 1662 treatise Logic, a work put out 
by the Port Royal Monastery with which Blaise Pascal was associated. 37 
These new notions of evidence and probability constituted the kind of knowledge which 
according to Foucault, “encloses signs within its own space” and this is perhaps the most essential 
change which took place in the 1660s, ushering in a new era of “risk management.”  However, the 
rise of probability theory is a specifically mathematical story, to which I am unable to do much 
justice.  In fact, the circumstance in which probability theory was born was highly theoretical and 
playful rather than practical: in a mathematical contest. 
For more than a century, those who studied dice games and combinations had tried to solve 
a puzzle first proposed by Luca Pacioli In 1494 : In a game of balla, wherein the winner is the first 
to win 10 sets, the two players have to terminate the game before it is finished. One is leading the 
other in the score by 7 to 3. The question was, how could the stakes be divided ethically, based on 
the mathematical likelihood that the leading player would have gone on to win the game? This, 
the “problem of the points”, was itself derived from an ancient source38. The answer had eluded 
all of those who had tried to solve it. The solution had to wait until 1654, when French aristocrat, 
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gambler and enthusiast of mathematics, Chevalier de Mere challenged two leading 
mathematicians, Pierre de Fermat, and Blaise Pascal, to solve the problem. Their solution involved 
the listing of all possible outcomes, an exhaustive effort made easier by Pascal’s “triangle” in 
which numerical patterns allowed for step by step proofs by induction of estimated outcomes. 
From the predicted outcomes Pascal and Fermat could calculate the proportion of the prize which 
should go to each player.  The analysis that Pascal and Fermat brought to the problem of the points 
was, according to Bernstein, a “form of forecasting [that] held the key to a systematic method for 
calculating the probabilities of future events” and brought us “to the threshold of the quantification 
of risk.” 39 
Real World Applications of Probability Theory 
While Bernstein suggests that many of the “major problems of probability analysis had been 
resolved” by the end of the seventeenth century, these early solutions were purely theoretical, 
mathematical exercises focused solely on games of chance.40 Those who continued to work on 
probability over the next two centuries expanded their analysis of probability so that it could be 
applied to real world problems. Among other things, this involved wrestling with the subjective 
element of probability, that is, the degree of one’s belief that something is probable. Subjective 
probability is, as Daston puts it, “the sense of probabilities rooted in states of mind” rather than 
“states of the world.”41 In fact, Hacking has argued that this subjective response to probable 
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outcomes is an inherent part of the dual understanding of probability which emerged in the mid 
seventeenth century. On the one hand, probability was “statistical”, in the sense that it involved 
finding patterns or laws within chance processes. Thus, the analysis of probability focuses on “the 
frequency of a particular outcome among all possible outcomes.” On the other hand, Hacking notes 
that it is also epistemological, for it involves assessing reasonable degrees of belief in the 
likelihood or expectation of a particular outcome.42 To understand this latter, “subjective” element 
of probability, theorists also had to pay attention to how decisions are made when there is a degree 
of uncertainty about an outcome. It involves not only the analysis of risk but also its management.43 
Already in Pascal’s Pensees and in the Port Royal Logic the topic of utility and its 
variability had been introduced. That is, they recognized that decisions related to probability 
depended as much on the intensity of each individual’s desire for or fear of a particular outcome 
as on the frequency with that outcome occurs. 44 This problem was furthered explored in the early 
eighteenth century, especially in the work of Daniel Bernouilli. By systematically studying how 
different people responded to the probability of financial risks and rewards, Bernouilli discovered 
that “the utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate to the 
quantity of goods possessed.”45 Beyond that particular insight however, his true contribution to 
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probability theory was that he was the first to attempt to measure something as intangible as 
desire.46 
In roughly the same period, Daniel’s uncle, Jakob Bernouilli, broke new ground by finding 
a way to generalize from a probability.  In his Ars conjectandi, published in 1713, eight years after 
his death, Jacob Bernouilli demonstrated how the probability of an outcome can be inferred from 
a limited sample of data. 47 Through experiments that involved great repetition, such as tossing a 
coin hundreds or thousands of times and observing the result, Bernouilli concluded that the more 
an event is observed the less likely the average outcome of the observed events will diverge from 
the true average outcome of such events. This is theory known as the “law of large numbers”, 
wherein probabilities are calculated “a posteriori,” for what Bernouilli had discovered was that 
“under similar conditions, the occurrence of an event in the future will follow the same pattern as 
was observed in the past.”48 Thus, even when information is limited (for example, a smaller 
number of throws of the coin) the true value of the unknown quantity (such as the percentage of 
times the coin will come up heads) can be inferred from patterns in the observed sample.  
Probability, Bernouilli concluded “is a degree of certainty and differs from absolute certainty as 
the part differs from the whole.49 But the more observation and data available, the closer to absolute 
certainty the probability will be.   
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Probability theory may have involved highly advanced mathematical calculations but its 
implications for the real world were eminently practical. In fact it was Bernouilli’s ambition to use 
probability theory to find patterns and make predictions in the social realm, such as finding the 
incidence of different diseases or estimating life expectancies.50 As Bernstein notes, Jacob 
Bernouilli’s theory was the crucial first step in measuring and defining uncertainty. This was a key 
development in the modern concept of risk, for risk is uncertainty objectified and measurement 
and demarcation are –as we saw in the examples of surveying and enclosing - the very gestures 
that prefaced the modern movement towards objectification. Knights and Vurdubakis explain: 
“Risk is not an intuitive category which refers back to some transhistorical condition, but is derived 
from specific practices of recording, measurement and calculation.” 51 Such calculative practices 
were further refined in the centuries following Bernouilli’s theory. From De Moivre, Leplace and 
Poisson to Gauss, Galton and Quetelet, theorists found new ways to “tame chance,” rendering 
uncertainty objective and societal patterns predictable and malleable to reform. Many such 
advances- some of which I will discuss at a later point in this chapter- would be applied to 
actuarialism, and to the social and economic sciences.  By the nineteenth century probability theory 
would become instrumental to the risk management of European societies.  
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The Adventure of Investment: 1690s to 1720s 
The Trade in Risk: A Crisis in Public Finance Resolved 
Long before most of these advances in probability theory, risk was already being perceived and 
managed in a variety of new and more immediately practical ways. By being pooled, transferred 
and commodified, risk was an object manipulated to desired ends, namely, the accumulation and 
protection of property. In England, much of this activity first took place in the 1690s. In this section 
I will provide a brief account of how a debt-burdened English government, ever in need of revenue, 
began to create new vehicles for investment in government, such as annuities, joint stock 
companies and banks, as well as how an investment market with flexible credit instruments 
developed in tandem with the strength of the state.   In a very short time, and for the most part, in 
a very small place - London’s Exchange Alley- people began to use new instruments of credit to 
trade in stocks, bonds, options, futures, lotteries, and annuities, and to underwrite the risks of 
overseas trade.52 Adventure was no longer solely the province of merchants sailing abroad, but 
could now also be taken by those at home through financial investment. To invest one’s capital in 
the enterprises- and even the debts- of others was to take the risk of never seeing a return on that 
capital. But a risk is, by definition, not a certainty, and thus investors more or less gambled on a 
favourable, that is, a profitable outcome.   
It is no coincidence that the same few streets at the centre of this wave of speculative 
financial investment, were also the birthplace of modern insurance in England. The purchaser of 
an insurance policy pays to transfer the risk attached to his own venture to the underwriter, who 
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himself invests in the chance that a loss won’t occur.  Investment and insurance are therefore two 
sides of the same tossed coin: risk. Thus, before discussing the role of risk in modern insurance, I 
wish first to look first at how it began to be used and managed in public and private finance in the 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Not only was investment in financial risks made 
both more secure and more flexible during the financial revolution, but this manipulation of risk 
was also the activity through which the modern English state and the market constituted 
themselves.  
The development in the 1690s of practices which commodified both capital and the risks 
attached to its investment constituted what is now referred to as England’s “financial revolution.” 
Following on the heels of the Glorious Revolution, the financial revolution greased the wheels of 
trade with new and more flexible forms of credit and exchange.53  While the merchants would 
benefit from these innovations the impetus behind them came largely from the government, which 
was desperate for revenue to fund its wars.54 In the early modern period, European governments 
would raise taxes to finance their wars. But tax revenue was rarely sufficient to cover the expenses 
of warfare. 55 Thus it was common for governments to take on expensive short term loans from a 
limited pool of creditors to cover the shortfall. If revenues were perpetually outpaced by these 
loans, the entire system of credit was endangered. 56 This is what began to happen in England in 
                                                          
53 For a detailed study of the rise of speculative investment and innovations in public 
finance, drawing on a wealth of archival research see  Anne L. Murphy, The Origins of English 
Financial Markets: Investment and Speculation before the South Sea Bubble (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
 
54 Ian Klaus, Forging Capitalism: Rogues, Swindlers, Frauds and the Rise of Modern 
Finance (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), 33. 
 
55 Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial 
Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 55. 
 
292 
  
 
the early years of the Nine Years War. According to Carruthers, “By 1693 short-term debts had 
climbed to almost 6 million pounds and were threatening to overwhelm the government’s credit 
system.”57 What was needed was some kind of infrastructure for long-term loans, and, following 
the Dutch example, this is what Parliament managed to create. Since the early seventeenth century, 
the United Provinces had successfully induced creditors to invest long-term in the government, 
primarily through the creation of a national bank and by selling life-time annuities. Now, in the 
1690s, England followed suit, with Parliamentary Acts in 1693 and 1694 allowing the sale of 
annuities and lottery tickets and the creation in 1694 of the Bank of England.58 
Annuities were an arrangement in which the subscribers to loans were not repaid the 
principle, but instead, received an interest payment annually for the remainder of their lives. 
Because Parliament guaranteed the loans, and set aside a fund specifically for the purpose of 
repaying the interest, annuities were classed, along with other such long-term loans, as “funded 
debt,” the most popular means of investing in the “National Debt.”59  In 1693 and 1694 sales of 
annuities brought in 891,900 pounds with another million pounds coming from annuities with 
alternative terms (2 or 3 lives, or a 96 year term).  As Carruthers notes, annuities became so popular 
that “During Anne’s reign, the state borrowed a total of 10,403,738 pounds through the sale of 
various types of annuities.”60  
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Lotteries were another popular form of funded debt, one which took advantage of the 
public’s appetite for gambling. In 1694 an Act of Parliament endorsed the raising of a further 1 
million pounds through the sale of lottery tickets. Tickets for The Million Lottery cost 10 pounds 
and, aside from offering a range of top prizes, each ticket holder was guaranteed a return of 1 
pound per year for 16 years.61 Not only did annuities and lotteries provide the government with a 
more affordable source of credit than that offered by short term loans, but they were also popular 
with creditors as relatively secure avenues for investment. Both were a form of ‘pooled’ risk, 
wherein each subscriber contributed to a “pool” of investment and the risk of loss was offset by 
guaranteed minimum returns.  
Land was the most secure and the least liquid form of investment, being difficult to alienate 
and time-consuming to transfer to another party. Loans secured by mortgages were also safe and 
offered a better rate of return than land itself, but they too were illiquid. 62  While they offered a 
degree of security, annuities and lotteries were also difficult to transfer to a third party. Thus it was 
that investments in joint stock companies offered creditors the ideal balance between security and 
flexibility, for, although the sum invested could not be redeemed, shares in these companies were 
exchangeable on the London stock market. Because prices on the stock market fluctuated, there 
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was a further element of risk in liquidizing company stocks, but for many merchants and “moneyed 
men” the freedom to move assets quickly was a necessary part of the dynamic market.  
The Bank of England was the first of three major joint stock companies of the period that 
served as primary sources of credit for the government and whose stock could be sold in the private 
financial market. The bank was established in 1694, over a million pounds having been raised by 
its founding investors. This sum was, in turn, immediately loaned to the government at a favourable 
rate.  The bank gave the government permanent access to a source of short term credit, and to a 
host of other financial instruments.63  Because company stock could be exchanged in the London 
market, The Bank, along with the New East India Company and the South Seas Company, 
established in 1698 and 1711 respectively, “embodied, in effect, the connection between the 
private capital market and public finance.”64  As A. H. John points out, “the security of the English 
Funds enabled them in turn to be used as the basis of a pyramid of other loans within the business 
community.”65 Perhaps even more important for our purposes here is that participation in these 
joint stock companies led to what Chaudhuri calls the revolutionary realization among the public, 
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that “corporate financial liabilities were someone else’s assets.”66  This meant that the risk attached 
to lending (investing in someone else’s debt) could be transferred to another party. In effect, the 
risk was objectified- closed off and disembedded from its original social context as a particular 
debtor-creditor relationship. This ability to transfer risk was also the basis of the insurance 
contract. 
Making the trade in debts possible and occurring alongside the innovations in public 
finance were a host of legal changes to property rights pertaining to debtor- creditor relations, 
which had the effect of commodifying these particular social obligations both in public and private 
finance.67  By the 1690s, the common law had begun to incorporate the lex mercatoria, the law 
merchants, within its own framework. The result was a series of private financial instruments 
which eased the transfer of debts to parties outside the original loan arrangement. The earliest such 
instrument was the promissory note- the receipt given to anyone who had deposited gold with a 
goldsmith banker. As early as the 1660s holders of these notes began to use them to pay off their 
own debts. The notes were, in effect, like paper money. As there was, in the late seventeenth 
century, a recurrent shortage of coinage, the idea of paper credit became ever more attractive. 68 
According to John, “the provision of a series of transferable paper assets was of great practical 
importance at a time when trade was expanding and when the day-to-day business of the ordinary 
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merchant comprised a variety of financial activities, such as acceptance, discounting, foreign 
exchange, underwriting and stockjobbing.”69 By offering shares in the bank of England and the 
New East India Company that could be converted into promissory notes, the government was thus 
“committed to a role of fundamental importance in the nation's economy. For the paper assets thus 
created formed the basis upon which the English money market was built.” Without them, the 
speedy accumulation of capital needed for all of the projects and schemes of the early eighteenth 
century- including insurance- would not have been possible.70 
As Carruthers argues, “the processes of market formation and state development were 
linked together.”71 The ability to borrow on transferrable securities had allowed Britain to 
transform itself from a “weak nation state and second rate military power” in the 1670s to a 
political-military powerhouse, with a thriving capital market in London, by the second decade of 
the eighteenth century.72 Out of this same process, practical risk management methods were 
developed, in the form of investments and insurance. 
Frenzied Investment, the South Seas Bubble and Critiques of Credit 
The irony is that, while all of these financial innovations were born out of the government’s need 
to increase revenue, in the longer term they only deepened that need. That is, the extending of the 
government’s access to credit really meant extending its debt. Once it had started on this path the 
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government needed to raise ever more revenue through taxes to pay the interest on all of its loans.73  
As Carruthers notes, there was a political advantage to many of these debts, since it was in the 
interest of those who had invested heavily in the government to support the governing party 
politically.74 Nevertheless, by “1710, barely  two decades removed from the glorious revolution, 
the government found itself drowning in unsecured debt…with long term obligations around 20 
million pounds.” 75 Had that not been the case, the South Sea Company- and its infamous bubble- 
might never have been created. 
When the Tories took power in 1710 the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Harley, 
discovered that the previous government had left him with a debt of 8 million pounds. As a 
newcomer, and a Tory, he was denied loans by both the Bank of England and The East India 
Company, since both were controlled by Whigs.76 Thus it was that he, along with John Blunt, 
established a new joint stock company, which could draw investors into its trade in the South Seas.  
The South Seas Company was just one of hundreds of new schemes attracting investment in the 
1710s, schemes that ranged from legitimate and practical to outlandish and fraudulent. Now, an 
ever greater number of people, from ever more sections of society, were being drawn to the activity 
of investing and pulled by the current of credit. But as Klaus notes, novel financial developments 
also came with “a profound distrust of credit, debt, and financial innovation, a position that came 
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to be known as the ‘country’ ideology.” 77 “Stock jobbers” and “moneyed men” were condemned 
as self-interested con-men whose practices injured the public good. It did not help that the stock 
market had a disproportionate number of outsiders working within it, such as merchants, Jews, and 
foreigners. And because credit seemed to spring suddenly from an invisible source, it appeared to 
some as a kind of sinister alchemy.78  
These criticisms did little to stop the fervour for investing, and once the South Seas 
Company began to sell its shares in 1710, the effect was like a great gust of wind on an already 
raging fire, igniting new schemes for investment in all new directions. The very novelty of the new 
company may have been its source of attraction.  Then, in 1720, “the year of the bubble,” 
misleading rumours deliberately stirred speculative frenzy to new heights, and the company’s 
stock rose by nearly 500% between January and June, from £ 128 to £1050.79 The problem was 
that the South Seas Company actually did very little trade in the South Seas. It was more like a 
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Ponzi scheme and it ended as such schemes have to end: the bubble burst and thousands were 
ruined. To critics of the alchemical process of credit, this disaster was a divine judgement on the 
hubris and greed which had fuelled the frenzy of investment. But if it was a story like the Tower 
of Babble, it didn’t end in the same way, with the building blocks scattered to the winds. Instead, 
in the wake of the South Seas Bubble, although the government enacted legislation that would give 
it more control, financial investment and the stock market were there to stay. The state and the 
market had been forged together through the alchemy of credit and the manipulation of risk. 
Early Insurance Schemes 
Lombard and Cornhill streets in central London, where the stockjobbers, brokers, and ‘moneyed 
men” met in coffeehouses, were likely as grey and sooty as the rest of the city. But socially, this 
was as richly oxygenated a climate as the tropical lands that were the source of the stimulating 
brew served in the coffeehouses. ‘’Change alley’ was lively and restless, busy with new growth, 
teeming with both possibilities and dangers.  As the eighteenth century unfolded that energy and 
excitement spread throughout the country as ever more people were caught up in schemes and 
subscriptions, ‘contributorships’ and ‘little goes,’ all lured by the adventure of investment.  
That the vibrant climate of Exchange Alley was one of the key nurseries of modern 
insurance may seem unlikely to us today, associated as the industry is with the boredom and chill 
of calculating and impersonal bureaucracy.80 To describe how insurance has evolved from its 
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beginnings at the turn of the eighteenth century as just as one of a host of daring and faintly 
heretical ventures unfolding in the frontier atmosphere of Exchange Alley, to its towering presence 
today as a monument to orthodoxy, is also to describe the modern effort to domesticate the wild 
terrain of the future. This effort, as we will see in chapters five and six, has not always produced 
the desired outcome. What it has achieved is a consolidation of the power of state and the 
institutions of the market over populations, and a greater cultural acceptance of the role of chance 
in nature and society and of the ability of scientific knowledge to predict the patterns within it.  
As has already been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the basic function of 
insurance, the spreading of risk, is not itself modern. What makes insurance modern is risk 
distribution through commodification and the increasing distance between the party transferring 
the risk and the party undertaking it.81  In England, the first “modern” insurance schemes arose in 
response to two risks of particular concern at the end of the seventeenth century. One was the 
susceptibility of merchant vessels to a multitude of dangers on their journeys at sea. The other was 
the threat of devastation to property posed by fire, a threat emphatically demonstrated in the 
London Fire of 1666.  
Of these two, the coffeehouse origins of Maritime insurance is the better known, 
particularly Lloyd’s coffeehouse, which has evolved into today’s “insurance market”, Lloyds of 
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London. Established in 1687 and relocated to Lombard St. in 1691, Lloyd’s coffeehouse began as 
the preferred meeting place of merchants and ship-owners. Here they exchanged the latest news 
affecting their trade, including the potential dangers of particular political conditions, piracy, 
weather or currents likely to be encountered on certain trade routes. 82  Some of this essential 
information also came from the long experience of the retired ship captains who frequented the 
coffee shop. 83  By the late 1690s, Edward Lloyd regularized this flow of information by publishing 
a daily shipping newsletter, “Lloyd’s list.” Such up-to-date information was indispensable for 
those trading in the risks attached to maritime trade.   It allowed the underwriters of risk (so named 
because they signed their names under the terms of the insurance contract) to assess the likelihood 
of a return or a loss on the venture in order to determine an appropriate premium for the contract. 
84  The risk was not simply transferred from one party (the ship owner) to another, but through a 
broker, it was shopped around to potential risk-takers at the various coffeehouses. By the turn of 
the eighteenth century Lloyds had become the headquarters for underwriters of maritime insurance 
contracts. 85 
Along with the trade in maritime insurance, the 1680s and 90s also witnessed the first 
schemes for the insurance of properties from the risk of fire. In England, these arose in response 
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to The Great Fire that swept through London in 1666, destroying 13,000 properties and leaving 
100,000 homeless.86 A year after the fire, architect Christopher Wren opened up a fire insurance 
office, which began selling policies in 1670.87 In the years that followed, new building regulations 
were enacted with the aim of preventing the spread of fire. 88 Meanwhile, the first fire insurance 
company in England, “The Fire Office,” was established in 1680 by the economist Nicholas 
Barbon, among others. 89 Other such companies soon followed, including the Friendly Society, 
established in 1683, Amicable Contributors and Hand-in-Hand Fire and Life insurance in 1696, 
and the still existing Sun Fire Insurance in 1710. 90 For the most part, these earliest forms of fire 
insurance were localized, private and independent, and they were based on mutual aid rather than 
intended as profitable enterprises. 91 Mutual aid societies involved the pooling of individual 
contributions into a community fund that could be used for fire-fighting and rebuilding efforts. 
Other insurance schemes – including fire insurance- were launched as for-profit ventures during 
the fever for new projects in the decades leading up to the South Sea Bubble, but many of these 
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failed. Nevertheless, according to John, there were 14 friendly societies in London by 1760, and 
30 by the end of the century and the majority of these were for fire insurance.92 
Growing membership in “friendly” or “mutual” societies offering fire insurance was 
largely due to the public’s greater exposure to information through the proliferation of print media. 
According to Pearson, “eyewitness reports of earthquakes, floods and fires, given publicity by a 
growing pamphlet and newspaper press from the late seventeenth century, pushed these events 
into the popular consciousness, and raised awareness among the educated and propertied classes 
of the need for preventative and remedial action” 93 
Although the legitimacy of private property had been bolstered by the settlement reached 
at the end of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, by the early eighteenth century it was still by no 
means deeply enough rooted as a social institution to have eluded all forms of uncertainty. As I 
have argued in the preceding chapters, private property is a manifestation of the modern attempt 
to delimit and claim spheres of certainty and control by excluding the uncertainties of the wider 
environment. And yet, following Bauman, modernity’s ordering imperative only creates new 
forms of ambivalence, thus necessitating the continual work of boundary construction and 
maintenance. In the case of private property, there can be few better illustrations of its vulnerability 
to destruction and loss than the specter of fire. Especially in the crowded conditions of the cities, 
the privately owned dwelling could not be insulated from the uncertainty of the complex social 
environment surrounding it. Urban fires, like the great fire of 1666, were levelling forces, as 
contagious as plague, spreading without regard to class or status. Thus, according to Pearson, fire 
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“could be viewed as a social as well as a physical and economic hazard, and efforts at fire 
prevention, fire education and improvements in firefighting could be seen as …a prophylactic 
against social disorder, while fire insurance offered some financial security against the threat to 
property.” 94 
In spite of increasing public awareness of the importance of both preventing fires and 
insuring one’s property against fire’s effects, it was not until the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century that fire insurance schemes became at all common in England or in other European 
countries.  This cultural diffidence towards insurance was especially evident in attitudes towards 
life insurance and the widows’ and orphans’ funds that preceded it.  
Opposition to Insurance 
In fact, there were a number of reasons for the eighteenth century cultural ambivalence towards 
insurance; aside from the bare fact of its novelty, there was its association with gambling and 
speculation, with usury, with fraudulent schemes which took advantage of the poor, and its 
disturbing attempt to quantify and commodify things which had never before been quantified.   But 
beneath all of these qualms was the threat that insurance posed to the long embedded belief that 
the future unfolded as an expression of God’s will. It was not natural, for example, for people in 
the eighteenth century to think of fire as an event caused by, and subject to control by, human 
activity.  For most of human history it was precisely because of the unexpected and 
incomprehensible nature of catastrophes such as fire, plague, droughts and floods that people 
attributed them to the will- whether capricious or wise-of a deity. In the Judeo-Christian and 
Islamic traditions calamitous events were a primary means by which the wisdom of the divine was 
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communicated. A natural disaster was both a judgement and a corrective to human behaviour. 
Thus in Germany, where fire insurance schemes predated those in England by decades, an early 
seventeeth century initiative for insuring against fire was quelled by the region’s governing Count 
because “a fire insurance company is an act against God’s right of providence.” In fact, the notion 
that fire was “god’s instrument” and that insurance was “amoral,” persisted among the German 
clergy until well into the nineteenth century. 95  
This providential outlook was also prevalent in the way that people thought about the early 
life-insurance schemes, called widows’ and orphans’ funds, in early eighteenth century Germany. 
Reviewing the public debates and court testimony surrounding the failure of one such scheme in 
1720, Rosenhaft has found that, rather than focusing on who was to blame for the failure and what 
calculations and planning should have been used in the scheme, the emphasis in most arguments 
was on the relationship of the scheme, and its failure, to God’s plan. The Christliche 
Gesellschaftzur Versorgung von Witwen und Waysen (the Christian Society for the Maintenance 
of Widows and Orphans) was established in Lunenburg Germany in 1710 and involved the pooling 
of subscriber’s contributions, with a portion to be paid out to each family suffering the loss of life 
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of the male subscriber. 96 In its written constitution the aims of the fund were expressed only within 
the limits of a larger deference to God’s plan. That is, they hoped that God might bless the fund 
with success or, should He choose to send them a pestilence, that they might endure the 
punishment. As Rosenhaft points out, the main hazard to the scheme imagined by its founders was 
the natural hazard of epidemic disease, which might lead to more claims upon the fund than could 
be covered by the pooled contributions. As such a calamity would clearly be an expression of 
Divine judgement, to directly hope for its avoidance would be to lack faith in His wisdom: they 
could only hope that the scheme might somehow survive.97 
  In 1720, when the fund’s managers realized that the shrinking number of subscribers could 
not cover the claims of 55 widows, they decided to terminate the fund, and to return the invested 
capital to the subscribers. The widows considered this a breach of contract and litigated against 
the fund managers and the subscribers. But their key argument was Christian and providential: the 
subscribers, by wishing to pull out of the fund, were guilty of a lack of trust in God. Conversely, 
it was suggested that if they remained, God would reward them.98  
In the arguments of all those concerned, Rosenhaft finds an “uncertainty about what had 
happened” to make the fund untenable, and this uncertainty “extended to an ambivalence about 
the very legitimacy of individual claims to agency, whether practical or moral.”99 While the fund’s 
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founders and managers had tried to ensure that it was overseen responsibly and without corruption, 
neither they, nor the other interested parties seemed willing to assign the cause of the failure to the 
judgement of any persons. Instead, “they appealed to no authority but god.” 100 The views of those 
involved in the Christliche Gesellschaftzur Versorgung von Witwen und Waysen were not unique. 
They corresponded to a wider cultural tendency in early eighteenth century Europe: a marked 
discomfort with the application of calculative reason towards future events. 
This discomfort was most apparent in the cultural response to life insurance and its proto-
types and variants such as pensions and widows’ funds, for each of these involved the calculation 
of and speculation on the most sacred and unknowable of human fates: the extent of life.  In no 
other form of insurance did so many objectionable features inhere as in life insurance. The future, 
which was god’s territory, was trespassed upon when insurers tried to measure life expectancy and 
policy holders tried to hedge against their fates. The impiety of surveying and mapping the territory 
of the future was made all the more profane when profits were made from the schemes and lives 
were compensated monetarily.  By putting a price on human life, insurers defied “a normative 
division between the marketable and non-marketable, or the sacred and the profane” 101 Indeed, as 
Clark has noted, there was only one other trade in which personhood and property, human life and 
commodity, were so mingled: the slave trade. 102 Finally, all of these transgressions were made 
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more flagrant by the tendency of insurance to subject human life expectancy to the same whims 
and calculations used in gambling. 
In England, the speculative nature of life insurance was most explicit in cases where people 
bought insurance on the lives of people with whom they had no connection.  Usually, such wagers 
centred on public figures. Robert Walpole, for example, was once described as having a “much 
insured life”, and when King George II went into battle in 1743, speculators wagered on whether 
he would die there.  One infamous example of life insurance as cynical wagering involved “800 
German refugees who, in 1765 were brought to England and then abandoned without food or 
shelter on the outskirts of London. Speculators and underwriters at Lloyd’s placed bets on how 
many of the refugees would die within a week.” 103 
While insurance on lives was probably at least as likely to stem from benevolent motives 
as from callous profit seeking, the shocking nature of the latter drew greater public attention. In 
fact, because insurance seemed to equate one person’s death with another’s fortune, life insurance 
was widely considered “an inducement to fraud and murder.”104 In response to the outrage 
occasioned by the worst abuses of life insurance, Parliament enacted legislation that would 
eliminate policy holders whose interest was purely speculative. That is, only those who had an 
“insurable interest” in the death of a party could legally enter into a life insurance contract .The 
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gambling act of 1774 marked the first formal attempt by government to draw the distinction 
between immoral gambling and legitimate insurance.  
It would take far more than one act of parliament to draw that distinction conclusively in 
the minds of the public. In fact, because the distinction was not ontological, but the work of legal 
and moral categorization, it would take many generations to dress the activities of insurance and 
financial investment in the clothing of legitimacy. Even today, whenever a crisis results in a loss 
of public trust in the workings of insurance or investment, that clothing drops off and they appear 
before us nakedly as forms of gambling. 
The Sin of Gambling in a Divinely Ordered World 
In the eighteenth century, the opposition to insurance on the basis of its association with gambling 
was closely tied to the endurance of a providential attitude towards the future.  Moral repugnance 
towards gambling was not merely a favourite complaint of a few censorious clergymen. Rather, it 
was a deeply rooted cultural response to a representation of the world that directly contradicted the 
idea of a divine order. Only by coming to terms with the nature of the world made visible by 
gambling, did eighteenth and nineteenth century Europeans begin to adopt the modern notion of 
risk.   
Although gambling of one sort or another has been a popular pastime enjoyed by most 
cultures in human history, it has also been widely condemned by religious authorities.  Opposition 
to gambling has been the norm in monotheistic religions in which the order of the world is 
guaranteed by an omniscient god.  Because all games of chance revolve around the uncertainty of 
the outcome, they seem to operate independently from a divine order. Chance, as the hinge upon 
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which all wagers are made, does not follow any design or issue from the intention of any deity. To 
wager on future events is to behave as though God did not exist.   
Thus, it is not surprising that gambling has traditionally been prohibited in Jewish, Islamic 
and Christian societies, for it demonstrates a world in which chance, and not Divine will, is the 
moving force. 105 Yet, according to Brennan and Brennan, this distinction “between providence 
and chance was blurred” in medieval Christianity. The church condemned gambling, but it 
recognized “the claim that people were able to manipulate God’s grace for earthly purposes. 
Aquinas, Boethius and Dante all stressed that the notion of Divine providence did not exclude the 
operation of chance or luck.” With the challenges to the traditional church in the early modern 
period, “these latter views came under severe attack, in England in particular.”106 Calvin, for 
example, denounced the prevalence of belief in chance in his day and “if there was a common 
theme that ran through the writings of Protestant theologians during these centuries it was the 
denial of the very possibility of chance or accident.” 107 The arguments put forth by one non-
conformist minister, John Northbrook, in a 1577 pamphlet, were typical of the Protestant 
opposition to gambling. Gamblers, he argued, disrespectfully asked God’s favour to intercede in a 
profane and frivolous matter, “as though we would make God servant to our Pastymes and 
Sportes.” 108 
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However, there is some evidence that by the turn of the seventeenth century, the dread of 
admitting any element of chance in the world, or of questioning God’s “determining presence” in 
all matters was no longer unanimous, even among the clergy. In his 1619 sermon “On the nature 
and uses of lots,” for example, Puritan minister Thomas Gataker argued that lots themselves, as 
long as they were used purely in play, did not directly invoke divine intervention and that, in 
fact, though God’s will unfolded at the global level, chance did play a role at the level of the 
particular. Similarly, latitudinarians and secular determinists admitted a degree of chance “at the 
level of a second cause.” That is, from our limited human perspective, the outcomes of games or 
events appeared to be random, even if they were actually ultimately traceable to providence or 
universal physical laws. 109 
As Crump suggests, thinking about games of chance was a valuable way of working 
through issues of determinism, uncertainty and choice in matters of faith and philosophy. 110 
Some, like Pascal, even went so far as to use the metaphor and logic of wagering to discuss the 
decision of whether or not to believe in God. 111 Only a few years later Latitudinarian theologian 
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John Tillotson followed Pascal’s model in his sermon, “The Wisdom of being Religious”. 
Tillotson asked his listeners to “think about their spiritual choices as ‘ventures’ to be made after 
considering the ‘odds,’” which suggests to Crump “that the experience of gambling had 
naturalized a new kind of cognition, based upon the probabilistic evaluation of possible 
outcomes.” Yet, while some seventeenth century theologians followed the mathematicians of 
their time in using the language and concepts of gambling to “evolve what amounted to a new 
kind of epistemology based on probability,” there was a backlash against this trend in the 
eighteenth century.112 If Pascal and Tillotson used gambling “to demystify uncertainty and to 
negotiate its impact upon belief,” eighteenth century theologians and moralists railed against it in 
order to reinforce the determinate nature of universe and the ubiquity of providence. For some 
commentators, any discussion of chance was a “deistic plot to eliminate God from the world.” 
Gambling was the pastime of the “atheist who denied God's providence in everything, resorting 
instead to a sacrilegious faith in the all-determining power of chance.” 113 
Gambling as a Threat to Social Order 
The religious critique of gambling was a powerful tool in the hands of those who wanted to shut 
down the new practices of financial investment and insurance, for they only had to highlight their 
likeness to wagering and their dependence on chance to cast a shadow on their moral legitimacy. 
But there was another reason for the continuing attempts to suppress gambling, even as the culture 
was beginning to adopt probabilistic thinking.  Gambling, whether in its familiar forms or in its 
more recent guises, seemed to bring to the surface the insecurities of a society undergoing rapid 
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change.114 Just as it allowed doubt to creep into the belief in a determinate universe, it also allowed 
for irregular and rapid forms of social mobility which frightened the traditional holders of power.  
Particularly disturbing to some was the sudden wealth that could come to anyone entering 
a lottery, for although a ticket in a state lottery usually cost 10 pounds, members of the lowest 
orders often bought shares as small as 1/64 in a ticket.115 Some feared that the involvement of the 
lower orders in the lottery threatened the social order. Crump cites a number of horror stories that 
circulated in the press in the late eighteenth century which were meant to demonstrate the 
dangerous implications of the poor entering the lottery: whether they won or lost, their dramatically 
changed fortunes would lead them to heartbreak, suicide, rebellion or murder. 116 She also cites 
one critic of lotteries, barrister Thomas Erskine, in whose words we see both a genuine fear of 
social disorder and a jealous guarding of power:  
“Property is the cause of all power, and its changing hands by sudden strides is the cause 
of forcible convulsions, while the silent shifting of its channel is only the current of the 
blood, and the health of the political body.  All sudden transitions, therefore, from poverty 
to riches, or from riches to poverty [...] as they are unnatural motions, and can never happen 
but by vicious practices inimical to commerce, are to be guarded against by every prudent 
legislature [...]117 
Writing this in the year of the American victory in the revolutionary war, Erskine clearly 
belonged to a cohort of the ruling class who felt queasy at the pace of change in their society. In 
the last line, he espouses what is known as the “country ideology” by juxtaposing “virtuous 
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commerce” with “vicious speculation.”118 As Klaus has noted, the societal change associated with 
commerce was considered a productive force, contributing to the health and wealth of the nation, 
while the parasitic nature of speculation led to violent spasms, sapping the nation’s strength by 
rewarding the unscrupulous and ruining the already vulnerable.119 A generation earlier, the 
proponents of the country ideology had laid the same charges against the use of credit. By the mid 
to late eighteenth century, when credit’s role in advancing the nation could no longer be denied, it 
was deemed legitimate as long as it was used in the service of commerce and not speculation. 
Commerce could thus lend legitimacy to activities formerly assigned to the speculative side of the 
moral division.120 Because no virtuous commercial association could be found to legitimize 
lotteries, they remained a subject of criticism and heated debate in the House of Commons until 
well into the nineteenth century.  
Hansard’s record of one such debate, in May of 1809, illustrates the common arguments 
for and against the continuation of state lotteries. A Mr. Whitbread had asked the committee to 
come to a resolution on the issue of lotteries, to which he objected, stating that, “there was no sin 
pointed at in the Decalogue which was not encouraged by the lottery. It was a speculation which 
always began in covetousness, and often led to theft. The instances were not new, where murders, 
and particularly self murder, had been instigated by losses in the lottery.”121 A Mr. Windham 
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agreed with 122and extended this paternalist argument, claiming “that a lottery engendered vice no 
man could deny; the seductions were strong and numerous, and calculated to catch the lower orders 
of the people, whose minds were as weak as their passions were strong….he thought the evil so 
great that nothing but the necessities of the state could justify the resorting to lotteries.”  
Recognizing that the chief reason his colleagues continued to vote in favour of keeping the 
lottery was the revenue it brought in, Mr. Whitbread contended that the 300, 000 pounds collected 
annually from the state lottery was not so much that it could not be made up for in some other way. 
To this, Sir T. Turton countered that, in fact, it was 700,000 pounds that were garnered from the 
lottery, and that, in any case “All the evils mentioned were to be traced to insurances.” The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed that “The circumstances of misery which had been alluded to, 
arose not out of lotteries, but from insurances” and that “The Little Goes were much more 
mischievous than the lottery.”123 
These Lottery ‘insurances’ referred to in the debate, were side bets popular among the 
lower orders. Because the lottery was drawn over a period of six weeks, people could wager on a 
ticket number being drawn on a particular day.124 ‘Little Goes’ were similar “schemes for 
insurance against such contingencies as marriage, birth or the completion of apprenticeship.”125 It 
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is unclear just why these activities were referred to as “insurances” and not simply as wagers. But 
the label insurance, and its identification as the true source of the lottery’s evils, tell us two things. 
First, even in the early nineteenth century, as insurance was beginning to evolve into a legitimate 
industry, the taint of its association with gambling had not yet been removed. The crucial matter 
seemed to be the idea of staking claims on contingent future events. Secondly, by placing blame 
squarely on these smaller, informal side wagers, the political elites in this debate gave an early 
indication of just where the line between legitimate and illegitimate gambling would eventually be 
drawn: speculation on future events was an evil to be suppressed, except when it was in aid of and 
supervised by the authority of the state.  
At this early point, however, the distinctions between the many forms of speculative 
activities were still muddy and many were still ambivalent about the state’s use of the lottery. In 
the above-mentioned debate, for example, Mr. Windham noted the difficulty of untangling the 
lottery from the system of credit in which the state was now entrenched: “If [the lottery] were at 
an earlier period of the practice, he should certainly vote against it, but as it was now become so 
interwoven with the system of finance, he saw no particular advantage in opposing it at present.” 
126  The political elite faced a dilemma. How could their objections to some kinds of speculation 
be sustained when the new economic order rested on the inherently unstable ground of credit, 
especially when that ground was not only enticingly fertile, but also, once cultivated, seemingly 
inextricable?  For credit, like, gambling, lotteries, and insurance, involved a particular kind of 
contract, the completion of which was suspended into the future, and was therefore uncertain and 
dependent on trust.  
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For Crump, the attempts to define and distinguish different kinds of speculation were a 
way of confronting a new level of uncertainty in British society. “Writing about gambling made 
visible a crisis in the basis of faith and epistemology.” It was “a sign for the element of contingency 
which in the eighteenth century had pervaded faith, commerce, and the social order. 127 
How Insurance Achieved Legitimacy  
As it turned out, by 1826 the lottery would be banned, as it had been before the eighteenth century, 
while life insurance was well on the way to becoming “the exemplary financial technology of the 
orderly, pious and prudent.” 128 What accounted for this change in the perception and popularity 
of life insurance and other kinds of insurance between the mid eighteenth and mid nineteenth 
centuries? Scholars have offered a number of plausible responses to this question, but have 
disagreed on which factor was the primary cause of the change.   
On the key dates in the history of insurance in Britain, scholars do seem to agree. The 1760s 
and 70s were a turning point for life insurance, for it was then that actuarial techniques and 
demographic information were first systematically applied to life insurance schemes. The first 
British company to combine “the practice of premium insurance with … actuarial techniques” was 
the Equitable Society, established in 1762. Other companies soon followed, for this approach 
“allowed underwriters to balance premiums realistically against benefits in terms of the 
expectation of the life of the insured.” There is also agreement that the 1774 Gambling Act was an 
early but significant victory in the legitimation of life insurance: by banning speculation on lives 
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by those without insurable interest, the most offensive practices were removed from life insurance. 
That which was not banned was implicitly legitimized. 
From Faith in Providence to Trust in Abstract Systems 
Finally, scholars seem to agree that a shift had occurred by the end of the eighteenth 
century, whereby the values which had inhibited those earlier in the century from entering into 
insurance contracts, were overtaken by new values to which insurance appealed.  But what were 
those values? Lorraine Daston argued in 1985 that the relationship between risk and prudence 
changed over the eighteenth century. Earlier in the eighteenth century life insurance was little 
different from the riskiest of speculations, and thus, only risk takers involved themselves in such 
schemes. Only in the second half of the century, when the life insurance companies lessened the 
risk involved by adopting actuarial techniques and advertised themselves as the prudent path 
towards middle class thrift and domesticity, did people begin to view insurance as a respectable 
device for protecting families.129 
For many years Daston’s thesis remained the accepted account of life insurance’s transition 
towards legitimacy. And there is much in her thesis that continues to ring true.130 But more recently 
other scholars have challenged Daston’s account, arguing that there was more to the ascendance 
of insurance than its association with prudence. In his 1999 Betting on Lives, Geoffrey Clark argues 
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that in first half of the eighteenth century, people involved in proto-insurance schemes were just 
as motivated by prudence as they were by a gambling spirit.131 Meanwhile, in her work on 
nineteenth century life insurance, Robin Pearson has shown that speculative practices continued 
to be a component of life insurance even while the industry promoted itself as the bastion of 
respectability and prudence. For Rosenhaft, the longer view and new evidence presented by 
Pearson and Clark demonstrate how complex the evolution of life insurance really was. There was 
“real fluidity and overlap” in the practices of life insurance societies and companies, and in their 
appeal to the public.132 
The 1760s and 70s were indeed an important moment in the legitimization of insurance, 
and in the construction of its moral and scientific foundations. However, what Pearson, Clark and 
Rosenhaft seem to be challenging is the implication that the 1770s were the pivot between a pre-
modern insurance that was wildly speculative, and a modern insurance that was rational, scientific 
and prudential. While these latter traits would certainly be emphasized as the industry promoted 
itself in the nineteenth century, this does not mean that insurance suddenly shed its uncertain, 
aleatory or speculative elements. The obvious conjunction of science, rationality and modernity 
obscures the complex of role of risk within insurance and within modernity itself. And it tells us 
little about how an activity once tarnished by its association with a world of chance achieved 
acceptance.   
The modernity of risk lies in its future orientation, in the consideration of what shapes may 
form in the future, and in actions to either shelter or profit from eventualities which remain 
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uncertain in the present.  As an instrument for managing risk, insurance is not merely an attempt 
to secure against unwanted events, nor is it merely an attempt to profit from the uncertainty of an 
investment. It is both, at the same time. Life and other kinds of insurance involve both the 
protection of property and family from the possibility of loss, and the pursuit of ventures that are 
potentially profitable- because they also carry potential risks. The application of scientific 
knowledge, especially probabilistic knowledge, did not banish this uncertainty. 
There is a further element connecting risk, insurance and modernity, which helps to explain 
the legitimization of insurance: trust. Rosenhaft sees the greater legitimacy of insurance at the end 
of the eighteenth century as the result of a transition through the century from faith in providence 
to trust in expert knowledge and abstract systems. She reaches this conclusion after comparing the 
above-mentioned Lunenburg case of 1720 with a similar case in the 1770s. You will remember 
that in the earlier case, in the debate occasioned by the failure of the widows’ fund, the participants 
repeatedly referred to the authority of God and his Divine plan.  
The Calenberg fund, established in 1767, was a much larger fund, reaching at one point 
5,000 members, including many from other countries. It was thought that the greater the pool of 
participants, the more likely that abnormally long or short lives would cancel each other out, 
making estimated life expectancies more predictable It was also established and promoted 
explicitly as a scientifically supported endeavour. In fact, the founders of the Calenburg fund 
bragged about the complexity of the scheme, telling potential members that “those who are perhaps 
unfamiliar with this kind of calculation will not take it amiss if we expect that they place more 
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confidence in the judgement of men who have more knowledge of the business…than in their 
own.” 133 
The size of the fund and its foundation on expert knowledge were important differences 
which would inform the way in which participants responded when the fund reached a crisis in the 
1770s. When the available funds were found to be insufficient and managers declared that the 
widows would have to accept much smaller pay-outs, the result, as with the Lunenburg case, was 
an extended dispute between the widows and the subscribers. By the 1770s, however, almost all 
“reference to God had disappeared. The debates around the crisis of Calenberg and other 
contemporary funds invested agency and responsibility fully in human actors.” 134 It was in the 
interests of subscribers to insist that they had joined the fund with an expectation that their security 
was guaranteed by the mathematical calculations of experts. The widows, on the other hand, sought 
to diminish their own liability by “rejecting the claims of statistical probabilism” and by 
emphasizing the degree to which subscribers to the funds had taken on a risk. Whereas the debate 
about the earlier crisis centred on trust in god, the debate around the Calenberg crisis centred on 
trust in the “the worldly institution of the widows’ fund and the men who ran it” as well as the 
secular authority of expert knowledge of mathematics and data analysis.135 
 Rosenhaft cautions that there was still a great deal of skepticism about the claims of 
certainty provided by statistical and probabilistic knowledge, and that there was no “practical 
triumph of mathematical thinking” in this generation.  Even among the experts and practitioners 
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of life insurance schemes, the tendency was to rely on simpler and more familiar means of 
calculating life tables and premiums. Yet, even when experts did use more refined mathematics, 
making it ever “more remote …from common sense or public understanding,” the public still 
insisted on weighing in on the debate and using the language of risk and probability. The 
“discursive ground had shifted” so that, while trust in expert knowledge was not complete, it was 
nevertheless the focus of the debate. Thus, Rosenhaft argues that  “over  three generations of the 
same social formation and even the same families we can observe how confidence in the possibility 
of ‘taming chance’  replaced explicitly providential  or fatalistic thinking, and how by the same 
token confidence in expert systems and in particular mathematics, began to displace other forms 
of trust.” 136 
Trust in expert systems is, of course, one of the key features of modernity identified by 
Anthony Giddens. In The Consequences of Modernity, Giddens argues that this kind of trust 
develops in modernity as ever more social relations are disembedded from local contexts and 
restructured “across indefinite spans of time and space.”137 This disembedding occurs, he explains, 
through the mechanisms of “symbolic tokens” and “expert systems.” We have already seen an 
example of the former in the development of new credit instruments in the English financial 
revolution. Money is a kind of symbolic token, meaning that it is a kind of “media of interchange 
which can be ‘passed around’ without regard to the specific characteristics of individuals or groups 
that handle them at any particular juncture.” Money he says, following Keynes, is a “mode of 
deferral,” a “means of bracketing time and so of lifting transactions out of particular milieux of 
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exchange.”138  With the increasing use of credit instruments from the 1690s on, financial 
transactions were even further disembedded from local and immediate contexts. As Carruthers 
notes, the money market became ever more anonymous, creditors and debtors were unknown to 
each other and the completion of transactions could be indefinitely deferred. 139     
Meanwhile, expert systems are those systems “of technical accomplishment or professional 
expertise that organise large areas of the material and social environments."140 Like “symbolic 
tokens” such systems provide “‘guarantees’ of expectations across distanciated time-space.”141 
Giddens explains that, for trust to exist in these systems, it is not necessary that people share in the 
expert knowledge by which they function. On the contrary, “a lack of full information” is “a prime 
condition…for trust.”142 
Conclusion 
The Calenberg case, discussed above, is an example of the transition towards trust in expert 
systems. Widows’ pensions, even with the far simpler scheme of the earlier Lunenburg case, entail 
both time distanciation and trust, because, like credit, they defer the completion of financial 
transactions into the future.  By expanding the size and geographical scope of its membership the 
Calenberg scheme was also spatially disembedded. Compared with the Lunenburg fund, the 
Calenberg fund was composed of many who were strangers to one another, most of whom had no 
                                                          
138 Ibid, 24 
 
139 Carruthers, The City of Capital, 127-134. 
 
140 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 27. 
 
141 Ibid, 28. 
 
142 Ibid, 33. 
324 
  
 
way of observing the day to day operation of the fund. Disembedded from the local and immediate 
context, the fund also operated according to scientific methods beyond the grasp of all but a few 
members. All of these conditions meant that – whatever skepticism people felt about the science 
behind it- if they wanted to participate in the fund they would have to trust it as a system.   
In our own time, participation in insurance and other abstract systems of risk management 
is less and less of a choice.143 In order for insurance to become such a powerful social institution 
and in order for “the concept of risk (to) replace that of fortuna,” there had first to be “an alteration 
in the perception of determination and contingency, such that human moral imperatives, natural 
causes, and chance reign in place of religious cosmologies.”144Thus, the rise of risk – and trust – 
in modernity was not merely the result of more refined calculations of probabilities, but also of the 
perception that chance could be tamed. The developments I have described in this chapter marked 
the transition towards that perception. In the next chapter I will describe how chance was “tamed,” 
for the purpose of improving the social realm when in the nineteenth century, the state and the 
market used “technologies of distance” to know and control the population. 
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Chapter Five 
Surveying and Mapping, Enclosing and Improving “The Social” in Nineteenth 
Century Britain 
This chapter relates the nineteenth century use of innovations in probabilistic theory to discover 
patterns within large populations. The “law of large numbers” allowed statisticians, actuaries and 
governments to map out the probable risks of the future. With every advance in probability theory, 
demography and other emerging social sciences, the insurance industry and governments were 
better able to “make up people”.  I demonstrate these developments in the case of Victorian Britain, 
where the national census and a statistical movement were used as technologies of distance, 
facilitating the classification of the population into risk categories. This allowed insurers to focus 
their coverage on the least “risky” and to exclude the most “risky”, while allowing governments 
to target the riskiest categories for social improvements and moral reform.   
In the nineteenth century a number of the socio-economic, epistemic and political processes 
that had been developing since the seventeenth century now came together in constituting the 
population as an object of knowledge and governance.  Social and economic relations were, for 
example, gradually disembedding from their local contexts, a process largely impelled by changes 
related to the transition to a market society: enclosures, the legal and philosophical legitimization 
of private property, the growth of credit, industrialization and migration to urban centres. 
Epistemologically, the “integrative” understanding of knowledge predominant in the Renaissance 
was gradually replaced by a “representational” classical epistemology that we might call clastic, 
or dispersive, in that it progressively differentiated the objects of knowledge.1 Central to this 
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epistemological transition were the development of probabilistic thought, risk as an object of 
calculation, and, in the nineteenth century, the ascendance of objectivity and quantification as the 
key markers of authority and trustworthiness. These developments appeared to indicate or support 
a deterministic world view, precipitating an acute concern over the extent of individuals’ freedom 
in this new world. 
Alongside these developments were changes in the meaning and function of the state. In 
England the state shifted from divinely justified absolute rule in the seventeenth century, to a 
limited notion of self-government after the Glorious Revolution, to the foundations of a liberal 
democratic government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Foucault has said that the 
period associated with classical epistemology is when “knowledge breaks off its old kinship with 
‘divinatio’.” 2  It can likewise be said that this was when the state ceased to be an embodiment of 
divine authority, and became instead an impersonal authority, a “collective subject charged with 
establishing order.” This consciously artificial order increasingly functioned through instrumental 
knowledge.3  By the nineteenth century the state’s ordering function and its legitimacy were no 
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longer tied to divine order and authority, but to the order that could be discovered through the 
collection and analysis of information about the governed population. 
That order, supporting and propelling material changes in the social, economic and 
political spheres, was closely tied to the representational epistemology mentioned above. In 
Making of a Social Body, Poovey describes this epistemology as a new kind of abstract thought 
which began to be imposed upon the phenomenal world, and which generated both a “process of 
vivification” and the production of an “abstract space” in which all things are measured by 
numerical calculation.4 She argues that it was only with the emergence of mass society toward 
the end of the nineteenth century that this representational thought came to fully dominate 
modern epistemology. Like Poovey, I see the nineteenth century as a crucial transitional period, 
during which new ways of knowing and representing the world were progressively 
institutionalized through processes of both disaggregation and aggregation. In the former 
process, an order in which social, economic and political arrangements were once integrated 
became disaggregated, and split off into “domains” which were at once conceptually and 
materially discrete (ie, “the Economy” “Society”). People are likewise disaggregated, divided 
into discrete categories and classifications through the production of statistical knowledge. At the 
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same time, we see an aggregation of the governed into a unified citizenry and a mass society. 5 
Later in this chapter I will address the aggregation and disaggregation at work in the constitution 
of the social in the nineteenth century. My focus, however, is on their relation to the logics of 
risk and insurance, as modern efforts to both contain and transcend the uncertainty of an open 
future.   
The disaggregation of the previously integrated order into the distinct domains of 
“Society”, “the Economy” and “Politics” can also be understood as a disembedding, or as a process 
of distanciation. Here I want to stress how these developments are a kind of distanciation, because 
the ability to see, know and control objects (land, society, the future) from a distance is a crucial 
characteristic of the modern response to an uncertain and open future, which I have described in 
preceding chapters. Distance is, furthermore, the condition that gave rise to techniques of 
abstraction and abstract ways of knowing such as surveying, mapping, enclosing, probability and 
insurance. If these techniques succeeded in overcoming vast spatial and temporal distances for 
their own ends (control of territory, expansion of industry, the accumulation of capital and 
knowledge), they also seem to have allowed for the perpetuation of distance in other ways. That 
is to say that, with the development of every new “shortcut” for bridging distance, previous 
relations or integrations dissolve or break apart as formalized ways of relating over a distance 
become embedded in the cultural practices of the new, large-scale rearrangement of populations. 
In large urban centres, or in the membership in an insurance pool, for example, one is distanced 
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from decision-makers, and indeed from intimate knowledge of fellow urban dwellers or policy-
members, and thus must rely on trust in an abstract system. 6 
Industrialization is perhaps the most obvious example of a modern abstract system that 
realigned social relations into extra-local and dispersive patterns. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century in Britain, ever more people were uprooted from their communities and moved about the 
country in search of waged labour. Most found themselves in rapidly growing urban centres where 
demographic concentration was no replacement for the social relationships that had prevailed in 
their communities of origin. Once disembedded from their root systems, what could bind these 
people together? How could coherence and stability be brought to the dispersed relations of this 
ever more socially and geographically mobile population?   
What came to bind people together were new technologies for overcoming distance, 
technologies that could apprehend and represent this deracinated population in a unifying 
language, a map of the people that aspired to a fully comprehensive scope.  In Britain, as in a 
number of other countries, the first of these technologies to emerge was the modern census and it 
was followed shortly after by a second: the establishment of statistical knowledge as a panacea for 
the investigation of all social and natural phenomena. Drawing upon the work of historians of 
science, epistemology and the Victorian administrative state, I argue that the census and statistics 
                                                          
6  For Anthony Giddens’ discussion of abstract systems see The Consequences of 
Modernity, 83-88. Also see Anthony Giddens, “Time-Space Distanciation and the Generation of 
Power” in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: Power, Property and the State, 
ed. Anthony Giddens, 90-108 (London: Macmillan, 1981). Also see David Harvey’s discussion 
of space, particularly in relation to post-Fordism, in The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry 
into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). Doreen Massey 
challenges conceptions of ‘place’ that attach essential identities to territorial boundedness in “A 
Global Sense of Place" in Space, Place, and Gender (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1994). For an interesting discussion of the function and effects of moral distance see Deen K. 
Chatterjee, “Moral Distance: Introduction.” The Monist 86, No. 3 (2003): 327-32.  
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were new iterations of the gestures of control I explored in the chapters two and three. That is, 
both were a way of surveying and mapping, enclosing and improving, only their object was no 
longer limited to the land. Instead, the census and statistics were largely directed at knowing the 
“population,” predicting its future patterns and intervening to improve those patterns in order to 
align them with the political and economic objectives of a liberal government. I will also show 
how the classifications of people produced by statistics and the census aligned the subjectivities of 
the governed with the objectives of the government, as they came to identify with the categories 
into which they fell. 
Technologies for Overcoming Distance 
The Census 
The census is not an exclusively modern technique of statecraft- it is indeed one of the oldest 
actions that states have taken to control populations.7 Since it has so often been carried out for the 
purposes of taxation and conscription it is not surprising that when a comprehensive population 
census was first proposed in parliament by MP Thomas Potter in 1753, many responded with 
outrage. One Member of Parliament, William Thornton, proclaimed “this project to be totally 
subversive of the last remains of English liberty .... The new Bill will direct the imposition of new 
taxes, and, indeed, the addition of a very few words will make it the most effectual engine of 
                                                          
7 Censuses were carried out in many ancient societies. For some specific discussions of 
different ancient censuses please see: Kent G. Deng, “Unveiling China's True Population Statistics 
for the Pre-modern Era with Official Census Data,” Population Review 43, no. 2 (2004): 32; Gary 
Urton, The State of Strings: Khipu Administration in the Inka Empire (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2015); David Oliver Relin, “The Census in History,” Scholastic Update 122, no. 9 (1990): 
11-12.; Wadād al-Qāḍī, “Population Census and Land Surveys under the Umayyads (41–132/661–
750)," Der Islam 83, no. 2 (2008): 341-416. 
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rapacity and oppression that was ever used…”8  There was also resistance to the idea of a census 
among the general populous, who, it was feared, might rise up against it.9 
Although there was just enough support for Potter’s bill to pass in the Commons, it was 
allowed to lapse before it could be enacted.10 It wasn’t until the last decade of the eighteenth 
century that the idea was taken up again. This time it passed, likely because many in government 
were alarmed by Thomas Malthus’s theory on population and its relation to recent food shortages 
and economic depression.11 A census would allow the government to either disprove or confirm 
Malthus’ thesis that the population was rising beyond the limits of the nation’s resources. Greater 
knowledge of the population could, moreover, provide the government with a better idea of the 
numbers of men who might be conscripted to serve in the Napoleonic wars. 12 The fact that other 
                                                          
8 For the ancient relation- and enduring association – between censuses and taxation or 
military conscription please see Melissa M. Lee, and Zhang Nan, "Legibility and the Informational 
Foundations of State Capacity," The Journal of Politics 79, no. 1 (2017): 118; Henry C. Binford, 
"Never Trust the Census Taker, Even When He's Dead," Urban History 2 (1975): 22-28.; Peter 
Skerry, Counting on the Census? Race, Group Identity, and the Evasion of Politics, Volume 56, 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 12, 96; Bernard Baffour, Thomas King, and 
Paolo Valente, "The Modern Census: Evolution, Examples and Evaluation," International 
Statistical Review 81, no. 3 (2013): 409. For the quotation by Thornton, see A. J. Taylor, "Taking 
of the Census, 1801-1951," British Medical Journal 1, no. 4709 (1951): 715. 
9 Knights and Vurdubakis. "Calculations of Risk,” 737. 
  
10 Colin R. Chapman, Pre-1841 Censuses & Population Listings in the British Isles 
(Baltimore MD.: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1999) 36. 
11 John Avery, Progress, Poverty, and Population: Re-reading Condorcet, Godwin, and 
Malthus (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 1997) 78-79.; Thomas Southcliffe Ashton, An Economic 
History of England: The Eighteenth Century (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2013) 2. ; Baffour, King, 
and Valente, "The Modern Census,” 411. For Malthus’s provocative thesis see Thomas Robert 
Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, 
with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers (London: 
Johnson, 1798; New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2007). 
12 Knights and Vurdubakus, “Calculations of Risk,” 737; and James Vernon, Distant 
Strangers: How Britain Became Modern, Vol. 9 (California: University of California Press, 2014,) 
53. 
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nations had already implemented the new technology of a national census – Sweden, as early as 
the 1760s, and the United States in 1790 - was a further inducement to undertake such a project.13  
Thus, when a new proposal was made in 1800, the bill was passed and the Population Act, 
detailing how the census was to be carried out, was enacted.14 What made the census of 1801 novel 
in comparison with previous censuses held within Britain was the scope of its ambition and the 
systematic and centralized nature of its methods of gathering information. The census was to cover 
every household in the nation: it was arranged so that it was taken everywhere on the same day, 
and in such a way that the information passed back to the government through a strict hierarchy, 
from household to enumerator, enumerator to parish and then district supervisors, until it reached 
a central office. Following the American Census, it was set up to be repeated every ten years on 
the same day. This allowed for more meaningful analysis of the numbers, because changes in 
occupations, family and town sizes, birth and death rates could now be tracked. 15 
The census of 1801 was not nearly as detailed as subsequent censuses would become, for 
it only asked each household for the number and sex of those living within it and did not include 
individual’s names or occupations. With each new census enumeration methods were improved, 
                                                          
13 Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820-1900 (Princeton, NJ.: 
Princeton University Press, 1986,) 37 and Rebecca Jean Emigh, Dylan Riley, and Patricia Ahmed, 
Antecedents of Censuses from Medieval to Nation States: How Societies and States Count (New 
York: Springer, 2016), 135. 
14 The Bill was introduced by MP Charles Abbot, who had been influenced by John 
Rickman’s essay of 1796, which made the case for the many advantages of a national survey of 
the population. After the Bill was enacted Rickman was appointed to oversee the deployment of 
the Census. See Rebecca Jean Emigh, Dylan Riley, and Patricia Ahmed, Antecedents of Censuses 
from Medieval to Nation States: How Societies and States Count (New York: Springer, 2016), 
134-5. 
  
15 Vernon, Distant Strangers, 54; Kathrin Levitan, a Cultural History of the British Census: 
Envisioning the Multitude in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Springer, 2011). 
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obstacles to accuracy noted in the previous censuses were further minimized and ever more 
detailed questions added to the census forms.16 However, as Vernon points out, even with its 
limitations the first census provided an unprecedented picture of the nation’s people: “Never before 
had the state possessed such detailed knowledge of its population, even if it was confined to 
household data that were returned in aggregate form. Nonetheless, an official in London could 
now tell how many men and women lived in a particular village hundreds of miles away without 
leaving his office.”17 Just as the innovation of the estate map had allowed landowners a 
comprehensive view of their lands from the comfort of their studies, the national census allowed 
government officials a view of the governed population in its totality from the seat of power. In 
both cases the distanced view of the object of knowledge was a necessary precondition for 
intervention and re-ordering of those objects. 
Opposition to the Census 
Meanwhile, the passing of the Population Act did little to quell concerns about the census among 
critics outside of Parliament. Just as the calculative innovations and metrological ethos at work in 
land surveying had drawn strong criticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the counting 
of people-the objective of the census- met with suspicion and resistance in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. You may remember from chapter two that much of the early critique of 
surveying had centred on the impiety of landowners forgetting that they were mere stewards of 
                                                          
 
16 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 19-21. 
 
17 Vernon, Distant Strangers, 54. 
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God’s land, that the land was not theirs to measure and calculate “to the utmost acre.” 18 While the 
religious critique of the census was less prominent than it had been against surveying and 
enclosures, those who did oppose the census on such grounds often quoted Old Testament 
scriptures which recounted how God sent a plague following King David’s census of Israel. Just 
as lands were not landlords’ to count and measure, so King David’s transgression lay in forgetting 
that the people belonged to God, and were neither his nor any other earthly ruler’s to count. 19  This 
divine punishment must have been in the minds of the people of Newcastle upon Tyne in 1753, 
when, in response to a Bill brought before the House of Commons proposing an annual census, 
their MP reported that “ they looked upon the proposal as ominous and feared … an epidemical 
distemper should follow the numbering.”20  
                                                          
18 For example, the English clergyman and polemicist, Robert Crowely, admonished 
landlords who used surveyors: "God hath not sette you to surveye hys landes, but to playe the 
stuards in his householde of this world, and to see that your pore below tenantes lacke not theye 
necessaries." quoted by Andrew McRae, in “To Know One’s Own: Estate Surveying and the 
Representation of the Land in Early Modern England,” The Huntington Library Quarterly 56, No. 
4 (Autumn, 1993) 334. 
 
19 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 245. See also Ashton, An Economic 
History of England, 2. Two of the most often cited scriptures were Samuel 24 and Chronicles 27. 
In Samuel 24, after making an extensive census of Israel and Jordan King David recognizes his 
sin: “And David's heart condemned him after he had numbered the people. So David said to the 
LORD, ‘I have sinned greatly in what I have done; but now, I pray, O LORD, take away the 
iniquity of Your servant, for I have done very foolishly’." God sends three days of plague on Israel 
to punish King David. See Verses 1-25, Samuel 24 in The Revised Standard Bible Containing the 
Old and New Testaments, ed. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (New York: Oxford UP, 
1962), 411-412. 
  
20 Daniel R. Headrick, When Information Came of Age: Technologies of Knowledge in the 
Age of Reason and Revolution, 1700-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 70.  
Opposition to the census on the basis of these passages did not end with the passing of the 
eighteenth century. In 1841, for instance, the newspaper The Examiner reported that a Reverend 
William Black of Blaisdon, Gloucestershire, was fined £5 for refusing to fill in his census form, 
having written instead that he "considers it highly sinful to number the people. See the 24th chap. 
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 The logic of secular arguments against the census corresponded to religious ones, in that 
they claimed that to count the people was to overstep the proper bounds of political authority. In 
England, where a discourse of liberty had flourished in the century following the Glorious 
Revolution, there was a marked sensitivity to forms of governance which might exceed the limits 
so recently placed on political authority. 21 That the census might destroy “the last remainders of 
English liberty” and act as the vehicle for state “rapacity and oppression” was not a view exclusive 
to M.P. William Thornton. And, while wealthy landowners of the mid-eighteenth century viewed 
a census as the encroachment of tyranny, they also worried that putting numbers to the people 
might lead to a levelling of the traditional social hierarchy, in which they enjoyed a high status.22 
                                                          
Of the 2nd Book of Samuel, in the Holy Bible". The Examiner 3 July 1841, quoted at 
http://www.historyhouse.co.uk/articles/census_objectors.html 
 
21 John Miller, The Glorious Revolution, (London and New York: Routledge, 2014) ix. 
Also see. Peter Mandler, Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006); 
Jonathan Scott, “From English to British liberty, 1550–1800,” European Review of History: 21 
no.1 (2014): 59-72; and Dario Castiglione, “'That Noble Disquiet': Meanings of Liberty in the 
Discourse of the North,” in Economy, Polity, and Society: British Intellectual History 1750-1950, 
ed. Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, and Brian Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 48-69.  
 
22 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 7, 16. The opposition of landowning 
aristocrats to any sort of government encroachment on the liberties of English citizens can be 
traced to the contest between Court Party and the Country Party in the period of the Civil War. 
The “country platform” held that parliament was no protection from tyranny, legislation could be 
corrupted and liberty eroded by parliamentary majority. For insight into this rich intellectual 
history please see Kenneth Olwig, Landscape, Nature, and the Body Politic: from Britain's 
Renaissance to America's New World (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002). Also 
see Mark Goldie, “The English System of Liberty” in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
century Political Thought Vol. 1, ed. Goldie, Mark, and Robert Wokler, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); and Perez Zagorin, Court, Country, and Culture: Essays on Early 
Modern British History in Honor of Perez Zagorin (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell & Brewer, 1992).  
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In ways that they could not have imagined, the governmental encroachment feared by 
eighteenth century critics of the census was realized in the century that followed. The census would 
usher in an era of unprecedented governmental surveillance and control over the lives of subjects. 
Moreover, the census data would be used in such a way that the population was both categorized 
and homogenized, so that, as some critics had feared, much of what remained of the traditional 
social hierarchy and organization would indeed be undone.  
Resistance and Recognition: Public Responses to the Census 
While the census had become an indispensable technology of governance by the mid-nineteenth 
century, its implementation was not wholly one-sided. The state may have imposed a regular 
census upon the population, but, as Levitan argues, the public did have at least some role in shaping 
it. In response to particular concerns voiced by the public, the extent and nature of questions on 
the census forms were continually revised. Census architects were made aware of both the practical 
obstacles of carrying out the census and the limits of popular consent through feedback from 
enumerators, but also through the press. The press was the key means by which the census was 
negotiated between the public and the government. It voiced the public’s perceptions of the census 
at the same time as it persuaded the public of its duty to participate in the census as a national 
project. Ultimately, the state’s power to unilaterally implement the census was restrained by the 
requirement that each new census had to be approved in an Act of Parliament.23 Until this stricture 
was removed in 1920, census managers were always aware that public concerns raised in 
                                                          
23 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 46, and Edward Higgs, Making Sense 
of the Census Revisited: Census Records for England and Wales, 1801-1901 (London: Institute of 
Historical Research, 2005).  
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parliamentary debates might prevent such an act from passing. 24 Thus there was an ongoing need 
to consider the population’s sensitivities in the shaping and implementation of the census. At the 
same time, we should not overstate the public’s power in shaping classificatory schemes of the 
census. That is, the press, in mediating between the state and the public, can also be said to function 
as an “ideological state apparatus,” to use Althusser’s term. And people largely came to recognize 
themselves in the census categories publicized and debated in the press. I will discuss the curious 
phenomenon of this recognition, what Althusser called “interpellation,” at a later point in this 
chapter.25 
While the national census in Britain was partially shaped and limited by its exposure to 
public scrutiny, this was not at all the case for censuses carried out on subordinated populations, 
such as inmates of asylums or workhouses, or colonial subjects. Wherever it was unnecessary to 
solicit the cooperation of those being counted, censuses could be made as extensive and detailed 
as the government wished. 26 In Ireland, for example, census forms asked far more questions than 
those in Britain, and sought information on property and wages, which in Britain “would have 
been considered intrusive and utterly outside government jurisdiction.” In fact, the census in 
Ireland was often treated as a chance to “experiment with possibilities that would not have been 
considered acceptable within Britain.” 27 
                                                          
24 A. J. Taylor "Taking of the Census,” 715. 
 
25 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation),” in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. Aradhana Sharma, Akhil Gupta, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 92; 103-4. 
 
26 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 46, 150. 
 
27 Ibid, 150-153. 
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In colonies like India, where white settlers were a minority, information was not gathered 
directly from the population but through the cooperation of local leaders. This was both because 
British personnel were scarce and because it was assumed that the population would oppose the 
census. Indeed, a full census of India was not actually attempted until 1881, not only because of 
its immense size and diversity, but also because colonial rulers feared the unrest a census might 
stoke.28 Once the census was taken however, it had an enduring impact on the identities of those 
counted and categorized.29 This was also the case in Britain, where, as Hacking points out, the 
census categories may have played a much larger role in shaping class consciousness than Marx 
ever did.30 But, as Kertzer and Arel, note, there was at least some negotiation in the domestic 
census between the officials constructing categories and particular social groups.31 This diverging 
approach to domestic and colonial censuses was common to all the European colonial powers, 
which, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, sought to foster a sense of 
nationhood at home. According to Arjan Appadurai, too much stress on cultural categories in the 
                                                          
 
28 Ibid, 149, 156 and Vernon, Distant Strangers, 55. 
 
29 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 149. For more detailed accounts of the 
relationship between the census and the identity formation among colonized subjects see David I 
Kertzer and Dominique Arel, eds., Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and 
Language in National Censuses (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002); Bernard S. Cohn, “The 
Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia” in An Anthropologist among the 
Historians and Other Essays, ed. Bernard S. Cohn (New York: Oxford UP, 1984), 224; Arjun 
Appadurai, “Numbers in the Colonial Imagination,” in Orientalism and the Postcolonial 
Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia, ed. C.A. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 314; Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind, 
Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, NJ; Princeton UP, 2001); and  Timothy 
Mitchell, The Rule of Experts: Egypt,. Technopolitics and Modernity (Berkeley, University of 
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30 Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
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domestic census was thought to be “incompatible” with these “imagined ‘nation states’” whereas 
they “had no such qualms when faced with the daunting task of counting their colonial subjects.” 
32  
In Britain, the press played a major role in normalizing the census, largely by encouraging 
the view that it was a national project in which every citizen was engaged. Yet suspicion and 
resentment of the census had not disappeared.  According to Levitan, voices opposed to the census 
in political and intellectual circles had diminished by the 1850s and 60s, while in the press it was 
implied that any remaining recalcitrance came from the poorer segments of the population. It is 
difficult to know whether the poor really were more resistant to the census or whether their more 
precarious and marginal living conditions simply made it more difficult to gather data on them, or 
to fit their experiences into the census categories. They may also have been deemed anti-census 
because their very marginality seemed inimical to the spirit of progress that the census was thought 
to embody. The census not only measured the nation’s progress, but as a technology capable of 
accumulating data on a remarkable scale, the census was itself evidence of that progress. By 
displaying ever more complete knowledge of the governed, the census had become a mark of 
England’s scientific advancement and civilization.  Those still resistant to the census were 
therefore portrayed in the press as superstitious, backwards, and eminently uncivilized. 33 
Paradoxically, it was this “backward” or marginal segment of the population-those who 
could not easily be counted- upon whom the technology of the census would be most consistently 
trained in the nineteenth century. In particular it was the obdurate poor who were viewed as the 
                                                          
32 Appadurai, “Numbers in the Colonial Imagination,” 317-18.  
 
33 Levitan, A Cultural History of the British Census, 22 
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greatest threat to the progress of the nation and who were thus made the primary targets for social 
reform.34 The idea that the poor were surplus to the natural limits of the population- were the flaw 
in the formula for an ordered society - had gained purchase ever since the agricultural crisis of the 
late eighteenth century. When the Speenhamland system of “outdoor relief” failed to stem the 
rising tide of pauperism in the 1790s, Thomas Malthus diagnosed the problem in his utilitarian 
theory on the “population principle,” a theory that relied extensively on quantitative data. 
Expressing a vision of the natural laws governing wealth in the austere language of numbers, the 
essay on population was rather ill received in a period when numerical treatment of human affairs 
was considered unsympathetic and amoral. 35  
But this cultural discomfort with the counting of people had begun to change in the 
reforming fervour of the 1830s. In this decade alone, a number of statistical societies were 
established, The General Registry Office was created to oversee and amalgamate census data, and 
the problem of the surplus poor was submitted to a new calculus under the aegis of the Poor Law 
Board. The creation of each of these agencies correlated with larger changes to epistemology, 
government and social policy taking place in the nineteenth century. While not without its critics, 
statistics began to accrue legitimacy as an “objective” form of knowledge, a transparent lens 
                                                          
 
34 Ibid, 44, Hacking, The Taming of Chance, 120. 
 
35 In Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population, we can see an amalgam of several 
contemporary schools of thought. In addition to utilitarianism and the “science of wealth” (political 
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governing human affairs Providentialism had been a principle theme of much eighteenth century 
moral philosophy, but according to Poovey, when Malthus revised his 1798 edition he limited his 
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moment in the history of the modern “fact”, when numerical representation was severed from 
previous religious connotations and began to be viewed as amoral. See Poovey, A History of the 
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through which the state of the nation and its population could be surveyed from the distanced, 
impartial perspective of quantification.36 Meanwhile, the General Registry Office further 
centralized and rationalized the operation of the state’s key surveying instrument, the census, a 
movement indicative of the turn to liberal governmentality. Finally, the social intervention of the 
New Poor Law would come to be seen as archetypical of that governmentality, and is illustrative, 
I will argue in a later section, of a new iteration of the modern logic of enclosure and the drive to 
improve.  
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Statistics as Surveying Instrument  
It is the surveying function of statistics to which I turn now, for, like any new property 
development, the restructuring and improvement of the population required first a survey of the 
site upon which it would be built. That is to say, the establishment in the 1830s of statistical 
societies, the General Registry Office and the Poor Law Board, signalled the consolidation and 
extension of technologies for mapping the terrain of the existing population with a view to its 
future development. We have already briefly discussed the census as such a technology, but in 
fact, the census was only one – crucial- method in the new form of knowledge known as statistics. 
The rise of statistical activity across Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century intersected 
with several key developments in the risk management mode of modernity. Not only did statistics 
help to inaugurate an “objective” standard of knowledge, and a science of society that was 
instrumental to modern governance (and constructive of the identities of the governed) but it also 
allowed both insurers and states to find large scale patterns within populations, and in turn, to 
apply probabilistic reasoning to the crafting of both insurantial and governmental policies.  
That statistics are a form of knowledge instrumental to modern statecraft can be seen in the 
etymology of the term itself. Ultimately traceable to the seventeenth century Italian word statista 
for “statesman”, the term statistics itself first arose in the context of German polizeiwissenschaft 
(political science) in the eighteenth century.37 Usually attributed to Gottfried Achenwald in 1749, 
the first use of the noun “statistik” signified the collection of observable data related to the state.38  
As an effort to measure the power of the state or to assess the population and other resources that 
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could be called upon to maintain or increase that power, the German statistik was comparable to 
the late seventeenth century project that the English called Political Arithmetic. Yet, as a practice 
that developed closely with theories of probability, some scholars argue that the true origin of 
statistical thought was the publication of Graunt’s mortality table in 1660, and the use of this and 
other mortality tables in drawing up insurance contracts in late seventeenth century England. 39 
As Hacking has noted, every nation has its own unique history of statistics. One pattern in 
these histories, noted by both Hacking and Woolf, is a difference in the nature of statistics in more 
individualistic or liberal nations such as England or France compared with more collectivist 
nations such as Germany or Sweden. Where the former tended to stress the descriptive purpose of 
statistical efforts, and those efforts tended to be the work of amateurs, in the latter nations, statistics 
were more prescriptive and were carried out by officials of the state.40 In England for example, in 
spite of the early work of political arithmeticians, the term ‘statistics’ was not used in English until 
John Sinclair published his Statistical account of Scotland in 1790, and even then, Sinclair stressed 
that his “statistics” had more to do with utilitarian calculations of the “quantum of happiness” than 
the exertion of state power associated with the German word “statistic”. While Sinclair’s work was 
groundbreaking in its scope, it was, according to Woolf, “essentially topographical, the sort of 
project undertaken by surveyors.” That is, it was not a work intended to inform public policy.41 
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Up until the 1830s the statistical information amassed in England came largely from 
disparate and limited studies published by amateurs. Certainly, such data was useful to the nascent 
profession of actuarialism, as life assurance companies had become increasingly aware of the need 
for the most accurate mortality data possible.42 Additionally, the collection and publication of 
statistics by amateurs with diverse intellectual interests fed into a growing appetite for information 
on social phenomena. From the late eighteenth century, the moral sciences had begun to adopt and 
apply to the social realm the scientific methods used to observe and categorize natural phenomena 
and to discover the systems and laws of the physical world. 43 
Yet, while this early statistical work in England contributed to both actuarial knowledge 
and to the “science of man” burgeoning throughout Europe, it was curiously disassociated from 
some of the intellectual fields in which it now plays an integral part.44 It was not, for example, 
informed by any of the mathematical and probabilistic innovations cropping up on the continent 
at that time. Nor was it allied with the new science of economics. In fact, many political economists 
anathematized statistical knowledge on the basis that it was devoid of any theoretical content.45 
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This particular anti-statistical attitude reflected an epistemological conflict that became acute in 
early nineteenth century England, one that explains why it wasn’t until the 1830s that statistics 
approached legitimization as a science or was fully embraced as a useful tool for public policy.   
Poovey has explored the tensions and ambiguities surrounding the epistemological claims 
of statistics in the early nineteenth century, and situates them within the larger context of Western 
philosophy’s “long campaign to sever the connection between description and interpretation.” 46 
Among the first to mount this campaign was Francis Bacon, who insisted that all knowledge must 
first be grounded in the observation of particular facts.  Rather than jumping to general principles, 
a continuing legacy of Aristotle, Bacon wished to “insulate” each observation of a natural 
phenomenon from all theoretical prejudices or ambitions to systematize knowledge. As Poovey 
explains, this ambition was achieved rhetorically rather than in practice, for such discrete 
particulars were still conceived of as a units of a larger system of knowledge. 47  
Yet the idea that the most valid form of knowledge derived from descriptions of facts free 
of interest or interpretation was given further momentum in the “scientific revolution” of the mid 
seventeenth century. Boyle and other members of the Royal Society followed Bacon by choosing 
to ground their scientific findings in the evidence of the senses as demonstrated in controlled 
experiments. By the end of that century the knowledge project of accumulating “disinterested” 
facts was further validated by William Petty’s “political arithmetic” which sought to reveal the 
state of the nation in “number, weight and measure.” 48  
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  But the ascendance of descriptive knowledge did not continue unrivalled in British thought, 
for the eighteenth century was dominated by the conjectural histories of the Scottish moral 
philosophers. Now, the political arithmetic model of “government by information” faced 
competition from a new model: “government by sociality.” 49 It is not that Hume, Smith, Ferguson, 
and others abstained from observing particulars or using numerical data, but that their theories of 
sociality, liberal government and divine providence tended towards the production of general, and 
even universal knowledge and rested upon abstractions such as “society” or “the market.” 50 While 
descriptive and interpretive knowledge co-existed in much of the work of moral philosophers, a 
sharper division was made between the two in the “moral sciences” of the late eighteenth century. 
An outgrowth of moral philosophy and a precursor to political economy, the moral sciences 
explicitly linked the laws governing wealth and society with providential design. It was in this 
context that Malthus’ treatment of the problem of poverty appeared to critics as methodologically 
suspect, for it seemed to use mathematical tools to evaluate what many viewed as a spiritual and 
ethical subject. Ironically, while the supposed amorality of Malthus’ approach led Carlyle to 
dismiss political economy as “the dismal science,” by the 1830s the (supposed) absence of moral 
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intent in numerical representations of wealth and society had come to be seen as a virtue- at least 
by some.  
Between the 1820s and 1840s the number of statistical works published across Europe 
increased exponentially, so much so that Ian Hacking has referred to this output as “an avalanche 
of numbers.” 51 In England, this “avalanche” intensified the debate about descriptive versus 
interpretative knowledge. The dispute often took the form of an opposition between what 
contemporary journalist, William Cooke Taylor, called “the figures of arithmetic” and “the figures 
of speech.” Which form of knowledge could claim greater validity? The persuasive power of 
morally charged “pathetic tales” used in rhetorical argument or the “dull, dry parade of stupid 
numbers” used in statistical reports? For Taylor, the “stupidity” of numbers was proof of their 
superiority as conveyors of truth, for they did not speak for anything beyond themselves, or deceive 
and manipulate through the narrative devices of rhetoric.52 On the other hand, even Taylor - a 
proponent of statistics- knew that there were holes in this argument. For the presentation of tables 
and columns of numbers could also be used to deceive. In fact, when rhetoric was the accepted 
mode of knowledge production in the seventeenth century, numerical representations such as those 
produced by Petty were dismissed as “conjuror’s tricks”. After all, the apparent simplicity of each 
statistical fact, unaccompanied by an explanatory framework, could be interpreted in any way and 
used to any end.  As Taylor admitted, when “fierce controversies rage. …every disputant is 
prepared to support his views with a formidable array of figures”.53   
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The 1830s Statistical Movement: ‘Objective’ Knowledge, Moral Reform 
The controversies surrounding statistical knowledge at this time reflected a self-conscious concern 
about the appropriate methodologies for knowledge production.  It was thus in a climate of both 
uncertainty and reflexivity that statistics first attained a place in scientific and administrative 
institutions.  Although the British Society for the advancement of Science was one of the first 
British organizations to establish a statistical section, it did so, in 1833, with strong reservations.54 
Adam Sedgwick, the founder of the BAAS, was among those who regarded statistics as less than 
scientific. Unlike the model of science, astronomy, statistics lacked a theoretical foundation and 
was insufficiently divorced from the ambitions and controversies of the political world. It was only 
through the influence of mathematician and enthusiast of industry Charles Babbage that Sedgwick 
relented.  At Cambridge, Babbage had organized an impromptu gathering of prestigious thinkers 
interested in statistics such as the celebrated Belgian astronomer and inventor of “social physics,” 
Adolphe Quetelet, and professor of political economy Richard Jones. 55 
Cullen suggests that it was the prestige of these men that helped Sedgwick to overcome his 
reservations about statistics’ proximity to politics. But those reservations were, in fact, well 
founded, for, on the whole, the early members of the BAAS statistical Section F were active in 
liberal and Whig politics and were particularly interested in the issues of social reform that 
predominated in the 1830s. Nevertheless, Sedgwick tried to insulate the BAAS from political 
controversy by insisting that the new section limit itself to numerical descriptions, arguing that “if 
we transgress our proper boundaries…and open a door of communication to the dreary world of 
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politics, in that instant, will the foul Daemon of discord find its way into our Eden of philosophy.” 
56 When chairing the second meeting of the statistical section, Jones likewise urged members to 
avoid “the premature speculation which is too apt to mingle itself with such researches.“ To this 
end they should “limit as far as possible their reception of such matter to facts capable of being 
expressed by numbers”57  Thus, it was thought that adherence to strictly quantitative and abstract 
presentations of data would insulate the statistical section – and BAAS’s scientific reputation- 
from political interestedness or dispute.   
It wasn’t long before a second major statistical body was organized in London, by many 
of the same people from the BAAS statistical section. Wanting to find a more permanent 
organization dedicated solely to statistical research, Jones, Quetelet, Malthus, Babbage and the 
political economist and New Poor Law architect Nassau Senior, established the Statistical Society 
of London in 1834.58  The society’s mission was to collect facts- “which are calculated to illustrate 
the condition and prospects of society” 59 Again, in spite of the reformist ambitions of many of the 
members, they affirmed their commitment to objectivity.  The Society’s prospectus declared that 
its “first and most essential rule of its conduct” was “to exclude all opinions.” This tenet was 
repeated symbolically in the emblem chosen for the society: a wheat sheaf accompanied by the 
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words aliis Extenderum- “to be threshed out by others”, meaning that they would only gather the 
data; it would be left to others to interpret it.60 
It soon became obvious –at least to those skeptical about statistical knowledge - that 
honouring the pledge of pure and disinterested description was a more difficult proposition than 
making a declaration and an emblem.  Some critics charged that even if the Statistical Society of 
London could separate numerical facts from their political intentions, it made little sense to do so. 
In 1838, one such critic, John Robertson, of the radical London and Westminster Review, argued 
that the SSL’s attempt to separate facts from opinion or interpretation was not methodologically 
possible, since “the exclusion of opinion is the exclusion of the only guides which can conduct 
…researches to any useful end” for “facts are valuable only in relation to what they prove.” 
Isolated from any proposed idea or hypothesis, facts can be interpreted to mean anything and 
everything - and therefore nothing at all. 61 
As it turned out, the facts presented in the works of the SSL and the BAAS statistical 
section were accompanied by plenty of interpretative discussion. And notwithstanding their 
emphatic declarations of objectivity, when one reads the published works of these organizations 
one cannot fail to discover the social and political interests of their authors. One can see this, for 
example, in the published proceedings of the SSL, in its first volume, when  the Reverend J.E. 
Brombey, honorable secretary, read the Annual Report of the Council for the newly founded 
Bristol chapter of the Society. He stated that the purpose of the Bristol statistical society was to 
collect a “series of facts connected with [Bristol’s] commerce and general prosperity, capable, 
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when constantly observed and registered, of shewing, by the simple inspection of tables, the 
fluctuating vicissitudes of its internal condition and of its trade” of “use to the citizen and merchant, 
and to the legislator”. 62 
But the Society had a second objective “of much greater importance,” which was “to make 
such a thorough investigation into the state of the poorer classes of society as to ascertain what 
means of instruction and improvement they either have or can command for themselves … and 
how far they enjoy those comforts and conveniences which every man must enjoy before he is 
entitled to the epithet of civilized.” 63 Brombey makes it clear that this concern for ameliorating 
the condition of the poor was founded on a  fear of uprising and the spectre of revolution exampled 
in the French Revolution: because “the formidable power of Sanculottism…is ready, at any season 
of public weakness and agitation, to sally forth to its work of destruction.” He asks: “May not 
remedies be applied which shall go far to extinguish its existence which shall therefore place a 
man's liberties, and his honest title to the social comforts he enjoys, on a much more stable 
foundation..? In the solution of this question, the facts collected by the Statistical Society will not 
be without their use.”64 
Brombey then reflects on the reasons why it is now necessary that “the principle of charity 
to the poor must undergo considerable modification.” In a simpler state of society, he explains, the 
poor were cared for by their wealthier counterparts who looked upon such care as their duty. In 
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the more closely knit relations of the past, not only did the poor and the wealthy live in closer 
proximity, but the needs of the community were also “produced and fabricated within a 
comparatively limited district, (say a patriarchal household,)” so that “the ordinary visitations of 
Providence are easily known, and as easily mitigated.” For Brombey, the problem of the poor is 
made more difficult in contemporary urban and industrial society, where social and economic 
relations are ever more widely dispersed. In the “artificial and complicated state” wherein “a nation 
manufactures for half the world,” there is an “enormous distance between the labourer and his 
virtual or subdivided employer.” This distance precludes the “interchange of courtesy as well as 
of information” that exists in simpler, smaller communities, impeding the “intellectual and moral 
education” that –apparently- would improve the lot of the poor.65 Leaving aside his widely shared 
assumption that the lot of the poor would improve under the moral tutelage of the middle classes, 
Brombey’s speech shows, I think, how well he and his fellow members in the statistical society 
understood their role in addressing the problem of distance in governing modern societies- 
particularly the difficulty of knowing the risks faced by certain subclasses of the population and 
of finding ways to manage those risks to prevent general social disorder. 
Having said all this, however, Brombey concluded his speech with an assertion that these 
issues were “not the province of the Statistical society” whose “only object is to ascertain, as nearly 
as possible, what the actual exigencies are, and by an accurate exhibition of them, to rouse the 
community and eventually the legislature to make adequate measures to meet them.” 66 The stress 
on the objective nature of their work was vital, for as one member present at that meeting noted, 
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the Society was in need of funding, ideally from the wealthy citizens of Bristol, but “he was afraid 
that it was thought by some that the Society was a political one” and –reading between the lines- 
the wealthiest were not necessarily of the same reforming politics as those in the statistical society. 
67   
Members of and contributors to statistical societies –‘Statists’ they called themselves- seem 
to have understood their role in modern industrial Britain as bridging the knowledge gap created 
by social distanciation by taking accurate surveys of the state of society, and relaying them to those 
governing so that they could avoid “legislating in the dark.” 68 But today’s reader is particularly 
struck by the moralistic character of some of their surveys- especially when the poor were the 
object of their analysis. There was, in fact, a category of statistical research devoted to “moral 
statistics”. In one report on “Moral Statistics of Parishes in Westminster” the “habits of prayer 
amongst children” in St. James, St. George and St. Anne Soho were presented in tabular form. 
Children in these parishes were asked to recite their nightly prayers. Those who could recite 
customary bedtime prayers fluently were grouped into class 1; those who recited prayers which 
were likely learned at school or church and not from their parents were in class 2; those who 
claimed to say their prayers but could not recite them were class 3 and those who admitted that 
they never said their prayers were grouped in class 4. 69  
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The report also presents, under the heading “reading and literature,” the results of a survey 
of books circulated by small libraries in the same parishes. This table shows the “proportions of 
different characters of the books found in 10 libraries which have been thoroughly analyzed and 
counted.” The subjective judgements in this table are easily apparent: some of the books listed are 
described as “Works of a good character, Dr. Johnson, Goldsmith, &c”, others as “novels of the 
lowest character, being chiefly imitations of Fashionable Novels, containing no good, although 
probably nothing decidedly bad” and, in the last column, “books decidedly bad.”70 
Dickens’ Critique of the Statistical Societies 
So little were the statistical organizations able to inhibit moral and subjective elements from 
pervading their works that they were an easy subject of mockery. In 1838, Charles Dickens, who 
would become a life-long critic of both the statistical and moralistic approaches of social 
reformists, published a satirical essay lambasting the arrogance and didacticism of scientific and 
reforming associations so prevalent in the period.  If its target was not the SSL or section F of the 
BAAS, its blows nevertheless landed on a body of work very like theirs. The “Full Report of the 
first meeting of the Mudfrog Association for the Advancement of Everything” – (its name perhaps 
mocking the far-reaching ambitions of the British Society for Advancement of Sciences) - begins 
with a breathless narrator relating the eagerness with which the town of Mudfrog awaits the 
meeting of the Mudfrog Association.71  
Dickens skewers the self-importance of scientists and statists who seem to dissect the 
objects of their study with icy single-mindedness. A few days before the meeting the narrator 
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describes an event which occurred soon after the arrival of Professors Snore, Doze and Wheeze. 
A small dog was said to have been taken from the street and brought up to the hotel room of those 
eminent professors. Before they were able to dismember it, the dog had gotten loose and hidden 
beneath some furniture. The narrator writes. “you cannot imagine the feverish state of irritation we 
are in, lest the interest of science should be sacrificed to the prejudices of a brute creature, who is 
not endowed with sufficient sense to foresee the incalculable benefits which the  whole humane 
race may derive from so very slight  a concession on his part.”72 
As the meeting begins, it is announce that the council has corresponded with “no less than 
3,571 persons on no fewer than 7,243 topics”73 The meeting is broken into 4 sections: zoology and 
biology, anatomy and medicine, statistics, and mechanical sciences. In the narrator’s account of 
the proceeding of the zoology and botany section, we see what Dickens thinks about the 
condescension with which scientists and statists investigate the state of the poor.  Professor Snore 
begins by calling upon, 
“one of the secretaries to read a communication entitled “some remarks on the Industrious 
fleas, with considerations on the importance of establishing infant schools among that 
numerous class of society; of directing their industry to useful and practical ends; and of 
applying the surplus fruits thereof, towards providing for them a comfortable and 
respectable maintenance in their old age” 74 
And when the celebrated statistical member Mr. Slug presents his report on the “state of 
infant education among the middle classes of London” we are reminded of the subjective nature 
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of the above mentioned report on the character of the books circulated by libraries in the parishes 
of Westminster: 
 Jack & the Giant Killer-------------------------7,943 
 Ditto and Beanstalk----------------------------8,621 
 Ditto and Eleven Brothers--------------------2,645 
 Ditto and Jill--------------------------------------1,998 
 Total-----------------------------------------------21,407 
After decrying the general ignorance of the children of well-known literary characters, Mr. 
Slug points out that among the many criticisms that can be levelled at “Jack and Jill”, was the fact 
that “the whole work had this one great fault, it was not true.” A knock, I think, against the 
hypocrisy of Statists’ who were fixated on objective truth, even as they evaluated the moral 
propriety of certain reading materials.75 
In their exhaustive quest for scientific knowledge, Statists tended to treat their human 
subjects as children to be taught, or indeed, like wasteland to be converted. For Statists tended to 
be Whig reformers, whose ideology centred, in part, on quelling the potential rebellion of the lower 
classes by “improving” them morally and turning them to productive activity. But the unlikely 
mixture of moralism and statistics, so hilariously parodied by Dickens, was not limited to the work 
of the Statistical Societies. In fact, it was a double-edged tool that would get a great deal of use by 
social reformers throughout the Victorian period. As we will see below, this two-pronged approach 
meshed well with the liberal mode of governmentality, and would be adopted by both the state and 
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the insurance industry, in order to persuade the public of their duty to adopt a rational, productive 
and providential approach to their lives 
Statistics and the State: the General Register Office and Rational Bureaucracy 
The 1830s statistical movement that I have described above was largely driven by reform minded 
intellectuals who, despite their political ideas and ambitions, amassed statistical data independently 
of any government office. But, as we saw with the development of the census, statistics also played 
an essential role in the increasingly centralized bureaucracy of the state. In this section I argue that 
the creation of the General Register Office (GRO) in 1836 was a crucial step in the British 
government’s attempt to map and measure its population, or to use McRae’s phrase, “to know its 
own.” 
According to Wolfenstein, the GRO was established not merely through the influence of 
statistically minded men like Quetelet and John Finlaison (the actuary for the National Debt 
Office) but primarily as a response to the expansion of the franchise in the Reform Bill of 1832. 76 
The Reform Bill had removed the formerly compulsory membership in the Anglican Church as a 
prerequisite to voting rights. Since a majority of those who pushed for the Bill were dissenting 
Protestants, it was not surprising that an alternate system was soon devised to replace the traditional 
means by which the English government had obtained population data. For centuries, because the 
Anglican Church was the official religion of the English state, data on the births, marriages and 
deaths of the population had been collected in Anglican parish records. That meant not only that 
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dissenting Protestants, Catholics and Jews had been excluded from the state’s population data, but 
also that in legal cases relating to the transfer of property, any non-Anglican records of birth were 
not considered valid evidence. Added to this was a more general and longstanding complaint that 
the current system of registration was insufficiently rigorous in its record-keeping.77  
With the passing of the Reform act in 1832, newly empowered dissenting Protestants and 
their supporters campaigned for a new system of registration, one that would count everyone in 
the country regardless of their religion. The GRO was created with the passing of two new acts: 
the Registration Act, and the Marriage Act, which made civil registration compulsory for all 
marriages, requiring every couple to obtain a certificate from the superintendent registrar prior to 
the marriage. The GRO had four main objectives: tracing descent of property, calculating life 
expectancy and laws of mortality, ascertaining the health of the nation and charting population 
growth. 78  
The new system of the General Registry no longer rested upon the pre-existing system of 
local Anglican parishes, but upon the recently centralized, - and secular- structure of Poor Law 
Administration. Created just two years previously, with the passing of the Poor Law Amendment 
Act in 1834, the administration of the New Poor Law was organized so that information passed 
from Poor Law Unions at the local level, and through a hierarchy of officials until it reached the 
central government. With the creation of the GRO, the poor law commissioner of each of 626 
registration districts across England and Wales  was assigned the duty of completing a quarterly 
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civil register, which was then sent to a “regional superintendent registrar” and then on to the 
London based GRO, for multiple rounds of verification.79  
This was a massive operation, with “more than 3100 persons, acting under the instructions 
of the Registrar General.”80 By the end of its first year of operation, 1837, 847,149 entries had 
been passed to the central office in London, with 739,737 of those “certified to be correct.”81 By 
1841 the GRO had taken on the additional the role of managing the census. 82At that point there 
were 35,000 enumerators each of whom dropped standardized forms off at households , picked 
them up, and entered the information into standardized books which were then passed on to the 
Register General. It was the work of officials at the central office to organize this data, in such a 
way that trends over time could then be analyzed.83  
Under the central administrative body of the GRO, data from both the census and civil 
registration were joined together, and this, A.J. Taylor notes, “opened up new fields of social 
investigation. It was now possible to observe more closely the trend of vital statistics, to trace the 
connection between housing, sanitary and  industrial conditions and the incidence of disease” and 
thus to target districts in need of reform.  Although the GRO “had no direct access to the decision-
making process”84 its very structure, situated at the centre but linked to every local authority in the 
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nation, enabled it to transform statistical knowledge into social reform.  Under the aegis of the 
GRO’s Compiler of Abstracts, Doctor William Farr, “the census was increasingly used to furnish 
evidence about social problems,” particularly those related to public health.85  Both the census and 
civil registration data were used to promote not only reform, but also the prevention of illness and 
morbidity. Possessing the most up to date and comprehensive vital statistics available, the GRO 
was able to put everyone on the same page, and did so by regularly publishing not only its statistics, 
but also its analysis of those statistics. In this way Doctors, local authorities, and even the wider 
public were able to see such data as the mortality rate in their own city or district and to compare 
it with the national average. In fact, the publication of these figures even spurred a rivalry between 
cities, arousing public interest and eventually informing aspects of the new public health law in 
1848. 86  
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for every district in England and Wales in reference to the preceding three months. These 
publications are accompanied by remarks, in which their contents are generalized, and 
inferences are drawn on points to which it is desirable that attention should be directed. 
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Thus, although GRO was an executive, rather than a legislative body, its role of overseeing 
all data on the condition of the nation’s population gave it a unique capacity to effect social change. 
While it was particularly focused on improvements in public health, statistical analyses soon drew 
attention to the correlation between disease, mortality and the conditions under which the poor 
lived.  Thus, as Desrosieres, notes, the GRO came to play “an essential role in debates on the 
diagnosis and treatment of a problem that obsessed English society during the entire century: the 
problem of poverty linked to anarchic industrialization and urbanization.”87 If the statistical 
societies were anxious to portray their work as the apolitical pursuit of objective knowledge, the 
GRO made no such distinction between scientific and socio-political ends. Instead, as Desrosieres 
suggests, the GRO functioned according to the norms of both scientific knowledge production and 
the rationalizing, modern state. Indeed, through the production of public (official) statistics 
scientific and bureaucratic authority seem to have reinforced one another.88 
In just a handful of years, the GRO had realized the vision of its first General Registrar, 
Lister, by becoming “the centre of a web of communication… an amazing, almost omnipresent, 
information-gathering body.”89 With its all-seeing view of the nation, the GRO empowered the 
English state in a new, and distinctly modern way, for the centralization of information led directly 
to the centralization of power.90 One could argue that the English state had been in the process of 
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centralization for centuries by this point, but, as Eastwood demonstrates, the will of the central 
government had always been limited by its necessary partnership with local governments, 
necessary because it had always relied on those governments for information. With the New Poor 
Law and the GRO, this had changed, for the commissioners of each district across the country 
were now appointed by those at the centre.  Through the body of the GRO, the central government 
was now able to simultaneously “command, filter and deploy information,” an ability that 
Eastwood suggests, “constituted the kernel of a revolution in government.”91 
                                                          
91 Eastwood, “Amplifying,” 278. Leonard J. Hume explains that an extended debate 
about whether this period could be called a “revolution in government” originated in an article 
by J. Bartlett Brebner in 1948. Contrary to A. V. Dicey’s claim that Benthamism largely shaped 
the laissez-faire individualist character of the government in the Victorian period, Brebner 
asserted that this was a period of intense state intervention, and that it was this interventionism 
which was shaped by Benthamite thought. Following Brebner’s article, scholars David Roberts 
and Oliver MacDonagh reinforced Brebner’s argument by asserting that the administrative 
structure of what would become the welfare state was built in this period, but they viewed these 
developments as pragmatic responses to social problems, and not as the outcome of principled 
ideological positions. Other interpretations of the legacy of Bentham and of the nature of the 
administrative state in the mid nineteenth century followed. The key texts in this scholarly 
debate, which was most active from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s were as follows: J.B. 
Brebner, “Laissez Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth Century Britain,” Journal of 
Economic History, 8 (1948); David Roberts, Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960); Oliver MacDonagh, A Pattern of Government Growth 
1800–60: The Passenger Acts and their Enforcement. (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1961); and 
Henry Parris, “The Nineteenth Century Revolution in Government: a Reappraisal Reappraised,” 
Historical Journal, 3 (1960), 17. For summaries of this debate see Leonard J. Hume "III. Jeremy 
Bentham and the Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government," The Historical Journal 10, 
no. 3 (1967): 361, and G. B. A. M. Finlayson, England in the Eighteen Thirties: Decade of 
Reform (London: Edward Arnold, 1969). Some of the key texts in the debate are collected in P. 
Stansky (ed.), The Victorian Revolution: Government and Society in Victoria's Britain (New 
Viewpoints: New York, 1973).  For a recent treatment of this topic, see Stephen Conway, 
"Bentham and the nineteenth-century revolution in Government," in Jeremy Bentham, ed. 
Frederick Rosen, (London: Routledge, 2017). 
 
363 
  
 
It is not only the government’s more comprehensive access to and control over knowledge 
of the nation that gave it more power. The GRO’s impact on governance went beyond the maxim 
that “knowledge equals power.” It is the nature of the power conferred by statistical knowledge 
that defines the early Victorian period as a shift towards modern liberal governance. The GRO 
helped to facilitate the rise of the professional bureaucratic expert, the regulation and 
standardization of how data is reported and presented, and the panoptic surveillance of a population 
that came to recognize itself in statistical representation.92 Each of these changes have been 
identified by social theorists as characteristic of modern liberal governance. 
The rise of professional experts and the regularisation of data are both related to the 
ascendance of a modern civil bureaucracy. Being at the “centre of a web of communication,” the 
GRO’s role in collecting data and producing statistical knowledge was crucial to this development, 
but it was also part of the wider statistical movement and state-led social investigations of the early 
Victorian period.  According to Eastwood, in the 1830s and 40s, as agencies of the state like the 
GRO began to handle ever greater volumes of information, and used ever more sophisticated 
means to analyze and represent this data to the public, they acquired a “growing monopoly over 
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official information.” In fact, although their original function had been to inform the legislature, 
“a bureaucracy of self-styled experts came increasingly to question parliament's ability to 
assimilate the weight and subtlety of the information with which it was being provided.”93  
Agencies like the GRO were not merely politically independent; they were at the centre of a new 
kind of imperialism, a rational bureaucracy that may have begun as a tool of government, but 
which soon began to shape the modern state itself.  
According to Weber, in a rational bureaucracy, trained professionals occupy their positions 
for the duration of their careers; these positions are arranged hierarchically and are impersonal in 
nature (that is, authority rests in the office, and not the person holding the office). These 
characteristics ensure that the organization functions in a stable and consistent manner. There is, 
moreover, an emphasis on standard rules and regulations and means-ends (instrumental) 
calculation, which facilitates greater predictability of results throughout the organization, 
minimizing uncertainty and contingency. In this way, the bureaucracy is able to control outcomes 
at a distance. 94 
As Wolfenstein notes, the GRO possessed many of the characteristics of the rational 
bureaucracy. Beyond the fact that its positions were permanent, and hierarchically ordered, the 
GRO, from its earliest days, insisted on universal adherence to its standards and regulations. 
Wolfenstein relates two cases in which the new authority of the GRO clashed with older, local 
authorities. In one case, the second Register General, George Graham, found himself in a 
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quarrelsome correspondence with an Anglican bishop, who defended the right of one of his 
clergymen to refuse to register a marriage through the GRO (in accordance with the Marriage 
Act.)95 In the second case, Graham again found himself involved in a tetchy correspondence.  This 
time it was county magistrates who resented the GRO reaching into their own territory. The 
Register General had learned, in 1858, of numerous instances in which coroners refused to hold 
inquests into the causes of death because the county magistrates tended to withhold payment for 
inquests they deemed, post facto, to have been unnecessary. Because the collection of accurate 
death statistics was a central objective of the GRO, such a breach in the reporting of data was 
regarded as intolerable. The Register General thus sent out a circular to all county coroners, in 
which it denigrated county magistrates for obstructing justice and the regularity of death reports. 
The country magistrates, who had always acted independently, were deeply offended, and wrote 
to the Home Office complaining that the GRO was overreaching their authority. After much 
correspondence and argument, the GRO got its way.96 
What these cases reveal to Wolfenstein is that “by the late 1850s... the GRO had become 
integrated into the functioning of the state,” and also that it “had a great deal of influence in the 
regularization of reportage.” 97 Ensuring uniform statistics was important enough to the GRO that 
it did not hesitate to tread on the territory of pre-existing modes of authority. Porter sees the GRO’s 
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insistence on regular reports as part of a wider pattern of behaviour in the information-centred 
institutions emerging in European states in the nineteenth-century: 
The effort by administrators and professionals to create information in a sufficiently 
coherent or standardized form that … could be put to use in far- away places by people 
who lacked intimate knowledge of the conditions of its production. Science plays an 
important role in this production (however incomplete) of homogeneity, but here, and 
often, it depends on an alliance with bureaucratic power.98 
The rational characteristics of bureaucratic agencies such as the GRO enhanced the 
government’s ability to know and control its population from a distance.  It was Weber who first 
identified bureaucratic power and science as partners in this push to rationalize.  And while the 
statistical work of institutions like the GRO may only have been “quasi-scientific” in its early 
history, it was nevertheless motivated by what Porter calls a “scientific spirit…associated with 
systematizing, centralizing, and mathematizing”.99  
With every decade, the GRO expanded its workforce to include ever more office holders, 
each charged with specific functions in one of three departments: Correspondence, Accounts and 
Arrangement and Indexing of Registers. Later, in 1842, a fourth department was added: Statistics. 
While those working within the General Register Office were modestly titled “clerks,” as 
Wolfenstein notes, they were “clerks in name but professional bureaucrats in fact.” 100 Their 
professional expertise in organizing and producing the vital statistics of the nation was an essential 
part of what made the GRO a rational bureaucracy constitutive of the modern state.   
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The defining feature of bureaucratic administration, according to Weber, is “domination 
by virtue of knowledge.” 101 The “clerks” in the GRO were experts because they had exclusive 
access to the production of a particular form of knowledge, one which was essential to the 
functioning of the state.  With the GRO, as with similar state agencies and investigative select 
committees emerging in the mid Victorian period, “it was information which constituted the 
currency of expertise, and as information became more specialized and extensive so the experts 
who could claim intellectual mastery over it became more important to government.” So much so 
that "gradually central government exchanged a partnership with the localities for a partnership 
with experts.” 102 
The GRO was therefore an early example not only of rational bureaucracies, but also of 
what Giddens has called the “expert system”. This is a “system of technical accomplishment or 
professional expertise that organizes large areas of the material and social environment”.103 Our 
lives today are so enmeshed in expert systems in which we play no active role that we are hardly 
aware of them. We tend not to question our faith in the structural integrity of our homes or the 
safety of our roads and traffic systems, but these are just two examples Giddens gives us, of how 
our everyday environment has been organized and guaranteed by unseen systems of experts.  For 
Giddens, expert systems play a similar role in modernity as ‘symbolic tokens’ such as money do. 
That is, they are both “disembedding mechanisms” which “remove social relations from the 
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immediacies of context. Such systems presume, yet also foster the separation of time from space 
as the conditions of the time-space distanciation which they promote.” 104 
On the one hand, such a system bridges distances by incorporating a wide range of 
particular social contexts into its own logic. This, you may remember, is what the Calenberg 
friendly society did when it expanded its membership – and thus its collective risk pool-to include 
those from distant communities.  On the other hand, because an expert system does this through 
means that are out of both the sight and understanding of most people affected by it, it requires 
and elicits an attitude of trust or faith in the legitimacy of those means. In the case of the GRO, the 
distances between the central government and all the localities of the nation were bridged through 
the practice of simultaneously and continuously gathering data from them. The collection of 
statistical data, and its analysis at the central office, provided the government with a continually 
updated and detailed picture of the entirety of the nation, something that would not have been 
possible without the coordination of a host of people with expert knowledge.  
When an expert system such as the GRO establishes itself it usurps local forms of authority 
and knowledge and instead provides “‘guarantees’ of expectations across distanciated time-
space.”105 Because the British government used the information produced by the GRO to make 
policy decisions it had to trust that that information was accurate and that the abstract principles 
used by the statisticians and analysts to find meaningful patterns in the data were sound. As far as 
the populace was concerned, some people did distrust or resent the way the GRO encroached onto 
the terrain of pre-existing forms of governance and into the private lives of citizens.  Indeed, some 
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saw the collection of household data as ““an attempt to create tax lists or even to erode civil 
liberties.”106 Yet, as Wolfenstein tells us, in the case of the GRO: 
A previously unknown governmental bureaucracy quickly and smoothly integrated itself 
into the life, death, and day-to-day (and decennial) actions of the British people…There 
were no riots in the streets, no protests outside Parliament, and no widespread refusals to 
participate in this new reportage. Indeed, at first blush, the whole transformation seemed 
so smooth as to be nonapparent.107 
That the legitimacy of the GRO was generally and almost immediately accepted is rather 
remarkable in a nation and an era notably suspicious of centralizing and interventionist tendencies 
in government!108 Perhaps this legitimacy can be explained by the fact that, like all expert systems, 
the GRO functioned in a way that was both ubiquitous and invisible. After all, ordinary people 
only ever encountered the GRO when an enumerator dropped off and picked up census forms, or 
when they submitted marriage registration forms to an official, and later of course, when they read 
its official reports in the newspapers. It seemed to function as though it had always been there- and 
such an arrangement seems to have made general trust in its motives and methods the default 
response.  
The development of the GRO into an unseen but pervasive presence in British society is 
illustrative of a larger historical development in which “modern state institutions became 
unquestioned parts of the social and political landscape.”109 Indeed, the GRO’s twin characteristics 
of ubiquity and invisibility are central features of the “panoptic” style of governance which 
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Foucault associated with modern liberal states. The Panoptican was the name given by rationalist 
utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham to his model of an ideal prison, in which a guard tower was 
situated at the centre of a circle of individual cells. This arrangement ensured that the warden had 
an all seeing perspective while the inmates in their separate cells could see neither the warden nor 
each other.110 
In Bentham’s model, rational, efficient control of prisoners was built into the architecture 
of the prison itself.  The total view of the prison population, and the separation of that population 
into individual cells optimized surveillance while precluding any kind of coordinated resistance 
among the prisoners. It is this architecture of control that Foucault and others have seen as a 
compelling metaphor for the way that populations are governed in modern liberal states.  For 
control over large, diverse and mobile populations cannot be achieved by physical proximity and 
force, and need not be when there are more abstract means of coercion that can be managed from 
a distance. In its centralized structure-unseen but all-seeing- and its production of demographic 
information, the GRO was both emblematic and constitutive of this liberal mode of governance. 
The statistical division of the population into different classifications, which I will discuss in 
greater detail below, certainly played a role similar to the separate cells of the panoptican, 
neutralizing the potential for mass resistance.  
Yet the parallels between Bentham’s panoptican, and the liberal mode of governance are 
not exact.  For instance, Bentham’s structure prevented the prisoners from seeing each other, 
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solitary reflection and atonement being key tenets of prisoner reform at the time.111 This was not 
exactly the case in the liberal mode of governance arising in the mid nineteenth century. It is true 
that an individualist ethos was central to moral, economic and political discourses in that period. 
Yet that was only one side of the liberal equation. The other side was that, unlike the prisoners in 
their cells, the British public was able to see itself. In the “avalanche” of statistical reports 
published and publicized, the populace saw itself represented in the aggregate and this image of 
itself would become a key instrument in its governance.  
Patterns in the Aggregate: the Law of Large Numbers and the Average Man 
Whether they are compiled by actuaries, scientific institutions or state-related organizations like 
the GRO; whether they are an accumulation of criminal, medical, or economic data, statistics 
always represent mass data. Just as risk is identified by calculating multiple probable outcomes 
rather than measuring any single, isolated outcome, there no such thing as a statistical 
representation of one individual person or unit of information. All the actions made possible by 
statistics - the ability to identify large regularities in a population, to predict future patterns in 
society and to intervene in order to alter those patterns - would not be possible without the 
aggregation of data. While probability theorists of the eighteenth century attempted to harness the 
potential of large numbers, and grappled with the challenge, as Desrosieres puts it, of “conceiving 
the unity of diverse phenomena,” it wasn’t until the nineteenth century that statistical tools were 
found for determining “laws” within large numbers with which social phenomena could be 
objectified.112    
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The “law of large numbers” had first been demonstrated by Jacob Bernouilli in his work 
Ars Conjectandi published in 1713. As you may remember from the beginning of this chapter, 
Bernouilli found that the more times one tossed a coin, the more likely one would be able to 
estimate not the average outcome, but the degree by which the observed average and the true 
average differed. Bernouilli discovered that the more times one observes a phenomenon the more 
probable that a stable degree of error in those observations could be defined. 113 What this signified 
was that with a large amount of data and repeated observations the probable degree of error for 
observations of all kinds could be calculated, even those for which a true average was unknown.  
Bernouilli’s was the first of a number of methods proposed for the measurement of 
uncertainty. Such approaches are not unlike the way a visual artist might create form by defining 
the negative space around it, for the unknown dimensions of some object of inquiry may be 
approximated by defining ever more clearly the limits of probability calculations.  Following Jakob 
Bernoulli, his nephew, Nicolas Bernoulli, and Abraham de Moivre continued to measure 
uncertainty by working on statistical samples.  Seeking to determine how representative of the 
whole a sample of data might be, de Moivre observed that the outcomes of samples tended to be 
distributed around a norm.  The appearance of this “normal distribution”, better known to lay 
people today as the “bell curve,” struck de Moivre as a proof that providential design undergirded 
even the most random and chaotic of phenomena. He concluded that “Although Chance produces 
irregularities, still the Odds will be infinitely greater, that in process of Time, those Irregularities 
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will bear no proportion to recurrence of that Order which naturally results from ORIGINAL 
DESIGN.” 114 
It was not unusual in the eighteenth century for those discovering regularities within what 
first appeared to be chance phenomena, to attribute them to divine providence.115 By the nineteenth 
century this divine attribution was less pronounced, but the order to be found within large numbers 
continued to impress probability theorists and statisticians. According to Porter, the French 
mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace viewed probability as a tool made necessary by the 
limitations of human calculation. Without such limitations, “[a] being who could follow every 
particle in the universe, and who had unbounded powers of calculation, would be able to know the 
past and to predict the future with perfect certainty.” 116 That is to say, certain knowledge and order 
may be beyond our capacity, but would be apparent to any being- like God- with an infinite view 
which could take in each detail. For Quetelet however, individual details were not necessary if 
large patterns could be discerned at the macro level. 
It was Quetelet, the Belgian astronomer behind much of the English statistical movement, 
who found a way to calculate errors in observation in such a way that an average measurement of 
any phenomenon could be determined. In the 1820s and 30s Quetelet had gone on a measuring 
spree, “examining birth and death rates by month and city, by temperature and time of 
day…mortality by age, profession locality, season, in prisons and hospitals.” He measured 
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people’s “height, weight, growth rate and strength, and developed statistics on drunkenness, 
insanity, suicides and crime.”117 But it was when he measured the chest sizes of Scottish regimental 
soldiers that he discovered a new way to calculate the “law of errors” and to construct an average 
of a phenomenon. Previously, there had been two competing methods for determining the degree 
of error in observations of phenomena; one way was to increase the number of observations of one 
phenomenon, this was a “binomial law”- like the repeated coin tosses of Bernoulli.  The other 
came from astronomy, wherein a law of error could be determined from “one measurement of 
several different objects.” Quetelet found a way to combine these approaches in such a way that 
an average measurement of an object- soldiers’ chests, for example- could most accurately be 
determined. 118 
It was in his 1835 work “l’homme moyen”, that Quetelet first applied the combined 
methods of astronomical measurement and binomial distribution to macro-social phenomena. He 
argued that “the greater the number of individuals observed, the more do peculiarities, whether 
physical or moral, become effaced, and allow the general facts to predominate, by which society 
exists and is preserved.”119 From these “general facts” emerged the l’homme moyen- the average 
man. The average man represented the mean attributes of a nation, “in relation to which all other 
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men of the same nation must be considered as offering deviations that are more or less large. The 
numbers that one would have on measuring the latter, would be grouped around the mean.”120 It 
was no coincidence that at the very time Quetelet was engaged in this work, he was also actively 
working to establish statistical organizations in England: the more data of all kinds that could be 
accumulated on that populace, the more detailed the mould of the average man of that nation would 
be. Then, the central tendencies of the nation could be charted over time, predicted, and even 
directed, as could the characteristics of those deviating from the norm. Now, just as astronomers 
had found laws determining the movements of heavenly bodies, it seemed that individual lives 
were determined by unseen social laws. Quetelet referred to this study of social laws as “social 
physics” but we know it better today as quantitative sociology.121 
In the same year that Quetelet first published his ideas about l’homme moyen, French 
mathematician Poisson first coined the term “the law of large numbers” for the regularities that 
could be discovered in aggregate data. This “universal law” ensured that “if one observes a very 
considerable number of events of the same kind, depending on causes that vary irregularly … then 
one finds that the ratios between the numbers of events are very nearly constant.”122 Again, the 
idea that constants could be found in the most disparate phenomena was a thrilling confirmation 
that ours is an ordered world. But this order could only be grasped in the aggregate. Thus, “in 
statistical affairs” Poisson wrote, “the first care before all else is to lose sight of the man taken in 
isolation in order to consider him only as a fraction of the species. It is necessary to strip him of 
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his individuality to arrive at the elimination of all accidental effects that individuality can introduce 
into the question”123  
Neither Poisson’s “law of large numbers”, nor Quetelet’s “average man” went 
unchallenged by their intellectual peers. According to Hacking, Poisson’s theorem was sharply 
criticised by the members of de I'Academie des Science, who questioned both its precision and its 
novelty.124 And yet, the term “law of large numbers” seems to have ignited the imagination of the 
public in France. “No matter that hardly anyone in France understood Poisson’s mathematics,” 
Hacking says, the regularities to be found in any large number of events, 
was taken to denote a profound fact about the world….Thanks to superstition, laziness, 
equivocation, befuddlement with tables of numbers, dreams of social control, and 
propaganda from utilitarian’s, the law of large numbers – not Poisson's theorem but a 
proposition about the stability of mass phenomena - became, for the next generation or two, 
a synthetic apriori truth.125  
And while few in England took Quetelet’s “average man” literally, and mathematicians 
like Cournot attacked it for lacking theoretical vigour, many people were nevertheless drawn 
powerfully to Quetelet’s arguments. 126  His efficient “ability to convert from volatile individuals 
to social solidity” was particularly attractive to the burgeoning social sciences, which could use 
such reasoning to “justify the autonomous existence of the whole.” 127  But the average man was 
understood by many to be a kind of shorthand, and indeed Quetelet consciously used analogies 
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that would enable “the reflective but less gifted to understand something conceptually 
embarrassing.”128 In Hacking’s view, Quetelet’s demonstration of how human traits and 
behaviours clustered around a mean was far from coherent. In it “(t)he mathematics of probability 
and the metaphysics of underlying cause were cobbled together by loose argument to bring an 
'understanding' of the statistical stability of all phenomena.” 129 
  Indeed, Hacking suggests that the incoherence of the concepts – smoothed over by 
Quetelet’s rhetoric- stemmed from the incomprehensible nature of the data accumulated in the 
“avalanche of numbers” at the time. That is, statistics had revealed a world of overwhelming 
complexity that could not easily be accommodated within one coherent theory or framework. As 
Hacking sees it, the fusion of statistics and probability calculation and the discoveries of statistical 
stability at this time are not proof of deterministic laws, but rather the beginning of its erosion- the 
first taming of chance. Thus “a deterministic world view was threatened” by the new statistical 
phenomena, and it was in response to this that Quetelet, his audience, and many others of the 
period imposed a deterministic reading onto statistical regularities.130   
 
                                                          
 
128 Hacking, The Taming of Chance, 110. 
 
129 Hacking explains Quetelet’s argument on pages 110-112. 
 
130 Ibid, 114. Metz argues that the statistical argument “drew it strength from the revelation 
of regularities and the quasi-Newtonian assumption that behind all probabilities there existed some 
great deterministic laws. Out of this consideration sprang the Laplacian demon, out of it grew a 
kind of Benthamite demon, the ruler of the Panopticon. It is the deterministic "if” behind utilitarian 
statistics. This idea inspired environmentalist enthusiasm, and was responsible for the intimate 
relationship between statistics and social reform for years to come.” See Karl H. Metz, “Social 
Thought and Social Statistics in the Early Nineteenth Century: the Case of Sanitary Statistics in 
England,” International Review of Social History, 29 (1984), 261-2.  
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Statistical Fatalism? 
Both the heuristic tool of the average man and the statistical effacement of the individual helped 
to spark a profound debate about determinism across Europe, a debate that informed intellectual 
developments and social policies until well into the twentieth century. To what extent did statistical 
knowledge allow room for the freedom of individuals to shape their destinies? The word 
determinism itself was not used in English until the 1840s. But what the work of Quetelet, Poisson 
and others seemed to suggest to the wider reading public was the idea of “statistical fatalism”-that 
the free will of individuals was constrained by the regularity of large patterns in the population.131  
The public was not, in fact, correct to draw that conclusion from either Poisson or Quetelet’s 
arguments. Just because a certain number of people commit suicide or adultery or steal from their 
employer each year does not mean that the wills of a certain number of individuals are constrained 
to perform these actions. But the concept of a statistical regularity, and of an aggregate 
phenomenon like the average man –an abstract entity treated as a real thing with its own 
characteristics- was new to this public. And, as with today’s public, the conceptual thought behind 
such theories and abstract categories was beyond the grasp of most people. 
It is easy to see why the conclusions of mathematicians and scientists working on 
probability and statistics were interpreted as fatalistic by those outside that small field of expertise 
when these experts themselves were so unrestrained in their language. In 1832, for example, 
reflecting on recent statistical publications, which showed the astonishing regularity with which 
particular crimes were committed each year.132  Quetelet had concluded in a letter to his friend, 
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L.R. Villerme, that: “It is society that prepares the crime; the guilty person is only the instrument 
who executes it. The victim on the scaffold is in a certain way the expiatory victim of society. His 
crime is the fruit of the circumstances in which he finds himself." 133 
Unsurprisingly, these law-like regularities in macro-social phenomena were received by 
many as an alarming repudiation of the individual will. Carlyle, for example, remonstrated against 
the way that the unique lives of individuals were obscured beneath the abstraction of the average 
or the mean in statistical representations.134 In his famous pamphlet on Chartism, he regretted the 
so far ineffectual attempt of statistics to answer questions on the “Condition of England” question, 
especially regarding the question of whether the working class could sustain itself. Statistical 
representation was like the ‘sieve of Danaides,’ through which much that mattered filtered through 
the grasp of its container. Mere numbers and tables cannot capture everything: “The labourer’s 
feelings, his notion of being justly dealt with or unjustly; his wholesome composure, frugality, 
prosperity in the one case, his acrid unrest, recklessness, gin-drinking, and gradual ruin in the 
other,—how shall figures or arithmetic represent all this?”  135  
                                                          
 
133 Quoted in Hacking, The Taming of Chance, 114. 
 
134 Karl H. Metz, “Paupers and Numbers: The Statistical Argument for Social Reform in 
Britain,” in The Probabilistic Revolution Volumes 1 and 2 and Volume 1; Ideas in History, ed. 
Lorenz Krüger, Lorraine Daston, Michael Heidelberger, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
During the period of industrialization. “The attitude that counting men instead of weighing them, 
which was generally ascribed to the statisticians by their critics, was unbearable... Statistics, they 
claimed, reduced men to averages, to a mean man that only existed in one’s fancy,” 348. 
 
135 Metz, “Social Thought and Social Statistics,” 261. For more on Carlyle’s critiques of 
statistics see Wolfenstein, “Recounting the Nation,” 265, and Timothy Alborn, Regulated Lives: 
Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).  
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While Dickens’ early satirical treatments of statistics centred on the frivolity and 
hypocritical moralism of many statistical accounts, his later criticisms were levelled at the growing 
conceit that human behavior could be proved to follow certain laws. In Hard Times, his most direct 
attack on statistical fatalism, Mr. Gradgrind is the ultimate caricature of utilitarian rationality and 
of a world view that reduces all human life to numbers and immovable scientific laws. Indeed 
Gradgrind introduces himself as “a man of facts and calculations…with a rule and a pair of scales 
and the multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh and measure any parcel of 
human nature and tell you exactly what it comes to. It is a mere question of figures, a case of 
simple arithmetic.” At the end of the book, Gradgrind’s own son, guilty of robbing his employer, 
comforts his father with the very philosophy he had taught him: “so many people are employed in 
situations of trust; so many people, out of so many, will be dishonest. I have heard you talk a 
hundred times of its being a law. How can I help laws?” 136 
More than anything, such criticisms of statistical “laws” focused on their dehumanizing 
effect upon those they claimed to represent. This dehumanization was apparent in the upsurge of 
social investigations, in which statisticians and well intentioned reformers of all stripes descended 
into the working and living environments of the lower classes to observe, quantify, analyse and 
experiment with the moral and physical characteristics of the poor. By the mid-Victorian period 
the use of surveying instruments, “the rule and pair of scales and the multiplication table.” had 
extended beyond the domains of the estate land, the laboratory, and the botanical garden, into the 
streets and homes and habits of people. Now and for the first time, the process of objectification, 
                                                          
136 Charles Dickens, (1854) Hard Times (New York: The New American Library, 1961), 
12. 
381 
  
 
by which the future was made malleable and by which time, space, nature, trade and risk were 
tamed, was now directed at the social realm.  
Despite enjoying no small amount of fame during his life, Quetelet’s role in this process 
of social objectification has long been overlooked.  Both Hacking and Desrosieres view his 
innovation in applying the bell curve to social and biological phenomena as a founding moment 
of sociological thought. For Hacking this moment occurred not with Quetelet’s work on the 
average man in the 1835 work, but in 1844, when he,  
transformed the theory of measuring unknown physical quantities, with a definite probable 
error, into the theory of measuring ideal abstract properties of a population. Because these 
could be subjected to the same formal techniques they became real quantities. This is a 
crucial step in the taming of chance. He began to turn statistical laws that were merely 
descriptive of large-scale regularities into laws of nature and society that dealt in 
underlying truths and causes.137  
The result was that means or averages, which are abstract, mathematical constructions, 
came to be treated as objectively real, and as a foundation upon which social engineering could 
begin. 
For Desrosieres, the swing towards the objective or “frequentist” approach to probability 
in the nineteenth century –and public enthusiasm for the regularities discovered in mass 
phenomena - can be understood as a response to the social and political upheavals of the period.  
Quetelet and his contemporaries began to think about the social realm in a starkly different way 
than their predecessors had. The subjective or “epistemic” approach to probability of Laplace, 
having focusing on degrees of belief and the rational choices of individuals, belonged to the 
intellectual context of the Enlightenment.  Disturbed by the sudden events of the French revolution 
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and the unforeseen effects of industrialization, Desrosieres argues, people in the nineteenth century 
wanted to understand society as an entity in itself, to uncover its internal mechanisms:  
Not only was this society henceforth seen as a mysterious whole, but it was seemingly 
viewed as if from the outside. The objectifications and macrosocial realities shown by 
Quetelet responded to this kind of anxiety…The reasonable, prudent human nature 
embodied by the enlightened eighteenth-century scholar was succeeded by the normal man, 
the average of a large number of different men, all of whom shared in a sum that exceeded 
them. 138  
No matter how poorly understood, or how conceptually unsound the average man was, his 
traits and behaviors were measureable, predictable and improvable. So too were the traits and 
behaviors of those sections of the population that could be shown to deviate from the average man. 
The conversion of accumulated population data into aggregate and calculable forms of knowledge 
was treated as a stable enough foundation for the policies and sciences of “the social” to proceed 
with their investigations and interventions. 
Objectification, according to Desrosieres, is about “providing solid things on which the 
managing of the social world is based.” The constitution of “the social” as an object of 
management was achieved when probabilistic efforts to master uncertainty were joined with the 
building of “administrative and political spaces of equivalence” wherein a huge diversity of events 
and people were statistically encoded into quantitative terms.139  That Quetelet was at the centre 
of both of those efforts, the probabilistic and the statistical, is remarkable. But far more remarkable 
is what the objectification of the social made possible in the rest of the nineteenth century:  as an 
object of liberal governance, society was now constituted by host of a new identities stemming 
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from quantitative and aggregate population data; these new identities were then made the object 
of risk classification and management by both the state and private enterprise.  
Binding and Dividing: the Constitution of the Social 
The degree to which statistical representation shapes the way we view ourselves and our place in 
society is rarely appreciated. This may be because the gathering and analysis of statistical data by 
corporate and state agencies occurs so continuously that it tends to escape our notice. This has 
particularly been the case in recent decades as ever more of our activities as citizens and 
consumers are recorded digitally. But many of us are also resistant to the idea that something as 
personal and cultural as identity could in any way be shaped by entities as seemingly divorced 
from our daily lives as state bureaucracies and marketing divisions. In fact, the perception that 
the state exists on a plane entirely separate from our own individual lives and identities is a 
tribute to the enduring success of the liberal mode of governance which emerged in nineteenth 
century Europe.  
The ability to surveil and control political subjects from a distance is a key characteristic 
of modern states and of liberal governments in particular.140  This was the mode of governance 
which developed institutionally in mid- nineteenth century Britain, even as the discursive field of 
governance was dominated by the rhetoric of ‘less government,’ the political correlate of the 
self-regulated market. Yet governing from a distance did not entail “less” governmental 
interference. For, behind the apparently autonomous functioning of  the laissez-faire economy 
and a society composed of rational individuals pursuing their self-interest lay  an unprecedented 
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level of state intervention into the lives of subjects.141 The census and other statistical projects 
were key technologies facilitating that intervention, allowing the state to access, interpret and 
represent the characteristics of subjects in ways that made the population more manageable. That 
is, the population was organized into categories that were most relevant to the concerns of 
government, those relating to the health, security and productivity of the nation as a whole. Once 
newspapers began to publish population statistics in the mid nineteenth century, people began to 
identify both with the aggregated characteristics of the nation and with the specific categories 
into which their own selves fell.  
Just as surveying and mapping the lands of estates changed the meaning and purpose of 
those lands, statistical representations did not merely describe populations but constructed them 
anew. This reconfiguration of the populace is what Ian Hacking has referred to as “making up 
people” and what sociologists and social theorists have described as ‘the constitution of the 
social.’ 142 The construction of the social, as a domain separate from economic and political 
domains is an ongoing process. 143 But it is a process founded in a definite, if gradually 
                                                          
141  Karl Polanyi forcefully challenged the received wisdom that “free” markets were free 
of government intervention in The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
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142 Ian Hacking 'Making up People' in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, 
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emerging, development:  the subsumption of local boundaries through the centralizing efforts of 
modern states. As I have recounted above, the enclosure movement had uprooted actual local 
boundaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the same time, this development 
entailed the colonization of local knowledge and authority. In the early nineteenth century this 
process was given new impetus, as traditional social ties were severed through industrialization 
and urbanization and as the technologies of statistical surveying and aggregate mapping were 
applied to the population. From the quantitative representation of British subjects in the census 
and other statistical projects new kinds of social solidarity and identity were born, which largely 
overshadowed those of the local community. 
Before states like Britain centralized the surveillance and control of their populations, 
people identified themselves differently. Not more simply, for identity had probably always 
entailed some overlayering of different elements such as gender, age and occupation. Instead, 
identity was different because it was shaped by more tangible references. A person would have 
identified with categories they could see in everyday relationships and activities: a person was a 
girl or woman like one’s mother, aunts and baby sisters; or a cowherd like one’s father, 
grandfather, uncles and neighbours. A person was of this village, as compared with the one over 
that hill. The categories created by the state were markedly more abstract: one belonged to a 
group of 6,783 people who were also born with a shrivelled arm; or to a group of 1.5 million 
who belonged to a certain denomination of Christianity, or to a newly titled subclass of labourers 
numbering 12,000.  
One wonders how anyone without previous knowledge of such categories could suddenly 
find themselves identifying with them, as many British people apparently did in the mid 
nineteenth century. There are a few possible answers to this question. First, there is Althusser’s 
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explanation, which is that this recognition is how ideology reproduces the relations of production 
in any given society. Through ideological state apparatuses, such as the church, family or the 
press, concrete individuals are constituted as subjects. That is, they are “interpellated”, or 
“hailed” “in such a way that the subject responds: ‘Yes, it really is me!’” because “it obtains 
from them the recognition that they really do occupy the place it (ideology) designates for them 
as theirs in the world, a fixed residence: ‘It really is me, I am here, a worker, a boss or a 
soldier!’144 Interpellation thus involves a mirror effect, whereby individuals recognize what is 
presented to them, the name (category, class) called to them, as their own. This process occurs 
without any awareness that it is occurring because the “peculiarity of ideology that it imposes 
(without appearing to do so,) obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot fail to 
recognize.” I do not think, as Althusser does, that “It is only from the point of view ...of the class 
struggle, that it is possible to explain the ideologies existing in a social formation.”145 But I do 
find compelling his observation that the subject constituted by interpellation is a subject, both in 
the sense of a free agent who is responsible for his or her choices, and in the sense of “a 
subjected being, who submits to a higher authority.” 146 Thus the free subject submits to his or 
her subjection to the ideology or the classification, in the case we are discussing. 
Hacking, meanwhile, looks at the phenomenon of people recognizing their classifications 
through a more philosophical lens. In “Making up People, he suggests that “numerous kinds of 
human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of the categories 
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labeling them” through a process he calls dynamic nominalism.147 He uses this term to 
distinguish it from a sort of “ideal type” or extreme of the nominalist position, which holds that 
‘all categories, classes, and taxonomies are given by human beings rather than by nature and that 
these categories are essentially fixed throughout the several eras of humankind.”148 In contrast, 
the notion that many (but not all) human identities, behaviours or conditions come into being at 
the same moment that they are named and classified, dynamic nominalism, recognizes that both 
the categories and identities change over time. We only have to look at some of the latest 
categories of identity entering public discourse today-whether biomedical, psychological, sexual 
or socio-economic- to get a sense of the simultaneity of newly created categories and the groups 
of people identifying with them, and how such categories and identities have changed over time. 
149  
Finally, I think we should also consider that when individuals identified with census 
categories it may have had something to do with the rising status and more widespread 
recognition of two relatively new expressions of knowledge: the print medium of newspapers 
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and statistical accounts of numerical “facts.” A greater number of people than ever before were 
consuming the information presented in broadsheets, including many of those who were 
illiterate, for they had publications read to them.  When people were presented with statistical 
reports published in broadsheets they were likely convinced by both the authority of the medium 
–by publishing these facts the paper was guaranteeing their truth - and the purported objectivity 
of numbers themselves 
The fact that many people in nineteenth century Britain identified with the categories 
newly  created by statistics - and even used them as platforms from which to agitate for 
particular rights- does not negate their usefulness to the state in  governing the population.150 
Indeed, this is how liberal governance works. As Foucault explained, it is the self-regulation of 
individual subjects, their willing conformity with norms that makes governing from a distance 
possible.151 Norms for every facet of the human life- medical, occupational, religious, 
                                                          
150 According to Levitan, “people used the census not only to count, categorize and 
control others but also to count, categorize and claim rights for themselves. …In the European 
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distribution of rank. In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it 
individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities, and 
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educational, sexual and so on- were produced and formalized in the averages presented in the 
census and other official statistics.152 These functioned as reference points guiding the behaviour 
and situating the identity of individuals within society. The government itself was the intended 
beneficiary of this orienteering function: mapping and measuring the population would prevent 
political leaders from “legislating in the dark,” and allow them to chart the progress of the nation 
and to identify any threats to the social order.  Once these “maps” of the population were 
publicized, however, their usefulness in orienting the behaviour of individuals and propagating a 
shared national identity became obvious. Such uses were often not recognized until after 
technologies such as the census were deployed. As the author of the ‘Results of the Census of 
1851’ noted, for instance, although the first U.S census, in 1790, was instituted with the aim of 
managing the electorate, “it was soon found, by a self-governing people, that a census ought to 
be a thorough survey and record of society, by which every sort of social experience might be 
embodied for social guidance.” 153 
Meanwhile, regional, class and cultural distances disappeared before the image of the 
aggregate: the nation, in whose average quantities each member was counted.154 Aggregation 
                                                          
to render differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy to understand how the 
power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that 
is the rule, the norm introduces as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the 
shading of individual differences.” 196-197. 
 
152 On the relationship between statistics, norms and governmentality see Nikolas Rose, 
“Governing ‘Advanced' Liberal Democracies." in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, ed. 
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consolidated the population, and this numerical inclusion in the statistical table of the nation 
created a new kind of solidarity and social harmony in what was becoming an ever more 
individualistic society. 155 But this was a homogenizing kind of belonging, originating in 
abstraction. According to Poovey, modern abstraction “tends to generate norms that are typically 
defined as such by numerical calculation” and involves the “imposition of a conceptual grid that 
enables every phenomenon to be compared, differentiated and measured by the same yardstick.” 
156 Like the Euclidean rationalization of space manifested in the mapping of estates and national 
territories, statistical representation rearranged the social boundaries of belonging, situating and 
measuring every individual against the same standard.157 
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155 Levitan, A Culture History of the British Census, 9-10. 
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Maps (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2012), 37-8. 
391 
  
 
Even as subjects were bound together by aggregate data, they were fragmented into ever 
more discrete categories by the classificatory order structuring statistical knowledge. Individuals 
found themselves belonging not just to the national aggregate but also to a number of 
“overlapping identity groups that operated as fractions of the aggregate; each individual was a 
member of an age group, a gender group, a regional group, an occupational group and a religious 
group, for example.”158 This social differentiation became so complex that the importance of 
what had once been a crucial marker of identity- local community- was diminished. By the 1850s 
and 60s, a transition was underway in which people began to identify less with particular, 
concrete phenomena and more with the abstract categories constituted by statistical knowledge.  
In the case of the census, Levitan explains, 
By de-emphasizing geographic communities the census essentially defined the nation as 
the primary locus of identification and analysis and weighted each individual within that 
nation equally and anonymously. This meant that most of the aggregates to which 
individuals belonged were not located anywhere other than the nation, an abstract rather 
than a geographical location…the census, after 1841, rather than pinning individuals 
down, extracted them from their local communities into various nationally based 
demographic groups” 159 
If the local, geographical basis of identity was diminished by the statistical “map” of the 
nation, the historical and epistemological process that went into making such maps was entirely 
obscured behind their presentation as “facts.” Bruce Curtis has described this phenomenon in his 
work on the politics of the census: “statistical objects and practices are ‘blackboxed’; that is, 
their dependence on particular investigative modalities ceases to be visible. Objects and practices 
that emerge out of the world of classification, codification and theoretical formation come to be 
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taken as commonsensical elements of the scientific or administrative domain.” 160 Because 
statistical representations tend to appear as always already complete, the disputes, judgements, 
decisions and omissions behind their creation are never registered by the wider public. The facts 
and categories produced by statistics are thus generally received as legitimate truths, and like the 
commodity form described by Marx, they are perceived as things themselves, rather than mere 
representations of things. This is the process Mary Poovey calls “vivification”, a hallmark of 
modern abstraction.  Whether it takes the form of reification, commodification or fetishization, 
vivification involves the occlusion of relations, practices and histories behind representations.  
Thus, while people began to identify themselves with the demographic aggregates that 
represented them statistically they were seldom aware that such categories were designed as 
instruments of liberal governance. 
Statistical aggregation and categorization created the “administrative and political spaces 
of equivalence” that Desrosieres identifies as the precondition for social objectification.161 When 
joined with efforts to overcome uncertainty through probabilistic thought, such spaces of 
equivalence made it possible to manipulate the realm of “the social” through the self-governance 
of individuals, who compared their own behaviors and identities with that of the average man. 
This is essentially the same phenomenon that Foucault identified when he wrote about 
“normalization.” That is, he saw people’s identification with abstract categories as a new mode 
of the disciplinary power. When subjects learn what the standard characteristics and behaviours 
of “their” category are, they begin to regulate their own behavior in order to conform to the 
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norm. 162 It is ultimately through this self-regulation of individuals that the census and statistics 
facilitated effective control over a large and fragmented population from a distance. 
But some categories of the population were less “equal” than others: Curtis notes, for 
example, that while a census “group(s) subjects together to form a population” certain elements 
within that population “may then be selectively disaggregated and made the objects of social 
policy and projects.”163  As Hacking points out, in Britain, as in other European countries in the 
nineteenth century, these elements – the disaggregated objects of reform- were almost always 
comprised of “deviant” subpopulations, such as criminals, the poor and the mad. 164 It is in 
reference to such groups that James Vernon remarks that “for much of the 19th century “the 
social” had been the dustbin of liberalism, where those unable to improve themselves, or to be 
improved, had been subjected- the arena where difficult but discrete problems … were consigned 
for scrutiny and disciplinary regulation.” 165 These efforts to enclose and improve the social 
realm mirrored efforts that had been directed at land in the previous century. 
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But some of the key demographic categories inscribed by nineteenth century statistics did 
not serve the ends of liberal governance as much as they did the profits of industry. The 
insurance industry was particularly influential in the development of the first official statistics in 
early nineteenth century Britain. For example, because life expectancy was central to 
calculations of annuities and life insurance policies, the industry was in need of statistics that 
divided the population into age groups. In the years leading up to the censuses of 1821 and 1831, 
the industry lobbied Parliament for the inclusion of age as a key category in the census.  Because 
John Rickman, the chief administrator of the census, was intent on keeping the census 
questionnaire as simple as possible, he only partially relented, by dividing males only into those 
under and those over the age of 20.  But after the statistical movement of the 1830s and the 
creation of the General Register Office, the needs of insurers were addressed in censuses which 
subdivided the population into more detailed categories of age and occupation. 166 
Hungry for “large numbers” and the patterns that they revealed, the industry and science 
of insurance played a pioneering role in the development of statistical knowledge, and in 
techniques for governing populations at a distance. Thus before exploring in more detail the 
ordering imperative at work in the state’s classification of the British population in the nineteenth 
century, I wish first to recount the development of actuarial science and the classification of risks 
practiced by the insurance industry in the nineteenth century.  
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Developments in Nineteenth Century Insurance 
Actuarialism 
The fusion of probabilistic thought and statistical “spaces of equivalence” made it possible not 
only to map the terrain of the social, but also to project that map onto multiple imagined futures. 
Conceiving of society as an objective phenomenon in itself, rather than as an abstract aggregation 
of individual phenomena, and conceiving of the future as knowable and mutable, had massive 
implications for how populations were governed and for the identity and behaviour of the governed 
themselves. But it was equally and simultaneously transformative for the burgeoning industry of 
insurance. As I have recounted above, insurance only began to develop into a scientific and profit-
orientated practice in the latter decades of the eighteenth century. Learning from the failures of so 
many schemes that came before them, insurers saw that in order to remain solvent while covering 
the risks of their policy holders they needed a better way of assessing the probability of those risks. 
For life insurance providers, what was needed was “large numbers” showing the patterns of 
mortality, so that policy rates could be set according to the most accurate estimates of life 
expectancy at different ages. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, British life 
assurance companies depended almost exclusively on just two sets of mortality data: the 
Northampton and the Carlisle life tables.   
In Britain, it was the Equitable life assurance company which first employed actuarial 
methods. Founded by mathematician William Morgan in 1762, Equitable began by setting its 
premiums according to data from the London Bills of Mortality. Then, in 1780, it began to use a 
life table compiled by Richard Price which presented the data on 4,689 deaths from 1735 to 1780 
in Northampton. For decades Price’s “Northampton table” was the most widely used life table in 
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Britain, informing the actuarial practices of many other life insurance companies. 167 The 
popularity of the Northampton table was unrivalled until 1815, when Sun Life’s actuary Joshua 
Milne published a new life table based on mortality data from Carlisle from 1779 to 1787.  By the 
1830s the Carlisle table had surpassed the Northampton table as the most relied upon set of data 
for mortality rates, for its data were more recent and it corresponded more closely with the actual 
experiences of the life insurance companies. 
But neither of these tables were without problems. Neither of them had very recent data, 
and they both drew on regional rather than national data. One would think that, once the GRO had 
been established, life assurance companies would draw on the published records of the nation’s 
registered deaths in order to determine their policy rates. While they did make some use of the 
GRO’s statistics, the problem was that life assurance companies needed mortality data more 
directly reflective of the lives they selected for coverage: healthy middle class males. After all, this 
was the sector of the population which had both the financial means and the will to purchase 
policies, while also having less exposure to environmental risks that would shorten their lives. That 
is, the gentry still had the institution of inheritance to protect them in the future, while the working 
classes, besides being unlikely to afford the policies, lived riskier (thus shorter) lives. It wasn’t 
until much later in the century that insurers recognized the untapped potential of working class 
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lives, and it was much later still when women were seen as potential policy holders and not merely 
the beneficiaries of life insurance.168 
The selection of “healthy” lives was deemed necessary to the very survival of a life 
insurance office. As Porter explains, from the perspective of early Victorian life insurers, 
A society that admitted all applicants would soon have a membership made up 
overwhelmingly of the sick and dying, which would be fatal to the company as well as its 
membership. Even if there were general “laws of mortality,” a matter of controversy among 
the actuaries, they provided no adequate basis for the institution of life insurance. 
Nineteenth-century actuaries recognized that their work required creating a domain of 
artificial order. This they aimed to accomplish mainly through the skillful selection of lives. 
169 
To this end, in 1837, life assurance companies hit upon a strategy for accessing the 
particular set of large numbers they needed. They would create a new life table, tailored to the 
needs of their industry, by pooling their collective records. This would not have been possible a 
generation earlier, for the number of insurance companies had grown exponentially, from five 
London based companies in 1800, to 90 across Britain by 1840. 170 By 1843 a new life table was 
created by pooling together the records of seventeen different life insurance companies. The 
unimaginatively named “Seventeen Life Assurance Offices Table” gave actuaries the advantage 
of even larger numbers, based on their pooled experiences of their target market.171  From this data 
actuaries could compare the mortality rates of this particular section of the population with those 
of the general population, and create subdivisions within this group so that policies and liabilities 
could be more accurately determined. Later the pool of contributing life offices expanded to 
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include 20 companies, who produced a “Healthy Males” table that charted the age-specific 
mortality of more than 130,000 men whom doctors had deemed to be sufficiently average to pay 
standard premiums for their life insurance”172 
Classifying Risks: Selecting Lives  
With the more detailed and accurate data provided by these new tables, actuaries for life assurance 
companies were now able to refine their classifications of the policy holder’s according to their 
risks.173 In the first half of the century the selection of lives had been extremely simple: applicants 
were either accepted or, if there was reason to suspect poor health, rejected. Usually this distinction 
was determined by a medical reference supplied by the applicant, or by an examination by the 
company’s own medical officer.174  But with the pool of healthy applicants being spread amongst 
ever more competitors after the passing of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, Life assurance 
companies were pressured to use more sophisticated means of selection.175 What was needed, as 
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Trowbridge explains, was to sort clients into homogeneous risk groups, so that in each grouping, 
the appropriate risk level could be calculated and distributed among the pool.176 
It thus became the practice to sort prospective clients into one of several different classes. 
In the “first class” were the healthiest; in the second, those of “average” health; next there was a 
“doubtful” class and finally a “rejected” or “inferior class.” The further down this hierarchy clients 
found themselves, the higher the premiums they were expected to pay. Still, life assurance 
actuaries focused the bulk of their attention on the healthiest class.177  Alborn cites, for example, 
an 1872 account of the experiences of ten Scottish assurance companies up to 1863, in which a 
small percentage of those applying for coverage were turned away: 7% were classed as “under-
average” and a further 10%, who were women, were assigned their own high risk category. The 
remaining majority were “average” and paid premiums at a standard rate. 178  
While this sort of risk classification is nowhere near as complex as the processes used by 
today’s insurance companies, such examples do reveal a clear shift towards more precise 
calculations in the industry in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was not only due to 
problems like adverse selection and the growing competition in industry itself, but also to the 
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professionalization of actuarial science and intensified efforts to oversee the industry on the part 
of the government.    
Actuaries Professionalize, the Governmental Scrutinizes 
As the industry of insurance grew the knowledge on which it was founded became ever more 
defined and regulated. In the early nineteenth century actuaries had simply been trained 
mathematicians, who applied their knowledge to the field of insurance. But with the expansion of 
life insurance in the mid-nineteenth century, actuarialism became a specialized profession, 
requiring certification with either the Institute of Actuaries, established in 1848, or with the Faculty 
of Actuaries, established in Edinburgh in 1856.179 In time, the industry’s efforts to pool knowledge 
specific to its needs, and to guard and elevate the calculative expertise of actuaries would help to 
establish its legitimacy. 
But the old association of life insurance with speculative gambling, as well as fraudulence, 
amateurism and insolvency lingered for some time. It did so with good reason, for shady practices 
were common enough during this turbulent period in the life insurance industry.180 In fact, it seems 
that of the many insurance schemes which had registered as companies after the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1844, only a minority survived beyond ten years. According to Klaus, in the 
first seven years after the Act was passed, 78 out of 131 new insurance companies failed.181 
Buhlman’s figures for the first nine years after the Act was passed are even more dramatic: 
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“between 1844 and 1853 in Great Britain, 335 new insurance companies were planned, 149 were 
actually formed and a total of 59 survived this period.” Such a failure rate, Buhlmann notes, 
stemmed from the absence of a “proven base for premium calculations” in many companies in this 
period. Such a state of affairs “called for legislative measures to protect the insured.”182 For every 
company that failed, scores-possibly even hundreds or thousands- of policyholders would lose 
their invested premiums, leaving them that much closer to reliance on government aid. 
As I will discuss at length below, the deterrent policies of the New Poor Law had been 
enacted in 1844, in order to reduce such pressure on poor rates.  However, this new system would 
take decades to get off the ground, and anyway, the government was keen to stem the flow of 
poverty at every source. If actuarial techniques could be proven to increase the effectiveness and 
ensure the security of insurance schemes, then the government would eagerly encourage such 
private vehicles for the financial security of the population. For this reason, after the mid nineteenth 
century a series of parliamentary select committees held inquiries into life assurance practices and 
actuarial techniques. As Porter has demonstrated, the government had hoped to find a way to 
standardize actuarial knowledge. However, such hopes were frustrated by the actuaries 
themselves, who insisted that their knowledge– though of a highly quantitative nature- involved 
expert judgement and experience that could not be reproduced.  
Friendly Societies 
If governments in nineteenth century Britain were concerned about the soundness of life assurance 
practices, they were equally interested in monitoring the practices of “friendly societies” which 
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had begun to proliferate in response to the insecurities of the industrial period.183  Friendly societies 
were not unlike insurance schemes, in that members made regular payments into a fund from which 
benefits were dispersed when necessary. However, they functioned purely on the principle of 
mutuality, so that when faced with incidents of sickness, old age or burial costs each member could 
turn to the fund. 184 Unlike commercial insurers, who were selective about what risks they took on, 
friendly societies didn’t discriminate, even on the basis of age: young and old paid the same 
contribution. Nor did these mutual associations invest their funds in order to accumulate a surplus, 
for they were not profit making enterprises.  
Governments were rather ambivalent in their attitudes towards friendly societies. As a form 
of financial security organized by the working classes themselves, friendly societies benefited the 
state to the extent that they kept many of the poorer classes of society “off the funds.” Because of 
this, and in order to foster in the working classes the qualities of thrift, foresight, self-discipline 
and self-help, administrations in the early nineteenth century actively promoted these associations.  
The friendly society was viewed as one of many vehicles for socializing and improving the 
working class in order to facilitate their admission into proper society (an admission that would 
be, in the words of Knights and Vurdubakis, “protracted, sponsored, conditional and incomplete.”) 
185  But working class initiative was double sided. Since any sort of association among this class 
was eyed with suspicion friendly societies could be viewed as a potential breeding ground for 
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“combinations” or even revolutionary activities. Meanwhile, because they were not intent on 
ensuring a surplus, and did not adjust the contributions of members according to their health, age 
and other risk facts, friendly societies were that much more prone to insolvency, ultimately putting 
pressure back on the poor rates.  
One solution, attempted in the 1820s, was to require friendly societies to submit to certain 
amount of actuarial supervision. However, as Porter notes, actuarial science at this point had not 
been professionalized, and anyone could have claimed to be an actuary. 186 It wasn’t until after the 
Institute for Actuaries had been formed in 1848 that some level of governmental control over the 
workings of friendly societies could be tried in earnest. In a series of Parliamentary Select 
Committees inquiring into insurance matters the government sought the alliance of actuaries in 
standardizing their science so that this standard could be legislated for insurance companies and 
friendly societies alike. As I noted above, Porter has demonstrated how reluctant actuaries were 
about such an alliance, for they were protective of their professional knowledge and refused to 
reduce it to quantitative formulae for the benefit of the government. Nevertheless, Parliament did 
settle on a few methods for reforming friendly societies, and created legislation that “encouraged 
them to replace their traditional emphasis on fraternalism and benevolence with actuarially based 
principles of fund management.”187 Two major reforms that were introduced were the requirement 
that members in friendly societies pay contributions according to their risk classification, and that 
each society hire full time collectors to ensure the regularity of payments and keep an eye on 
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contributors’ financial behaviour and any changes in his or her risk profile.   By these means a new 
disciplinary regime had been ushered into the government of working class security.”188 
Industrial Life Insurance 
By the 1850s and 60s Insurance companies began to recognize an untapped market in the large 
number of unskilled labourers who could not afford traditional life insurance and who did not 
belong to the trade guilds from which most friendly societies were formed. Catering to this market 
also meant imposing upon them a disciplinary regime that would counteract their known habits of 
intemperance and improvidence. Much of this regime centered on the weekly visit of the rate 
collector.  A large lump sum to be paid on an annual basis was not thought feasible for a class that 
had little in the way of savings. Instead, a smaller fee could be collected by an agent of the company 
each week, before the family’s weekly earnings could be spent.189 Not only did this have the 
advantage of making life insurance appear affordable to the working classes, but it also allowed 
agents to keep an eye on the physical and financial health of each client. New furnishings in the 
home, for example, would indicate to the agent that the client might be persuaded to invest in a 
better policy. Conversely, the sudden absence of belongings in the home might indicate that the 
client had pawned them. Such signals of financial distress, as well as evidence of ill health, alerted 
the agent to the possibility that the client was a bad risk.190 Agents also urged clients to forego 
spending on more immediate or compelling desires and to focus instead on building a secure future 
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for their families. Industrial life insurers saw themselves as providing a “necessary discipline of 
thrift” in the working classes, and “educating people about the need to insure for the future.” 191 
Insurers as Investors 
The growth of the insurance industry in the second half of the nineteenth century wasn’t limited 
to its expansion into new regions and new markets. Insurance companies were also becoming 
important participants in the financial sector, with ever more sophisticated investment portfolios 
earning them interest on the funds gathered from policy holders. Of course insurance and 
investment were the twin engines that had stimulated the development of the London stock market 
in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth centuries. And as insurance schemes 
proliferated over the next century and a half it was not uncommon for insurers to invest the funds 
of their subscribers in various projects and types of loans.192 By the mid nineteenth century, 
however, the industry had become much more competitive and insurance companies felt an even 
greater pressure to accumulate capital to survive. 193  
Life assurance companies were by far the most active investors among insurers, in part 
because unlike fire, property or maritime insurance, reference to mortality data allowed them to 
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approximate the period in which claims would come due. 194 Earlier in the century life insurance 
companies accumulated capital by lending to the government and to landowners at high rates of 
interest. By the mid-century municipal bonds for public works had become a popular avenue for 
investment and after 1870 insurers invested primarily in what had become a greatly diversified 
and globalized stock market.195 In the second half of the nineteenth century life insurance had 
become one of “Britain’s biggest institutional investors,” drawing the attention of commentators 
like William Farr, who singled out the life assurance office as “a Company of Capitalists constantly 
looking out for long investments, and well organized, to deal profitably in securities at some 
greater risk than those returning 3 per cent interest”196  
Of course, life offices were themselves the depository of capital invested by millions of 
policy holders across Britain.  That this was a wise, prudent and safe way to invest one’s savings 
was a key refrain in the industry’s marketing literature. Even the names of the life assurance 
companies underscored this point: Prudential, The Rock and the Provident, and Refuge, The 
Reliance Mutual, the Guardian. Whether it was aimed at the middle class or the working class, the 
marketing of life assurance worked upon powerful emotions and social norms to convince 
prospective clients that this product was indispensable, a panacea that could allay the fear of 
leaving one’s family destitute in the future, while granting one’s desires for propriety and 
respectability. Above all, the industry’s promotional material aimed to persuade the public that it 
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was an individual’s duty to society to insure the future security of his (or occasionally her) 
family.197  Such moral and emotional appeals were made in tandem with an emphasis on the 
scientific and disinterested nature of the actuarial calculations by which premiums were set. 
At least as persuasive as these arguments was the use of monetary incentives to invest in 
life insurance. As the nineteenth century unfolded it became ever more common for life insurers 
to offer bonuses to clients on a periodic basis, in the form of a reversionary payment, cash, or 
reduced premiums.198 For the insurer, the reversionary payment was the ideal option, for the 
company “could declare a substantial bonus without sacrificing its ability to make long-term 
investments.”199 
Alborn argues that by “publiciz(ing) money’s reproductive powers” life insurance 
companies were crucial in fostering the habit of investment amongst the public. Indeed, by the late 
nineteenth century the British people were investing a huge amount of capital into life insurance 
alone. From this period to the early twentieth century, the proportion of capital invested in the life 
insurance industry as compared with banks and other industries grew exponentially: “In 1880 
British life offices boasted £150m in invested capital compared with £470m in bank deposits; by 
1914 their assets stood at £530m, compared with £1,150m held by commercial banks, £256m by 
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savings banks, £120m by building and friendly societies, and £90m by trust companies.”200   In 
Britain, and to a lesser extent in continental Europe and America, the late nineteenth century 
marked the genesis of insurance as a driving force in financial markets and in national and global 
capitalist economies. 
The State’s Classification and Management of Risks 
Both insurance companies and the state used aggregate data in order to classify populations and to 
select certain classes as objects of calculation.  But where the insurance industry in the mid- 
nineteenth century sought the custom of the least risky class, the state’s attention was focused on 
those classes it considered most risky. This reversal of logic stemmed from the diverging 
objectives of the insurance industry and the state. The calculations of insurers aimed to safeguard 
the profit and survival of their enterprises in a competitive industry. They had no obligation to 
concern themselves with portions of the population which did not further these causes. The state, 
though similarly concerned with long term solvency of the nation in a competitive international 
environment, could not simply ignore the sectors of its population considered unproductive or 
destabilizing. For the health and stability of the population as a whole, the infected portion of the 
social body had either to be healed or excised. There were, as Foucault and others have 
demonstrated, a number of social categories in Victorian England which were deemed high risk, 
both for themselves and for the nation as a whole. Prostitutes, criminals, the insane, or the disabled 
were all targeted for special intervention and isolated from the larger populace.201 But no category 
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was as large or as disquieting to the ruling class as the poor and no intervention was as extensive 
or as central to the embedding of capitalist relations as the New Poor Laws of 1834.  
Though I have so far in this book discussed what I think are some key logics of modernity 
in a roughly chronological order, focusing first on surveying and mapping, then enclosure and 
improvement and now risk and insurance, I hope I have made clear their interactivity. They do not 
strictly follow upon one another with one leaving off for the other to replace it. With the New Poor 
Law we can see each of those logics acting upon the same object:  the surveying and mapping of 
the population through statistical representation; the enclosure of that population into separate 
categories; and the targeting of the poor and their classification either as paupers, a waste category 
to be contained, or as propertyless labourers, a risk class to be managed and improved. 
The New Poor Law: Managing the Risk of Pauperism 
 I follow Polanyi and others in viewing the New Poor Law as a defining moment in modern 
capitalism, for it was an attempt to subsume the social realm within the logic of the market.202 But 
it is equally important as an illustration of modernity’s compulsive- because unattainable- pursuit 
of both order and growth, of both stability and forward movement. The “self-regulating” market 
is an enduring example of the kind of order or foundation created by modernity: based on the 
freedom of individuals to pursue their self-interest, it succeeds in producing growth, but at the cost 
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of greater uncertainty, instability and risk. Instead of supporting the society, this foundation 
requires continual repair and social rearrangement in order to support it. The New Poor Law was 
the first major effort to rearrange social relations to support the unstable foundation of the capitalist 
market. 
Of course this was not how the problem was viewed in the early nineteenth century (or 
how it is viewed today, for that matter).  Rather, the market was largely understood to follow 
natural laws as orderly and immutable as those governing the natural sciences.203  The persistence 
of poverty was in stark contradiction with the harmonious and ordered world envisioned and 
aspired to by political economists and social reformers. The poor may have always been with them, 
but the late eighteenth century production of ever more paupers with no means of sustaining 
themselves was a result of the instability of capitalism and the creation of a class of propertyless 
labourers entirely dependent upon their wages. But again, contemporaries saw the problem as 
stemming not from the system that exposed this class to risk but from the riskiness of the class 
itself. 
Early nineteenth century political economic theory, from Malthus to the architects of the 
New Poor Law, had been shaped in response to the agricultural crisis of the 1790s. At that time a 
combination of factors- declining demand for labour, falling wages and rising food prices- 
produced a surge in the number of people in need of aid. In response, a system of “outdoor” relief 
                                                          
203 See for example, J.W. F. Herschel, (1830) Preliminary Discourse on the Study of 
Natural Philosophy (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1987), 72–73; George Poulett Scrope, 
(1833) Principles of Political Economy, Deduced from the Natural Laws of Social Welfare and 
Applied to the Present State of Britain (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1969), 39, 200; Adam Smith, 
(1776) The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edited by Edwin Cannan. With a Preface 
by George J. Stigler (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1977). 
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(later known as the Speenhamland system) was devised in which allowances were given to those 
without work and compensation given to labourers who could no longer subsist on their wages.204 
The severity of the crisis was such that this form of aid did little to reduce the numbers of paupers.  
In fact, to some observers, such as Malthus, the Speenhamland approach to poor relief only 
exacerbated the crisis by interfering in the laws of supply and demand. By artificially propping up 
wages, real wages were depressed further; by feeding families who would otherwise have starved, 
there were ever more pauper mouths to be fed. Malthus thus called for the complete dismantlement 
of the poor laws, so that the natural forces of the market could be restored. 205 
In the decades following the crisis this analysis of poor relief became a widely accepted 
tenet of political economic thought. While few others wanted to go as far as Malthus, most agreed 
that the existing poor law system needed to be amended. The lessons learned from the crisis of 
1790s were not about the instability of the market or the particular vulnerability of wage labourers 
to such instability. Instead, it was understood that government interference in the form of poor 
relief imbalanced the natural laws of the market;206 that only hunger could prod the poor towards 
productive labour and that if any aid were given at all it should not be “outdoors”- unconditional- 
                                                          
204 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 81-89. 
 
205 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 87. Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the 
Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the 
Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers (London: Johnson, 1798; New 
Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2007), 30. 
 
206 Peter Dunkley, “Whigs and Paupers: The Reform of the English Poor laws, 1830-1834,” 
The Journal of British Studies 20, no. 2 (1981), 135.   
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but rather confined to an institution and made as unattractive an option as possible. These were the 
principles upon which the New Poor Law would be built. 207 
The architects of the New Poor Law sought to sway the choices of those seeking relief by 
maximizing the pains and minimizing the pleasures associated with relief. They came up with a 
two-pronged policy of deterrence: “less eligibility” and “the workhouse test”. Less eligibility was 
intended to reverse the fatal logic of Speenhamland outdoor relief, under which pauperism had 
only proliferated, by reducing the degree of relief offered to a rate below what the poorest labourer 
                                                          
207 For some seminal discussions of the New Poor Law, and the intellectual, political and 
economic forces that shaped it please see Anthony Brundage, The Making of the New Poor Law: 
The Politics of Inquiry, Enactment, and Implementation, 1832-1839 (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1978); Peter Mandler, "The Making of the New Poor Law Redivivis." Past and 
Present, 117 (1987):131; and F. Driver, Power and Pauperism: the Workhouse System, 1834–
1884 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993).  Debates about the motives for the 
reform of the poor laws were ignited at precisely the time when many liberal democracies, 
including the UK and the US, were committed to neoliberal policies that included welfare 
reform, the retrenchment of other social supports and the removal of constraints on free trade. 
On the scholarly debates on the meaning of the New Poor Law at this time, see Peter Mandler, 
“The Making of the New Poor Law Redivivus, Past and Present 117, no.1 (1987) 131; Anthony 
Brundage and David Eastwood, “The Making of the New Poor Law Redivivus,” Past and 
Present, 127 (1990): 183; and George Boyer, "Malthus was Right after All: Poor Relief and 
Birth Rates in Southeastern England," Journal of Political Economy, 97, no. 1 (1989): 93. For 
more recent treatments of the subject see Anthony Brundage, The English Poor Laws, 1700–
1930 (Palgrave, New York, 2002); Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate and Timothy Guinnane, 
“Incentives, Information, and Welfare: England’s New Poor Law and the Workhouse Test,” in 
History Matters: Essays in Honour of Paul David, ed. Timothy W. Guinnane, Timothy, William 
A. Sundstrom, and Warren Whatley, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Sarah 
Tarlow,  The Archaeology of Improvement in Britain, 1750-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Charlotte Newman, "To Punish or Protect: the New Poor Law and the 
English Workhouse," International Journal of Historical Archaeology 18, no. 1 (2014): 122; and 
George Nicholls, A History of the English Poor Law Vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 2016).  For a 
recent work reviewing twentieth century scholarship on the poor within capitalism see Tim 
Rogan, The Moral Economists: R. H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E. P. Thompson, and the Critique of 
Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017). 
 
413 
  
 
could earn. In this way, labour would always be seen as more attractive than aid. In a similar vein, 
the workhouse test was a way of weeding out the undeserving poor. All aid was now to be tied to 
one’s tenure within a workhouse, a prison-like institution wherein one laboured at demeaning tasks 
in exchange for bare subsistence in miserable conditions. This was the crux of the New Poor Law, 
the rational calculus that would convert the “mischievous ambiguity of the word poor” into two 
distinct and manageable classes.208  
The Poor Law Amendment Act passed in 1834, only after decades of social investigations, 
trials and parliamentary debate. Leading these efforts were economist Nassau Senior and social 
reformer Edwin Chadwick, the authors of the Royal Commission on Operation of the Poor Laws 
in 1832. 209 Their approach to the problem of poverty was informed by their own backgrounds, but 
also by a cluster of ideas circulating prominently in the period.210 Among these were Bentham’s 
utilitarian rationalism and Malthus’ notion of the “surplus” population. 211   
                                                          
208 Clarifying this ambiguity by sharply delineating the pauper class from the “self-
sustaining laboring class,” was a chief aim of the poor law commissioner’s report of 1834. The 
phrase “mischievous ambiguity of the word poor” comes from the report itself.  Quoted in 
Englander, Poverty and Poor Law Reform in Britain, 11. Also see the 1894 edition of The First 
Report of the Commissioners for Inquiring into the Administration and Operation of the Poor 
Laws (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1894), 229. 
209 George Nicholls, John Shaw Leferve and Thomas Frankland Lewis were the three 
chief commissioners of the New Poor Law itself.  Senior and Chadwick wrote the report, but 
were not made commissioner. Chadwick, however, was named secretary.  
 
210 Boyd Hilton does a good job of presenting the complexity of these ideas, especially 
with regard to the links between protestant theology and political economy. See Hilton, The Age 
of Atonement. 
 
211 The extent of Bentham’s influence on the construction of the New Poor Law has been 
the subject of vigorous debate among historians, especially in the decades following the Second 
World War.  Indeed, the intellectual context in which the New Poor Law was conceived was far 
too rich and varied to be attributed to the thought of one man. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
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Bentham’s Rational Calculus and Pauper Classification System 
Not only would Bentham’s ideas about human motivation – the calculus of pains and pleasures 
through which people made rational choices- figure prominently in the design of the New Poor 
Laws, but so too would his workhouse designs and his emphasis on bringing classificatory order 
to the amorphous mass of the poor. In his writings on reforming poor relief Bentham proposed the 
creation of a system of some 2,000 workhouses distributed across the nation. In these, paupers 
would be confined and set to productive labour in exchange for sustenance and shelter.  Bentham’s 
“plan of provision” involved firstly dividing the poor into classes. A plan of treatment would be 
adjusted for each class with the aim of minimizing the expense of sustaining them while 
maximizing the profit from their labour: 
For some of the classes a peculiar mode of provision is requisite, different as between class 
and class; as in the case of infants, lunatics, idiots, the deaf and dumb, and the blind. The 
rate of neat expense per head, as between class and class, is also susceptible of a very 
extensive scale of variation: the quantum and value of return, actual or possible, in the way 
of labour, by the produce of such labour, is again susceptible of a scale prodigiously more 
extensive.212 
In Bentham’s proposal the indigent were broken into several large classes, which were then 
subdivided into ever more specific categories. For example, those whose indigence stemmed from 
                                                          
deny the elements of Bentham’s thought that do appear prominently in the final poor law report of 
1834.  For a summary of the debates which took place largely in the period between 1945 and 
1975, please see Stephen Conway, "Bentham and the Nineteenth-Century Revolution in 
Government," in Jeremy Bentham, ed. Frederick Rosen, 597-616 (London: Routledge, 2017), or 
footnote 771, above.  
 
212 Jeremy Bentham, “Observations on the Pauper Population Table, Hereunto Annexed:  
a Table of Cases calling for Relief—a general Map of Pauper-Land, with all the Roads to it: 
Situation and Relief of the Poor – Tracts on Poor Laws and Pauper Management,” 1796-8, in The 
Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 8 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838-1843), at 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-works-of-jeremy-bentham-11-vols  
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“personal or internal causes” were then divided into those with an “infirmity of mind” and those 
with an “infirmity of body”.  Each of these were then broken down into an extensive list of 
variations. Other major classes included those of “non-age” or “old age” (those either too young 
or too old to work productively) and “out of place hands.” This latter class, the unemployed, was 
subdivided by occupation, as well as by the causes of the cessation of their work.  
Among the many detailed arrangements intended to heighten the efficiency of the 
“Industry-house system,213 Bentham’s plan included the two key principles that would become the 
core of the New Poor Law of 1834: the containment of all paupers within the workhouse, and the 
reduction of all relief to the barest minimum. Both of these principles were envisaged by Bentham 
as the practical application of his theory on utility, in which individuals chose the least painful, or 
most pleasant of the options presented to them.214  Presented with choice of losing one’s liberty in 
the industry house, or sustaining oneself through productive labour outside of the industry house, 
most people would choose the latter. Likewise, presented with the choice of bare sustenance within 
                                                          
213 Bentham had an ingenious and idealistic plan for getting the maximum productivity 
from even the most incapacitated of industry-house inmates: the blind could do things that did not 
require sight, and even the “lunatic” could be put to work on some simple tasks. The key to 
employing all the inmates was that no person should be employed in a task which someone with a 
lesser ability could manage. Similarly, he imagined that particular combinations of inmate classes 
could be housed together for maximum comfort: the blind, for example, could be placed in 
proximity to the disfigured, the deaf, next to the more raucous lunatics and so on. Conversely, 
Bentham urged the “separation of the indigenous and quasi-indigenous stock of the non-adult 
class, from the coming-and-going stock, who might excite hankerings after emancipation, by 
flattering pictures of the world at large.” Bentham, “Outline of a Work Entitled Pauper 
Management Improved”: Book 1, in Tracts on Poor Laws and Pauper Management. 
 
214 Bentham, (1789) “On The Principle of Utility,” in An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1907), Accessed through Library of 
Economics and Liberty Online, http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML1.html. 
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the industry house and slightly better conditions provided by selling one’s labour, most people 
would again choose the latter.215    
The “Industry-house system” was, for Bentham, “the only possible means, of extirpating 
mendicity.” For, he argued “in this country, under the existing poor laws, every man has a right to 
be maintained, in the character of a pauper, at the public charge: under which right he is in fact… 
maintained in idleness.” Only by compelling paupers to labour productively could this scourge of 
idleness be stopped.  While the labour of inmates was central to the workhouse system that came 
into being after 1834, it was never carried out to the profitable extent imagined by Bentham, for it 
was administered by the state and not as Bentham had urged, by a private corporation following 
“mercantilist principles”. The profit motive was, for Bentham, a key factor in encouraging the 
pursuit of maximum efficiency. Not only would the New Poor Law be less efficient and profitable 
than Bentham’s plan, but it also fell far short of Bentham’s ambition to tailor the treatment of 
pauper’s according to their specific circumstances.  Bentham had argued that it was indeed 
important to determine whether individual paupers were or were not to blame for their own 
indigence, but cautioned “that every plan of provision which regards the indigent, in the lump, 
either as virtuous or as vicious—either as objects of pure compassion, or as objects of pure 
                                                          
215 Bentham explains, in a section titled  “Compulsion Indispensable,” how these principles 
would apply in the case of beggars: “It would be absurd to expect that… by any good 
management—the Industry-house provision could be rendered generally acceptable to beggars: 
that is, that a system which affords bare maintenance—maintenance in the most frugal and least 
luxurious shape—nor that otherwise than on the condition of working, as far as ability extends, to 
the full amount of it, should be preferred to a mode of life exempt from working—to the condition 
of him who is not at present the lowest of those who are maintained in idleness.” Thus, the 
functioning of the industry house system depended upon the outlawing of begging. Bentham, 
“Outline of a Work Entitled Pauper Management Improved.” 
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coercion or pure neglect—must be fatally erroneous.” In practice, the classificatory system 
accompanying the New Poor Law tended towards this fatal error. 
Once they were established in the 1830s and 40s the reality of the workhouses fell far 
short of Bentham’s vision. Instead of tailoring the treatment and institutional space for each 
specific sub-class of pauper, the Commissioners of the poor law board soon settled for a simpler 
scheme wherein paupers were divided by age, and gender and health. This was partly because of 
the prohibitive cost of building separate workhouses, for although the New Poor Law was 
administered centrally, its funding was the responsibility of each district.  Thus, conditions of 
workhouses varied from district to district. 216 But even the simplified division of paupers by age, 
sex and health was a cause of great distress and demoralization among workhouse inmates. It 
meant that family members were separated from each other for the duration of their stay, as if the 
condition of pauperism negated one’s right to family.217   
Nevertheless, the ruthless efficiency and calculative logic of the New Poor Law never 
fully achieved the transition from theory to practice. Not only was it too expensive to erect 
separate workhouses for each classification of pauper, but across the country the ban on “outdoor 
                                                          
216 Englander, Poverty and Poor Law Reform, 29. Englander explains that, in subsequent 
decades there were some classes of paupers for whom specific provisions were made, based 
largely on their particular vulnerability and/or their innocence in finding themselves in the 
condition of pauperism. In time the infirm, pauper children and the aged were partially exempted 
from the strict calculus of the New Poor Law. In the latter half of the century medical care was 
made ever more available to the poor outside of the institutions and classification of pauperism. 
That is, people, by being sick, were not instantly pauperized. Meanwhile, it was thought that 
pauper children could be improved, - and their morals guarded- by being separated from the 
“unwholesome influence of the general mixed workhouse” and educated in barrack schools. 
Finally, towards the end of the century elderly paupers were favoured with better conditions. At 
least for these “deserving” poor, a less punitive and more socialized approach to relief was being 
tried. See 25-6. 
217 Besley, Coate, and Guinnane, “Incentives, Information, and Welfare,” 10. 
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relief” was resisted again and again. According to Englander, in industrial centres poor law 
guardians were often unwilling to enforce the ban because industrialists made it known that they 
wanted the poor to be available for upturns in the trade cycle. If they were confined to 
workhouses during the slow periods, the poor would also not be on hand when their labour was 
needed.218 This, of course, contradicted the popular justification of the New Poor Law as the 
means by which the poor could be better incorporated into economy. It also revealed the extent 
to which pauperism and unemployment were attendant features of the market economy itself and 
thus, how ineffective a tool the New Poor Law was in addressing such problems.219 
Malthus Returns: the Poor as Surplus Population or Waste 
Bentham’s utilitarian calculus may have helped to shape the institutions and policies of the New 
Poor Law, but the consensus on and will to reform the poor law system was largely influenced 
by Malthus’s theory on population and the causes of chronic pauperism. While his Essay on 
Population was originally regarded as exceedingly bleak, by the 1820s a consensus had formed 
around Malthus’ idea that the poor represented a surplus population.220 There were a number of 
reasons why political economists and social reformers may have become receptive to the 
language of “surplus” or “redundancy” at this time. First, surplus implies an order, or an ideal 
balance that has been breached. Not only does the trespass of a natural limit affirm the idea that 
there is indeed a natural order hidden beneath the apparent chaos of human affairs, but it 
suggests a clear way of restoring that order: the subtraction of the surplus. This appealed not only 
                                                          
 
218 Englander, Poverty and Poor Law Reform in Britain, 29. 
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because it coincided with the optimistic view that social and economic relations were guided by 
natural laws, but because it suggested such relations could be uncovered and resolved with the 
unambiguous neatness of mathematical logic.221  
As I mentioned in the section on the rise of the census and statistics, the quantitative 
representation of social affairs only accrued legitimacy in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, as the advantages of its chief characteristic- objectivity- became apparent. Numerical 
representation, with its universal application, answered the need at that time for certain 
knowledge of the shape and scope of the nation’s population. The retrieval of numerical data on 
the population by the centralized efforts of the national census afforded government the 
comprehensive and “impartial” view it needed.  Thus, as Levitan notes, “The notion of surplus 
population arose alongside and in dialogue with the development of the census, the dramatic 
population growth that it documented, and the increasing sophistication by which the population 
was internally differentiated.”222 Now that the unproductive portion of the population could be 
identified numerically, its disproportionate, “surplus” character could be confirmed as a 
mathematical fact. 
                                                          
221 Levitan explains that the census, in counting the productive and non-productive 
members of the nation, reinforced the notion that there was a significant and quantifiable 
proportion of the nation that exceeded the natural balance, bringing the nation into disorder. 
Meanwhile, Poovey has argued that when Malthus revised his Essay on Population, eliminating 
much of its providentialist content and adding to it extensive numerical data, he helped to 
reshape “the cultural connotations of numerical representation.” According to Poovey. Malthus’ 
focus on numbers, devoid of the religious significance it had been given in eighteenth century 
Christian Platonism,– is precisely what repelled so many contemporaries and later romantic 
critics. In time, however, the amorality of numerical “facts” was associated with the greater truth 
claims of objective knowledge, 283.  
 
222 Ibid, 47-48. 
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Finally, the concept of a surplus population made up of paupers can be seen as an 
extension of the eighteenth century discourse on productivity versus waste. Waste land, as I 
discussed in chapter three, was land which was not being put to “productive” use. It served 
neither for growing crops nor as pasture nor for the extraction of natural resources for industry. 
Further, having no individual owner attached to it by law, it attracted strays. The vagrants and 
other commoners who lived or fed upon it were thought to be as unnamed, ungoverned and as 
dangerously disordered as the wasteland itself. In order for productive land - property that 
contributed to the nation’s economic wealth- to thrive, the obstacle and infection of wasteland 
had to be contained.  
Such thinking recurred in the early nineteenth century commentary on the “question of 
pauperism.” Paupers were those unassigned to any productive labour, and their dependence on 
relief, or upon some illegitimate means of sustenance, was viewed as a drain upon all 
productivity and wealth. Both the able-bodied poor and true paupers, those who were unable to 
work for reasons beyond their control (infants, the aged, the sick), had to be contained somehow, 
so that their condition did not spread to the rest of the population. And like wasteland that had 
the potential to be made productive, the able-bodied but unemployed had to be converted 
somehow into a productive resource.  
For Edwin Chadwick, enthusiastic “statist” and “overpowering poor law official,” the 
unproductive and infectious character of the surplus population of paupers was quite literally 
linked to waste.  After his work on the Poor Law Report in 1834, Chadwick applied his interests 
in poor law reform and statistics to an investigation of the sanitary conditions of the urban poor. 
When an outbreak of typhus spread across a poor section of London in 1837 the poor law 
commission, alarmed by its impact upon poor relief spending, sent three physicians to study the 
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problem. The physicians determined that the problem stemmed from miasmata- the release of 
poisons into the air from decomposing or waste matter from animals, humans and vegetation. 
The solution to the problem was better sanitation- the removal of waste as well as the building of 
sewers, cleaning of streets and improvements in ventilation.223  
Though Chadwick himself was not a physician he launched a series of investigations into 
the state of sanitation in poor neighbourhoods, the results of which were published in 1842 as the 
Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of G. Britain. 224 Among other 
things, these investigations measured the “daily average and yearly aggregate productions of 
excrement” of the poor. As Poovey puts it “the critical products that interested Chadwick were 
labour and waste; in the overall social calculus he recommended, the object of the government 
was to increase the former by efficiently eliminating or redistributing the latter.”225 While the 
improvements of the sanitary conditions of the poor over the decades to follow was an unalloyed 
good, saving the lives of countless people and establishing the crucial role of public health in 
government, bureaucratic interventions such as Chadwick’s also illustrate how the risky category 
of the poor was managed through the logics of enclosure and improvement. After all, the Poor 
Law Commission’s inquiry into the typhus epidemic stemmed from its concern about an 
overreliance on poor relief, while Chadwick’s own investigations were an attempt to make the 
                                                          
 
223 Metz, “Social Thought and Social Statistics,” 265. 
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New Poor Law system more efficient.226 The goal in both cases was to eliminate or contain the 
contagion of pauperism while improving the productive capacity of the poor in general.   
Pervading the discourse on surplus population was an instrumental evaluation of the 
worth of human lives. That is, the worth of a human life was not seen as intrinsic but as 
conditional upon behaviors or characteristics that aligned with the objectives of an external 
entity: the nation state. Because the lives of paupers did not contribute to the national objectives 
of economic growth and political stability, they were viewed as surplus, redundant. These were 
lives to which no worth was attached, a condition that Agamben, in his work on sovereign power 
and modernity, has called “bare life.” Agamben explains that whereas in previous periods this 
“natural life”, zoe,  had been considered sacred (homo sacer), after the emergence of the modern 
nation state only those with bios - lives constituted by the polis - were recognized. Homo sacer, 
excluded from the polis, now existed in a state of exposure, unclothed by the rights and 
protections given to bios.227 Before the prolonged efforts to reform the poor law system, the poor 
                                                          
 
226 Metz, “Social Thought and Social Statistics,” 265; Poovey, The Making of a Social 
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227 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. By Daniel 
Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
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were members of the polity. They may have occupied a position at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, but through customary rights and “outdoor relief” they were protected from full 
exposure to the risks of starvation.  With the passing of the poor law reform act, paupers were 
essentially stripped of any claim to protection from the polis. Their choices were pared down to 
either mere subsistence in the condition of detention or a life of animal scavenging for survival: 
bare life. Just as the containment or conversion of wasteland and commons constituted private 
property, the containment or conversion of the poor constituted the political subject. For all the 
theoretical and practical classifications of paupers, and the classifications of the population, the 
fundamental classification in the era of classical political liberalism was the division between 
those with bare life and those with bios. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with the emergence of two important nineteenth century technologies for 
knowing and controlling a large population from a distance. Britain’s national census and the 
statistical movement of the 1830s provided the government, and social reformers of all sorts, to 
map the population and identify risks within it. I then attended in some detail to the innovations in 
probability theory, such as the law of larger numbers, which allowed users of statistical knowledge 
to see large patterns in aggregated data. Such knowledge was essential both for the growing 
insurance industry and for the centralized administration of the government at the General Registry 
Office. In fact, we may think of the GRO as the government’s estate surveyor, since it took in 
information from across the nation and reported back. Two different maps of the nation were 
developed from statistical and census data: an aggregated national identity and a classification of 
the population into discrete categories. People began to recognize both the nation and their own 
particular categories as belonging to them. If the Victorian government had replaced Divine 
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Providence as the risk manager of society, it shared this role, to some extent with informal mutual 
aid societies and insurance companies. I end the chapter with the case of the New Poor Law, which 
sought to either contain the risky class of paupers through detention and improvement, or to cast 
cast them out of the polity, leaving them to “bare life.” 
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Chapter Six 
Risk and Insurance since the Late Nineteenth Century: “Social Property” or  
“Risk Society”? 
This chapter focuses largely on twentieth century developments in insurance and risk, not only in 
England, but internationally. It begins, however, with a sea change that took place in the late 
nineteenth century, when many governments began to recognize the degree to which a large 
propertyless class of people with no access to security was the greatest of all risks to the liberal 
capitalist state. Seeing that the New Poor Law solution of “contain”, “improve”, or “cast out,” was 
not working, reformers began to push for the socialization of insurance. I trace the development 
of these efforts from the patchwork of different schemes to the consolidation of the welfare state 
in the years immediately following the Second World War. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, both liberal governments and the insurance industry shared the role of managing the risks 
of citizens. Together, social insurance and the global industry of private insurance began to shape 
and regulate our lives. I then explore the “rise of risk” since the 1980s, from the dawn of 
neoliberalism to today, the period most associated with “risk society.”  How has risk management 
evolved in the era of shrinking social services and the deregulation of industry and finance? What 
do the risks of global warming, terrorism and global financial crises mean when we reflect on the 
evolution of risk taking and risk management from the eighteenth century on? I conclude that in 
the modern effort to shelter from the risks of an uncertain future we have not yet learned that, far 
from guaranteeing security, attempts to control and calculate future events have tended to create 
ever more insecurity and uncertainty 
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The Shift towards Socialized Insurance in Late Nineteenth Century 
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century there was a shift in the British governments’ 
approach to the problem of poverty. Whereas the regime of the New Poor Law had attempted to 
weed the poor out of the polity, a new strategy gaining ground from the 1870s focused instead on 
containing the risk represented by the poor by granting them some basic access to security. Among 
the factors contributing to this change were the ineffectiveness of the New Poor Laws in reducing 
poverty, the inadequacies of corporate and mutual insurance organizations in protecting their 
members, and a climate of economic insecurity and philosophical pessimism about the prospect of 
endless progress. 
The deterrent policies of the New Poor Law were widely resisted and resented. Far from 
redirecting the poor into the capitalist economy, recipients of workhouse aid were burdened with 
a stigma which effectively barred them from future employment.1 Furthermore, there was little 
proof that poverty as a whole was decreasing under the New Poor Laws. Some of the pressure on 
the poor rates was relieved by industrial life insurance and friendly societies which provided some 
sort of financial security to sectors of society that were more susceptible to destitution while 
training them in the habits of thrift. But neither corporate nor mutual insurance schemes were 
without their critics in political administration.   
Friendly societies, as I mentioned above, were susceptible to insolvency. Meanwhile, 
industrial insurers spent so much capital employing an “army of agents” to visit the homes of 
policy holders that the rate of return for those policy-holders was minimal. Worse still, 
encouraging these agents to “upsell” bigger policies only led to the cancellation of policies when 
                                                          
1 Poovey, Making of a Social Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830-1864 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 108-9. 
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clients couldn’t afford to make the payments. While the loss of money already invested in such 
policies only brought working class families closer to the workhouse, cancelled policies were a 
boon to insurers. According to the Northcote Report On the 1874 Royal Commission on Friendly 
and Benefit Societies, “the lapsing of policies amounted to windfall profits through `confiscation 
of the premiums of its members,'2 Industrial insurers touted their role in inculcating habits of thrift 
among the poor, but with negligible returns on their savings, such thrift was dismissed by critics 
as “useless.” Useless thrift, which wasted efforts to save among the working classes, was an unjust 
and inefficient means of governing working class security. Moreover, some questioned whether 
the virtue of thrift was being developed at all, if clients were constantly prodded towards it by 
insurance agents. 3  
With these concerns in mind, the British government began to challenge industrial insurers. 
As early as 1865 Prime Minister Gladstone began the construction of a rival system of life 
insurance, one that would be led by the state. Hoping to “drive industrial insurance companies 
from the market,” his scheme did away with the costly and intrusive role of collectors, and 
encouraged policy holders to make small and regular payments to the Post Office. Not only would 
this bring them a better rate of return, but, since the Post Office had no financial interest in securing 
new policies, they would also be spared the sort of upselling tactics used by insurance agents. 
Unfortunately, when this new system proved to be unsuccessful it confirmed the insurers’ view 
that the poor had to be cajoled into habits of thrift and saving. 4 Rather than quitting the scheme 
                                                          
 
2  Royal Commission to Inquire into Friendly and Benefit Building Societies, 1874.  quoted 
in O’Malley, “Imagining Insurance: Risk, Thrift and Life Insurance in Britain,” Legal Studies 
Research Paper 9, no. 119 (2009) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491898, 8-9. 
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altogether, the government expanded the system to include other forms of insurance coverage and 
grudgingly adopted the practice of sending the collectors into policyholders’ homes. This was an 
unpopular move. Aside from it being thought a duty beneath the dignity and objectivity of 
members of the post office, it contradicted the central commitment of liberal government to less 
intervention in the lives of citizens.  While the post office scheme limped along for a few more 
decades, its importance lay not in its practical success as an insurance office, but in its having been 
the first of many attempts by the state to directly arrange for the basic security of its citizens. 
Meanwhile, the government, which had so far struggled to regulate private insurance 
schemes and friendly societies, attempted a more far reaching reform with its passing of the Life 
Assurance Companies Act in 1870. Under this Act life assurance companies were to be constrained 
by a number of conditions, including a £20000 surety to be paid upon the founding of each 
company, a strict separation of life from other kinds of insurance, and submission to periodic audits 
by external actuaries.5 According to Mcfall, this Act “prompted waves of panic across the 
industry” not only because of its terms but also because of the broader question it seemed to raise: 
whether the market was the appropriate means of distributing life insurance at all. 6 Many 
responded to this question in the affirmative, arguing that the government should not interfere at 
all, or that it should limit its role to regulating the industry. But there were others too, who felt that 
the central government should take on entirely the management of insurance on lives. 7 
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5 Liz McFall, “Prudentialism and the ‘Missionaries’ of Life Assurance,” CRESC Working 
Papers, 32 (2007):13. 
 
6 Ibid, 13. 
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In fact, at this time, support was growing for national and compulsory insurance of all 
kinds. In the 1870s and 80s a number of proposals were submitted to Parliament for consideration, 
including a compulsory health insurance scheme and a nationwide general insurance system.8 
These advocates of a public approach to insurance were not only responding to the corruptions and 
limitations of the insurance industry, but were also inspired by the apparent efficacy of the system 
in Germany, where national socialized insurance had been in place for decades already. While 
Parliament rejected these early attempts to nationalize insurance, it wasn’t very long before similar 
schemes were supported by legislation. Industrial accident insurance and old age pensions were, 
for example, nationalized as early as 1897 and 1908.9  By the turn of the twentieth century the state 
had begun to bear some of the collective risks of its citizens: in the decades to come it would 
progressively take on the management of ever more of those risks. 
But this turn towards socialized insurance may not have happened had there not been a 
major change in thinking about poverty in the 1870s and 80s. This involved the recognition that 
poverty was an enduring problem, one that could not be solved by the neat equations of utilitarian 
rationality. The main focus of one such equation, underpinning the New Poor Law, had been the 
conversion of the “undeserving” poor into productive labour. These were able bodied individuals 
who, though capable of employment, were not regularly engaged in it. For much of the nineteenth 
century the prevailing opinion was that such people had not been willing to work. Yet, after 
decades of applying the less eligibility principle and the workhouse test this category of the poor 
                                                          
 
8 David Knights and Theo Vurdubakis, "Calculations of Risk: Towards an Understanding 
of Insurance as a Moral and Political Technology," Accounting Organization and Society 18, no. 
7/8 (1993): 750. 
 
9 Ibid, 752. 
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remained undiminished. Further disenchanted by the economic depression of the 1870s and 80s, 
many began to question the inherent harmony that had been attributed to market forces since the 
time of Smith. If –as it began to appear- disruptions and crises were just as inherent  to the market 
as its harmonious elements, perhaps the hordes of unemployed seeking aid were not merely 
unwilling to work, but were systematically confronted with a lack of demand for their labour. The 
promise of full employment and the precepts of political economy were increasingly brought into 
question. 10 Among those challenging the notion that poverty emanated from the moral failings of 
individuals were early social scientists like Charles Booth, whose investigations of the working 
poor in the 1880s and 90s provided empirical evidence of social and structural causes of poverty. 
11  
Increasingly, a host of problems were now being redefined as social risks. 12 Not only were 
those suffering poverty exposed to more insecurity than any other group, but the persistence of 
their condition threatened the security of the entire society and of the economic system by which 
it was circumscribed.13 The uprising in Paris in 1851, and the gathering force of socialist thought, 
were ready reminders to the governing class that those who have little to lose can wield the weapon 
of their numbers and shake the stability of society. As Castel explains, the entrenchment of 
                                                          
 
10 Ibid, 748-9. Also see Jose Harris, “Victorian Values and the Founders of the Welfare 
State” in Proceedings of the British Academy, 72 (1992): 167-8.  
 
11 Knights and Vurdubakis, “Calculations of Risk,’ 748. 
 
12 Jose Harris, “Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940: An Intellectual 
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capitalism in the nineteenth century had made property ownership the condition of entry into the 
polity. The propertyless were, of course, always the majority of the population, both in France, the 
context for Castel’s discussion, and in Britain. However, as Castel notes, only with the rise of 
industrialization was the role of the propertyless in the economy recognized. To preserve the 
system of private property those excluded from it had to be appeased with some other form of 
property. They had to be admitted to the polity at least to the degree of offering basic security.  
In the late nineteenth century few could deny the unremitting growth of a class of people 
with no property or security beyond their labour- labour that was only periodically in demand. The 
threat to social stability that such a class of people represented may well have been the deciding 
factor that convinced the British government to take on the insurantial role of managing social 
risks. Yet the fit between the logics of insurance and liberal governmentality had been recognized 
long before this period. For at least a century, both friendly societies and insurance companies had 
been held up as the ideal models for organizing and optimizing social relations among autonomous 
individuals. But the more explicit state management of social risks did not mean that private 
insurance simply stepped aside. Instead, over the next few decades responsibility for the 
management of risks was divvied up between state and private insurers, and it took another major 
economic crisis- the great depression of the 1930s- before a more robust system of social protection 
was constructed in most liberal democracies.  
Social Property?  
Early 20th Century Insurance in Britain 
For those of us who have lived through the neo-liberal assault on the welfare state, it is all too 
easy to accept the view that the state and the market are opponents in a protracted conflict. This 
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antagonistic relationship is not, however, born out in the history of socialized insurance. True, by 
the close of the nineteenth century there had been a shift away from the rhetoric of “less 
government” and the practices of laissez-faire political economy.  Positivist methodologies, 
mechanistic views of society, and the promotion of the rational self-interested individual that had 
all helped to shape the New Poor Law had fallen out of favour.14 Above all, there was a growing 
recognition that problems like unemployment and poverty were “social risks.” But while 
“socialized insurance” gained legislative purchase in the early twentieth century in Britain, the 
idea of socializing, or pooling risks at the national level was not new. As early as 1772, Richard 
Price had attempted to tie his annuity scheme to a reform of the nation’s poor law system, and in 
the following decade John Ackland had proposed applying friendly society principles to poor 
relief. 15Neither these, nor a handful of late nineteenth century attempts to nationalize insurance 
succeeded.16  Yet, when the British government did begin, in the twentieth century, to adopt 
insurantial technologies to address social risks, it was not so much turning from an individualist 
to a collectivist model, as it was extending the logic of liberal governmentality. 
  As a technology that manages individual risks indirectly by pooling them, insurance 
offers an organizational solution particularly applicable to the core problem of liberal 
governments: the maintenance of both social cohesion and individual liberty. It should not, 
therefore, come as a surprise that some of the figures most closely associated with both classical 
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15 Knights and Vurduburkis, “Calculations of Risk,” 751. 
 
16 For example, Cannon W. Blackley’s 1878 proposal for a compulsory “national 
insurance” that would replace existing poor laws, and H.S. Tremenheree’s 1880 proposal for a 
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liberalism and the New Poor Law viewed the principles of both insurance and friendly societies 
as appropriate models for governance. Chadwick, the Benthamite social reformer who had 
helped to draft the report on which the New Poor Law was founded, noted in his 1828 essay “on 
the means of insurance,” that insurantial techniques such as data collection, actuarial tables and 
the law of large numbers could be used by government to “forestall sickness and death” in the 
population.  In 1840 J.S. Mill went further, declaring that “a state ought to be considered as a 
great benefit society or mutual insurance company” a point that would be repeated almost 
verbatim by the Fabian Sydney Webb in 1890.17  
The foundations of the welfare state that would be established in the 1940s would include 
some elements from both insurance and friendly societies, with some necessary differences to 
how contributions would be made, risks classified and benefits distributed. But this welfare 
legislation didn’t appear fully formed from thin air.  It was, rather, a rationalization and 
centralization of earlier piecemeal reforms made by Liberal governments in the Edwardian 
period, such as labour exchanges, industrial accident legislation in 1897 and old age pensions in 
1908. 18 The most ambitious of these reforms was Lloyd George’s National Insurance Act of 
1911, which would provide sickness and unemployment insurance to workers. The scheme 
called for compulsory contributions of 4 pence from each employee, to be supplemented by a 3 
pence contribution from the employer and another 2 pence from the government. The scheme 
would entitle roughly two million male workers to benefits should there be an interruption in 
                                                          
17 Ibid, 751. 
 
18 Ibid, 752.  Also see Jane Lewis, “The Voluntary Sector in the Mixed Economy of 
Welfare,” in Before Beveridge: Welfare beyond the Welfare State, ed. David Gladstone, 10-17 
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their regular income.19 Meanwhile four fifths of the working population would be covered for 
sickness and disability through the National Health Insurance side of the scheme.20 While this 
was a good deal, it was not a win for all. 
Many in the working class felt that the programme failed to address the core problems of 
low wages and uncertain employment.21 Others, who had proposed alternative programmes for 
replacing the poor laws, were disappointed to see their visions sidelined by the victory of the 
insurance model. Nor were private insurers pleased at the prospect of losing part of their market 
to a government scheme. In fact, the powerful insurance lobby managed to change a number of 
details in the programme, maintaining, for example, their monopoly on life insurance and 
insisting on playing a role, alongside friendly societies, in distributing benefits locally.22 
                                                          
19 Women not excluded from the National Unemployment Insurance scheme, however 
because relatively few were engaged in waged work, most women were not covered, and the 
benefits for those who were covered were lower than those provided to men.  Meanwhile, The 
National Health Insurance side of the legislation was, from the beginning, characterized by a 
differential benefits by age and gender. See J.C. Brown, Victims or Villains? Social Security 
Benefits in Unemployment, (York, Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust, 1990), 81-2. 
 
20 Michael Heller, “The National Insurance Acts 1911–1947: the Approved Societies and 
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21 Knights and Vurduburkis, “Calculations of Risk,” 753-4; Also see J.R.  Hay, “The 
Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms,” in Studies in Economic and Social History, ed. M.W. 
Flinn (London: MacMillan, 1983), 19. 
 
22 O’Malley argues that, although industrial life insurance was widely considered 
problematic, those crafting the 1911 legislation decided against incorporating it into the national 
insurance scheme as a concession to the industry in exchange for its acquiescence on the matter 
of social health insurance coverage. See O’ Malley, “Imagining Insurance,” 12. While O’Malley 
further suggests that the government had a “pragmatic desire to deploy the insurance companies 
and their collectors as convenient agents for state insurances,” Knights and Vurdubakis suggest 
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was a grudging reversal of the government’s original intent to exclude them. See Knights and 
Vurdubakis, “Calculations of Risk,” 755. One historian, Gilbert, frankly described the industry’s 
role in this process as rapacious: “the insurance companies sought…to take over the government 
programme and run it themselves.” Whereas many had hoped the National Insurance programme 
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Meanwhile, because contributions to National Insurance were directly tied to employment, many 
people, including most women, casual workers, the sick, and the elderly, were left uncovered.23 
National insurance did, however, answer the political and fiscal needs of a government 
which wished to pacify a restive working class, improve the health of the population, and restore 
the nation’s strength and efficiency. As Castel has noted, European governments at the turn of 
the twentieth century had come to see the necessity of granting “social property” – “a right of 
access to collective goods and services”-to the growing mass of non-property owners, in order to 
stem the threat it posed to the social order. Not to grant this class access to social security was 
“to sanction the presence of a zone of an ever more massive and potentially explosive 
vulnerability, condemned to permanent insecurity, and which, like a ‘gangrene’, would gnaw 
away at the body politic as a whole.”24 In the British case, there was also a fear that in times of 
economic crisis the most vulnerable of the poor would infect the more respectable poor, morally 
and physically, but also politically, by stirring up revolutionary sentiment.25 Such fears likely lay 
beneath Churchill’s words when he wrote, in the report on the poor laws in 1909, that the 
working class “will not continue to bear, and they cannot, the awful uncertainties of their lives. 
That is why standards of wages and comfort, insurance in some effective from or other against 
                                                          
might cover those excluded from both private insurance policies and the friendly societies 
(which tended to be the domain of skilled workers only), it “became instead a form of national 
compulsory savings administered awkwardly and expensively by private insurance firms, most 
of which saw the programme …as an avenue to the extension of their private business.” Quoted 
in Knights and Vurdubakis, “Calculations of Risk,’ 755. 
  
23 J.R. Hay, “The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms,” 12. 
  
24 Castel, “Emergence and Transformations of Social Property,” 319; 322-323. 
  
25 Hay, “The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms,” 34. 
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sickness, unemployment, old age, these are the questions, and the only questions by which 
Parties are going to live in the future.” 26  
The reforms enacted between 1906 and 1914 were the governing Liberal Party’s way of 
staving off political threats on two fronts: the growing power of the Labour Party, which more 
directly represented the interests of the working classes, and, more profoundly, the rising tide of 
support for socialist thought at home and abroad.27 “Socialism”, Churchill explained, “would 
destroy private interests,” whereas liberalism would “preserve them in the only way they could 
justify being preserved, by reconciling them with public rights.” Insurance, both voluntary 
(through private insurance) and compulsory (managed by the state), would become the key 
means of realizing this reconciliation between private interests and public rights. By providing a 
larger segment of the population with access to security in the face of the worst eventualities, the 
state was committing itself to a new role, that of “insecurity reducer.” The state would attempt, 
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27 There were a number of other factors behind the early nineteenth century Liberal 
Government’s to attempt to improve general social condition of the nation. There had been some 
concern, for example, since the closing decade of the previous century, that Britain’s economic 
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the same time, many feared that the strength of British people themselves was deteriorating, 
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of working class social conditions by social scientists such as Booth and Roundtree and it was 
distressingly confirmed during the Boer war, when 40% of those recruited to fight were declared 
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with the idea “National Efficiency”, the theory that the welfare of the working classes and of the 
empire were interdependent. Finally, the idea that socialized insurance might raise the standards 
of the lower classes was inspired by the examples of other nations that pioneered such schemes, 
such as Germany, New Zealand and Denmark. See Hay, “The Origins of the Liberal Welfare 
Reforms,” 27-32. 
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in Churchill’s words, “to substitute for the pressure of the forces of nature, operating by chance 
on individuals, the pressures of the laws of insurance, operating through averages.” 
In the first few decades of the twentieth century social insurance in Britain and elsewhere 
was still in its infancy. Nevertheless, the social legislation introduced in this period inaugurated a 
new set of relations at the core of modern societies: those between the state and individuals, 
between the state and private insurance companies and between individuals and the larger 
society. With the passing of the National Insurance Act a contractual relationship was forged 
between the state and individuals. The state would reduce insecurities in exchange for the regular 
contributions of workers to the National Insurance fund.28 These compulsory contributions by 
individual workers were, according to Knights and Vurdubakis, intended to prevent dependency 
and demoralization on the part of the working class.29 Meanwhile, because health coverage was 
tied to the contributions of workers, not all individuals in British society were given the chance 
to enter into a contractual relationship with the state. Women were effectively excluded from the 
1911 schemes, and even with the expansion of the Act in 1920, their contributions and benefits 
were set at a lower rate than for men.30 Meanwhile, the contractual relationship with the state did 
not extend to married women, for responsibility for the contract lay with husbands.31 
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Whereas a host of different agencies responded to the problem of pauperism in the 
nineteenth century, including private insurers, charities, friendly societies and the state-, by the 
second decade of the twentieth century it was clear that the management of such social risks would 
now fall to just two large actors acting in a partnership: the private insurance industry and the state.  
The 1911 National Insurance Act “brought into being a hybrid institutional apparatus that straddled 
both the public and private spheres.”32 Both private insurers and friendly societies were charged 
with the direct administrative tasks of collecting contributions and delivering benefits, but whereas 
membership in the former expanded considerably over the next three decades, it dwindled away 
in the latter.33  According to O’Malley this “reflected a pragmatic desire to deploy the insurance 
companies and their collectors as convenient agents for state insurances.”34 Indeed, as McFall 
notes, the fact that the “private, commercial model survived” the state’s incursion into its markets  
“serves as an indication both of its resilience and adaptability but also of just how neatly it 
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33 Some of the success of Industrial insurance companies in recruiting new members was 
due to their enrollment of women and unskilled workers into their schemes, two large groups 
who were eligible for coverage under the 1911 Act, but who were historically excluded from 
friendly societies. But the waning of Friendly Societies over subsequent decades has also been 
attributed to their inability to compete with private insurers, which could afford to operate at a 
loss in distributing benefits, in exchange for access to a wider market for their other products. 
They were, thus, less stringent in determining eligibility for benefits and were even able to add 
extra benefits on to the minimum that was funded by the National Unemployment Insurance and 
National Health Insurance schemes. Meanwhile, their primary business soared: by 1939, 
according to Whiteside, there were “2.5 life policies for every UK citizen and four fifths of these 
were held by one of 14 major industrial insurance companies.” P.22 In contrast, by the 1940s, 
friendly societies were faced with an aging membership, low participation and insolvency.  
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Whiteside, “Social Insurance in Britain 1900-1950: Frameworks of the Welfare State,” La 
Previsión Social en la Historia (2009): 538-541; 552-3. 
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intersected with the larger goals and values espoused in a still prevailing liberal political 
rationality.”35 
The most important relational change introduced by early social insurance was the 
interdependency that the dynamics of insurance established between individuals and the larger 
society. Insurance pools together a populations’ risks, and by this means, individuals can, as 
Churchill puts it, “be secured against catastrophe which would otherwise smash them for ever.” 36 
Risk pooling created a mutual dependency between the security of individuals and that of the 
collectivity to which they belong.  Such an arrangement answered the particular needs of liberal 
political rationality by providing a basis and a means of social cohesion in a population of free 
individuals who were no longer embedded in traditional communities or institutions. In the 
decades following the 1911 National Insurance Act, British politicians were increasingly mindful 
of the benefits of improving a sense of solidarity in the population, and of the usefulness of 
insurantial technology for achieving this. 
Donzalot has written about the importance of the idea of solidarity in modern 
governance, and while his discussion refers to the experience in France, I think it is relevant to 
modern governance in general. He suggests that solidarity offered a solution to the antagonistic 
dynamic that dogged “the metaphysics of sovereignty.” If, he explained, “right resides solely in 
the individual, the individual can always repudiate and paralyze the intervention of the state.” If, 
on the other hand “the state is the embodiment of the general will, the active synthesis of 
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individual sovereignties and powers, there is nothing left to oppose it.” The way out of this 
dilemma was to find a different foundation for the legitimacy of the state, a foundation external 
to social relations. Such a foundation was made possible by the idea of social solidarity.37 In its 
role of overseeing and promoting the interdependence of the individuals that make up society, 
the state was justified in its legislative and economic interventions: “The concept of solidarity 
makes it possible to arrive at a situation where the state itself is no longer at stake in social 
relations, but stands outside them and becomes their guarantor of progress.” 38 In elucidating his 
theory of social property Castel has likewise described how the state began, in the early twentieth 
century, to play the role of a guarantor of progress and social solidarity: The “social state” he 
writes, was tasked with “ensuring the security- the social security- of the members of a modern 
society and reinforcing their interdependence in such a way that they continue to constitute a 
society.” It “fundamentally …sought to be an insecurity reducer, a guarantor of effective 
political or legal regulations, and provider of collective services aimed at maintaining social 
cohesion.”39 
The concept of solidarity had attracted attention in fin de siècle Europe with the 1893 
publication of Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society. In this work, Durkheim compared 
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the kind of social cohesion that prevailed in small, traditional and homogeneous societies with 
those prevailing in large industrialized and complex societies. The former, in which people were 
bound together by common values and roles, he characterized as having a “mechanical” 
solidarity. In the latter, where the division of labour was highly complex, it was the 
interdependence of their differentiated roles which bound people together. Durkheim called this 
kind of solidarity “organic”, because it resembled the inter-reliant relations of bodily organs. 40 
According to Gerard Delanty, the transition from ‘mechanical’ to ‘organic’ social solidarity, 
from “social integration through family and religion to integration through membership of 
occupational groups and the interdependence of these groups,” was a crucial moment in the 
emergence of modernity itself. 41 
The dependence of all individuals upon each other in a complex society had already 
begun to develop as a result of industrialization and urbanization in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. It was not until the turn of the century, however, that governments began to 
see that this mutual dependence invited a particular “mode of state intervention,” one,  according 
to Donzalot, “which affects the forms of the social bond rather than the structure of society itself. 
The aim is not the recognition of the right to work and its application…but the development of 
forms of solidarity in society which take account of the greater risks faced by certain of its 
members, risks to which they were also in a position to expose society as a whole.” 42 It is thus 
                                                          
 
40 Gerard Delanty, “The Foundations of Social Theory,” in The New Blackwell 
Companion to Social Theory, ed. Bryan S. Turner, (UK: Blackwell-Wiley, 2009), 26. 
  
41 Ibid, 26. 
 
42 Donzalot, “The Mobilization of Society,” 173. 
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not surprising that the insurance principle of mutuality came to be viewed as the most 
appropriate means of reinforcing and regulating this modern and abstract form of social 
solidarity.  
By pooling and managing these risks the state itself, and private property, are left 
unscathed, while warring political factions, with their contradictory visions of a just society, are 
neutralized.  Donzalot does not use the term ‘risk-manager’ for the role the state begins to play in 
cementing social solidarity, but he does describe it as the transposition of an “insurantial 
technology” “to the arena of the security problems of the whole society.”43 With the formation of 
the welfare state in the mid twentieth century this insurantial approach became an undeniable 
feature of liberal democratic governance. 
Towards the Welfare State 
It is said that the term ‘welfare state’ was first coined by Sir William Temple, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, when, in 1941, he compared the motivation of the British government with that of 
the ‘warfare state’ of National Socialist Germany. Where Germany funnelled all of its energy 
and resources towards warfare, Britain planned to channel its own resources towards welfare of 
its citizens. Temple’s vision of a just post-war society was shared by many in the wartime 
coalition government, most notably by the economist William Beveridge. In 1942, as chair of a 
committee tasked with evaluating the existing social insurance system, Beveridge wrote and 
submitted to Parliament the Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services.  Beveridge’s report 
highlighted three “guiding principles”. First, in creating a new social insurance system planners 
should take advantage of the “revolutionary moment” of the war by making it as comprehensive 
as possible. Second, social insurance should be viewed as part of a “comprehensive policy of 
                                                          
43 Donzalot, quoted in Knights and Vurdubakis, “Calculations of Risk,” 749. 
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social progress,” which should aim to overcome   “Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and 
Idleness.” Finally, social insurance should centre on a contractual relationship between the state 
and the individual, wherein the state would provide security in return for each individuals’ 
contributions. The state should guarantee a national minimum standard of living without stifling 
“incentive, opportunity and responsibility.”44  Beveridge’s plan would bring pre-existing health, 
employment and pension schemes into one comprehensive system, based on risk pooling and the 
contributory principle used in insurance. 45 Beveridge envisioned a new social policy in which 
“three methods of security” would coexist: “social insurance for basic needs; national assistance 
for special cases and voluntary insurance for additions to the basic provision.” His Report is still 
considered the founding text for Britain’s post war reconstruction and for what came to be 
known as the post-war social compact.46 
                                                          
 
44 William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services, Presented to Parliament by 
Command of His Majesty November, 1942, HMSO Cmnd 6404, Accessed at Socialist Health 
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45 Ibid. Unlike private insurance however, premiums would not be adjusted according to 
risks, because, with contributions being compulsory, the risk pool would be large and diversified 
enough that the fund would be unlikely to lag behind benefits claimed. Meanwhile, Beveridge 
proposed a national assistance program for special cases where people could not contribute 
through employment. As this would be an allowance, it would require means-testing in order to 
ensure true need.  Beveridge also outlined three indispensable features, or “assumptions” of a 
post war social security policy: a scheme for children’s allowances, full health and rehabilitation 
services and state maintenance of full employment. Together, these would supplement incomes 
interrupted for a various reasons. 
46 It was also wildly popular for a government report. People apparently lined up outside 
His Majesty’s Stationary Office the night before it was made available to the public; it sold 
100,000 copies in the first month and went on to sell more than half a million.  Noel Whiteside, 
“The Beveridge Report and its Implementation: a Revolutionary Project?” Histoire@Politique, 
24 (2014): 1-2. 
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While much of the groundwork for Britain’s welfare state was laid during the second 
world war, this work was largely an institutional extension and rationalization of the reforms 
enacted earlier in the century.  The experiences of two world wars and a devastating economic 
depression had underscored to political leaders of all stripes the need to more fully commit to the 
principles behind the earlier reforms.  While those early reforms did provide basic social security 
to a greater number of workers than ever before, many were still left uncovered. Moreover, the 
social protections afforded by the National Health and Unemployment Insurance and the Labour 
Exchange and Pensions Acts did little to forestall the excesses and abuses of the market itself. 
After the First World War Britain, like many countries, continued with a generally non-
interventionist approach to the economy. The world-wide economic depression of the nineteen-
thirties was not, in the case of Britain, preceded by boom years in the 1920s. On the contrary, 
this was a time of high unemployment, deflation, contractionary fiscal and monetary policies and 
high national debt.47 This combination of conditions and policies led to a further decline in 
investments and spending. Meanwhile those nations experiencing a boom in production, in 
particular the USA, also followed a tight monetary policy, even as they cut taxes drastically, and, 
by easing regulations, allowed for the rise of monopolies, a frenzy of speculative investment in 
the stock market, and the formation of a credit bubble. After the First World War, the US had 
replaced Britain as the world’s leading creditor and exporter- it was also the world’s second 
                                                          
47 One reason for the general economic contraction of the 1920s in Britain was that there 
was now a global oversupply of the resources with which Britain had dominated world trade in 
the previous century. Now that other countries produced and exported iron, cotton and steel, 
Britain’s productive capacity shrunk. Barry Eichengreen, “The British Economy between the 
Wars” in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul 
Johnson, 314-343 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 314-16. 
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largest importer after Britain. 48 The dominance of the US economy, and its interconnections 
with economies around the world, meant that when its stock market crashed in 1929, those 
economies were also severely impacted. 49  
While the 1930s were not as devastating for Britain’s economy as they were for the 
economies of most other nations, the global crisis only exacerbated an already severe and 
prolonged unemployment problem. Even this problem was less severe than in other nations, such 
as the USA or Germany, where one third of workforce was unemployed during most of the 
1930s.  At its peak, in 1932, Britain’s unemployment rate was 17%. Nevertheless, with 10% of 
insured workers remaining unemployed by 1938, the situation was untenable.50 Insurance 
employment benefits– which had been expanded to more categories of workers in 1920- were 
extremely costly for the government to pay out to such a large segment of the population at once, 
while also being too limited in duration to protect workers from the enduring and systemic 
shortage of work.51  Meanwhile, a lack of income among such a large proportion of the 
population inhibited consumer demand, further slowing the economy. In these conditions, many 
                                                          
48 Nicholas Crafts and Peter Fearon “Lessons from the 1930’s Great Depression,” Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 26, no. 3 (2010): 285–317, 289. 
   
49 According to Crafts and Fearon, the key factor in the transmission of the crisis from the 
U.S. to economies around the world was the international adherence to the gold standard. Many 
nations, attempting to balance budgets according to the rules of the gold standard, drastically cut 
public spending and kept interest rates high, but this did little to help with rising unemployment, 
shrinking demand, and soaring debts. See Crafts and Fearon, “Lessons from the 1930’s,” 294-
297. 
50 Ibid, 295. Also see Eichengreen, “The British Economy between the Wars,” 334. 
 
51 Ibid, 339-340. 
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workers were drawn to the alternatives offered by fascism on the one hand, and socialism on the 
other. 52   
  When he reflected on this experience, as well as those of America and of the global crisis 
as a whole, economist Milton Keynes drew from them certain lessons on both avoiding and 
recovering from economic recessions. His 1936 treatise The General Theory of Employment, 
Money and Interest highlighted the imperative of full employment for effective demand in the 
domestic economy and the dependence of full employment upon a confident investment climate 
stimulated by an expansionary fiscal policy.53 This meant that, rather than reacting to a sluggish 
economy with austerity measures, as most major economies had in the early years of the 
economic crisis, the government’s role should be to “prime the pump”  through a comprehensive 
socialization of investment. Socialized investment did not mean that the state would take over 
the means of production but rather that investment activities should play a beneficial role in 
society. While he was highly critical of the certain features of capitalism, such as speculative 
investment, Keynes was far from being a socialist. Rather, he wanted to save capitalism from its 
own demise by improving its faults, the worst of which were unemployment and inequality. 
Keynes’ thinking would play a major role in shaping a post war governmental strategy of 
interventionist fiscal policies and a focus on full employment. Socializing investment would 
foster “a new kind of capitalist culture of cooperation between public and private authorities.”54  
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53 Fadhel Kaboub, “Socialization of Investment,” in International Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences, 2nd edition, Vol. 7, ed. William A. Darity, Jr. (Detroit, MI: Macmillan 
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Solidifying this cooperative relationship between the state and the capitalist economy - 
and facilitating the development of the welfare state- were the conditions and experiences 
prevailing during the Second World War.  In many ways, the war was a means to economic 
recovery, for it demanded a massive increase in production while it drove the majority of the 
workforce into combat. But there were other, perhaps more important ways that the wartime 
experience increased the capacity and willingness of states to expand welfare provisions.  
Administrative capacity, for example, was improved and centralized as never before in order to 
meet the exceptional needs of a nation at war. This, along with a considerable increase in 
taxation rates and public expenditure, allowed the wartime government to carry out a 
comprehensive programme of social provision.55 Programmes that had already existed for 
decades, but which had been geared towards the neediest segment of the population –and which 
still carried with them the residual moral stigma of Victorian poor relief schemes – were in 
wartime dramatically expanded to reach a major portion of the population. The School Meals 
Programme, for instance, had provided meals to only 1 in 30 children in the economically 
depressed 1930s, but was expanded to reach 1 in 3 children by 1945. 56  
A new principle of equal and universal access to basic social needs had overtaken the 
“residual” model of welfare that had predominated until that time, in which social provision was 
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aimed only at the enduring class of the poorest.57 The common war time experiences of 
deprivation, sacrifice and insecurity had stimulated a political appetite for a universalist 
“institutional” approach to social security.  A 1944 White Paper on Social Insurance declared 
that “it is right for all citizens to stand in together, without exclusion based on differences of 
status, function or wealth”. A universal scheme would give “concrete expression” to the 
“solidarity and unity of the nation, which in war has been its bulwark against aggression and in 
peace will be its guarantee of success in the fight against individual want and mischance.”58  
For their part, the public, accustomed to paying higher taxes in wartime, were not 
unwilling to do so to cement social security in peacetime. Indeed, postwar social security was 
presented in a series of wartime government white papers, as a reward that citizens could look 
forward to in exchange for their sacrifices during the war. Meanwhile, public acceptance of a 
universalist social insurance system, with flat-rate contributions and no means-testing, can be 
attributed to the equalizing experiences of the war. Because wartime brought different classes of 
people together in unprecedented ways, and exposed rich and poor alike to many of the same 
risks and profound uncertainties, there was broad support for the kind of risk spreading proposed 
in Beveridge’s report.59  
                                                          
57 Hay, “The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms,” 3. The differentiation between 
“residual”, “institutional” and “industrial achievement performance” models of welfare states 
was first made by Richard Titmuss in Social Policy: An Introduction, ed. Abel-Smith Brian and 
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ideal types: Jorgan Goul Anderson for instance, uses the term “universalist” for the institutional 
model and “corporatist” for the Industrial Achievement Performance model. See J.G. Andersen, 
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Studies, Aalborg Universitet, 2012). 
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The Post War Expansion of the Welfare State 
After the Labour government came to power in 1945 it passed legislation on a host of 
Beveridge’s recommendations for social welfare provision, including the Family Allowances Act 
in 1945, the National Health Service Act, the National Insurance Act and the National Assistance 
Act in 1946, followed by the Children Act and Housing Act of 1948 and 1949.60 Ernest Bevin, of 
Atlee’s Labour government, proclaimed that “Homes, health, education and social security, these 
are your birthright,” while T.H. Marshall, who would go on to develop the theory of social 
citizenship, explained that whereas the previous social service policies dealt only with “the 
basement of society” it has now “begun to remodel the entire building.61  
Because of the comprehensive scope of Britain’s post-war welfare legislation and the 
global renown of the inspirational rhetoric contained in Beveridge’s 1942 Report, the British 
case remains central to any history of the welfare state. Yet Britain was far from alone in 
developing a system of social security. Similar legislation had been passed in the USA under the 
                                                          
59 John Dryzek and Robert E. Goodin, “Risk Sharing and Social Justice: The 
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61 Even the Conservative, the opposition party, embraced this new approach to social 
welfare, writing, in their 1949 election campaign pamphlet “The Right Road for Britain” that 
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Roosevelt administration.62 In fact, by the late 1940s there were few nations left on earth that had 
not already enacted social security legislation of some kind. Most had, like Britain, waited until 
the end of the war to implement or adjust and expand upon that legislation. 63  
The widespread adoption of social insurance principles and legislation from as early as 
the 1920s was due, in part, to global outreach of both the International Labour Organization and 
the International Social Security Agency.64 That it was fundamentally just for all national 
governments to create robust social security systems was further underscored in the United 
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Article 22 of that document states that 
“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, 
through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and 
                                                          
62  For Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation see Patricia P. Martin and David A. Weaver, 
“Social Security: A Program and Policy History,” Social Security Benefit 66, no.1 (2005). The 
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64 Cédric Guinand, “The Creation of the ISSA and the ILO,” International Social 
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resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity 
and the free development of his personality.” Article 25 likewise declares that “Everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”65 
Variously known as a social “compact”, “consensus” or “contract”, in the post war period 
most national governments pursued broadly similar domestic programmes, creating a set of 
social and economic policies that are now associated with the “golden age of the welfare state.” 
66 In Britain, and in much of western Europe, that course came to be known as the “post-war 
consensus” and included: an adherence to international free trade coupled with  the adoption of 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies that could respond to the volatility of a capitalist economy 
and promote full employment and economic growth; a mixed economy which included both 
private enterprise and public ownership of certain public goods, as well as a strong regulatory 
framework; and a comprehensive welfare state that included social insurance, an array of social 
services and a safety net system for the poorest members of society.67 A similar set of policies, 
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pursued in the United States, is usually referred to as the “post war social contract” or the “post-
war capital-labour accord.”68  
As Pierson notes, the element of agreement indicated in all of these terms refers not only 
to the convergence of different political parties on the above-mentioned social and economic 
policies, but also to a compromise made between different classes within the capitalist economy. 
That is, the labour class would relinquish its more radical objectives of class war or socialization 
of the economy while the capital class would accept “the commitment to full employment, to the 
public ownership of strategic utilities and support for the welfare state.” Meanwhile, the state 
would facilitate bargaining between the organized representatives of labour and of capital.69  As 
with the post war consensus in Britain, the historical accuracy of the notion of a post war labour 
Capital Accord in the US has come in question. 70 
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What cannot be doubted is that in the decades following the Second World War, national 
governments attempted to integrate the objectives of economic growth and social welfare. State 
regulation and management could minimize the social risks associated with a capitalist economy, 
while delivering economic growth and full employment. On the other hand, a population with 
access to social security, insurance and services would provide a stable environment for business 
while reducing the appeal of either fascism or socialism. Because they promote both social 
welfare and economic growth, welfare states are often referred to as “welfare capitalism.”   
With the rise of neoliberalism in the early 1980s, the wisdom and practical efficacy of the 
welfare state became the subject of prolonged and heated debates among academics and 
politicians. While some of these debates may have brought attention to substantive issues of 
governance in a globalized and post-industrial era, there has also been a tendency on both sides 
of the argument to oversimplify the nature of the welfare state. As Garland points out, in political 
discourse especially, the Welfare state is often conflated with welfare programs aimed at the 
most vulnerable sectors of society. As with poor relief in the nineteenth century, stigma tends to 
be a central feature of such means-tested programs. Their recipients, especially in in the 
neoliberal era, are often depicted as manipulative and undeserving, with the most extreme 
examples of fraudulence being held up as illustrative of a systematic abuse of taxpayers’ money. 
Ronald Reagan, for instance, while campaigning for presidential election on 1976, repeatedly 
told the story of a Cadillac-driving “welfare queen” who bilked the system of $150,000 by 
receiving welfare checks under dozens of aliases.  The story of the “welfare queen” was intended 
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to expose the wrongheadednes not only of safety net welfare provision, but of the welfare state 
as a whole.71 
Yet, as Garland reminds us, “welfare”, or “social assistance” programs, which provide 
subsistence income to those without any other means of living, are only one fractional element of 
the welfare state.  Another element involves ‘social work and personal social services” which 
include services and care for children, the elderly, the mentally ill, the disabled and other 
particularly vulnerable groups.  A much more central feature is Social Insurance, in which, as I 
have explained above,  risks such as unemployment, health, old age, disability are pooled and 
covered through the  compulsory contributions of all citizens.  Meanwhile, a great many social 
services, publicly funded through taxation, are available to all citizens, such as schooling, 
infrastructure, healthcare, legal aid, childcare, museums and parks. Finally, the welfare state 
manages the economy in myriad ways, by ensuring property rights, setting fiscal, monetary, 
consumer credit, and labour market policies, nationalizing some industries, and subsidizing or 
regulating others, and managing inflation, demand and money supply.  Unlike social assistance, 
there is much public support for social insurance, public services and economic governance, and 
even after decades of neoliberal policies aimed at reducing social spending, these remain 
unassailable features of what is still, the welfare state.72   
I have, of course, been discussing welfare state in general, but while the above mentioned 
features all tend to exist to some degree in all welfare states, there is a considerable variation 
from nation to nation. Aside from having different cultural values and different levels of 
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economic wealth, most states will have built their social welfare systems upon pre-existing 
policies and programs, so it can be said that each welfare state is unique. Scholars have tended to 
follow Asa Briggs and Richard Titmuss in classifying this variety into models, or ideal types. 
The “residual-institutional” or “liberal” model followed in Britain and most Anglophone 
countries tends to include modest social insurance benefits and means-tested social assistance. In 
Continental European countries such as France, Germany and Italy, the “corporatist-statist” or 
“conservative” model prevails, in which social benefits are based on contributions through 
employment and are more closely attached to class and status. Here the focus is on the 
maintenance of status differentials and traditional family roles.  Finally, there is the 
“universalist” or “social-democratic” model predominant in Scandinavian countries. This model 
includes generous universalist benefits and a focus on equality. 73 
Rather than evaluating welfare states according to their social expenditure, as some have 
done, Esping-Anderson asks to what extent the social rights granted by a welfare state serve to 
decommodify the individuals within it.74 Social rights, in this context, play the same role as 
“social property” in Castel’s formulation, providing an alternative to property rights as the basis 
for security in modern societies. The various institutions of the welfare state limit the 
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the welfare state’s role in expanding the rights of citizens to include social rights including 
economic security. See Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 21, 36-37. 
Also see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time, intro. by R. M. MacIver (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957) and T.H. Marshall Citizenship and 
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population’s exposure to the risks commonly produced in market society. This is true not only of 
policies that aim to redistribute wealth, or provide insurance for the sick, the disabled or the 
unemployed. Even many of the strategies by which states manage capitalist economies, such as 
regulating industries, labour policies and macroeconomic stability are aimed at protecting 
citizens from the abuses and volatility associated with a capitalist economy.  
According to Esping –Anderson, the measure of a welfare state’s decommodifying 
effects is the extent to which citizens can live independently of the commodification of their 
labour and have access to social services as a right. Thus, even when social insurance is 
compulsory and includes generous benefits, as in Germany, because eligibility for those benefits 
is tied to contributions made through one’s workplace, it cannot be said that there exists an 
alternative to market dependence.75  Meanwhile, in liberal welfare states, such as the UK, US 
and Canada, the stigmatization and means-testing of those receiving social assistance and the 
subsidization and promotion of private welfare schemes pushes most citizens into market 
participation and a reliance on private solutions for their security. The exposure to the risks 
attending capitalism is therefore highest for populations living in liberal welfare states, and 
lowest for those within the social democratic welfare states.76 
Recent scholarship on welfare states in developing nations has found that, as with 
developed nations, welfare states tend to cluster into three distinct models with differing degrees 
of decommodification. Nita Rudra classifies these as productive, protective and dual welfare 
states. Productive welfare states promote commodification by favouring economic development, 
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international trade and capitalist interests over social welfare. Protective welfare states tend to 
resist commodification with an emphasis on domestic trade, housing and labour protections for 
civil servants, while dual welfare states contain a mixture of commodifyiing and 
decommodifying features. Even in the decommodifying “protective” welfare states, the reach of 
social services and benefits tends to be minimal, largely because proletarianization occurred after 
decommodification.77 Meanwhile, the reach and substance of welfare states in developing 
countries has been severely limited over the last four decades by the IMF’s structural adjustment 
programs. After the US responded to the 1973 oil crisis by raising inflation rates, many 
developing countries were unable to service their debts. After the debt crisis of the early 1980s 
the IMF stepped in with SAPs which demanded the liberalization of markets, privatization of 
services and industries and severe cuts to social spending.78 With the rise of neoliberalism states 
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USA, in that they put fewer constraints on the market, and pursue social policies such as 
education, which can improve the commodity status of labour.  The “protective” welfare states 
tend to share with the social democratic model, an aversion to commodification, while also 
sharing with the conservative welfare state an emphasis on authority and the preservation status 
differentials. But unlike both of the conservative and social democratic welfare states, where 
proletarianization spread to the majority of the population over a period of more than a century, 
the empowerment of the labour class occurred after the development of the welfare state so that 
social benefits tend to be limited to a “small privileged stratum.” 
   
78 For more on the effect of Structural Adjustment programs, neoliberalism and the 
Washington Consensus on the welfare state in developing countries please see United Nations, 
“The End of the Golden Age, the Debt Crisis and Development Setbacks,” in World Economic 
and Social Survey 2017, Reflecting on Seventy Years of Development Policy Analysis (New 
York: United Nations), 49.  https://doi.org/10.18356/8310f38c-en 
Walden Bello, Structural Adjustment Programs – Success for Whom? In The Case against the 
Global Economy, ed. J. Mander and E. Goldsmith, (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996); 
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in the Global North also began to follow this set of policies, known as the Washington 
Consensus. However, because they were not imposed upon them, and tied to aid or debt 
repayment schemes, they have not been forced to carry them out to the same extreme as nations 
in the Global South have.  
When we compare the Swedish and American welfare states, or the welfare states in the 
Global North and the Global South the divergences appear to be so wide that we can forget that 
they share anything in common. However, whatever differences they might exhibit, welfare 
states share a rationality of government that is distinct from all previous modes of governance. 
As Garland puts it, welfare states have been the product of “a new style of thinking about, and 
acting upon, the problems of unemployment, insecurity, and uncertainty.”79 By reconfiguring 
these problems as “social risks” the welfare state, following insurantial rationality, managed to 
render them calculable. It “socialized processes of control and provision, organized them on a 
national scale and made them public responsibilities.”80 This is a mode of governance which 
achieves order through what Peter Wagner calls “socialization of risk or, vice versa, the 
enhancement of certainty.” It does so by deploying new forms of knowledge and rules, and what   
this has meant, for everyday life, is,  
A formalization and shaping of reality via the translation of a phenomenon into different, 
more operational terms….the welfare state entailed a drastic transformation of the rules 
                                                          
Biplab. Dasgupta, "SAP: Issues and Conditionalities: A Global Review," Economic and Political 
Weekly 32, no. 20-21 (May 17-30, 1997): 1091. Wayne Ellwood, Debt and Structural 
Adjustment. In The No-Nonsense Guide to Globalization, ed. Wayne Ellwood (Toronto: Between 
the Lines, 2002) and Joseph Stiglitz Globalization and Its Discontents, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2002). 
 
79 Garland, The Welfare State, 54-5. 
 
80 Ibid, 56. 
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on which individual human beings could draw. Not least, it redefined the social space, its 
external and internal boundaries, on which assessment of risks was undertaken and over 
which relative certainties could be spread.81 
The Return of Insecurity: Neoliberalism 
In recent decades there has been a tendency to look back at the post war welfare state as a 
“golden age”, a stable social arrangement, and a standard from which we have only lately 
deviated. In fact, that period was short-lived, lasting only from about 1950 to 1975. The 
subsequent era of neoliberal retrenchment has endured for nearly twice as long!82 While the 
boom was experienced unevenly and delayed in many places, it is certainly true that by 1960 
many industrialized nations were witnessing a period of impressive economic growth, high 
employment rates and expanded systems of social security. By 1975, however, this post war 
economic expansion came to an end.  In 1971 US president Nixon uncoupled the US dollar from 
the international gold standard, effectively ending the Bretton Woods System. Then, with the 
OPEC oil embargo of 1973-5, the price of oil quadrupled, inhibiting industrial productivity. 
                                                          
81 Peter Wagner, A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 98-99. By “formalization’ Wagner means “a way of reinterpreting the 
world and re- classifying its elements with a view to increasing manageability. The achievements 
of modem institutions in terms of the extension of reach are regularly based on such kinds of 
formalization. My understanding of this term is close to Weber’s concept of rationalization, …a 
belief in the knowability and, following from it, in the mastery of the world by means of 
calculation,” 26-28. 
82 Nor was this entire period uniformly “golden” for all nations. In Europe alone, the 
1950s were a period of deprivation for many countries. For example, in Italy in the early and 
mid-1950s, as in many southern and eastern European nations, the infant mortality rate was 60 
per thousand live births, a rate comparable to those of Haiti, the Republic of Congo, or Burundi 
today. Although Britain fared better by this measurement, at 25-30 per thousand, there the 
rationing of food only ended in 1954. See Andrea Cornia Giovanni and Sheldon Danziger, eds, 
Child Poverty and Deprivation in the Industrial Countries, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 25, 260-261.  
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Economic growth stagnated even as inflation soared, a unique combination dubbed “stagflation,” 
which resulted in high unemployment and a prolonged recession across most industrialized 
nations.   
It was at this time that economists in the US began to question the Keynesian 
macroeconomic model, the welfare state and the international economic order of the post war 
era.  Milton Friedman and others from the Chicago School of economics, as well as Austrian 
economist Friedrich Hayek, argued that beyond setting monetarist policies and making deep cuts 
to public expenditure, governments should not intervene in their economies. Neoliberalist 
policies were first put into practice by the Thatcher and Reagan governments in the 80s, which 
cut both taxes and social spending, liberalized financial trade, privatized industries and services 
and deregulated many elements of the economy. By the late 1980s neoliberal policies were 
imposed upon many developing nations as a condition of aid or debt relief. 
The neoliberal embrace of free markets was at the same time a rejection of the project of 
re-embedding markets into societies.83 Since the early decades of the twentieth century 
governments had attempted to protect their populations from the worst social risks created by 
capitalism, even if it was only in order to preserve that economic system and to prevent political 
revolutions. Neoliberalism was a renewal of nineteenth century laissez faire political economic 
thought, which centred on the self-interest of the rational individual, and a marketplace which, 
freed from governmental intrusion, was supposed to deliver all social goods. Thatcher’s 
astonishing claim in a 1988 speech that “there is no such thing as society” marked the sharp turn 
                                                          
83 Rawi Abdelal and John G. Ruggie, “The Principles of Embedded Liberalism: Social 
Legitimacy and Global Capitalism,” in Perspectives in Regulation, ed. David Moss and John 
Cisternino, (Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2009), 151-2. 
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of liberal democracies away from the aim of social protection. The global consequences of 
neoliberalism have often been as devastating as they were predictable. People whose gender, 
nationality, ethnicity or age have placed them at the margins of global society have been the 
most exposed to both old and new socio-economic, political and environmental risks. The effects 
on the nations of the Global South have been most extreme, as however much their citizens 
might protest neoliberal policies, governments are constrained by the rules of IMF’s structural 
adjustment programs and the WTO’s trade regulations.84 
Meanwhile, neoliberal policies implemented in the Global North have focused primarily 
on reducing and restructuring social assistance and unemployment benefits, privatizing or 
creating public-private partnerships for social services and public industries and deregulation.  
As Garland, Pierson and others have noted, many of the key components of welfare states- such 
as social services, health insurance and pensions- are very popular with citizens of OECD 
nations. Thus, efforts to “roll back” the welfare state have been somewhat limited by the political 
risk of alienating the electorate.85 However, retrenchment has certainly occurred in the areas of 
                                                          
84 Nitsan Chorev and Sarah Babb, “The Crisis of Neoliberalism and the Future of 
International Institutions: A Comparison of the IMF and the WTO,” Theory and Society, 38 
(2009): 468-470. 
 
85 Pierson has argued that this explains the “resilience” of the welfare state, and has 
shown evidence of such resilience by charting the increase of aggregate social spending in 
OECD nations in the 80s and 90s.  See Paul Pierson, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” 
World Politics 48, no. 2 (1996): 143-179, 144. For others who have argued that the welfare state 
is “resilient” or “steady” see Garland, The Welfare State; Francis G. Castles, The Future of the 
Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and 
Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, Why Welfare States Persist. The Importance of Public Opinion in 
Democracies (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007) Others, however, 
have argued that aggregate social expenditure does not take into account the impact of changing 
employment or demographic conditions on such spending, nor does it show how “individual life 
chances are shaped by welfare policies.” See Lea Elsässer, Inga Rademacher and Armin Schäfer, 
“Cracks in the Foundation: Retrenchment in Advanced Welfare State,” Economic Sociology: The 
European Electronic Newsletter 16, no. 3 (July 2015): 4-16, 5-6. Other scholars have tried to 
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social assistance, and unemployment insurance. For example, in their recent study of 20 OECD 
countries, Elsässer  et al, found that “Without exception, all countries spent less on income 
support for the working-age population in 2008 than they did at some point in the past, and in 
eight out of 20 countries spending in 2008 was lower than in 1980.”86 Labour market policies in 
the neoliberal era have re-stigmatized welfare assistance for those who do not qualify for 
unemployment insurance by subjecting recipients to greater discipline and surveillance, while 
cutting benefits to levels insufficient for subsistence. Meanwhile it is now more difficult to meet 
the eligibility criteria for unemployment and the amount and duration of benefits have been 
reduced, and are now conditional upon stringent job search evidence. 87   
In the post war period governments tended to apply their social and macroeconomic 
policies towards the goal of full employment, while labour market policies acted as a buffer, 
shielding citizens from full exposure to the insecurities that came with a loss or lack of income. 
88 By the 1990s these efforts were supplanted by new objectives: attracting capital investment 
and preventing inflation. Full employment was no longer a priority. According to Rueda, labour 
market policies now began to focus on “activation” “conditionality.” Because the traditional 
                                                          
measure welfare state generosity by calculating “net replacement rates” for those whose income 
has been lost or interrupted (through age, sickness, unemployment etc). Their work has shown 
that the “degree of decommodification of risks” for individuals in a data set of 18 countries had 
been reduced between the years of 1975 and 1999.  See James P. Allan and Lyle Scruggs, 
“Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies,” American 
Journal of Political Science 48, no. 3 (2004): 496–512.   
 
86 Elsässer, Rademacher and Schäfer, “Cracks in the Foundation,” 8. 
87 David Rueda, “Unemployment, Labor Market Policy, and Inequality in the Age of 
Workfare,” Comparative Politics 47, no. 3 (2015): 300. 
88 Rueda, “Unemployment,” 298. 
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welfare state was viewed as “passive”, responding after the fact to social risks such as 
unemployment, the idea of “activation” was that the state would prevent such risks from forming 
in the first place, by developing human capital through skills training, and getting people back 
into the labour market. To achieve this, the option of government benefits had to be made as 
undesirable as possible, and was made conditional upon either participation in skills retraining or 
the acceptance of any available jobs.89 The priority of pushing unemployed workers into the 
labour market was reflected in the neologisms that emerged in the 1990s: in the US and the UK, 
“welfare” became “workfare” while in Canada, “employment insurance” replaced 
“unemployment insurance.”  
On the surface, getting workers back to work and investing in human capital both seem to 
align with the goal of full employment. However, the nature of work has changed in the post-
industrial “knowledge” economy.  The greatest number of jobs are now found in the service 
sector, and of these, there are far more low-wage, part time and temporary jobs than there are 
quality jobs. The last few decades have revealed the structural nature not only of unemployment, 
but also of underemployment and precarious work. Over the last 25 years, income inequality has 
risen consistently, as both the quantity and quality of available work has declined. Since the 
1990s the watchword of neoliberal labour market policy has been “flexibility”, an inadvertently 
candid term for the bending of labour to the needs and whims of employers. It has been in order 
to attract industry in a competitive globalized economy, that governments themselves have bent 
over backwards to offer labour markets that are “flexible” about wages, hours, conditions and job 
security. 
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After decades of such labour market policies the trend towards more precarious 
employment is undeniable. For instance, a 2015 CIBC report on Canadian employment trends 
found that, since the 1980s, part-time work grew at much faster rate than full time work; between 
1990 and 2015 the numbers of self-employed workers rose even more steeply while low wage 
full time jobs grew at twice the rate of high paying jobs. It is not only the lower wages, fewer 
hours, short term contracts or lack of benefits that make such “non-standard” work “precarious.” 
90 Union representation is also far less likely in such forms of employment. As the proportion of 
Canadians eligible for unemployment insurance benefits has steadily decreased, ever more 
workers have been pushed into a market in which they have relatively little bargaining power. 
This is not at all the same as a commitment to full employment. It is simply a way of attracting 
investment capital and cutting social insurance and safety-net spending. In fact, in recent years 
Ontario’s EI funds, into which all workers contribute, have been in surplus. Rather than altering 
the criteria in order to make more than 36% of Ontarians eligible for unemployment benefits, 
                                                          
90 Dominique Fleury, “Precarious Employment in Canada: An Overview of the 
Situation,” Hillnotes: Research and Analysis from Canada’s Library of Parliament, Aboriginal 
Affairs and Social Development, (January 27, 2016)), https://hillnotes. 
wordpress.com/2016/01/27/precarious-employment-in-canada-an-overview-of-the-situation.  
According to Fleury, The International Labour Organization defines precarious employment as 
“a lack or inadequacy of rights and protection at work. This definition can apply to informal 
work, but also to several types of formal work, including subcontracting, temporary contracts, 
interim work, self-employment and involuntary part-time work….These types of formal 
employment are considered more precarious, because they are associated with reduced financial 
security and stability stemming from lower wages on average, less access to benefits such as 
private pension plans and complementary health insurance, as well as greater uncertainty about 
future employment income. These types of jobs are also associated with poorer physical and 
mental health outcomes.”  
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politicians have chosen to channel the surplus into lower EI premiums and other taxes. Similar 
trends have been noted in almost all OECD nations.91  
The neoliberal solution to the problem of unemployment has been to “create jobs” by 
appealing to the interests of industry. Faced with conditions such as a scarcity of full time quality 
work; conditional, and often exclusionary unemployment insurance systems, and deterrent social 
assistance programs, labour is forced to make itself available for the least tolerable or 
remunerative positions. If this response to economic insecurity seems redolent of the New Poor 
Laws discussed earlier in the chapter, that is because neoliberalism is literally a revival of 
nineteenth century liberalism and its emphasis on unregulated markets and  the commodification 
of labour. In fact, the neoliberal “recommodification” of labour been accompanied by a renewed 
interest in and debate about the New Poor Laws among historians. Conservative historians, such 
as Gertrude Himmelfarb, sought to reintroduce “Victorian Values” like self-reliance, and private 
charity, while others debated the motives and impact of the New Poor Laws, in the shadow of 
contemporary neoliberal reforms of the welfare state. 92 
What has this revival of a more fundamentalist liberal political rationality meant for the 
state’s role as the primary risk manager in modern societies? As new conditions have arisen, 
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92  See, for example, Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early 
Industrial Age (New York: Vintage Books, 1984); On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely 
Thoughts on Culture and Society (New York: Random House, 1994); The De-Moralization of 
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Peter Mandler, “The Making of the New Poor Law Redivivus,” Past and Present 117, no.1 
(1987): 131-157; Anthony Brundage and David Eastwood, “The Making of the New Poor Law 
Redivivus,” Past and Present 127 (1990): 183-194; and George Boyer, "Malthus was Right after 
All: Poor Relief and Birth Rates in Southeastern England," Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 
1 (1989): 93-114. 
 
466 
  
 
such as globalization, deindustrialization and post-fordism, has the model of the state as “a great 
benefit society” or “insurance society” become obsolete? Before moving on to consider these 
questions  I think it is important to remember that in its role as modern risk manager, the welfare 
state has always had a strong partner in the private insurance industry. Not only do these partners 
interact closely on many levels, but together they have shaped how people live in modern 
society, their everyday encounters with regulation and surveillance, how they think about risk 
and uncertainty and their expectations for the future. 
The Insurance Industry since the Post-war Period 
 By almost any measurement, the insurance industry is a dominant feature of the global capitalist 
economy. Since the turn of the century, notwithstanding the upheavals of 9/11, the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami of 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the global financial crisis of 2008, the global 
written premiums for the industry have averaged US $ 3.85 trillion annually.93 In fact, gross 
annual premiums have nearly doubled since 2000, from 2.49 trillion to 4.7 trillion in 2016. 
Insurance now generates nearly as much annual profit as the global food industry. Globally, three 
times as much is spent on insurance as is spent on defense.94  The industry constitutes 6.23% of 
the Global Gross Domestic Product and from 5 to 10% of the GDP of most developed nations, 
                                                          
93   Swiss Re Institute, Sigma, 3 (2017), http://www.sigma-explorer.com/. For the year 
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especially those in the OECD. 95 Meanwhile, market penetration in developing and emerging 
economies has been growing steadily in recent decades. 96 Insurance is also a major employer 
and a major source of investment capital in most advanced economies.97 But beyond the sheer 
size of the industry, it is the ubiquity of insurance, its presence in multiple social institutions and 
cultural discourses, which gives it an indisputable sway over modern lives. 
Governments and Insurance: Partners in Risk Management 
Historically, the insurance industry has been a vigorous opponent of government initiatives for 
socializing risk. In the post war period, as nations developed and expanded upon social insurance 
and benefits for their populations, the industry lobbied to protect their existing or potential 
market share against government encroachment.98 While the industry did grow at a slower rate 
                                                          
95 Sajid Mohy, Ul Din, Arpah Abu-Bakar, and Angappan Regupathi, “Does Insurance 
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an In Depth Perspective” McKinsey Global Insurance Pools, 4th edition (McKinsey & Company, 
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statistics: industry overview” Insurance information Institute, https://www.iii.org/fact-
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see Gerard W. Boychuk and Keith G. Banting “Rethinking the Divided Welfare State: the Role 
of Private and Public Benefits in the Development of Pensions and Health Insurance in Canada” 
Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, Ontario, May 2009. Also 
see Boychuk and Banting, “The Canada Paradox: The Public-Private Divide in Health Insurance 
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during the 1950s and 1960s than it did in subsequent decades, it cannot be said that it was 
significantly constrained by the emergence of the welfare state. Indeed, the intention from the 
beginning, especially in welfare states that would come to be classified as “liberal”, was that 
“State provision was to run parallel with, rather than to displace private insurance.” Deployed 
together, they would “form the twin pillars of social security.” 99 Just where the lines dividing 
public and private insurance have been drawn in each nation is the result of whichever conditions 
prevailed during the legislation of different social policies: which political party reigned at the 
time and what kind of relationship it had with the insurance industry or other industries that 
might be effected by the legislation; the compromises that had to be made between different 
regions, states or provinces and any number of  economic, political and cultural factors 
constraining or shaping a nation’s priorities at that time.100  
                                                          
and Pensions,” in Public and Private Social Policy, ed. Daniel Béland and Brian Gran, (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). For a more general account of the global insurance industry, 
including the “relinquishment” of some of its areas of business to governments in the post war 
period please see Peter Borsheid and Neils Viggo Haueter, “Global Insurance: The Global 
Expansion of the Concept of Modern Insurance,” European Financial Review, Dec. 2, 2012, 
https://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/global-insurance-the-global-expansion-of-the-
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99 Knights and Vurdubakis, “Calculations of Risk,” 757. 
 
100 Boychuk and Banting have highlighted the role that such factors played in the shaping 
of the Canadian pensions plan and universal health insurance scheme in the 1960s. In Ontario, 
for instance, the private pension industry had a much larger presence than in other provinces. 
Added to this, the Conservative party- which had close ties to the industry- was in power at the 
time. Thus, when the Liberal Federal Government sought to introduce a contributory pension 
plan, it began to revise its initial plan to make room for the private pension industry, in order to 
gain Ontario’s assent to the federal plan. However, when Quebec came forward with a much 
more generous and redistributive plan, one that other provinces saw as a model, the Federal 
government revised its plan in the other direction.  Meanwhile when the Federal government 
attempted to introduce universal health insurance under Medicare, the opposition of those 
provinces with the highest levels of private insurance benefits were overruled in the interests of 
creating greater national solidarity, for, as Canada neared its centennial celebrations in 1967, 
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In “liberal” welfare states like Canada, the government “carefully left room for the 
private sector to grow.”101 There are two principles means by which the state, in such regimes, 
“encourages the market.” First, it does so passively, by guaranteeing only minimal social 
provisions, thus driving all but the neediest citizens to seek market based or charitable forms of 
social protection. Secondly, it more actively favours private welfare systems, including the 
insurance industry and its consumers, with substantial tax subsidies.102 According to Esping-
Anderson, the growth of the private welfare market was largely enabled by the state. In the case 
of private pensions, for example, they “required the application of state power to build and 
nurture a viable private market. In turn, the state's role in furnishing pensions has been 
decisively shaped by the nature and limits of markets” Thus, “political power and the cash nexus 
have interacted continuously to manufacture the peculiar blend of social provision that goes into 
defining welfare-state regimes.” 103 
While the state’s promotion of private sector insurance –and other forms of private 
welfare – has been more marked under neoliberal governments over the last four decades, 
welfare states have always contained some degree of complementarity between private insurance 
and state social provision. One reason for this, and for the state’s willingness to subsidize private 
insurance, is that the two systems address the risk of income insecurity through different modes 
of distribution and funding.  Social insurance redistributes risks across income classes and relies 
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upon the principle of solidarity to build its fund, while private insurance redistributes risk across 
each person’s life span and relies upon actuarial principles to finance its operations. 104 But social 
insurance is not the only component of the state with which private insurance engages in a 
mutually beneficial relationship. Indeed recent sociological analysis of insurance as an institution 
reveals that insurance is a sort of hub through which almost all other social institutions and 
functions vital to a modern state are connected. 
Analysis of the insurance industry has until quite recently been confined to the fields of 
economics and law as well as actuarial and other literature produced within the industry itself. 
Such literature can be invaluable for those seeking to understand the dynamics of insurance, its 
role in the modern economy, its intersections with law and its relevance for pressing global 
issues.105 However, a more comprehensive approach to the “vast set of enterprises known as 
insurance.” 106 was largely absent until the publication of a groundbreaking sociological 
treatment of the industry in 2003.  In Insurance as Governance Erickson, Doyle and Barry 
                                                          
104 Benjamin W. Veghte, “Welfare State,” International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Encyclopedia.com. 3 Feb. 2018, http://www.encyclopedia.com. For a detailed account 
of the often overlooked relationship between public and private social provision in welfare states 
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painstakingly unravel the cultural, political, economic, legal and other functions through which 
insurance and the state are entwined, demonstrating that insurance is the institution for 
governance beyond the state.107  
Insurance and the Economy 
First, there are a number of financial and economic reasons why the insurance industry is 
indispensable to the state. Most simply, as a massive industry it is a major source of both tax 
revenue and revenue stemming from regulation.108 Insurance companies are also major investors 
in the government itself. The accumulation of a surplus is essential to insurance, not only in 
order to profit but in order to guarantee a fund sufficient for paying out claims. Insurers 
accumulate this surplus by investing in an array of financial instruments; foremost among these 
are Government bonds and securities which are particularly safe avenues of investment. 109 At 
                                                          
 
107 Richard V. Ericson, Aaron Doyle, and Dean Barry (Eds.) Insurance as Governance, 
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Child: the Changing Social Value of Children (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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the same time, as Leidtke points out, because the funds acquired by insurers tend to be linked to 
long term contracts, the investment of that money has a long term and thus stabilizing presence 
in financial markets and the economy as a whole.  Insurance also acts as a buffer in times of 
volatility by indemnifying the financial losses of those it covers. By preventing individual and 
corporate bankruptcies, insurance provides enough certainty for economic actors to continue 
planning and taking risks. In such an environment people are less likely to bind their savings to 
instruments that shield them from capital markets and more likely to invest them as productive 
capital.110 In this way insurance “stimulates investment and consumption by reducing bound 
capital,” transforming “dormant capital into free capital.” 111   Added to all of this is the not 
insignificant fact that insurers cover losses that the state would otherwise have to compensate.112 
Insurance therefore “plays a special role underpinning the growth of an economy.” 113 
While that role is now played in a much more complex economic and financial context, it is 
essentially continuous with the role insurance played in the coffeehouses of London in the early 
eighteenth century, when merchant ship owners transferred to insurers the risk of loss or damage 
to their vessels on trading adventures. Now, as then, insurance is the rooting mechanism that 
secures the freedom to risk adventure. Insurance underwrites risk taking in capitalist society. 
And just as in the mid-twentieth century states developed social insurance systems in order to 
                                                          
109 Ibid, 7, 46; Also see Leidtke, “What’s Insurance,” 215. 
  
110 Leidtke, “What’s Insurance,” 216-217; and Ericson, Doyle and Barry, Insurance as 
Governance, 5. 
 
111 Leidtke, “What’s Insurance,” 216. 
 
112 Ericson Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 46. 
 
113 Ibid, 46. 
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maintain social solidarity and political stability and to forestall revolution or collapse of liberal 
society and economy, the insurance industry maintains the functioning of key social institutions 
and systems, and promotes ongoing economic growth by stabilizing the economic system. 
Insurance thus attempts to bracket the insecurity that inevitably accompanies the dynamism of 
capitalism.  
But it isn’t only with regard to the economy that insurance acts as a sort of fungible, 
portable root system, keeping actors’ feet on the ground even as they fly off into new and risky 
terrain. Or, to put it another way, because capitalism pervades every aspect of society, insurance 
accompanies it everywhere. Thus, As Ericson et al point out, “Insurance companies interlock 
with other powerful corporations and the state to negotiate political economy on all levels of 
society. Insurance also governs other institutions through its powers of transferring and 
distributing risks. It strongly influences how institutions structure their environment, how they 
produce, take and manage risks.” 114 
To understand just why insurance is so central not only to institutions but also to 
everyday life in modern societies we must remind ourselves of the difference between 
uncertainty and risk discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Risk, is a calculation, a 
measurement of the probability of an event. Uncertainty lies outside of that calculation. One 
might say that risk is the enclosure and management of future possibilities by probabilistic 
knowledge and classification, while uncertainty is more akin to the waste lands that lie outside of 
the enclosure boundaries, all that is so far unknown, unnamed, and uncalculated. Insurance, 
which arose alongside, though not originally in strict relation to, probabilistic knowledge, is the 
                                                          
114 Ibid, 4. 
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institution that objectifies uncertainties, converting them into probabilities of risk.  Insurance 
companies apply their own expert knowledge, the science of actuarialism, to entire populations 
in order to predict and classify the risks attending nearly every activity and event in modern life.  
It then finds a price for and arranges for the transfer or distribution of each risk. Since it is so 
“often the precondition for (economic) action and it is intertwined with the most basic human 
needs and aspirations,” 115 insurance has thus been closely bound up with capitalism and the 
commodification of ever more spheres of life.116 
Insurance and Law 
Insurance is also “embedding in law.” Insurance is legal, Ericson et al explain, primarily because 
“It objectifies risk by making it subject to contract and adjudication and at the same time it helps 
the law assign liability for loss to the party most able to distribute loss through insurance.”117 Not 
only does insurance have its own body of law (which regulates the business practices of 
insurance, the content of its policies and its handling of claims), but it interacts with several 
aspects of both public and private law as well. It is most closely associated with tort law, a 
branch of civil, private law, in which legal liability for harms is determined. 118 While some 
                                                          
 
115 Leidke, “What’s Insurance,” 220. 
 
116 Ericson, Doyle and Barry, Insurance as Governance, 48. “Insurance cannot recover or 
repair loss or damage in themselves, but (it can at least provide some certainty that capital will be 
there to repair whatever damage can be expressed in monetary terms. This means that 
everything, whether person or property, is commodified for insurance purposes.” 
 
117 Ibid, 48. 
 
118  Tom Baker, "Insurance and the Law," University of Connecticut School of Law 
Articles and Working Papers, no. 5 (2002) http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn_wps/5. 5-6. 
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scholars see its role in tort law as nearly overpowering in its influence, especially in its capacity 
to distribute losses, others have pointed to the principles of contract law underpinning insurance 
law and, related to this, the influence of insurance on commercial law.119 Meanwhile, insurance 
is most obviously connected to public law in its social or public sector variants, where it is 
overseen by administrative law. But private insurance also plays a role in shaping public law. 
According to Shauhin Talesh, “insurance companies respond to laws in ways that end up 
influencing the meaning of law, not just in insurance companies’ own legal environment, but 
also among public legal institutions such as courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.” 120  
                                                          
119 The argument that insurance’s distributive logic has had an ideological effect on tort 
law, which undermines tort law’s restorative form of reparation was made by Jane Stapleton in a 
well-known article in the Modern Law Review. See Jane Stapleton, “Tort Insurance and 
Ideology,” Modern Law Review 58 (1995): 820. Tom Baker has also noted the ideological and 
practical impact of insurance (particularly liability insurance) upon tort law over the last 100 
years. See Baker, “Law and Insurance,” 7. However, Jenny Steele has argued that this emphasis 
on insurance’s distributive effects overlooks the broader connections between insurance and 
private law, particularly its contractual principles. See Jenny Steele, “Tort, Insurance and the 
Resources of Private Law” in Torts in Commercial Law, ed. S. Degeling, J. Edelman and J. 
Goudkamp, (Sydney: Thomson Reuters, 2011). Jens O. Zinn, meanwhile, reminds us of “the 
contractual, indeed commercial nature of much insurance law” in Social Theories of Risk and 
Uncertainty: An Introduction (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), 200- 201. For more on 
the relationship between tort, contract and insurance see Kenneth Abraham, The Liability 
Century: Insurance and Tort Law Reform from the Progressive Era to 9/11 (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008.) 
 
120 Shauhin Talesh, “A New Institutional Theory of Insurance,” University of California 
Irvine Law Review 5, no.3 (2015): 619. Talesh illustrates how the insurance industry can shape 
public law from the “bottom up”, with the example of Employment Practice Liability Insurance.  
Beginning in the 1990s a few insurance companies began to market this new product to 
employers wanting coverage for the legal risk presented by anti-discrimination employment law. 
Insurance companies promote EPLI by amplifying the legal and litigation risks faced by 
employers who fall afoul of civil rights legislation. They offer indemnification for punitive 
damages and require clients to  complete the insurance company’s risk management programs – 
most of which are aimed less at rooting out discriminatory behavior than they are at minimizing 
liability via formalized managerial procedures that may be announced but not necessarily 
followed. Talesh notes that by 2015 more than 70 Insurance companies in the US offered EPLI, 
and most large companies, and many mid-sized companies now hold such policies. Government 
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Insurance as Social Regulator 
Beyond the formal sphere of the law, the insurance industry also has as a powerful regulatory 
effect throughout society, especially in recent decades, as states have sought to divest themselves 
of their responsibilities for risk management. As Tom Baker notes, “because insurance 
institutions inevitably exert a regulatory force over their subjects, insurance must be understood 
as a complement to direct state regulation” but also as a “crucial form of (delegated) state 
power.” 121 The terms outlined in insurance contracts, and the differential pricing that reflects 
different risk profiles require policy holders to comply with certain standards of behavior.  In 
fact, Baker says, “exclusions and conditions written into coverage for property, life, and health 
amount to a form of private legislation.” Moreover, because this legislation pertains to behavior 
and conditions in the privacy of one’s home or business, it penetrates areas that were once off 
limits even to the sovereign authority of Kings!122 Ericson, Doyle and Barry likewise note that, 
despite its roots in the law of contract, insurance “operates beyond the law of contract.”  It 
“operates beyond the law because its systems affect the minutiae of everyday routines across 
society”123  
                                                          
bodies have also followed suit. Insurance therefore has actively shaped the legal meaning of 
compliance with civil rights legislation. See 626-632. 
121 Baker, “Insurance and Law”, 1- 5. 
 
122 Ibid, 5. 
 
123 Ericson, Doyle and Barry, Insurance as Governance, 50. They further suggest that 
because of its ability to penetrate of all aspects of social life “insurance exemplifies what 
Foucault called ‘counterlaw’ in that it provides a basis for social organisation that simultaneously 
underpins and escapes legal regulation.” Meanwhile Baker argues that the insurance contract is 
unlike other forms of contract, in that the bargaining power between the two parties, insurer and 
insured is unequal, and because people do not always enter into such contracts voluntarily. Thus 
“insurance contracts have long been regarded as the paradigmatic contract of adhesion and, to 
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The regulatory power of insurance is exerted through both its “abstract technology” and 
its “imaginary,” the ways, according to Ewald, that such technology is found to be “profitable, 
useful and necessary...in a given social context.” 124  Insurance technology, which involves 
gathering, analysing and classifying data on risk patterns in populations, gives insurance an 
informational advantage over many other regulatory bodies. According to Ben-Shahar and 
Logue, insurance “develops templates to regulate behaviour in ways that are potentially more 
finely tuned and information-sensitive than some forms of government control.”125 The efficacy 
and reach of actuarial techniques have thus been imported by all sorts of institutions, “from 
police departments to social service agencies and money management,” which have adapted to 
their purposes insurance’s probabilistic and demographic interpretation of social reality.126 The 
efficacy and efficiency of the insurantial approach to social regulation is such that even tasks 
which were once the purview  of criminal justice are now being passed on to insurance 
companies. 127 
                                                          
the extent that the adjudication of insurance disputes has developed the law regarding contracts 
of adhesion, this might be regarded as another effect of insurance on law.” See Baker, 10. 
 
124 In his Foucauldian analysis of insurance, Francoise Ewald clarified its multiple 
meanings and manifestations by dividing the phenomenon of insurance into four different 
categories:  its institutions, its abstract technologies, its forms and its imaginaries. Francoise 
Ewald, “Insurance and Risk” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 199-
202. 
 
125 Omri, Ben‐Shahar and Kyle D. Logue “Outsourcing Regulation: how Insurance 
Reduces Moral Hazard,” Michigan Law Review, 111 (2012): 201. 
126 Baker “Insurance and Law,” 8. 
 
127 Sharyn L. Roach Anleu , “The Role of Civil Sanctions in Social Control: a Socio-legal 
Examination,” Crime Prevention Studies, 9 (1998) 21. This “general Movement away from the 
criminal justice system’s monopoly on formal social control for some offences has been termed 
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Insurance companies often have greater resources than government agencies to employ 
the most advanced tools for gathering and analysing data. But they are also effective regulators 
because they operate in a competitive environment. To attract clients they must offer lower 
premiums, which can only be achieved by reducing the risks of their policyholders, thereby 
reducing the number claims that must be paid out.128 Thus, before accepting applications for 
policies, companies demand detailed information on applicants’ risk characteristics, details 
which are then verified by experts in relevant professions. Those who are too “risky” are refused 
coverage, and if information is withheld in the application process, claims can be excluded. 
Meanwhile, they also have a host of both deterrent and incentivizing schemes for policy holders, 
such as deductibles, “feature rating” and “experience rating” which target and audit the risk-
related behavior of each policy-holder, and adjust premiums accordingly. Insurers also shape 
behaviours by “coaching” clients on safety and loss prevention through risk management 
programs that come with reduced premiums. 129 In fact, Insurance is often at the forefront of risk 
prevention, innovations and new knowledge in multiple fields, from fire safety and regulations in 
the nineteenth century to epidemiology, public health and medical innovations today.130  
                                                          
decarceration, informalism and privatization.” Roach Anleu notes that there is now a general 
expectation that people insure themselves against the risk of victimization, and conform to risk 
reducing behaviors, especially in the area of property crime. This “growing reliance on 
probability, opportunity reduction and loss prevention signals a trend toward an insurance or 
actuarial model of social control. See 23, 35. 
128 Ben-Shahar and Logue, “Outsourcing Regulation,” 201. 
 
129 Ibid, 201-212. 
 
130 Baker, “Insurance and Law,” 3; and Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon, eds., Embracing 
Risk: the Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010), 8. 
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Private insurance companies are also innovators in the use of surveillance techniques, 
employing the latest in “information technology, expertise and private policing” to gather 
relevant data on their clients.131  Surveillance has become a crucial component of insurance 
because the discovery of information that contradicts claims made by policyholders can be used 
not only to avoid paying-out claims but also to reduce the overall risk levels in the insured 
population, since awareness of the insurer’s surveillance capabilities cautions all policyholders to 
behave with rectitude. 132 The regulatory scope of surveillance has become all the more extensive 
in recent decades with the explosion in digital information technology. Since the early 2000s 
there has been a massive increase in the volume and complexity of data sets that can be stored. 
This phenomenon, called “Big Data,” has allowed insurance companies to extend and deepen 
their surveillance at little cost. For example, a number of insurance companies have begun to 
offer “pay as/how you drive” policies which adjust premiums according to data on driving 
behavior obtained from a blackbox or smartphone app placed within a person’s car. 133  
                                                          
131 Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 52. 
 
132 The irony, Ericson, et al, point out is that while insurance companies treat policy-
holders with suspicion throughout the relationship, the knowledge and organization of the 
insurance system is so abstract that policy holders themselves have little choice but to place their 
trust in insurers, 52. 
 
133 Torben Iverson and Philipp Rehm, The Market for Creampuffs: Big Data and the 
transformation of the Welfare State (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). For an 
account of such policies in Canada see Jacqueline Nelson, April 2, 2014, updated March 25, 
2017, “Insurers Promise Discounts to Drivers Who Allow In-Car Monitoring “ in The Globe and 
Mail, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-drive/culture/technology/insurers-see-profits-in-
driving-data/article17782343/ Also see NAIC (National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners) “Usage-Based Insurance and Telematics” in The Centre for Insurance Policy 
and Research, Feb, 06, 2018, 
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_usage_based_insurance.html.  
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Of course, such advanced and targeted forms of surveillance are not exclusive to the 
insurance industry. Rather, insurance should be seen as a major component in what Ericson and 
Haggerty have called a surveillant assemblage, in which “a multitude of organized surveillance 
systems” now coordinate their efforts by “abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings 
and separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into distinct 
‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention.”134 The convergence of 
what were once discrete surveillance systems belonging to say, the police, or the insurance 
industry or government organizations, means that data on monitored populations is more easily 
accessed beyond institutional boundaries than ever before. 135 According to Ericson, Barry and 
Doyle, insurance exemplifies, “the tendency of liberal risk regimes to widen and deepen 
surveillance as a normal part of operations.  The search for better knowledge of risks and the 
populations subject to them is incessant and perpetuates itself.”136 The result has been that across 
liberal risk regimes – in both state and private organizations - regulatory bureaucracy continues 
to expand, so that some scholars have even suggested that ours is a “regulatory society” as much 
as it is a “risk society.” 137 
                                                          
134 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, “The Surveillant Assemblage,” British 
Journal of Sociology 51, no. 4 (December 2000): 605-6.  
135 For example, Haggerty and Ericson note that “police organizations have secured 
routine, and often informal, access to a host of non-police databases, such as those from 
insurance companies and financial institutions.” See 616. 
136 Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 53. 
 
137 For a review of the rise of “the regulatory state,” and its relationship with the risk 
society please see Christine Parker and John Briathwaite “Regulation,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies, ed. Mark Tushnet and Peter Cane, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. For 
an interesting discussion of the relationship between the risk society and the regulatory society, 
as a colonizing process please see Henry Rothstein, Michael Huber, and George Gaskell, “A 
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Finally, Insurance functions as a moral regulator.  As a “moral technology,” Insurance 
steers the behaviour of its populations in much the same direction it did in the nineteenth 
century.138 Then, as I recounted above, Assurance companies’ promotional pamphlets enjoined 
the working classes to think of the future for the sake of their families by practising habits of  
thrift and self-reliance, and  company agents even visited the homes of policy-holders on a 
weekly basis in order assess  and improve their spending habits. While policyholders would not 
tolerate such home visits today, insurer’s use other, less direct – but perhaps more effective - 
means of weeding out risky or careless behavior. But for all the advances in the tools used by 
insurance companies to regulate the behavior of policyholders, the objective is continuous with 
that of nineteenth century insurers: that individuals must learn to become the primary risk 
managers in their own lives. As Ewald puts it, the moral technology of insurance guides the 
insured towards compliance with, 
A morality whose cardinal virtue is providence. To provide for the future does not just 
mean not living from day to day and arming oneself against ill fortune, but also 
mathematizing one's commitments. Above all, it means no longer resigning oneself to the 
decrees of providence and the blows of fate, but instead transforming one's relationships 
with nature, the world and God so that, even in misfortune, one retains responsibility for 
one's affairs by possessing the means to repair its effects.139 
Meanwhile, the reach of this moral injunction of self-responsibility is not limited to 
policy-holders but extends to any and all who, inevitably, encounter Insurance marketing in its 
many forms.  And because the imperative to “take the future into your own hands” is part of the 
                                                          
Theory of Risk Colonisation:  The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional 
Risk,” Economy and Society 35, no.1 (February 2006): 91. 
 
138 Ewald uses this term, as do Knights and Vurdubakis. 
 
139 Ewald, “Insurance and Risk,” 207. 
482 
  
 
wider culture of neoliberalism, and indeed, western individualism, the message is continually 
reinforced from all sides. 
The Cultural Footprint of Private Insurance 
By guiding insured populations towards responsible risk management, private insurers are also 
helping to shape the culture of modern societies.  The promotion of individual responsibility is 
one of several ways in which insurers and states tend to collaborate ideologically according to 
Ericson, Barry and Doyle. States, they maintain, have become focused on minimizing their 
responsibility for risks, and thus have been begun encouraging individuals to seek “market based 
security product consumption.” 140  Increasingly, the promotion of individual responsibility for 
risk refers not just to prudential or risk-adverse behaviour but also to risk taking, or risk 
embracing behaviour.  
Risk Embracing: 
For O’Malley, the embrace of risk in recent decades is less a dramatic shift away from the risk-
spreading logic that dominated the twentieth century as it is the renewal of a second element in 
the risk discourses of nineteenth century liberal government. That is to say, the well-known 
emphasis on prudence and foresight in nineteenth century insurance and risk discourses was 
often accompanied by an emphasis on the rewards that can come from engaging with 
uncertainty, especially in entrepreneurial activity.141  Simon and Baker have also conceived of 
                                                          
 
140 Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 361. 
 
141 Pat O’Malley, “Uncertainty Makes us Free”: Liberalism, Risk and Individual 
Security," BEHEMOTH-A Journal on Civilisation 2, no. 3 (2009): 24-30. O’Malley explains that 
what has re-emerged is the full Benthamite conception of the relationship between security and 
freedom, wherein security promotes and nurtures foresight, not only to forestall the losses that 
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risk-spreading, the typical logic of insurance, as just one of “two related cultural trends,” the 
second being a “reaction against spreading risk,” wherein individuals are incentivized to embrace 
and take responsibility for risks.142  
The embrace of risk is apparent across the culture, from the popularity of extreme sports 
to the promotion of gambling activities such as lotteries and casinos by governments.143 
Gambling in financial markets has also had a growing appeal since the nineteen eighties. A 
“mass investment culture” has arisen, in which ordinary people, encouraged by tales of fortunes 
made, have begun to invest in the stock market with the fervour of those who flocked to the 
California goldfields in the nineteenth century. 144 This trend has coincided with the 
liberalization, deregulation and increasingly abstract activities of financial markets as well as the 
blurring of the boundaries between insurance, banking and financial services.145  
                                                          
might occur in an uncertain future, but also to take advantage of the opportunities that it might 
afford. For Bentham, O’Malley argues, the right kind of security acts as a foundation for 
planning, and for a subject that is free, not only in the “negative” but also in the “positive” sense.  
The right kind of security included property rights and contract law.  According to O’Malley, 
“The contractual basis of insurance made the uncertain future less uncertain…, by rendering 
some things directly calculable and …guaranteed by law.” It also made foresight “a legally 
enforceable duty owed to others” and the “practical and moral duty of every citizen….a form of 
calculative attitude that was to pervade the everyday life of liberal subjects.” Foresight, then, was 
not merely understood as a defensive posture taken against an uncertain future, but also as a 
means of imagining the possible. 
142 Simon and Baker, Embracing Risk, 1. 
 
143 Ericson, Doyle and Barry, Insurance as Governance, 38-39. 
 
144 Ibid, 1, and Paul Langley, “The Making of Investor Subjects in Anglo-American 
Pensions,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24 (2006): 920. 
 
145 According to Ericson, Doyle and Barry, “The four relatively autonomous pillars of 
financial institutions-banks, insurance companies, trust companies, and credit unions- are 
collapsing.” Meanwhile, “banks are making incursions into the insurance industry” and the 
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According to Ericson et al, the risk embracing discourse is particularly present in private 
insurance as a form of governance beyond the state. Embedded in its “institutional routines, 
classification systems, (and) information systems” this discourse corresponds with the general 
“movement toward private market alternatives for insurance and security provision.”146 
Individuals are now expected, “as participants in fast moving and fluctuating markets” to 
“become educated, knowledgeable, reflexive risk takers...each individual is to be her own 
political economy, an informed, self-sufficient consumer of labour markets, personal security 
markets and other consuming interests.” 147  
Perhaps most illustrative of this recent turn towards risk-embracing, is what has happened 
to pension plans over the last three decades. In most advanced economies the responsibility for 
pensions has steadily shifted from the state and employers, to individuals, and from the  “defined 
benefit” model (guaranteed, fixed benefits to be received after working age) towards a “defined 
contribution” model (defacto investment portfolios, with uncertain benefits). 148 The positive 
                                                          
“acceleration of mergers and acquisitions in all industries also characterizes the insurance 
industry.” See Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 45-6. 
 
146 Ibid, 35. 
 
147 Ibid, 36. 
 
148 As Impavido and Tower explain, in a defined contribution pension “the value of 
retirement benefits depends only on the level and timing of contributions as well as their 
compounded rate of return in the individual accounts during the working life. In traditional DC 
pension plans, contributors are often responsible for choosing plan managers, asset allocation 
and fully bear the investment risk. See Gregorio Impavido and Ian Tower, “How the Financial 
Crisis Affects Pensions and Insurance and Why the Impacts Matter,” in International Monetary 
Fund Working Paper 9, no. 151 (International Monetary Fund, 2009), 6. According to the 
OECD, this shift from DB to DC pensions (and “the shift in risk… from governments and 
financial institutions to households”) has been a global trend. Individuals are increasingly 
responsible for making investment decisions, however surveys have shown they do not 
understand the complexities of investments, and particularly in defined contribution pensions. 
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spin on this development is that individuals now have control over investment decisions that 
were once the responsibility of insurers, employers and professional investors and that by tying 
pension benefits to financial markets, individuals can expect greater returns to ease their 
retirements.149 The danger of such arrangements should be obvious to anyone with a historical 
sense of the volatile behaviour of financial markets.150  
Along with the state and other financial institutions, private insurers have encouraged 
individuals to invest in capital markets and consume the private security products offered by the 
financial services industry.151 For Langley, public participation in ever more marketized forms of 
                                                          
“An important trend in many countries has been the rise in the number of workers participating 
in defined contribution plans. Yet it is clear that many of the workers in these plans, faced with 
the responsibility for investing their retirement contributions, need help.” 106. For this reason the 
OECD strongly recommends prioritizing financial education. Please see OECD, "Financial 
Education and Saving for Retirement: Why Financial Education is Needed for Retirement 
Saving", in Improving Financial Education and Awareness on Insurance and Private Pensions, 
(Paris, OECD Publishing, 2008), 103. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264046399-16-en,   
 
149 Baker and Simon, Embracing Risk, 3-4; and O’Malley, “’Uncertainty Makes Us 
Free,’” 35; Castel notes that, (the right to a pension is the “clearest manifestation” of social 
property, whereby “there is a direct transfer of wages to security through the intermediary of 
obligatory insurance.” In an era when work (the source of contributions to this sort of insurance) 
is ever more scarce and precarious, and where an aging demographic narrows the risk pool of 
contributors, it is no wonder that pensions were among the first to be reformed. See Castel, 
“Emergence and Transformations of Social Property,” 327-330. 
 
150 The exposure to risk faced by individuals with pensions tied closely to financial 
markets was made apparent with the 2008 Global financial crisis. According to Impavido and 
Tower, “Private pensions in OECD countries reported US$4 trillion losses in asset values in the 
first 10 months of 2008. Pension funds in OECD countries have experienced on average a 
negative return of nearly 20 percent in nominal terms (22 percent in real terms) since the 
beginning of the year (see Figure 7). Most of the loss is accounted for by pension funds in the 
United States (US$2.2 trillion out of the total OECD loss of 3.US$3 trillion) due to their larger 
than average exposure to equity risk.” See Impavido and Tower, “How the Financial Crisis 
Affects Pensions and Insurance,” 19. 
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security and insurance has been facilitated by a discourse that constitutes its subjects as 
entrepreneurial investors. 152 Particularly with regard to the changes to Anglo-American 
pensions, this “investor subject” is targeted in multiple campaigns, from doomful reports that 
government pensions cannot be sustained for an increasingly aging demographic  to the 
promotion of financial literacy in schools, self-help books and websites and governmental 
pension guides.153 By advising individuals on how to be astute participants in financial markets, 
states and financial institutions have normalized the expectation that individuals “provide for 
their financial futures,”154 and surrender their reliance on social protection for their post-
employment years.  
If we consider the risk-embracing discourse deployed by both states and insurers in 
relation to Castel’s theory of “social property” and Esping-Anderson’s use of 
“decommodification” in assessing welfare states, it is apparent this discourse and its attendant 
practices have eroded social protections intended to minimize exposure to the risks of the 
market. For Castel, social property was an alternative means of granting the right to security to 
non-property owners, which became possible with the application of insurantial risk spreading 
                                                          
151 Sean French and James Kneale, “Excessive Financialisation: Insuring Lifestyles, 
Enlivening Subjects, and Everyday Spaces of Biosocial Excess,” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 27 (2009): 1030. 
152 Langley, “The Making of Investor Subjects,” 919.  French and Kneale, exploring the 
way that an evolving insurance industry has contributed to this trend in the “financialization of 
everyday life” have suggested that in addition to Langley’s “investor subject,” there has emerged 
an “insurantial subject”, the target market of new products and developments in health insurance 
and annuity markets which centre on lifestyle. See French and Kneale, “Excessive 
Financialisation,” 1030-1032.   
153 Langley, “The Making of Investor Subjects,” 925. 
 
154 Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 37. 
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across society. The right to a pension is, he maintains, “the clearest manifestation” of social 
property, whereby “there is a direct transfer of wages to security through the intermediary of 
obligatory insurance.”155 In an era when work (the source of contributions to this sort of 
insurance) is ever more scarce and precarious and when an aging demographic narrows the risk 
pool of contributors, it is no wonder that there has been a push to privatize and individualize 
responsibility for pensions.156  As Esping-Anderson noted, when social rights to services and 
protections have “the legal and practical status of property rights” and are “granted on the basis 
of citizenship rather than performance” the result is “a loosening of the pure commodity status” 
of “individuals vis-à-vis the market.” 157 While many of the social rights granted through the 
welfare state remain, others are being withdrawn as protections like pensions are ever more 
reliant on participation in the market. The discourses of risk embracing and individual 
responsibility for risk, promulgated by states, insurers and other financial institutions have had 
the cultural effect of normalizing and moralizing this recommodification of human needs.158 
   
Risk Consciousness and the Hypermarketing of (In)security 
Another cultural trend given considerable momentum by the insurance industry and closely 
corresponding with the discourses of risk-embracing and individual responsibility for risk, has 
                                                          
 
155 Castel, “Emergence and Transformation of Social Property,” 327. 
 
156 Ibid, 327-330. 
 
157 Esping-Anderson, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 21-22. 
 
158 As Baker and Simon note, considering the significance of the changes made to 
pensions over the last few decades in the US it is surprising that the subject has not been a matter 
of much public discussion. See Baker and Simon, Embracing Risk, 4. 
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been the heightened consciousness of risk and security throughout society. Whether it is the 
abundance of media attention given to risk related issues in health, technology and the 
environment, or the “hypermarketing of financial security products,” risk is an ever present 
feature in our cultural landscape. As Ericson et al note, the ubiquity of risk and insecurity are 
demonstrated in the 24 hour cable news programs, which place scrolling “real-time financial 
market trading indices over cheap, wire-fed disaster news items from anywhere that augment 
both a sense of insecurity and the need for security.” 159 The collapsed space and the hyper-
immediacy with which such media present risk related information induces in audiences a 
visceral anxiety about the future. Exposure to ever more knowledge of risks has had the effect of 
increasing the cultural perception of insecurity and powerlessness in societies that, by many 
indicators, are safer and less exposed to risks than ever before. 160As Krahman notes, if we think 
of risk as a discourse, “instead of being (exclusively) the result of the material transformation of 
‘real’ dangers, the defining feature of the risk society becomes its obsession with risk.”161  
                                                          
 
159 Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 38. 
 
160 Measures such as life-expectancy and infant mortality data, for instance, suggest that 
we have become increasingly sheltered from many of the risks that have long bedeviled human 
populations. In the conclusion to this chapter I further I discuss the paradox of heightened 
insecurity in spite of indications of improved security. On the increasing public perception of 
insecurity see Peter Taylor-Gooby, “Risk Governance and Public Trust,” 2018, 2. 
https://www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/events/beijingAb/TaylorGooby. Gabriel Mythen, Understanding 
the Risk Society: Crime, Security and Justice, (London: Palgrave-McMillan, 2014), 3. 
  
161 Elke Krahman, “The Commodification of Security in the Risk Society,” School of 
Sociology, Politics, and International Studies, University of Bristol Working Paper, no. 6-8 
(2008), 9. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/9667.  For example, In The Risk Management of 
Everything Michael Power remarks that “Not only private sector companies, but hospitals, 
schools, universities and many other public organisations, including the very highest levels of 
central government, have all been invaded to varying degrees by ideas about risk and its 
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Insecure populations make for ideal markets.  Businesses across nearly all sectors of the 
economy are able to present their products as security enhancing, from health foods, to smart 
phones and alarm systems.162 Risk – and the products and services intended to manage it- is a big 
business and, the growth of risk related industries seems to have been proportionate with the 
degree that private insurers and states have downloaded responsibility for risk management onto 
individuals and corporations. As I mentioned in the above section on insurance and regulation, 
risk reduction is essential to the survival of insurers in an ever more competitive industry. Thus, 
risk reduction programs and risk-management services are often built into insurance contracts for 
businesses. In the last 30 years, risk-management services have swelled into an industry, a 
profession studied in colleges and an essential component of both corporate governance and 
public organizations.163  
But risk and security discourses and the market in security and risk management products 
and services did not emerge simply as a result of cynical attempts to profit off of a culture of 
fear. Rather, as Ericson et al note, private insurers and states share the goal of collective security, 
and these “collective security needs are imagined through discourses of insecurity. Insecurity is 
based on knowledge of risk as danger and on the fears generated by that knowledge.” Thus “the 
rational knowledge of probability calculation not only allays fears but also accentuates them 
because risk is always surrounded by uncertainty.”164 That uncertainty is never vanquished, in 
                                                          
management.” Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything:  Rethinking the Politics of 
Uncertainty (London: Demos, 2004), 9.  
162 Power, The Risk Management of Everything, 4. 
 
163 Ibid, 37. Also see B.M Hutter, “The Role of Non-State Actors in Regulation” in The 
Centre for Analysis and Risk Regulation, Discussion Paper, no.37 (April, 2006) 1-2. 
 
164 Ericson, Barry and Doyle, Insurance as Governance, 47. 
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part because the future cannot ever be fully known, but also because the ceaseless quest for 
knowledge of risks always uncovers more unknowns to be objectified, calculated and 
commodified, requiring ever more actions and knowledge to prevent and insure against risks. 
This ongoing conversion of uncertain events into objects of calculation places upon us a burden 
of responsibility for the future that generates anxiety.  Like modernity’s quest for reform, 
improvement or progress, the project of risk management is never completed. The reflexivity of 
modernity means that knowledge is always questioned, and new knowledge always sought, so 
that the objectives of certainty and security can never be reached.165 As Defert puts it, “each new 
measure of protection makes visible a new form of insurable insecurity…security can become an 
inexhaustible market, or alternatively, an impulse toward a motive for ever more interventionist 
political action.”166  
Because the insurance industry is so intertwined with other major social institutions such 
as law, the economy, and government, it has had an enormous influence in making risk a central 
                                                          
 
165 Beck, Giddens and Lash introduced the idea of “reflexive modernization” to describe 
the way that our knowledge and control over nature and society have themselves come into 
question, as we attempt to deal rationally with the risks that science and technology have 
manufactured. See Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization: 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). 
For a discussion of reflexive modernity and its relationship with the Risk Society please see 
Mahmoud Eid, “Reflexive Modernity and Risk Society,” International Journal of the 
Humanities, 1 (2003): 813. If, as Beck contends, this reflexivity emerges in relation to the risks 
produced by industrial modernization, the relationship between modernity and reflexivity is not 
new.  Doubt or critique of received ideas has been characteristics of modernity from its earliest 
historical periods. Agnes Heller, as I noted in the introduction, describes modernity as founded 
upon doubt, and with each new foundation intended to replace a discredited one, doubt returns to 
deconstruct it. See Agnes Heller, A Theory of Modernity (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1999). 
 
166 Daniel Defert, “’Popular Life’ and Insurance Technology,” in The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991): 211-234, 215. 
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preoccupation of late modern society.  Yet, the proliferation of risk discourses, perceptions of 
insecurity and of products and services for managing risk over the last three decades is only the 
most recent example of how risk and insurance have shaped the modern response to an uncertain 
future. Over the last two centuries the charge of overseeing the unfolding of the future has been 
transferred from Providence to friendly societies, to private insurers and the state, and now, ever 
more so, to individuals. This downloading of responsibility for risk management has 
corresponded with the continual advancement of techniques for governing at a distance, from 
censuses and statistics to Big Data and smartphones.  
Conclusion 
Over the last three chapters, I have traced the development of techniques for governing at a 
distance (the census, statistical and actuarial knowledge) and the application of those techniques 
to the management of risks across populations. In the nineteenth century, private insurers, 
friendly societies and government social policies used different approaches to manage or 
mitigate the risks of certain target populations, such as skilled tradesmen, industrial labourers, 
the middle class, or the poor. In the twentieth century we saw states take a leading role in 
managing the risks of their citizens through the development of ever more comprehensive social 
insurance systems, while the private insurance industry grew in complexity and size, becoming 
indispensable to economy and governance of liberal polities. With the neoliberal restructuring of 
social and economic policies over the last three decades, states have progressively downloaded 
their risk management responsibilities onto individual citizens and private sector insurance and 
security providers. Private insurers have likewise found ways to transfer to their policy-holders 
much of the responsibility for managing risks.  
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Individuals are now expected to act as the risk managers of their own lives. On the face 
of it, such an expectation is not so outrageous. We might be forgiven for asking “why shouldn’t 
people be responsible for the risks in their lives?” But, aside from the fact that many of the 
greatest risks faced by individuals are not within their personal control, this question neglects to 
consider that risk is a relatively novel concept in human history. Before the nineteenth century, 
with the exception of a few probability theorists, ship-owners and stock jobbers, the various 
threats and dangers that people encountered in the course of their lives were not considered 
objects of calculation, contract, exchange or management. Instead, a fire, a famine, a stillborn 
baby, or an injury at work were all considered events beyond human control or reason, elements 
of the great unfolding of a Divine will.  It could never have been easy to accept that Divine will, 
but the attempt to accept it would have reaffirmed the notion that some aspects of our lives were 
subject to an external source of control and meaning.  By contrast, the management of risks - 
whether it is shouldered by states, corporations, individuals, or some combination of all three, as 
is the tendency today – is expressive of a worldview in which all events, even the unknown 
events of an uncertain future, are ultimately subject to human control. 
Is there a purpose to knowing and controlling ever more of the uncertain terrain of the 
future? Whether that behaviour is entirely purposive or not, I will consider in the concluding 
chapter below, but I think it can reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to banish uncertainty, to 
restore order and security, to shelter ourselves from exposure to the winds of chance. Security is 
certainly the ostensible purpose of insurance. But the question I wish consider in closing this 
chapter, is whether insurance, and risk management generally, have succeeded in making us 
more secure?   
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In some ways we have never been safer: never have so many contingencies been foreseen 
and prevented – or made compensable. Across the world- with few exceptions- life expectancy 
has never been higher.167 And in the Global North especially, it is a fairly rare occurrence these 
days for people to die from housefires, surgeries, or childbirth. Even deaths from cancer are on 
the decline.168 Such improvements did not just happen. They are the result of two centuries of 
concerted efforts to minimize the threats to life faced by populations. And those efforts 
succeeded because patterns in populations could be determined through the collection and 
analysis of data, and because with the rise of insurance entire systems of risk identification, 
prevention, regulation, liability and compensation were created.  
So, yes, managing risks, knowing and controlling ever more of the future, has made our 
lives more secure. And yet, as I have indicated in the preceding sections, some recent 
developments reveal a clear trend towards insecurity. In a post-fordist, post-industrial economy, 
further shaped by neoliberal policies like deregulation, work has become more “precarious.” 
With the rise of contract or temporary work and the relative decline in the power and presence of 
unions, fewer jobs- in both high and low skilled occupations- come with the benefits that 
previous generations relied upon to supplement a loss of income due to disability, injury, illness, 
                                                          
167 Colin J. Bennet, Kevin D Haggerty, David Lyon and Valerie Steeves (eds), “The Rise 
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maternity, unemployment or retirement. Meanwhile, the Social Insurance benefits provided 
through governments have become increasingly difficult to access, while pensions- a vital right 
to social property in a capitalist society- have increasingly been tied to financial markets. 
And then there are the ubiquitous expressions of insecurity apparent in cultures of the 
Global North, in spite of the highly regulated nature and comparative safety of such societies. As 
I mentioned above, the insurance industry has played a role in raising the cultural consciousness 
of risk and in the marketing of security products. But what is most interesting about the fears and 
insecurities evident in popular culture is that they often do not correspond with what are 
empirically the most dominant threats to security.  For example, the above mentioned trends 
towards economic insecurity appear to get far less public attention than a  host of other perceived 
risks that are less likely to occur, or likely to affect fewer people but that speak to our deep-
seated cultural anxieties.169  
Since Americans are more likely to die from falling furniture than they are from a 
terrorist attack, and far more likely to die driving to the airport than from a plane crash, why do 
                                                          
169 Barry Glassner noted this phenomenon in his 1999 book The Culture of Fear, pointing 
out that in the mid-1990s when the number of American’s covered by unemployment insurance 
was shrinking, wealth inequality at a record high, and many Americans suffered from food 
insecurity, people reported rising crime has their greatest concern, even though evidence showed 
it had steadily been declining for decades. See Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear: Why 
Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 65. The tendency 
for the public’s perceptions of risks to diverge greatly from scientific or probabilistic evaluations 
of risk has been interpreted by social scientists in a number of different ways, from the 
individualistic, “rational choice theory” to constructivist and structural theories among 
sociologists, post-modern and cultural theorists. Renn discusses the range of interpretations in 
Ortwin Renn, Risk Governance: Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World (London; 
Sterling, VA:  Earthscan, 2008), 15-23. 
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their fears and anxieties seem to suggest otherwise?170 Why, do people appear to be more 
concerned about the risks of artificial sweeteners such as aspartame than they are about regular 
processed sugars? While decades of extensive studies have not found that the former present any 
significant risks to the high majority of people, the overconsumption of the latter is known to be 
a major contributor to obesity, diabetes and heart disease. 171 Why do a majority of Canadians 
report that they think violent crime is on the rise when it is at a historical low?172  
There are a number of explanations for this phenomenon of “misfearing.” 173 First, risk is 
as much about subjective perceptions as it is about rational probability. And there are political 
and economic actors who stand to gain (power, media ratings, product sales) by highlighting 
some kinds of risk over others. Media, as well as political and marketing campaigns, mine data 
                                                          
170 Harold Mass, “The Odds Are 11 Million to 1 that You’ll Die in a Plane Crash,” in The 
Week, (July 8, 2013), theweek.com/articles/462449/odds-are-11-million-1-that-you’ll-ide-plane-
crash; Andrew Shaver, “You’re more likely to be fatally crushed by furniture than killed by a 
terrorist” in The Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2015.  
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171 Andre Picard, “The Complicated Truth about Aspartame,” The Globe and Mail, Dec. 
22, 2013. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/...complicated-truth...aspartame/article16069158/. 
 
172 Jake Edmiston, “Canada’s Inexplicable Anxiety over Violent Crime,” National Post, 
Aug. 4, 2012. http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadas-inexplicable-anxiety-over-violent-
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173 This term was first used by professor of jurisprudence Cass R. Sunstein, for when 
people “fear things that are not dangerous, and they do not fear things that impose serious risks.”  
See Cas R. Sunstein, “Misfearing: a Reply,” Harvard Law Review, 119 (2005): 1110; and Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, (Cambridge and NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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sources in search of psychological hot spots that can be triggered by presenting information 
about particular risks.174 
While it might appear that the public are inevitably fixated on risks that are more 
dramatic and exotic, I think the more meaningful characteristic common to popular fears is their 
relation to situations or processes that are in one way or another beyond the knowledge and 
control of the average person. 175 This lack of control is the common thread linking fears as 
diverse as airplane crashes, the randomness of violent crime or terrorist attacks, and the 
unfamiliar chemical content and processes that go into food additives. A great deal of this sense 
of having no control comes from our almost complete reliance on abstract systems and expert 
knowledge.176 Anxieties about genetically modified crops or contaminated foods or medicines 
are not just reflective of the “manufactured” risks produced by scientific and technological 
advances, as highlighted by Beck. They also stem from the situation of individual consumers 
who find themselves unable to act with true agency in what are massive global systems of 
                                                          
 
174 The role of media, marketing and politics in shaping the public fears is discussed in 
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production. Similarly, scares about the effect of vaccinations or fluoridated water reflect a 
distrust of biomedical, scientific and governmental power. 177 
This loss of trust in scientific knowledge, technological processes, and global systems of 
production intersects with a decline in the legitimacy of all sorts of previous forms of 
authority.178 The pluralistic nature of late modern societies accelerates modernity’s dynamic of 
endless critique. Thus, according to Furedi, evaluations of risks and questions about their causes 
“are complicated by the fact that Western societies possess a weak sense of shared meaning and 
therefore often lack a consensus about how to attribute blame and responsibility. The absence of 
consensus means that the link between cause and negative outcome is continually contested” 
                                                          
177 On the link between distrust in government and distrust in vaccinations please see 
Gustavo S. Mesch and Kent P. Schwirian, “Confidence in Government and Vaccination 
Willingness in the USA,” Health Promotion International 30, no. 2 (June 2015): 213. 
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early as the 1850s in the case of anti-vaccination movements. See for example, Catherine 
Carstairs and Rachel Elder “Expertise, Health and Popular Opinion: Debating Water 
Fluoridation, 1945-80,” The Canadian Historical Review 89, no. 3 (Sept, 2008): 345. 
http://doi.org/10.3138/chr.89.3.345. Also see Nadja Dirbacj, Bodily Matters: the Anti-
Vaccination Movement in England: 1853-1907, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
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risk, trust and  the abstract systems of modernity has been discussed at length by Anthony 
Giddens in Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, (Cambridge: 
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leading to “speculation, rumours, and mistrust. As a result, events often appear as 
incomprehensible and beyond human control.”179  
In recent decades there has been a heightened sense that we have reached the limits of 
human control over the risks we face. A host of “new social risks” have arisen which appear to 
be of an unprecedented magnitude, and which some, such as Beck, argue are beyond calculation 
or containment. Beck focused primarily on environmental risks as the unforeseen side effects of 
scientific and technological advances made during the industrial phase of modernity. But there 
are other ‘new’ risks of equal magnitude that are produced not by industrialization, but by the 
deeper logic animating both capitalism and modernity: the drive to contain and control the 
unfolding future of nature and society, as is illustrated in the management of risk. A series of 
global crises intersect with the risks associated with climate change: the forced migration of ever 
more people fleeing political violence, environmental devastation and poverty; global terror 
networks which have arisen in response to the effects of colonialism, imperialism, globalization 
and geopolitical conflicts; and the increasingly speculative nature of financial capitalism, which 
resulted in the 2008 global financial crisis.180   
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https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/apr/20/climate-change-will-fuel-terrorism-
recruitment-adelphi-report-says. Also see Peter Schwartzstein, “Climate Change and Water 
Woes Drove Isis Recruiting in Iraq” in National Geographic, Nov. 14/2017. 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/climate-change-drought-drove-isis-terrorist-
recruiting-iraq/ ; Ulrich Beck, “World Risks Society, Revisited,” Theory, Culture & Society 19, 
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The Beckian argument that these sorts of risks are beyond calculation or containment 
suggests that we have arrived at a point of radical insecurity. Our efforts to control and contain 
the risks of an uncertain future seem to have led us to a place where we have no control. While 
some may see this as a devastating blow for civilization, humanity, and the project of modernity, 
others see it as a long-awaited opportunity to begin again with something different, or at the very 
least, to seriously question the present order. Many see the crisis of climate change as a chance – 
because our backs are against the wall- to depose the rule of capitalism and to restore our 
relationship with nature. 181  In the same way, some political scientists and philosophers, 
observing the protracted nature of the refugee crisis, and identifying the nation state system as its 
root cause, have advocated for the opening of borders.182 Finally, the global financial crisis of 
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Chance to Reclaim Self, Society and Nature (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2012). 
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2008, encouraged some to hope that capitalism had finally destroyed itself, and that a saner 
system might be fostered in its place.183 Although I admire those who acknowledge the root 
causes of these interrelated crises, and share the hope that the compulsive character of capitalism 
and modernity has finally driven us to “hit bottom” so that we might find a saner way of living, 
there is not yet much evidence that we have reached that point. That is to say, despite the 
magnitude of these crises, we continue to approach environmental, political and financial ‘risks” 
through a risk management model.  
Beck first argued in the 1980s that the risks faced in this phase of modernity are beyond 
calculation. Yet we now have three decades of evidence that these “new” risks are indeed subject 
to calculation. According to Ericson et al, theorists who suggest that ever more risks are 
uninsurable, “not having studied the insurance industry, fail to appreciate that it will insure just 
about anything. Insurers gamble, trying to manage any fallout through a variety of pricing, 
claims control, financial risk redistribution and investment strategies.”184 Climate change, for 
example, does present extraordinary challenges to the insurance industry, but that does not mean 
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that the industry has thrown up its hands in defeat. New strategies, such as Catastrophe 
Modelling, are constantly being developed. 185 
The insurance industry, having a vested interest in remaining solvent, is actually far 
ahead of most states and international organizations in recognizing the need to change our 
behaviors to prevent or at least mitigate the risks associated with climate change. The general 
response of governing bodies to climate change has been one of reluctant and meager 
concessions to the projections of climate scientists, such as very gradually reducing the scale of 
CO2 emissions, investing in green technologies or carbon trading. The fundamental logic which 
drove us to this point is rarely questioned. Few ‘solutions’ better illustrate how our thinking is 
held captive within the logics of modernity and capitalism than the trade in carbon emissions. 
Signatories to the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 were given caps on the levels of carbon dioxide 
emissions that their nations were permitted to produce. They could then buy carbon units from 
countries with low carbon emissions, in order to raise the cap on their own. Like all commodified 
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and financialized risk transfer mechanisms though, carbon markets are productive of endless 
abstraction, with parcels of units being subject to speculative investment, and long chains of 
derivative transactions through which “risk” products are endlessly “offset” or externalized. 
Carbon trading not only fails to incentivize emissions reductions, it can actually end up 
rewarding the evasion of that goal.186 The other dominant response to climate change has been 
the promotion of technological solutions. The attention and legitimacy given to such 
technocentric and marketized approaches – which propose to fix a problem with the causes of 
that problem- crowd out the impulse to make more substantive change. 187 
We see a similar pattern in the superficial tinkering that has been applied to the financial 
markets since they caused the near collapse of the global economy a decade ago. The global 
financial crisis of 2008 was the result of speculative trading in a number of highly abstract 
financial instruments that allowed investors to skim the rewards from exchanges while endlessly 
passing the risks on. The practice of sub-prime mortgage lending and mortgage backed securities 
such as collateralized debt obligations were the trigger for the collapse of the market. But it 
wasn’t just that the assets being traded were toxic: some argue that the deeper reason behind the 
collapse was that these risk transferring instruments, derivatives, were parcelled and exchanged 
and re-parcelled and exchanged until there was a vast “interconnected web of risks,”, attached to 
                                                          
186 For a diverse selection of essays critiquing the carbon market please see Steffen Böhm 
and Siddhartha Dabhi, eds., Upsetting the Offset:  The Political Economy of Carbon Markets 
(London: Mayfly Books, 2009). 
 
187 See Ian Bailey and Geoff A Wilson, “Theorizing Transitional Pathways in Response 
to Climate Change: Technocentrism, Ecocentrism, and the Carbon Economy,” Environment and 
Planning A, 41 (2009): 2324-2341; and Paul Hawken, Drawdown: The Most Comprehensive 
Plan Ever Proposed to Reverse Global Warming (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2017). 
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nothing, ultimately, but each other. Once one strand was exposed to risk, the entire web fell 
apart. The US government bailed out AIG and the big banks because of the immensity of the 
shockwaves that would otherwise have spread through the wider economy. These banks were, 
famously, “too big to fail.” 
The crisis was deep enough to pierce the faith of the most fervent believers in market 
fundamentalism. Alan Greenspan had to admit that he was wrong when he insisted, for all those 
decades, on the innate wisdom of unregulated markets. And yet, ten years later, very little of 
substance has changed. In some countries regulatory mechanisms that had been dismantled were 
reintroduced, but in general, the conditions that led to the crisis remain in place. As one observer 
notes, “A decade after the start of the crisis, advanced economies still have not decisively 
pivoted away from a growth model that is overly reliant on liquidity and leverage.” 188 The 
American Enterprise Institution meanwhile observes that “a dangerous combination of a high 
global debt level, the gross mispricing of global credit risk, weak banks of systemic importance 
and global economic fault lines (like Brexit, the Chinese slowdown and the rampant banking 
crisis in the Eurozone) make it all too likely that the world is headed for a global economic and 
financial crisis”189  
                                                          
188 Mohamed A. El-Erian, “These are the Lost Lessons of the Great Recession” in World 
Economic Forum, Aug. 21, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/08/the-lost-lesson-of-
the-financial-crisis. Along a similar line please see Jacqueline Best, “The Limits of Financial 
Risk Management: or What we Didn’t Learn from the Asian Crisis,” New Political Economy, 15 
(2010): 29-49. 
189 Cedric Durand, “The Ignored Lessons of the Financial Crisis’ in Verso, March, 1, 
2017, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3114-the-ignored-lessons-of-the-financial-crisis.  
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Whether or not we are headed for another global financial crisis, what is clear is that 
there is not enough will, in the more powerful sectors of our societies, to resist the pull of the 
logic that has been driving us ever faster and further for centuries now. There is a momentum to 
the modern means of framing the future as an object, to be contained and managed on the one 
hand and gambled on and profited from on the other. that is easier to obey than to resist. If the 
big banks are “too big to fail,” the modern impulse to control is too endlessly inventive, its 
profits too alluring for some, to give up. In the thrall of this logic we create ever more abstract 
means of naming and containing risks, transferring them , and endlessly deferring them, in order 
to shape a future that looks a lot like “business as usual”- on amphetamines. We may want 
security, but it seems that we are beholden to a compulsion that only offers it in the form of 
temporary, ever more abstract ‘units.” 
 
.” 
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Chapter 7 
Modernity as Compulsion: Symptoms of Unfreedom and Ideas for Recovery 
 
Riding my bicycle recently, I noticed a billboard up ahead of me. It featured, simply, a shiny 
silver car and the words "driven by the driven". On this pithy piece of ad copy I was able to chew 
for some moments. I could see in my mind the very type of person this car was meant to attract. 
Ambitious executives and daring entrepreneurs, to be sure, but even more so, those who aspire to 
be like them- single-minded pursuers of success. It occurred to then me how odd it is that in a 
culture which appears to prize personal autonomy above all other values, to call someone 
‘driven’ is clearly meant to compliment them. For to be driven is also to be moved by an external 
force-- to act as the vehicle of some other, more powerful will. This contradiction extends to 
vehicles themselves. For nearly a century now, the car has been a core symbol of freedom, 
enabling its users greater autonomy of movement. And yet, in many ways it is the car that drives 
us, imposing its will in the arenas of geopolitics, resource extraction and employment, and 
“Choose a life. Choose a job. Choose a career. 
Choose a family… Choose washing machines, cars, 
compact disc players and electrical tin openers…choose 
good health, low cholesterol, and dental insurance. Choose 
fixed interest mortgage repayments. Choose your friends. 
Choose leisurewear and matching luggage… Choose your 
future. Choose life…But why would I want to do a thing 
like that? I chose not to choose life. I chose something else. 
And the reasons? There are no reasons. Who needs reasons 
when you’ve got heroin?  
Irvine Welsh,  Trainspotting. 
 
  Sit, be still, and listen, 
  For you are drunk, 
  And we are at the edge of the roof 
Rumi   
 
 
 
    Trainspotting, Irvine Welsh 
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occupying the greater part of the spaces in which we live. 
The point of these reflections is not to propose that we are mistaken in thinking that 
freedom is the core value being realized in modernity. Rather, it is to suggest that this freedom is, 
paradoxically, the means by which we find ourselves “driven” by modernity itself.  Freedom in 
modernity has meant more than mere independence from external forces. It has equally involved 
the exertion of control over all that is external to us. In the preceding chapters I have sought to 
demonstrate how the impulse to transgress boundaries is always coupled with an impulse to mark 
new boundaries and how these two impulses interact propulsively. In this final chapter I want to 
consider the extent to which this propulsive movement amounts to a compulsive repetition of 
modernity’s dynamic and the extent to which we are or can be free of this compulsion.  
Summary of the Dissertation 
First, however, let us briefly review how the twin engines of freedom/control were shown to 
propel modernity forward in each of the historical episodes of the foregoing account.  The 
second chapter opened with developments that actually preceded modernity “proper,” but which 
demonstrated the first unfolding of the modern dynamic. With the Papal revolution of the 
eleventh century the division between the secular and divine realms was redrawn, so that the 
divine was now accessible from within the time-bound secular world. This meant not only that 
one’s actions in the world had a greater weight, for they could propel one towards salvation, but 
also that the world itself  began to be seen as an object of reform, along with the Church, the 
Law, and thought. With the Renaissance innovations of linear perspective in the visual arts and 
the growing ubiquity of time keeping methods in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, space 
and time also began to be objectified, ushering in a new view of the world as quantifiable and 
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malleable to human control. Increasingly, the human subject was seen as self-moving, free to act 
in the world, rather than determined by external forces. In the second half of this chapter I 
explored how, against a backdrop of anxiety over unprecedented social and geographical 
mobility, modern surveyors in Tudor England began to view estate lands as objects that could be 
measured and represented according to universal mathematical standards. This meant that, rather 
than being understood as God’s domain, or evaluated according to the particular customary 
context in which it was embedded, each piece of land throughout England could be viewed, 
represented and controlled from the distant authority of monetary or legal power.  
In the third chapter, we saw how this distanced view of land, disembedded from its 
customary context and evaluated according to abstract forms of knowledge, prepared the ground 
for the land’s reordering. Property in land began to be viewed as the sovereign realm of the 
landowner. The ability to exclude other users of the land through enclosures was an expression 
of owners’ freedom to use, improve, or sell their property according to their own will. The 
containing impulse of the enclosure movement was justified and propelled by the expansive 
impulse of improvement. By the eighteenth century, the discourse of improvement shifted from a 
defense of the practice of enclosure to an aggressive and moralistic campaign equating ceaseless 
cultivation of the land with God’s providence, national strength and civilizational supremacy 
while portraying unenclosed wastes or commons as barren, chaotic, and fearsome voids. A 
parallel strategy of expansion through containment could be seen in the Baconian project for the 
reform and accumulation of scientific knowledge. Bacon’s method called for re-grounding 
knowledge upon natural facts observed by the senses and tested through experiment, and for 
progressing inductively through a series of discrete steps towards provisional certainty. We also 
saw, in the case of Linnaean classification, how the endless accumulation of known natural 
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objects necessitated ever more refinement and readjustment of the categories enclosing them, to 
keep the ambivalence of the natural world at bay.  
 In the fourth chapter we saw how financial and scientific innovations cultivated both 
profit and security by harnessing the uncertainty of the future. Beginning in the 1660s, 
innovators in the science of probability, from Pascal and Fermat, to Bernoulli and Poisson, found 
ways of “taming chance.” By collecting and mapping data and inferring large patterns in that 
data the probability of events to come could be calculated. Meanwhile, in the early eighteenth 
century, financial innovations in London’s emerging stock market allowed participants to take 
risks by investing their capital in ventures, or to purchase a degree of security by transferring risk 
on to an insurer. But, as in the case of the South Seas Bubble, the growing abstraction of such 
trade could easily conceal its true nature. The quantification and calculation of risk opened up a 
new and more abstract dimension in the modern drive for both freedom and control. We saw in 
the fifth chapter, for instance, how the ability to calculate probable future events allowed 
governments of the nineteenth century to measure and reform social phenomena. The 
government of Victorian Britain drew on the new decennial national census and the emerging 
science of statistics to collect comprehensive data on the population, as well as those of its 
colonies. The categorization and publication of national data both fragmented the population into 
abstract groupings, and united it under one national identity. Risky categories, such as the poor, 
could better be monitored and contained. Statistics and the census served as techniques for 
governing at a distance, allowing the government, as risk manager of society, to replace 
Providence as the guarantor of the future.  
In modern liberal societies property has become the medium through which citizens 
access security, goods, and membership in the polis. In the sixth chapter I showed how the 
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exclusion of the propertyless created a mass of people exposed to the insecurity of life without 
social protection, and how this risk-prone category came, itself, to be viewed as a risk to the very 
system by which liberal societies were organized. Thus, by the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries governments began to fill the gaps in social protection remaining between the 
private insurance industry and a host of informal mutual benefit societies. After the Second 
World War, the governments of developed nations began to create comprehensive social welfare 
systems for protecting citizens from risks, many of which (unemployment, social isolation, 
workplace accidents) were generated by capitalism and modern society themselves. The state 
took on the role of the guarantor of both progress and social solidarity, and sought to integrate 
the seemingly contradictory objectives of economic growth and social welfare.  
Meanwhile, states enabled the growth of the private insurance sector as their partner in 
risk management and as the primary institution for ‘governance beyond the state’.  Since it 
underwrites risk-taking in capitalist societies, the insurance industry has become an 
indispensable facilitator of economic growth as well as the means by which ever more spheres of 
human activity have come to be quantified, commodified and categorized according to risk, and 
regulated. Furthermore, insurance’s role in social regulation has been enlarged as states have 
sought to diminish their own role in social welfare provision in the neoliberal era. Over the last 
four decades, globalization, speculative finance, and deindustrialization have revealed that the 
stability enjoyed by welfare states was temporary, and that instead, modern systems and societies 
are characterized by instability, insecurity and inequality. The response to this uncertainty has 
been to unload the responsibility for risk management onto individuals, and take ever more of 
life’s contingencies into our individual control by submitting them to risk calculus and 
commodification. 
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In chapters two, three and four of this dissertation we saw how freedom meant both 
transgressing the traditional religious or customary standards of legitimate behaviour and 
extending the human will out into the world, by cultivating endless forms of growth. Again and 
again, this freedom was accompanied by efforts to fashion new grounds of legitimacy, security 
and certainty, whether through quantitative representation, enclosure, facts, probabilistic 
calculation, or insurance. In chapters four and five, we saw the repetition of the impulses of 
freedom and control as, by the nineteenth century, the logics of surveying and mapping, 
enclosing and improving were applied to the realms of society and the future, resulting in the 
increasing abstraction and integration of the systems governing modern life. We continue to 
respond to uncertainty and insecurity with the same double strategy of containment and 
expansion, as the impulses for freedom and control intensify, expand, and accelerate.     
In the remainder of this concluding chapter I wish to consider both the compulsive nature 
of modernity and some of the ways that have been and are being imagined for liberating 
ourselves from its grip. After briefly relating some of the theoretical arguments that have been 
made about the limits of freedom in modernity, I then examine some of the connections that 
socio-cultural scholarship has drawn between addictive and compulsive disorders experienced by 
individuals and the problems of freedom and control at the core of the modernity itself. I draw 
attention to a few of the most glaring examples of our compulsive attachment to the logics of 
modernity today, namely, our response to the 2008 global financial crisis and our response so far, 
to climate change. I ask how we can assert our independence from the processes and logics that 
seem to wrap us up in the momentum of modernity.  To answer this question I outline some of 
the major lines of critique and forms of resistance that have historically challenged modernity as 
a totalizing, rationalistic, and disenchanting force. Finally, I look at some contemporary practices 
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that, however modest, playful, or symbolic, can encourage us to see the unassigned spaces where 
weeds spring up, unofficial, nameless, free.  
Modernity as Monster, Iron Cage, and Juggernaut 
In The Consequences of Modernity, Giddens proposed a metaphor for modernity that would 
serve as an alternative to Weber’s iron cage of bureaucratic rationality1 and Marx’s monster to-
be-tamed.2 He argued instead, that modernity is a juggernaut, a huge vehicle moving with an 
unstoppable momentum, the pace and direction of which are not wholly within our control.3 The 
“runaway” character of the juggernaut captures some of Weber’s sense that modernity moves 
                                                          
1 I have already discussed, in the introduction, Weber’s view that the increasing tendency 
towards bureaucratic rationality in modernity can lead to the curtailment of freedom. His use of 
the term “iron cage” in The Protestant Ethic, has become a sort of shorthand for his ideas about 
the confinement of freedom through rational, bureaucratic and capitalist processes. However, as 
Peter Baehr has pointed out, the “iron cage” actually came to us through Talcott Parson’s 
original translation of The Protestant Ethic into English. Baehr argues that, in fact, the original 
German Stahlhartes Gehäuse is better translated as “steel-hard casing” or “shell”, and that this 
metaphor better captures both the complexity and modernity of Weber’s views on rationalization 
and freedom.  See Peter Baehr, “The ‘Iron Cage’ and the ‘Shell as Hard as Steel’: Parsons, 
Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism,” History and Theory 40, no. 2 (May, 2001): 153. For the Parson’s translation of the 
metaphor, see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott 
Parsons (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1930), 181. 
 
2 While Marx never portrayed ‘modernity’ itself as monstrous, the imagery of monsters 
runs throughout his critique of capital, in Capital Volume one. For instance, in Chapter 10 of 
Capital Volume One he wrote “Capital has one sole driving force, the drive to valorize itself, to 
create surplus-value… Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living 
labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks.” See Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of 
Political Economy, Volume One. Trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 342. On 
the theme of monsters and monstrosity in Marx’s critique of capital see David McNally, 
Monsters of the Market: Zombies, Vampires and the Global Capitalism (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 
2011). 
 
3 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1990), 138-9. 
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irreversibly and irresistibly forward, but without limiting its nature to the bureaucratic and 
rational. And, as a massive vehicle crushing people in its path, and threatening to “rend itself 
asunder” the juggernaut also captures the monstrosity suggested by Marx, particularly with 
regard to capitalism, but without his historical certainty that we can ultimately wrest control from 
it. What Giddens himself saw as lacking in the metaphor of the juggernaut was the sense of the 
contradictory forces, the dialectical tension propelling modern processes, that is so central to his 
theory of  modernity.4 
  While not immediately apparent from the imagery itself, the monster, the iron cage and 
the juggernaut all convey something of modernity’s essentially propulsive and overpowering 
nature. That is to say, there is something in the forward movement of modern processes through 
time that suggests a dynamic force. This force can appear monstrous because it seems to have a 
life and will of its own. But this monster is just the larger cousin of the commodity- an object 
fetishized on a macro scale, or as Poovey might phrase it, a giant we have “vivified.”5 Because 
we are so small, as individuals and cultures of specific times and places, modernity, striding 
forward with centuries of momentum behind it, appears to pull us along with it, as though we 
had no control over the matter. It appears to compel us. But modernity is really a macro-
historical process, the sum of our collective behavior over a particular period of time. Thus, in 
proposing compulsion as a metaphor, I wish to highlight the propulsive and seemingly relentless 
                                                          
4 For Giddens, a series of dialectical processes stem from the time-space distanciation of 
modernity, including the displacement and re-embedding of social relations, the development of 
both intimacy and impersonality, and expertise and everyday knowledge. See Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity, 139-141.  
 
5 Mary Poovey, Making of A Social Body: British Cultural Formation, 1830-1864, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 9. 
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character of modernity, but, in seeing it as the accumulation of our behaviour I hope to convey 
how ultimately, we have agency over it. 
What is the source of the compulsive behaviour we call modernity? Like Giddens, I see 
modernity’s propulsion as being fueled by contradictory forces. However, I more closely follow 
Bauman and Heller in identifying the source of modernity’s restless movement in the tense and 
interdependent drives for freedom and security. Bauman has described the way we move in 
modernity as a restless march towards the future, a horizon that is never reached. This forward 
movement is an act of freedom in search of its limits; with every step old certainties are shaken 
off like dust. With every step we intend to land our feet upon firm ground, to stand securely on 
some certainty. But we never arrive. Our freedom seeks to anchor itself, but instead of taking 
root, is dissatisfied, doubtful, and impelled further forward by the dream of home. Modernity 
thus propels itself with the mutual dissatisfaction of our alternating needs for freedom and 
security. 
But modernity is not a Sisyphean sentence of eternal repetition, for it is cumulative: every 
step has new consequences that propel us to the next. This is because modernity is, as Heller puts 
it, founded upon the paradox of freedom. The impulse of freedom allows us to transgress the 
limitations of the known, but in doing so, opens up the ground beneath us. Modernity’s 
compulsive desire for certainty and security is rooted in this groundless ground, and it is 
exhibited through ever more attempts to assert control. This compulsion for control is, I think, 
less like rationality’s ever-tightening embrace envisioned by Weber and the Frankfurt school, 
and more like the behaviors of individuals diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive or addictive 
disorders. In such behaviors the will is not taken over by internal or external forces, so much as it 
is given over to them in an act of submission.    
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Addiction in Modernity 
By the nineteenth century the job of protecting, guiding and framing human experience had 
largely been transferred from the realms of divine authority and the community to large 
institutions and systems on the one hand, and individuals, on the other. Human security in all of 
its forms has since then depended upon indirect and abstract relationships between individuals 
and institutions. Increasingly individuals have had to learn how to manage their freedom. One 
way of doing this has been through the internalization of social norms, as explicated by Foucault.  
Another way has been for individuals to approach their lives as ongoing projects, projects that 
are deeply influenced by cultural and economic contexts, but which ultimately fall to the 
individual to design and develop. A third way is to retreat, escape, or outsource the responsibility 
to manage one’s freedom by relinquishing it to an external force, and to follow the dictates of 
that force. The internalization of norms, the ‘project of the self’ and the surrender of the will are 
not isolated camps; most of us engage in all three strategies for managing freedom. I want to 
reflect on the third strategy, for I think it can tell us something about the compulsive character of 
modernity itself.   
Recently socio-cultural scholars have begun to consider these individual psychological 
conditions in the light of the larger cultural condition of modernity. Not surprisingly, they have 
found corresponding patterns of behavior between individuals afflicted with compulsive or 
addictive conditions, the dominant patterns in their wider societies, and in the history of 
modernity.  Their work tells us something too rarely voiced about how we act and how we feel in 
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modernity.6 As Reida Gerth puts it, "ideas about 'addiction' or 'pathology' are actually cyphers 
for concerns about issues of control.” Trouble with control, whether gaining, keeping or 
relinquishing it, is one and the same as trouble with freedom: a continual re-shifting of the 
burden that is unique to living in an underdetermined world. 
It may appear natural to us that individual, psychological “disorders” are considered the 
exclusive domain of medical and psychiatric professionals. But, as Robert Granfield has noted 
with regard to addiction, this “methodological individualism” in which addictions are treated as 
isolated and largely physiological phenomena, amounts to an “addiction fetishism”.7  Like the 
fetishism of commodities, addiction fetishism obscures the social relations that produce 
addiction. What are these relations? In seeking the causes of addiction sociologists often point to 
the same conditions of displacement, fragmentation, and alienation, identified as the products of 
modernity by observers from Marx, Tonnies, and Durkheim to Giddens, Luhmann, Heller, and 
Bauman.  
In a study of Vancouver’s drug ravaged east side, for example, Bruce Alexander has 
critically explored the social history of Vancouver and found a strong relation between its 
widespread addiction problem and the personal dislocations produced by the accelerating socio-
                                                          
6 Of course, one might argue that it is very often voiced, not only in existentialist texts 
and novels of the mid twentieth century, but also in art, film, literature, and music, the anxiety of 
disorientation is one of the chief expressions of art. 
 
7 Robert Granfield, “Addiction and Modernity: A Comment on a Global Theory of 
Addiction,” Nordic Council for Alcohol and Drug Research 44 (Jan, 2004): 29-34. I would 
suggest that the domination of “methodological individualism” is not total, for there are 
countertendencies to the individualization of addiction and other individual medical and 
psychological conditions. In recent years anyway, ‘individual’ problems as varied as smoking, 
obesity, domestic violence, alcohol, suicide, opioid and other addictions have been labelled 
“public health issues”. This reflects a growing recognition of the social causes and consequences 
of certain health concerns.  
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economic transformations of a free market society.8 As Granfield points out, such dislocation is 
akin to both Marx’s concept of alienation and Weber’s notion of disenchantment; an uprooting of 
individuals from coherent systems of meaning.9 The rootlessness and disorientation experienced 
by individuals in modernity necessitates what Giddens has called the “reflexive project of the 
self”, in which we ask ourselves, continuously; “What to do? How to act? Who to be?”, for none 
of these are determined.10 A reviewer of Giddens’s Modernity and Self- Identity describes 
Giddens’ “project of the self’ succinctly: “in this uncertain world, the self becomes a reflexive, 
i.e. circular, project where mastery of the self and body provides the certainty needed for 
everyday living. In other words, the goal of the reflexive project is to create unity from 
fragmentation, certainty from uncertainty, and empowerment from powerlessness.”11  
 But for many of us, dislocation cannot be corrected through a five year plan, a self-help 
program or artistic expression. Alexander explains that “[p]eople who cannot achieve 
psychosocial integration develop ‘substitute lifestyles’” in which certain “excessive habits” 
enable them to adapt to conditions of dislocation. In the long run, these habits are dysfunctional 
                                                          
 
8 Bruce K. Alexander, “The Globalization of Addiction,” Addiction Research 8, no.6 
(2000): 501. 
 
9 Granfield, “Addiction and Modernity,” 30. 
 
10 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Self and Society in Late-Modern Age 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 70. 
 
11 Chad Lackey, “Review: Giddens’s ‘Modernity and Self-Identity’,” Berkeley Journal of 
Sociology 37 (1992): 181-185. Of course Giddens was not the only or the first to underscore the 
necessity of self-fashioning in modernity. Bauman, Beck and Castells, have each articulated 
some version of it, and it was one of Nietzsche’s central messages, that each person should 
recognize that “he is… the actual poet and ongoing author of life.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Gay Science: with a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, ed. Bernard 
Williams and trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 171. 
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and tend to exacerbate rather than restore psychosocial deficiencies.  But they do, in Granfield’s 
words, “provide, at least for a time, effective avenues to personal meaning” as well as “comfort 
and security in a world that is increasingly experienced as being out of control.”12  
 In his 2004 book, The Globalization of Addiction, Alexander applies the term addiction 
not only to drugs and alcohol but to a wide, almost infinite, range of human activities, 
emphasizing people’s sense of dependence on or excessive attachment to some behaviour, or 
person or thing, rather than the addictive qualities inhering in certain substances that are the 
focus of most biomedical approaches to addiction. He also makes a case for the universal 
presence of addiction across cultures and historical periods, citing examples from China to 
Vancouver, and from Plato and St. Augustine to the junkies on Hastings Street. Yet, while he 
sees addiction in this broad sense, as to some extent inherent to the human condition, he also 
stresses that because people are “inevitably dislocated” under the conditions of late capitalism, 
addiction has now become endemic. 
Processes of social fragmentation have indeed intensified in the Post-Fordist economic 
period; neoliberal policies have forced labour to become more flexible, with the result that ever 
more people are moving for work, or changing the kind of work they do. This increase in 
geographic and occupational mobility, as well as the rise in contract work, are accompanied by 
ever greater uncertainty about where and how to work and to live. Of course, the flip side of this 
uncertainty is the widespread recognition that individuals are free to choose the shape and nature 
of their lives, not only once but continually. But when even the most basic conditions giving 
                                                          
 
12 Bruce K. Alexander, The Roots of Addiction in Free Market Society, (Vancouver, BC: 
The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2001), 1. Also see Granfield, “Addiction and 
Modernity,” 31. 
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structure to people’s lives –where they live and what they do-are subject to constant reevaluation 
and change, nothing can be taken for granted. Thus, the proliferation of addiction in late 
capitalism stems not only from dislocation, poverty and the fragmentation of communities and 
families but also from a hyperawareness that the substance of our lives is contingent upon the 
choices that we make as individuals. It is individuals who have the burden of steering through 
that contingency and taking a meaningful direction. 
 For Reith, addiction must be understood in relation to “the problem of freedom”, that I 
have just described, and, in particular, to the obligation of individuals in consumer-driven 
“advanced” economies, to assert that freedom through consumption. In the aggregate, excessive 
consumerism is imperative in ‘advanced’ economies where the productive sectors (industry, 
agriculture, resource extraction) have been overtaken by the service sector. But the ‘obligation’ 
to express one’s freedom through consumption also stems from the intersecting spheres of 
consumerism, lifestyle and identity, and from the mode of governance in liberal societies, where 
“it is through the exercise of freedom that individuals not only realize themselves but also govern 
themselves."13 Thus, neoliberalism both encourages and demands consumption, even while it 
exhorts individuals to maintain self-control by “managing freedom through self-government.”14 
The word ‘addiction’, Reith notes, is derived from a Roman legal term, meaning ‘a 
surrender, or dedication, of any one to a master.” From drug and alcohol addictions to the more 
recently identified addictions to sex, gambling, work and food, to even the half-joking 
confessions that one is a “chocoholic” or “shopaholic,” ever more individuals in consumer 
                                                          
13 Gerda Reith, “Consumption and its Discontents: Addiction, Identity and the Problems 
of Freedom," The British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004): 285. On the topic of governance 
through freedom, see Nickolas Rose. Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social 
and Personal Life, with Peter Miller (Oxford: Polity Press, 2008). 
 
14 Reith, “Consumption and its Discontents,” 294.  
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societies seem to identify with this state of surrendered agency.15 For Reith, the growing 
prevalence of addict identities points up the paradox of freedom in neoliberalism, wherein 
“values of freedom, autonomy, and choice associated with the spread of consumerism” are 
juxtaposed against discourses about the “vitiation of freedom, an undermining of agency and a 
lack of choice” within addictive states.  
But this paradox is not exclusive to neoliberalism or consumerism, and addiction is not 
the sole expression of the subjugated will. That is, the assertion of the will and its subjugation are 
both characteristic of the experience of individuals in modern societies. Particularly in modern 
liberal societies where both formal law and cultural discourse uphold individual freedom as the 
core value, a host of interlocking systems, bureaucratic, economic, and otherwise, confront the 
individual with a stark choice: submit to the logic of these systems or exist outside of the borders 
of legitimacy and protection. The indirect, but inescapable means by which individuals are 
compelled to participate in capitalist economic relations is but one example of the limits of 
freedom in modernity. As I discussed in the last chapter, the expert knowledge and abstract 
systems structuring our everyday lives function through the collective trust we place in them, but 
as they are beyond the comprehension of mere individuals we have little choice but to trust them, 
just as we have little choice but to make an endless series of choices such as are rejected by 
Renton, the junkie narrator of Irvine Welsh’s Trainspotting, quoted in the opening of this 
chapter.   
                                                          
 
15 Reith, “Consumption,” 284. Also see Anne Cronin, “The Substance of Consumption: 
Alchemy, Addiction and the Commodity,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 5, no.3 
(2002): 316-335, 328. 
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 In modern societies the hymn to freedom is sung so loudly that the compulsory aspects 
of our lives are diminished to an unacknowledged baseline beneath the surface. Addiction turns 
up the volume of the determinate, so that what needs to be done is sounded in a clear and urgent 
drum beat. As Reith explains, “at a time when the admonition to choose from a barrage of 
commodities and experiences is at its most insistent, the active adoption of the 'addict identity' 
may be interpreted as the embrace of a determined state that rejects the need for just such 
choice."16 In this context, the addict’s choice makes sense: the paring down of promise to one 
bare arrow, pointing to the next hit.   
Compulsion, Neurasthenia and Doubt 
Fleeing from too much choice into the strong arms of an addiction is just one response to the 
indeterminacy of the modern condition. Others respond by taking extreme control in some aspect 
of daily life where control is possible. In “Obsessional Modernity: the Institutionalization of 
Doubt,” Jennifer Fleissner takes the fictional narratives and the memoirs of people living with 
the condition of obsessive compulsive disorder as a starting point for examining the relationship 
between control and indeterminacy in modernity. 
Whether their compulsions lead to the repetition of counting, checking, or cleaning 
behaviours, the characters in the novels and memoirs Fleissner discusses all “feel the pull of that 
gorgeous order against the rough edges of the everyday.”17 In recent decades treatment for OCD 
has, as with many psychological disorders, turned decidedly towards biochemical interventions 
which target cognitive malfunctions as the source of the condition. In the nineteenth and early 
                                                          
16 Reith, “Consumption,” 296. 
 
17 Jennifer L. Fleissner, “Obsessional Modernity: ‘The Institutionalization of Doubt,’” 
Critical Inquiry 34, no. 1 (Autumn, 2007): 108. 
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twentieth centuries, earlier manifestations of obsessive-compulsive disorder, such as 
“obsessional neurosis” and “neurasthenia” were understood to be symptomatic of changes in the 
condition of the wider culture. In fact, many psychologists of the period made explicit the link 
between individuals’ disordered behaviours and the social malaise accompanying modernity. In 
the 1860s, for example, the American neurologist George Beard coined the term neurasthenia, 
meaning “weak nerves”, for a cluster of symptoms including fatigue, anxiety, depression and 
various fears, and attributed them to the accelerated pace and overstimulation of urban 
modernity.18  Beard thought of neurasthenia as an American disease, one that especially afflicted 
business and professional men prone to overwork in a culture obsessed with productivity. 
Another neurologist saw it as the tendency in modern people to view themselves as “perpetual 
motion machine[s].”19  
Although the nervous collapse of the neurasthenic is in some ways the opposite of the 
obsessive neurotic, the more obvious forebear of today’s OCD, both were understood, in the 
nineteenth century, to be a response to modernity’s restless forward motion, and to the sense that 
the world was spinning out of control. Fleissner recalls for us the suggestion proffered by the 
American historian Henry Adams, that beneath all of the restless productivity of his time was a 
roiling ocean of doubt. Rather than being purposeful, he saw this activity as arising from some 
“instinct of danger from behind.”  Adams ceaselessly scrutinized the meaning of his own 
                                                          
 
18 Fleissner, “Obsessional Modernity,” 111. 
 
19 It was understood at the time to have been more common among upper and middle 
class men, but a study of historical hospital data in England, found that men and women were 
equally diagnosed with it, as were all social classes. See Ruth E. Taylor, “Death of Neurasthenia 
and its Psychological Reincarnation: A Study of Neurasthenia at the National Hospital for the 
Relief and Cure of the Paralysed and Epileptic, Queen Square, London, 1870-1932,” The British 
Journal of Psychiatry 179, no. 6 (2001): 550-557.  
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neurasthenic symptoms and of the culture that produced them, but he was hardly alone in 
suspecting a pervasive doubt to be at the bottom of the cultural anxiety of the period.20 In fact, 
French psychologists of the time referred to one set of fearful and obsessive symptoms as la folie 
du doute, or maladie du doute, “the doubting mania.” According to the Historical Dictionary of 
Psychiatry, those suffering from this condition were “subject to irresistible thoughts with 
psychotic feelings of uncertainty about whether one has performed some specific act.” The 
resulting need to repeat such acts again and again crowded out all other aspects of their lives.21  
The French psychologist Pierre Janet suggested that what drove some individuals to the 
compulsive repetition of certain acts was not some desire to perfect them, but an unrelenting 
sense of their incompletion.22  
The nineteenth century perception that such compulsive, repetitive behaviours may stem 
from an unappeasable doubt is, Fleissner notes, entirely absent in the diagnostic definition of 
OCD today, where the emphasis is on the sufferer’s preoccupation with control, orderliness, 
rules and perfection.23 Certainly, what Fleissner calls “the hyperbolic quest for control” is the 
                                                          
 
20 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008).  According to Jackson Lears, the “paralysis of the will” suffered in neurasthenia was 
symptomatic of the larger cultural reactions to modernity in late nineteenth century America, 
when a discourse of “overcivilization” or degeneration dominated and seemed to produce 
“psychic crises.” See Jackson T.J. Lears, No Place for Grace: Antimodernism and the 
Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920. University of Chicago Press, 1994), 47-58. 
21 See Edward Shorter, ed. The Historical Dictionary of Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2005), 199.  Also, Gustavo Guerra, "Henry James's Paradoxical Bowl: The Reinstatement of 
Doubt in "Fin-de-Siècle" America," Style 32, no. 1 (1998): 60. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42946409. 
22 Fleissner, “Obsessional Modernity,” 117-118. 
 
23 Ibid, 118. 
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most observable feature of obsessive-compulsive behavior, just as the surrender of control is 
apparent in addictive behaviour. But focusing on these outward behaviours does nothing to 
explain the abysmal nature of the quests for control, or for the surrender of control in addiction. 
In fact, Fleissner compares the prevailing diagnosis of compulsive disorder with those accounts 
of modernity, such as Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of the Enlightenment, that focus 
exclusively on the obsessive drive for rational control: both are only partial understandings of the 
nature of the compulsive dynamic. Instead, she notes that the intuitions of both nineteenth 
century observers and the recent novels and memoirs about OCD suggest an “alternative framing 
of the dialectics of modernity.”24  In this framing, control and indeterminacy are two poles 
pulling one another in an ongoing revolution; the radical doubt and open-endedness of modernity 
create a sense of incompletion that drives a pathological restlessness and efforts to control, and 
these responses, being means without ends, only serve to deepen the abyss of indeterminacy.   
Modern Shelters for Modern Storms 
I haven’t gone on at length here about addiction and compulsion merely to suggest that these are 
manifestations of the larger condition of modernity, but also in order to consider their suitability 
as metaphors for our habituation to the condition of modernity. On the one hand, addiction points 
to the “problem of freedom,” the “sudden awareness of the self as the unjustified source of all 
values and of all action,” 25 and the surrender of the will to some determinate force in response to 
that problem. On the other hand, compulsion points to the repetition of particular acts of control 
                                                          
 
24 Ibid, 112. 
 
25  Fredric Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory: The Syntax of History. Vol. 2. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 7. 
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in response to a sense of bottomless doubt and a condition of “radical open-endedness”. What 
can the concepts of addiction and compulsion tell us about our current relationship to modernity 
today?  As I have shown in this work, modernity is a historically contingent set of social 
formations that were constructed over time, in which certain logics have recurred. In what ways 
are we beholden to continue acting out these logics? How are we, today, compelled to repeat the 
modern dynamics of surveying and mapping, improving and enclosing, and risking and insuring? 
In the following section, I consider three current examples of how we cling compulsively to the 
systems and constructs of modernity: in our responses to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the 
threat of climate change, and the global refugee crisis. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
When the governments of the US and the UK chose to prop up some of the very banks, 
insurance and investment companies that had contributed heavily to the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008, they did so with the rationale that these institutions were “too big to fail”.26 Just a few 
weeks after the investment firm Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15 -
triggering what many economists have called the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression- the Bush administration enacted a bill allowing the Treasury to spend $700 billion to 
buy the toxic assets held by some of the biggest investment firms and banks. Similarly massive 
bailouts occurred in the UK and across Europe.27 The crisis had been building for decades, 
                                                          
26 T. S. Umlauft, “The paradoxical genesis of too-big-to-fail,” Journal of Governance and 
Regulation 3, no.1, (2014): 28. http://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v3_i1_p2. 
 
27 Catarina Fernandes, et al, “Determinants of European Banks’ Bailouts Following the 
2007–2008 Financial Crisis,” Journal of International Economic Law 19, no. 3 (September, 
2016): 707.  https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgw060. Also see Paul Langley, Liquidity Lost: The 
Governance of the Global Financial Crisis, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 82–86; and 
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owing, in large part, to the deregulation of financial markets, and to the increasingly abstract and 
complex nature of financial transactions and instruments such as derivatives and securitization, 
including the bundling of subprime with prime mortgages. Deregulation also meant that 
investment, insurance, and commercial banking began to merge together within some of the 
largest institutions, exposing them (and all who are connected to them) to the greater risk that 
comes with speculative financial activity. 28In the end, it was taxpayers, homeowners and 
workers who underwrote this risk, through the bailouts, foreclosures and unemployment that 
followed.  
There are a few different ways that the global financial crisis can be seen as symptomatic 
of compulsive modernity. First, the speculative bubble that led up to the crisis was but one 
frenzied example of capitalism’s essential dynamic: the insatiable drive to accumulate capital.29 
                                                          
Maria Gerhardt and Rudi Vander Vennet, "Bank Bailouts in Europe and Bank Performance," 
Finance Research Letters 22 (2017): 74-80. 
 
28  For a succinct account of the processes of deregulation and the merging of investment, 
insurance and commercial banking in the American context, please see Barry Eichengreen, 
“Financial Crisis: Revisiting the Banking Rules that Died by a Thousand Small Cuts,” Fortune, 
January 16, 2015.  
29 David Harvey explains that this drive to accumulate capital perpetually is an example 
of what Hegel called “bad infinity” and argues that “Contemporary capitalism is locked into the 
bad infinity of endless accumulation  and compound growth …money can accommodate to the 
infinite need for the expansion of value simply by having the central banks add zeros to the 
money supply.” Moreover, our view of the world “is held hostage to the insanity of a bourgeois 
economic reason that not only justifies but promotes accumulation without limit while 
pretending to a virtuous infinity of harmonious growth and continuous and attainable 
improvements in social well-being. The economists have never confronted the ‘bad infinity’ of 
endless compound growth that can only culminate in devaluation and destruction. See David 
Harvey, Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic Reason. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 173-4. Marx himself wrote in the Grundrisse, that money “becomes a madness”, 
and in competition the madness of this ‘inner tendency of capital appears as a compulsion 
exercised over it by alien capital, which drives it forward beyond the correct proportion with a 
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The risk management strategies deployed in finance are part of modernity’s calculative 
rationality and its dynamics of surveying and mapping, enclosing and improving and risking and 
insuring. Second, the response to the crisis was essentially to defer any significant change of 
behavior by putting a shattered system on life-support. Finally, the logic of “too big to fail” can 
tell us something about our dependent attitude towards the entire global economy, and to the 
interconnected systems of modernity:  
It is thought that the seeds of the 2008 crisis were first sown around the turn of this 
century, when those who had accumulated wealth in emerging markets like China and the 
Middle East went in search of global investment opportunities. Because the Federal Reserve had 
lowered interest rates on the US dollar, US currency was no longer the profitable investment that 
it had once been.  Thus, there was a greater than usual demand for investment opportunities in 
the form of mortgages and other kinds of debt, as these have traditionally been both secure and 
profitable.  When this demand continued to exceed available investment opportunities, a new 
level of creativity and recklessness began to pervade Wall Street activity; mortgages and other 
contractual loans were made available to ever more people, including those least likely to afford 
to honour future payments. The risks attached to these loans were then bundled, sliced up, and 
transferred, many times over 30 That a reasonable limit- the (temporary) lack of investment 
                                                          
constant march, march!” See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political 
Economy, trans. & forward by Martin Nicolaus, 1973 (London: Penguin, 2005) ii-iv. 
  
30 While the catalyst for the recent surge in speculative financial activity may have been 
the flooding of capital from emerging markets around the turn of this century, and the search for 
new investments for that capital (which coincided with the removal of the regulations stipulated 
by the Glass Steagal Act in 1999), the trend towards the financialization of capitalism began as 
far back as the 1970s. At that time monopolistic corporations began to accrue massive profits, 
but this also reduced “the demand for additional investment in increasingly controlled markets.”  
What followed was a pattern of “more and more profits, fewer and fewer profitable investment 
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opportunities- was ignored and overcome by contracting (and then transferring the risk of) the 
debt of the poor is, I think, indicative of an unwillingness to forego the “high” of capital 
accumulation and the game of speculation, even when it defies reason and ethics. 
The 2008 crisis was the collapse of a house of cards (and a housing market) built in the 
insatiable drive to accumulate ever more capital. Many had seen such a crisis coming and had 
warned of the need to set limits on this drive. As early as 1984, James Tobin argued that, 
we are throwing more and more of our resources…into financial activities remote from 
the production of goods and services, into activities that generate high private rewards 
disproportionate to their social productivity…. the advantages of the liquidity and 
negotiability of financial instruments come at the cost of facilitating nth-degree 
speculation which is short-sighted and inefficient.31  
The diagnosis of the financial system as increasingly irrational, unjust and myopic fell on 
deaf ears. Not only were warnings not heeded, but the crash itself, sending shockwaves around 
the world, did not act as the wake-up call that it should have been.  
The collapse should have been analogous to the moment when an addict hits rock bottom, 
when the devastation wrought by the addiction cannot be denied. Seeing the fates of so many 
tied into the gambling games of the few should have made all of us question the status quo. And 
indeed, most commentators at the time vowed that fundamental change could no longer be 
                                                          
opportunities” igniting a, “double process of faltering real investment and burgeoning 
financialization.” Magdoff and Sweezy, quoted in John Bellamy Foster (Apr 01, 2007), “The 
Financialization of Capitalism” in Monthly Review, https://monthlyreview.org/2007/04/01/the-
financialization-of-capitalism/. As Foster himself explains “For the owners of capital the 
dilemma is what to do with the immense surpluses at their disposal in the face of a dearth of 
investment opportunities. Their main solution from the 1970s on was to expand their demand for 
financial products as a means of maintaining and expanding their money capital. On the supply 
side of this process, financial institutions stepped forward with a vast array of new financial 
instruments: futures, options, derivatives, hedge funds, etc.” 
31 James Tobin, quoted in Foster, “The Financialization of Capitalism.” 
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avoided.  More than a decade on, however, the consensus seems to be that there has been a return 
to ‘business as usual’; what changes have been made have not gone nearly far enough to avoid a 
repetition of the crisis.32 According to Piketty, the bailouts, and “the monetary pragmatism of 
2008 and 2009…[that] helped us avoid the worst, and put out the fire for now, also led us to 
think too little about the structural reasons behind the disaster,” not least of which was the 
economic inequality that led to “an explosion of private debt” among the middle and lower 
classes.33 In fact, structural conditions such as inequality and debt have only intensified since the 
crisis. That the rise in speculative finance fuels and is fueled by economic inequality is clear 
when we consider that for many, debt has overtaken income.34  Those who took on subprime 
                                                          
 
32 As Amitava Krishna Dutt, explains: “in the immediate aftermath of the crisis there was 
a retreat from the reigning doctrines of free market fundamentalism and conservative macro- 
economic policy focused on inflation control, as reflected by attempts at the regulation of (and 
government intervention in) financial systems…However, free market dogma, and fears of 
inflation and government debt and deficits, are now on their ascendancy.” See Amitava Krishna 
Dutt, “Uncertainty, Power, Institutions, and Crisis: Implications for Economic Analysis and the 
Future of Capitalism” in Review of Keynesian Economics 3, no. 1, (Spring 2015): 9. Also see 
Joseph Stiglitz, “Freefall: America, Free markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, (New 
York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2010), 342; Ernest Aigner, et. al. “The Focus of Academic 
Economics:  Before and After the Crisis” Working Paper No. 75 (May, 2018), Institute for New 
Economic Thinking, https://rwer.wordpress.com/2018/09/03/after-the-crisis-business-as-usual/;  
Christian M. Stiefmueller, Ten Years After: Back to Business as Usual, Finance Watch (Finance 
Watch, 2018), https://www.finance-watch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/10YA-FW-
report.pdf. For an argument that the crisis was not solely financial in origin but rather 
characteristic of the processes of capitalism since the early nineteenth century, see Paul Mattlick, 
Business as Usual: The Economic Crisis and the Failure of Capitalism, (Islington, UK: Reaktion 
Books, 2011). 
33 Thomas Piketty, “Why Save the Bankers” in Why Save the Bankers? And Other Essays 
on our Economic and Political Crisis, trans. Seth Ackerman, (Boston & New York: Houghton, 
Mifflen, Harcourt, 2016), 7. 
 
34 According to a recent report from Statistics Canada, “Debt-to-income ratios in Canada 
have continued to rise since the 2008-2009 recession.” See “Spotlight on Canadians and Debt: 
Who’s Vulnerable?” statscan.com, March 5, 2019, https://www150.statscan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-
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mortgages and credit card debt in the lead up to the crisis did not do so simply because they were 
irresponsible; certainly, many of us live beyond our means and consume frivolously at times, but 
for many, contracting debt is also a means of survival, especially when incomes do not match the 
cost of living and employment is increasingly precarious. Another economic crisis or set of 
crises are expected to develop not only from this surge in private debt, but from the escalation of 
public debt as well. In fact, the World Economic Forum reported in 2018 that “global debt has 
hit a new high of 225% of world GDP, exceeding the previous record of 213% in 2009.”35  
Meanwhile, many of the reforms that were planned following the crash either never 
materialized or have been repealed or weakened. One such reform is the Volcker Rule, intended 
to restrict speculative activity and to ban proprietary trading by commercial banks. By the time it 
finally went into effect in 2015, it had become severely weakened by the exceptions demanded 
by lobbyists. What remains of the Volcker Rule, and the larger set of reforms of the Dodd Frank 
                                                          
627-m/index-eng.html. As of March 2018, the average debt-to-income ratio in Canada was 
$1.71, nearly double the ratio thirty years ago. See Jennifer Wells, “Springtime is Here and Debt 
is Blooming,” thestar.com, March 13, 2018, 
https://www.thestar.com/business/opinion/2018/03/13/springtime-is-here-and-debt-is-
blooming.html. According to Statistics Canada this ratio (credit market debt for every dollar of 
household disposable income) increased in the third quarter of 2018 to $1.78. See “The Daily-
National Balance Sheet and Financial Flow Accounts Third Quarter” statscan.com, Friday, Dec. 
14, 2018, https://www150.statscan.gc.ca/n1/daily/quotidien/181214/dq181214-eng.html.   
 
35 Sir Howard Davies, “This is What You Need to Know About Global Debt” in Global 
Agenda, World Economic Forum, weforum.org, June 20, 2018, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/the-anatomy-of-global-debt. Also see  Bodo Ellmers, 
“Things to Watch in 2019: Debt and Emerging Debt Crisis” in CADTM, Committee for the 
Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, cadtm.org, January 18, 2019, www.cadtm.org/Things-to-watch-
in-2019-Debt-and-emerging-debt-crises; and Yanis Varoufakis, et al., “ten years after the crash: 
have the lessons of Lehman been learned?” theguardian.com, September 14, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/14/the-panel-lehman-brothers-ten-year-
anniversary-financial-crash.   
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Act, is vulnerable to further erosion under the Trump administration. 36 Meanwhile, in 2017, the 
European Commission abandoned attempts to enact their own version of the Volcker Rule, 
which would have forced the break-up of EU banks that were “too big to fail.” 37 
While the timidity of attempts to better regulate the global financial system surely has 
something to do with the political sway of financial industries, the collapse and its aftermath 
cannot solely be attributed to a small clique of evil bankers and investors. Some scholars, 
applying a Foucauldian analysis to the crisis, have argued that the behaviors leading to and 
following from the crisis stem also from the internal dynamic of neoliberalism: the logic of 
governance through risk.38 In the lead up to the financial crisis, the regulation and management 
of financial risks was largely outsourced to sophisticated computer-based risk models. 39  As a 
way of forecasting and thus guiding increasingly complex transactions, their accuracy became 
                                                          
36 Renae Merle, “Federal Reserve Votes Ease Rule Aimed at Preventing Big Banks from 
Making Risky Financial Bets,” thewashingtonpost.com, May 30, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/30/wall-street-is-about-to-snag-
one-of-its-biggest-victories-of-the-trump-era/?utm_term=.9593380d83e0.  
 
37 Huw Jones, "EU Scraps its Answer to U.S. Volcker Rule for Banks," reuters.com, 
October 24, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-banks-regulations/eu-scraps-its-answer-
to-u-s-volcker-rule-for-banks-idUSKBN1CT285?il=0  
38 See, for example, John G. Glenn, Foucault and Post-Financial Crises: 
Governmentality, Discipline and Resistance, (Cham: Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019); 
Martijn Konings “Governing the System: Risk, Finance, and Neoliberal Reason” in European 
Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 268; and John Morris, Securing Finance, 
Mobilizing Risk: Money Cultures at the Bank of England, (London: Routledge, 2018). 
39 While financial risk modelling predated the neoliberal era, the application of computers 
to these mathematical models allowed for extremely complex calculations of probabilities in 
relation to market, credit, and operational risks. Since the 1980s, the use of financial risk 
modelling has grown so common that it now plays a major role in pricing financial instruments 
and regulating investment activities. See Jon Danielsson, “The Emperor has no Clothes: Limits 
to Risk Modelling,” Institute of Economic Studies, Working Paper Series (June, 2000).  
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ever more difficult to evaluate, so that few actors in the financial system could detect the true 
instability of the system.40 Compounding this overreliance on models was the bias towards short 
term outcomes, a general failure to consider systemic risk, and a lack of personal responsibility 
or judgment among the actors involved.41 Since the crisis, financial risk management strategies 
have attempted to overcome the limits of risk modelling by focusing probability calculations on 
pre-emptive surveillance.42 However, the attempt to build a more resilient market by these means 
is, as Glenn points out, the “continuation of the distinctive rationality of neoliberal financial 
governmental techniques used prior to the crisis.”43 The employment of risk management 
strategies in the global financial system is an example of governmental rationality, or what Rose 
and Miller define as “ styles of thinking, ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it 
is amenable to calculation and programing. ”44 It is also part of the larger logic of calculative 
                                                          
40 Eric F. Gerding, “Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial 
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis,” Washington Law Review 84, no. 
127 (2009). 
41 In an article first published just 5 days before Lehman brothers collapsed, Dymsky 
discusses how risk management strategies are generating ever more undetected risks: “The 
industrial logic of competition in the financial industry – which makes this industry incapable of 
policing its own risk-taking – generates risk at high levels of volume that can easily swamp case-
by-case supervisory control protocols. So aside from their responsibilities for case-by-case 
accretions of risk, regulators must pay attention to, anticipate, and block behaviors and 
innovations whose systemic consequences for aggregate financial risk can jeopardize financial 
infrastructure.” See Gary A Dymski, “Financial Risk and Governance in the Neoliberal Era,” 
Managing Financial Risks: From Global to Local, ed. Gordon L. Clark, Adam D. Dixon, and 
Ashby HB Monk, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 48-68. Also see Tony Porter, "Risk 
Models and Transnational Governance in the Global Financial Crisis: The Cases of Basel II and 
Credit Rating Agencies," Global Finance in Crisis, (London: Routledge, 2010): 70-87. 
42 Glenn, “Foucault and Post-Financial Crises”, 122 
 
43 Ibid, 141 
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rationality within modernity itself: the attempt to capture and contain uncertainty via 
objectification, quantification, and categorization, while simultaneously reaping the rewards that 
come with risk. According to Konings, “rather than transcending risk calculus, the [post crisis 
financial] reforms have consolidated our reliance on it.”45 That is, the techniques used to 
calculate and mobilize risk generated unforeseen systemic risk, and yet, the response has been to 
refine those same techniques, rather than to question the nature of those techniques themselves. 
Finally, I want to consider what “too big to fail” really means for our relationship to the 
systems we inhabit in modernity. Naturally, the citizens of many nations were appalled and 
embittered by the bailouts given to the banks and other financial institutions after the collapse of 
the global financial system in 2008. At the same time, the possible alternative seemed too 
frightening to consider: if such financial institutions were allowed to collapse the domino effect 
on the global economy as a whole might have been even more devastating, destroying the very 
trust and credit by which it remains buoyant and upon which (for better or worse) societies are 
organized. That the post-crisis regime of austerity for citizens and bailouts for the banks was 
tolerated at all suggests that it was preferable to the chaos that might follow from the self-
destruction of capitalism. 46 But what does it mean that the greatest rationale for sustaining a 
                                                          
44 Peter Miller, and Nikolas Rose. Governing the Present: Administering Economic, 
Social and Personal Life, (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 16. 
45 Konings “Governing the System,” 273. 
 
46 That Capitalism’s self-destruction really appeared imminent is attested to by David 
Harvey: “When the banks stopped lending and credit froze in the wake of the Lehman collapse 
on Sept 15th 2008, the survival of capitalism was threatened and political power went to 
extraordinary lengths to loosen the constrictions. It was a matter of life or death for capital as 
everyone in power recognized.” See David Harvey, "The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis this 
Time," American Sociological Association Meetings, 16 (August, 2010). 
 
533 
  
 
failing system is fear of the (unknown) alternative?  Rather than serving the interests of society, 
such a system is converted- through our collective suspension of disbelief- into a totalizing, all 
powerful force that commands our allegiance no matter what ill-treatment we receive. Thatcher’s 
TINA – there is no alternative- lives on. Of course, we cannot know what would have happened 
if the big banks had been allowed to fail. It may not have led to chaos. But by feeding that 
dragon we have definitely reinforced its power over us. As some commentators noted at the time 
of the bailouts, the problem wasn’t simply that some financial institutions were “too big to fail”, 
but that they were “too interconnected” or “too complex” to be allowed to fail.47 The financial 
crisis revealed the degree to which the financial system, the economy and society are integrated 
globally, and the inescapable complexity of the systems we rely upon in modernity. 
Climate Change 
Our adherence to the momentum of modernity and to the logic of limitless growth has not 
wavered even in the face of a definitive limit: the looming threat to our species’ survival 
presented by climate change. Each year, scientific and popular consensus that we are witnessing 
the effects of anthropogenic climate change seems to grow. Yet technocratic and market-based 
solutions continue to dominate the attention and activities of the national and global 
organizations charged with steering us towards “carbon neutrality.” This approach may be 
politically feasible, but the focus on technological fixes, from hybrid cars to geo-engineering, 
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tends to distract from more systematic responses, further deferring the moment of change.48 The 
same is true for the carbon market, in which emissions are measured, commodified, traded and 
speculated upon. 
According to Pierse and Böhm, the overwhelming political support for carbon trading as 
the key response to global warming, originating with neoliberal economic theory in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and the formation of green-corporate partnerships in the 1990s, can only serve to 
exacerbate existing problems.49 In more than two decades of carbon trading, the emissions 
reductions have been negligible, and the problems have been many: the carbon market allows 
governments and industries to avoid focusing on decarbonisation, provides fossil fuel industries 
with loopholes and massive subsidies and aggravates the environmental injustice suffered by 
more vulnerable populations. 50 The carbon market has also been plagued with corruption and 
the shell-games of financial speculation. 51 Continued reliance on Carbon trading as a solution to 
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climate change betrays the persistence of a “utopian faith in pricing”: the idea that nature can be 
measured and made into marketable units, that the laws of the market can wisely govern and join 
together economic growth and emissions reductions.52 But carbon markets reveal our addiction 
not only to the disembedding logic of markets, but also to the universal application of scientific 
knowledge and technocratic governance. Together, economics, scientism and technocracy have 
“re-geared questions of sustainability away from being moral and environmental issues to being 
technical problems resolvable through economic calculation.” 53 
Likening our climate-impacting behaviours to addiction is not unusual, but, as with the 
current biomedical approach to substance addiction, the diagnosis tends to fixate on the 
substance and not the underlying cause or context of the addiction.54 For some time now we have 
heard it said that “we are addicted to oil” or fossil fuels. In fact, in a 2008 United Nations 
Environment Programme publication entitled “Kick the Habit: A UN Guide to Climate 
Neutrality, the preface begins: “Addiction is a terrible thing. It consumes and controls us, makes 
us deny important truths and blinds us to the consequences of our actions. Our society is in the 
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http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/lives-are-at-stake-unless-we-break-our-
addiction-to-fossil-fuels/article/539092 and Wal van Lierop, “A Methadone Plan for the World’s 
Hydrocarbon Addiction,” forbes.com, November 26, 2018,  
http:www.forbes.com/sites/walvanlierop/  
536 
  
 
grip of a dangerous greenhouse gas habit.”55 While the guide is a thoughtful and succinct account 
of the problem and suggests a range of actions that can be taken by  industries, governments and 
individuals, the shadow of environmental economics looms throughout, perhaps because, unless 
a case can be made that acting to mitigate climate change can contribute to economic growth, the 
most powerful interests won’t listen. Thus, the real source of the “addiction” is not fossil fuels or 
carbohydrons, but rather, the economic system and governance structures which promise us 
endless growth by converting every problem into a series of technically manageable units. Using 
commodification and technocracy to deal with climate change is an irrational repetition of the 
logics and behaviours that caused the problem.56  Or, as 15 year old climate activist Greta 
Thunberg put it at the December 2018 UN Climate Change COP24 conference:  
You only speak of green eternal economic growth because you are too scared of being 
unpopular. You only talk about moving forward with the same bad ideas that got us into 
this mess, even when the only sensible thing to do is pull the emergency brake. You are 
not mature enough to tell it like is. …Until you start focusing on what needs to be done 
rather than what is politically possible, there is no hope… We need to keep the fossil 
fuels in the ground, and we need to focus on equity. And if solutions within the system 
are so impossible to find, maybe we should change the system itself.57 
The Global Refugee Crisis 
The larger lessons not learned from the global financial crisis and our continued prioritization of 
endless economic growth over environmental sustainability are just two –admittedly huge- 
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examples of our how we succumb to dictates of the systems we have created in modernity. It is 
not only to the dynamic of capitalism that we seem to surrender our will, but also to the 
classificatory logic that has shaped modern politics.  Despite the international media attention 
given to the global refugee crisis in recent years, it is seldom acknowledged that refugee flows 
are not extraordinary occurrences signalling acute, emergency conditions, but rather, the 
systematic product and permanent feature of the Westphalian, territorial nation state system. As 
Peter Nyers and Rob Walker point out, the political order of sovereign states is founded upon, 
“the distinction between an inside and an outside, between the citizens, nations and communities 
within and the enemies, others and absences without.” 58 Just as the enclosure of private property 
by hedges and legislation created an excess population of propertyless people with no access to 
security, the refugee is produced by the continued fiction of the territorially bounded state. And 
just as the propertyless represented a threat to the integrity of the market system, the large flows 
of refugees we have witnessed in recent years are perceived as a threat to the integrity of the 
nation state system, even as goods, services, capital and information have been flowing freely 
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across borders. In Bauman’s terms, the ordering imperative within modernity seeks to extinguish 
all ambivalence, but in doing so, only creates more ambivalence.   
I am not suggesting that the solution to the production of refugees is to open all borders, 
or that the solution to climate change is to end all industry, trade and economic activity or that 
we must prevent financial crises by banning financial instruments and activity. It is unlikely that 
such complex problems can be so easily unraveled, without unforeseen new problems arising. 
Rather, I am suggesting that we at least reflect on the nature of our attachment to the dream of 
endless growth and the logic of enclosures. As Peter Nyers puts it with regard to the state, we 
need to question “sovereignty’s dominant hold over the political imagination” because, “while its 
account may be the prevailing one, it is in no way natural, normal, inevitable, or uncontested…. 
The state is neither given nor fixed” but rather, “a historical construct, created and sustained 
through continuous political activity.”59 Similarly, Warren Magnusson explains that “Like 
capitalism, the State just seems like a part of normal life, and people enact its routines— and 
hence re-create the State—day by day.”60  Only when we remember that the modern systems that 
have us in their thrall are our own creations - socially constructed and historically contingent 
creations- can we begin to see that they hold no necessary power over us. That is why, to 
compare our repetition of the logics of modernity to a compulsion is not an expression of defeat, 
but a call to recognize the hold they have over us and to recover our freedom. 
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Kicking the Habit? Practicing New Ways of Seeing and Being 
To say that modernity is compulsive is not to suggest that we are and always will be completely 
in its thrall. Habits are only insuperable fixed destinies when we believe them to be so. To 
imagine some other destiny requires first that we remove our blinders, and attend to the 
contingent within the compulsive. In fact, the postmodern celebration of contingency is only the 
latest in a long tradition of critique that seeks out openings in the edifice of modernity and asserts 
other ways of being in the world. There have been two main camps within this tradition- 
although the distinction is often overdrawn. These are, to use Boltanski and Ciapello’s terms, the 
social critique and the artistic critique.61 The social critique involves the efforts of the working 
classes, other dispossessed groups and their allies to push back against the social, economic and 
political oppressions and dislocations of modernity, and capitalism in particular. In this camp we 
can include hedge-breakers and levellers, revolutionaries, suffragettes, striking workers, civil 
rights activists and the Occupy Wall Street movement. The aim of the social critique, broadly, 
has been to repair fragmented social relations, and to assert the agency and integrity of the 
worker, and other groups oppressed by the systems of modernity. Meanwhile, in the artistic 
critique, artists and philosophers have sought or counselled liberation from the alienating effects 
of modernity through the expression of our non-rational faculties, primarily by attending to the 
creativity, sensuousness, and playful spontaneity of the aesthetic realm. This aesthetic critique of 
modernity is closely related to the Romantic Movement, with its emphasis on bridging the 
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modern divide between nature and culture, and to the idea of enchantment, either as an inherent 
feature of or a countermovement to rationalist modernity.62  
Where each of these broad categories of critique come together is in their pursuit of a 
fuller and freer humanity than is realized under the conditions of modernity and capitalism. 
Because I cannot, here, do justice to each of these critiques and their great variety of expressions, 
I will limit myself to a brief discussion of the recurring themes in the aesthetic critique, for these 
seem to open up the possibility of thinking about the world in a different way. If we are to 
challenge the compulsive nature of modernity’s dynamic, the first muscle of autonomy we must 
flex is the imagination, for it is our collective belief in the compulsion of modernity and its 
systems that keeps it moving forward ever faster. There are a few contemporary practices that 
bring together the artistic and social critique, and provide inspiring examples of how we can 
delegitimize some of the habits of modernity and practice other ways of being in the world.   
What can liberate people who suffer from addiction or who find themselves in the grip of 
compulsion? There are a host of suggested common-sense practices that recur throughout 
recovery literature: making connections with others, recognizing your feelings, paying attention 
to how the mind and body are connected; bathing the senses in the world outside of your head; 
questioning the authority of voice inside your head that says you have no choice but to follow the 
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same path you have been. Creativity. Engagement. Play. Each of these suggested practices offers 
a way of healing the wounds of alienation, fragmentation and disenchantment which occur when 
we surrender our wills either to an external force, or to an inner compulsion. Interestingly, these 
strategies strongly resemble the core features of the aesthetic critique of modernity.  
The Aesthetic Critique of Modernity 
Scholars often point to Kant as the originator of the aesthetic critique, because it was his 
1790 Critique of Judgement which first proposed the Aesthetic realm as the site where practical 
and theoretical reason, sensuousness and morality, nature and freedom could be united.63  But it 
was Schiller’s 1795 Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, that should be considered, as 
Habermas puts it, “the first programmatic aesthetic critique of modernity,”64 because, while his 
concept of the aesthetic was greatly influenced by Kant’s, it was conceived in direct response to 
the alienating condition of modernity. In a passage anticipating Marx, Weber, and Nietzsche, he 
lamented the rending of human nature into two opposing forces: 
It was culture itself that gave these wounds to modern humanity. The inner union of 
human nature was broken, and a destructive contest divided its harmonious forces 
directly. Intuitive and speculative understanding took up a hostile attitude in opposite 
fields… State and Church, law and customs, were now torn asunder; enjoyment was 
separated from labour, means from ends, effort from reward.65   
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For Schiller, this lost harmony could only be recovered by reconciling the modern 
opposition between the sense drive and the form drive through the human impulse to play. The 
form drive represents our capacity for reason; its object is the development of universal, eternal, 
law-like structures. The sense drive represents our physical existence: its object is the 
preservation of life. In modernity, the form drive is dominant, but neither it nor the sense drive 
should be allowed to dominate, for alone, each leaves the human incomplete. The play drive 
arises spontaneously in the imagination, through the contemplation of the beautiful in art. 
Because it engages us simultaneously in the particular and the universal, in the spiritual and 
material, and in becoming and absolute being, it frees us from the compulsions and limitations 
that come with the imbalance of the formal and sensual drives.66 This is why Schiller claimed 
that “man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only 
fully a human being when he plays” 67 
While Schiller’s aesthetic theory has been criticised, particularly by Marxists, as an 
apolitical solution to the social conditions of modernity, it has also influenced a great many 
philosophers and artists, including some associated with the Frankfurt School, such as Marcuse 
and Benjamin. The liberatory potential of both art and play was also a consistent feature in the 
work of Nietzsche, who counselled that we become “the poets of our own lives.”68 For 
                                                          
 
66 William F. Wertz, Jr, “A Reader’s Guide to Letters on the Aesthetical,” Fidelio, 14, 
no.1-2 (2005): 80-104; 84, 89, http://schillerinstitute.org/fidelio_archive/2005/fidv14n01-02-
2005SpSu/index.html. 
67 Schiller, Quoted in Moland, "Friedrich Schiller." 
68 In fact, there are echoes of Schiller’s opposition between the form and sense drives in 
Nietzsche’s discussions of the Apollonian and Dionysian forces. According to Nietzsche, each of 
these, “nature’s art impulses,” if not mediated by the artist, would wipe the other out. See 
543 
  
 
Nietzsche, artistic creation was not only a great consolation for the sufferings in one’s life, but its 
strategies of illusion, distance, framing and playful experimentation could also be used to create 
a self and a life that one could affirm.69 Of the three metamorphoses evoked in Thus Spake, 
Zarathustra, the camel, the lion, and the child, it is only, and ultimately, the child who can 
positively create and affirm his own life: “The child is innocence and forgetting, a new 
beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of 
creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills its own will, and he who had 
been lost to the world now conquers his own world."70  
 In many expressions of the aesthetic critique, play is conceived of as activity freed from 
the path of instrumentality: it is “off-road”, off the assembly line of useful production. If “work” 
is human activity colonized by systems of the state, capital, and the scientific knowledge 
production, then the art of play refuses this work. Against a disciplinary subjection to these 
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systems, art as play fashions new forms of subjectivity.71 The art of play can jolt and jar us 
awake from our inert and passive habits of living, our slogging progress along Instrumental 
Avenue, and this is what a number of twentieth century art movements attempted to do. During 
the First World War, the Dadaists ripped up the borders between means and ends, between art 
and everyday life. The original punk rockers, they tore from art all trappings of respectability, 
spat upon the authority of its knowledge and traditions, and had mad anarchist fun smashing the 
bourgeois values it reproduced.  It was a negation of art as ideology, of the progress, rationality 
and absurdity of modernity as exampled in the war. But it was also, in its own way, a form of 
political engagement, drawing on the social movements of the previous century, reframing and 
experimenting with ‘repertoires of collective action’.72  
In the twenties, a number of Dadaists founded the Surrealist movement, which drew on 
Freudian and psychoanalytical insights to tap into the emancipatory potential of the unconscious. 
They invented a host of techniques for following the spontaneous designs of chance. In every 
possible medium- theatre, music, poetry, film, painting, pamphlets, maps, parades- the surrealists 
re-imagined the products of art as dreamlike fragments that could awaken the audience to the 
absurdity of the everyday artefacts and practices of modern life. Later, in the 1960s, a group of 
intellectuals and artists formed the Situationist International, which sought, like Dada and 
Surrealism, to awaken people to the lived experience of the everyday. To counter the passive 
spectator role imposed on subjects in the modern, capitalist city, what Guy Debord called The 
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Society of the Spectacle, they constructed ‘situations’ , ‘psychogeographies’ and ‘dérives’: ways 
of drifting through and subverting urban space. Far from occupying an aesthetic space of 
critique, separate from the collective action and political protests of the “social critique”, the 
Situationists’ played a crucial role in the May 1968 protests in France.73  
Obviously, neither the Dadaists, The Surrealists, the Situationists nor other avant-garde 
art movements of the twentieth century “succeeded” in dismantling capitalism, halting 
modernity’s march of progress, or eradicating alienation. Critics of such radical avant-garde art 
movements have pointed to the ease with which their creations were simply incorporated by the 
forces of the market, or have dismissed them as mere diversions from the systems that 
overwhelm us in modernity.74 However, not only have their accumulated repertoires continued to 
inspire new ways of re-imagining and re-fashioning our way of being in the world, but the effort 
to awaken ourselves from compulsive modernity should be understood as an ongoing project, not 
a task to be performed once, checked off a list, and forgotten. New ways of engaging in the 
world we are given, that challenge the force and legitimacy of the juggernaut of modernity, are 
being born every moment. 
Contemporary Practices of Social and Aesthetic Critique 
A more recent practice that literally embodies liberatory potential within the structures of 
modernity is the art of parkour. Parkour originated in the 1980s with the training methods of a 
small group of young men, led by David Belle and Sébastien Foucan in a suburb of Paris. This 
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training involved maneuvering the body in multiple ways (running, jumping, climbing, vaulting 
etc.) to negotiate the most direct course of movement through the obstacles of the urban 
landscape. Parkour comes from the word parcours, meaning a course or a route, and those 
practicing it call themselves traceurs, from the word for bullet, meaning that they aim to move 
like a bullet through obstacles.75 While the original traceurs did not conceive of parkour as 
political, their practice and its associated philosophy has been viewed by many as a profound 
expression of emancipatory politics. 76 
In parkour, Belle once explained, “You always have to get through the first obstacle that 
says, ‘I can’t do it,’ whether in your mind or for real, and be able to adapt to anything that’s put 
in your path. It’s a method for learning how to move in the world. For finding the liberty men 
used to have.”77 (Wilkinson). Parkour’s practitioners see it as more of an art, a way of thinking 
and being, than as a sport.  It is not about performing acrobatic feats to compete with or impress 
others but rather, the practice of continually encountering and moving through fear and other 
limitations. By physically negotiating the obstacles of the built environment, traceurs both call 
                                                          
 
75 Matthew Lamb, "Negating the Negation: The Practice of Parkour in Spectacular City," 
Kaleidoscope 9, no. 6 (2010), 93-94. 
76 See, for example, Sophie Fuggle, "Discourses of Subversion: The Ethics and 
Aesthetics of Capoeira and Parkour," in Dance Research 26, no. 2 (2008): 204-205; Michael 
Atkinson, “Parkour, Anarcho-environmentalism, and Poiesis,” in Journal of Sport and Social 
Issues 33, no. 2 (2009): 169–194; Nathaniel Bavinton, “From Obstacle to Opportunity: Parkour, 
Leisure, and the Reinterpretation of Constraints,” in Annals of Leisure Research 10 no. 3-4, 
(2007): 391–412; and M. Daskalaki, A. Stara, and M. Imas, “The Parkour Organisation: 
Inhabitation of Corporate Spaces,” in Culture and Organization 14 no. 1 (2008): 49-53. 
77 Quoted in Alec Wilkinson, “No Obstacles: Navigating the World by Leaps and 
Bounds” in newyorker.com, April 9, 2007, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/16/no-obstacles.  
547 
  
 
attention to and improvise a path through the obstructive presence of corporate, bureaucratic and 
governmental structures in the human environment. Like the dériveur (“drifter”) of the 
Situationists, traceurs subvert the oppressive and repressive spaces of the modern city, seeing it 
differently and engaging in it freely. Whereas the aim of the dériveur is to counter the calculative 
rationality of the city by wandering aimlessly and invoking new meanings in the found 
environment, traceurs, in seeking to move ever forward by the most efficient passage through 
space, appear to perform the calculative rationality of modern space. Debord had argued that 
modern society, especially the city, is turned by Capital into mere “spectacle” as abstract 
representations increasingly mediate social relations. Parkour, according to Lamb, speaks back to 
the spectacle in the language of the spectacle. At the same time, because its spectacle is 
embodied, it “functions to reinscribe the “pre-eminence once occupied by touch” by falsifying 
the false reality of the spectacle, through spectacle, at once bringing to the fore and negating its 
unconscious domination.”78  
In Parkour, the recurring themes of aesthetic response to modernity are revived: the 
improvisation of play, the assertion of the body and the senses, engagement in the world and 
with others. The traceurs engage in dialogue in a space that demands a mute consumption of the 
spectacle. They draw on intuition and somatic knowledge to move and touch their way through a 
“world that can no longer be grasped.” 79 They are not solving problems; they are practicing 
                                                          
 
78 Lamb, “Negating the Negation,” 92. 
 
79  Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle” in Guy Debord and the Situationist 
International: Texts and Documents, ed. Tom McDonough (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2002). 
For the embodied practice of Parkour, see Jimena Ortuzar, "Parkour or L'art du Déplacement: A 
Kinetic Urban Utopia," The Drama Review 53, no. 3 (2009): 54-58; K.A. O'Grady, “Tracing the 
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freedom. For some, this practice provides a crucial respite from the experience of powerlessness 
particular to sites of protracted conflict. Like many young people around the world a group of 
boys living in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in Gaza were inspired by video footage of parkour 
shared on the internet. Ahmad Matar and a few of his friends went on to form Gaza Parkour, a 
team of twelve, who now travel worldwide to perform. He explained in an interview that parkour 
“was the only thing I could do, and the only thing that helped me to keep hope that the future is 
coming…for us in Gaza, we practiced parkour to feel our freedom.” 80  
Another loose, “grassroots” social movement that subverts the infrastructure of 
modernity, is “guerrilla gardening.”  In recent decades, this movement has arisen spontaneously 
in different places, with individuals and small groups planting gardens in neglected public and 
private properties without permission. Some years ago, before I had ever learned that this sort of 
activity had been given a name, a friend of mine told me about one individual’s illicit gardening 
efforts in a large public park in Toronto. Situated in a low-income neighbourhood in North York, 
this park was avoided by residents, and underserviced by the parks department. On her own 
walks through the park, however, my friend had noticed an elderly man who, year by year, had 
transformed a hillside into a terraced flower garden. We had been talking about how to find 
spaces in the modern world that were unofficial, un-designed by formal processes, and I was 
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Performer Training 3, no.2 (2012): 145-149. 
80 Sarah Illingworth, “Q&A/ Ahmad Matar: Learning Parkour in Gaza Made Me Feel 
Free,” impolitikal.com, January 31, 2017, https://impolitikal.com/2017/01/31/qa-ahmad-matar-
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struck by this image of an old man raising and tending new life, bringing beauty to a public 
space in quiet defiance of officialdom.  
While many “guerrilla gardeners,” do not necessarily identify themselves with that label, 
or consider themselves as part of a movement with one shared set of motivations, they are alike 
in their embodied refusal of prevailing property conventions.  Like the traceurs, guerilla 
gardeners disregard the authority inhering in the obstacles and boundaries of the built space of 
modernity in order to affirm some other way of inhabiting their environment. Some, like the man 
in my friend’s story, simply want to cultivate flowers either to express beauty for the love of 
gardening itself. Others cultivate food crops in order to draw attention to and redress food 
injustice. Ron Finley, for example, drew the ire of LA city officials in 2011, when he cultivated a 
vast range of vegetables on the strip of land between the sidewalk and the street in front of his 
house in South Central Los Angeles. New to gardening, and long frustrated with the dearth of 
places to purchase fresh produce in his low-income, largely African-American neighbourhood, 
Finley saw that strip of litter-strewn dirt as the obvious place to grow food. Soon, neighbours 
began to stop and talk to him about the garden, and those in need were invited to share in the 
tomatoes, peppers, melons, squash, pumpkins, onions, broccoli, eggplant, kale and herbs that he 
had grown. Then, city officials then came along to demand that he remove the “obstructions” 
from the city property. He was cited a number of times and when he refused to pay the fines a 
warrant for his arrest was issued.81 Fortunately, he had the community, other “green activists,” 
and the media behind him. People recognized the absurdity of forbidding food cultivation on 
                                                          
81 Steve Lopez, “In the Weeds of Bureaucratic Insanity There Sprouts a Small Reprieve,” 
latimes.com, August 20, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/20/local/la-me-0821-lopez-
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land that was not used for any other purpose- even while residents were permitted to waste the 
city’s limited water supply by watering turf on these strips. Not only did the arrest not take place, 
but, in 2013, the LA city council voted to change the law, so that now people are allowed to 
grow food on the “parkway” strips in front of their homes.82 
Few activities can be as life affirming as growing food for yourself and your neighbours, 
or converting the deindustrialized, abandoned spaces of a city into something beautiful. Few 
activities are at once, as aesthetically expressive, sensually engaging and embedded in nature and 
community as public gardening. This is the kind of labour that is infused with, rather than 
juxtaposed with play. Moreover, as Nick Blomley has argued, “Gardening presents a useful and 
accessible category for exploring the ways people think about and act in relation to property, in 
part because of its practical, embodied and geographical qualities.”83 Not only in guerrilla 
gardening, but also in other kinds of public gardening projects people tend to create “overlapping 
and multiple claims” to property which challenge the hegemonic conception of it as a commodity 
exclusively owned by sovereign individuals. To disregard or blur the existing boundaries of 
property opens up the possibility of boundaries that are ‘uncertain, intersubjective, and layered.”  
                                                          
82 Rose Heydon-Smith, “They Tried to Arrest me for Planting Carrots” in 
ucfoodobserver.com, February 26, 2015, http://ucfoodobserver.com/2015/02/26/they-tried-to-
arrest-me-for-planting-carrots/; Amy Scattergood, “In the Dirt with Ron Finlay “the Gangsta 
Gardener”” latimes.com, May 19, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/food/dailydish/la-fo-ron-
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83 Nick Blomley, “Un-Real Estate Proprietary Space and Public Gardening,” in 
Neoliberal Environments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences, ed. by Nik Heynen, 
James McCarthy, Scott Prudham, and Paul Robbins (Routledge: London & New York, 2007): 
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It is a kind of commoning practice, a way of unsettling core categories of modernity such as 
property, by questioning the authority we have vested in those categories. 84   
Most scholars view Parkour and guerrilla gardening as forms of protest: as graffiti art, 
squatting and a host of other practices of resistance, they are ways of marking or occupying the 
otherwise disempowering spaces of modernity and capitalism, particularly in urban centres.85  
Like those other practices, they as also subject to various critiques. Guerrilla gardening, for 
instance, has been criticized for eliding the democratic processes by which decisions about the 
use of public space should be made. And against all such practices- non-violent, mildly 
subversive, highly symbolic, and loosely organized if at all, it can be argued that real change 
must happen from within the formal structures and processes of the power that they wish to 
challenge. This formal approach to social change has its merits; many important rights have been 
realized in this way. But when what is being challenged is so large, complex, many headed, and 
irrational a force as the habit of modernity itself, forms of resistance that are oblique, informal, 
divergent and creative are, I would argue, especially capable of igniting change where it is most 
needed: in the imagination.  
There is another criticism that has been levelled at the practices associated with the 
“artistic” critique: they have historically been prone to co-option by the processes and systems 
that they seek to challenge. This is undeniable: just has graffiti was co-opted by the academy, the 
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Baudry, “Reclaiming Urban Space as Resistance: the Infrapolitics of Gardening,” in Revue 
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art market, and advertisers, so has parkour migrated to YMCAs, action movies and 
advertisements. Like graffiti, capoeira, rap and jazz, like yoga and wilderness camping, the 
market especially, seizes hold of every expression of adventure, beauty, authenticity, and 
subversion, turns every critique against it into more spectacle. But this is no reason for people to 
stop inventing new and joyful, weird and wakeful ways of being in the world. I doubt that such 
inventiveness can be quelled anyway. Rather, we should see in such creative practices, the 
diversity and abundance, the enduring will that humans have to affirm our lives outside of the 
dominant logics of modernity. If we are to overcome the illusion that those logics are 
inescapable, we need to continue carving out spaces for thinking and acting differently, and to 
recognize the ways in which we are already free.  
What I think holds us back from recognizing our freedom is our continued discomfort 
with the uncertainty that accompanies it- for we are freest but most exposed to uncertainty 
whenever we step away from the legitimacy of modern shelters. That is, private property, the 
nation state, scientific and academic knowledge, law and the media, continue to provide us with 
guides for proper behaviour in a time when most other forms of guidance have fallen away. 
Thus, when a solution to an intractable modern problem appears, but does not fall under these 
shelters of legitimacy, we try to make it fit, to have it legitimized, by naming it, measuring and 
mapping it, categorizing and calculating its probable future. In doing so, we undermine its 
potential as an alternative way of doing things, unmediated by modern logics. What is needed, 
ironically, is to embrace the revolutionary impulse that founded modernity: to dethrone the 
legitimacy of these modern shelters. 
In the modern dynamic the act of dethroning has always been followed by a sense of 
groundlessness and doubt, and then by an anxiety to impose order upon ambivalence, by creating 
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new forms of certainty and legitimacy. Instead of this, we might need to find some way of 
accepting groundlessness and uncertainty. We might need to stem our impulse to name, record, 
assign, and enclose whatever forms of wilderness we come upon.  We might live differently if 
we recognized and cherished all the unassigned spaces and unnamed experiences of the world, 
the concrete and particular, the unofficial and informal exchanges by which we already live.   
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